http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/burning-of-pak-boat-all-at-sea/45792.html
Admiral Sushil Kumar (retd)
It was a straightforward maritime operation
The handout photograph released by the Ministry of Defence is said to show a burning vessel off the coast of Gujarat in the Arabian Sea on January 1, 2015.
Seen professionally, the recent interception of an intruding Pakistani boat by the Indian Coast Guard was by all accounts a well-coordinated maritime operation. Since national security interests were at stake, a covert operation of this nature, based on actionable intelligence, had necessarily to be executed on a need-to-know basis. But unfortunately, this straightforward maritime operation by Indian security forces has been given weird interpretations and dragged into a political quagmire. As if that was not bad enough, we now have self-styled experts and loose cannons joining the fray and fanning the controversy.
It is well known that a terrorist, who is psyched up for a mission, is more than likely to commit hara-kiri if caught red-handed. And more so is this true when desperadoes are nabbed at sea with hardly an escape option. Our Navy and Coast Guard have ample experience of this modus operandi. What happened during Operation Cactus in 1988 and Operation Alondra Rainbow in 2000 are classic examples of this.
So is it any wonder why the intruding Pakistani boat went down in a fiery blaze if it was merely on an “innocent passage” with nothing to hide? Moreover, is it not presumptuous of armchair analysts perched ashore to question the tactical judgement of the commander at sea on how to approach a suspicious vessel with obviously dishonourable intentions?
Finally, while political discourse and debate are required in a democratic system, is it really fair to cast aspersions on the purpose of a covert operation when the agencies concerned are bound by a code of secrecy? Not only could this dent the morale of our security forces but also offer a lifeline to inimical forces across the border.
This is best conveyed in the oath for the Indian armed forces: “The safety and honour of our country come first — always and every time”.
Yet another case in recent times was the interception of Italian vessel Enrica Lexie, which entered the Indian maritime waters and shot and killed innocent Indian fisherman off the coast of Kerala. In a swiftly conducted joint operation the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard tracked down and intercepted the trigger-happy Italian ship on the high seas. While the action of the Indian maritime forces was in accordance with the international maritime law; subsequent events have shown how political intrigue and crafty sea lawyers can muddy the waters. The Enrica Lexie case thus remains unresolved and has acquired bitter international overtones.
So what is it about seaborne operations conducted in recent times by our security forces that tend to generate domestic and international controversies? If we disregard the political bickering that seems ingrained in our system, there can be only one reason for maritime controversies: It is the lack of understanding of the maritime dimension. And because of this it is perhaps not realized that there is a fundamental difference in the way maritime forces are required to operate in comparison to land forces.
Unlike the situation on land where our security forces operate within the confines of our landward borders, maritime forces always operate in an international arena where the oceans are deemed to be open highways. Whereas land forces are subject to the municipal laws of the nation state, the responses of maritime forces are conditioned by the international maritime law as prescribed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea — UNCLOS .
The task of maritime forces is therefore compounded since the oceans are not only deemed to be open highways but the UNCLOS provides for the ‘Right of Innocent Passage’ for any vessel to navigate and transit through any waterway. Accordingly, vessels of any nationality have the right to transit anywhere, including the territorial waters of a coastal state .
Intercepting a suspicious vessel amongst thousands that criss-cross the international oceans has always been a mind-boggling task at sea and is the reason why maritime operations have their own operational imperatives, quite different from land based operations.
Given the vastness of the oceanic arena, the complex task of operating within the international framework of the UNCLOS imposes an immense responsibility on the commander at the scene of action at sea. It is for this reason that he is allowed complete discretion to manoeuvre and determine the tactical situation and how he could best achieve his mission. This has always been the Standard Operating Procedure for maritime operations and was well illustrated during Operation Cactus in 1988 where the Indian armed forces intervened in the Maldives on the personal request of President Gayoom to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Having thwarted the attempted coup at Male, the scene of action shifted to the high seas where the rebel ship “Progress Light” was racing towards Sri Lanka. The immediate task for the Indian Navy was to intercept the fleeing rebel ship. But the real problem was how to rescue the Maldivian hostages held captive on board — some of them being Cabinet ministers. The Commanding Officer of the guided missile frigate INS Godavari was designated the Indian Navy’s Task Force Commander and the mission for Captain Gopalachari was unambiguous: “Rescue the hostages; capture the rebels”.
It was a tense moment at the Indian Navy war room and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was seen anxiously conferring with the Navy Chief, Admiral Nadkarni. Anything could happen. Captain Gopalachari rose to the occasion and accomplished the mission with professional brilliance. Within an hour came the signal from INS Godavari: “All hostages rescued and rebels captured” .
This is what operations at sea are all about and the lesson that comes forth from the Pakistani boat controversy is obvious: Let the security forces do their job; meddling with them can be counter-productive to the nation’s interest.
The writer was the Director of Naval Operations during Operation Cactus and later the Chief of the Indian Navy
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