FEBRUARY 17, 2015
“To say that counterinsurgency didn’t work is not a fair assessment. If you look at a variety of places in Iraq and Afghanistan you can see that counterinsurgency tactics -- particularly the ones related to the use of military force, patrolling, advising, and small projects -- worked in pushing insurgents out of a specific area. From a tactical perspective, counterinsurgency worked.
“The argument that counterinsurgency didn’t work has more weight from a strategic perspective. The Afghan surge ended with the government in control of more territory than any time since 2005 and in possession of large and competent security forces. As a result, the government may yet succeed. Nevertheless, the Afghan surge did not end with Afghanistan stabilized or the government ready to stand on its own. On top of that, counterinsurgency was expensive and demanded thousands for troops, facts that will always darken its story in Afghanistan.”
U.S. Army
By Lt. Col. Jeremy Kotkin, U.S. Army
Best Defense debater in the Gourley challenge
"Why did we lose in Afghanistan?" In hindsight this seems like an easy enough charge to answer: FM 3-24 was a cherry-picked collection of flawed logic and history; the Pakistani government enabled the very enemy we were fighting against and we never seriously dealt with the safe haven across the Durand Line; the US DoD was ill-prepared to fill all the socio-political and economic requirements of nation-building; NATO never fully signed on to the fight; the civilian surge fizzled out after never really materializing; we overemphasized the “human terrain” in relation to warfighting, etc. These answers are all true, to some extent.
Many more excuses exist with varying levels of veracity or relevance. But the honest answer is simple enough. We didn’t understand ourselves. Many more excuses exist with varying levels of veracity or relevance. But the honest answer is simple enough. We didn’t understand ourselves.
While saying ‘we didn’t understand ourselves,’ the reader must also acknowledge that a lot of other misunderstandings spawn from that, each going off in different directions, chipping away at the effectiveness of ISAF’s chosen lines of operation, our larger strategy, or even our fundamental comprehension about war and policy. But it all starts with us; our image of ourselves, our role in the world, the yes-men and sycophants to power in our military who refuse to acknowledge critical thought, and how our liberal, 21st-century Western minds see the messy world of geopolitics. With these problem factors in tow there was no way we could “win” Afghanistan. No COIN strategy, no better synchronized civil-military operations, no “better war” to save us. From the moment our war changed in 2001/2002 from a punitive expedition to exact justice and topple a regime to a large-scale and long-term nation building effort while never really settling the valid causes of the insurgency, we were doomed to fail. No amount of warrior-scholars who bought into the "graduate level of warfare" drivel could have saved that.
We failed because we forgot the basics. Matching strategy to policy. Letting the DoD run with a course of action, if not directly at odds with, than at least over and above civilian intent. Mirror imaging and assuming the Afghans wanted solutions as we would want them. Not dealing with the causes of the insurgency and instead chasing its symptoms and its tail. Assuming our geopolitical hypocrisy while dealing with states generating the ideological cause of the insurgency, i.e. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, would not come back to bite us in the end. Forgetting the entire determination and definition of what are vital national interests. These are all issues at the highest levels of understanding war and politics that we wholesale forgot from 2002 to the present. To wit, even the incoming SECDEF says we can still win if we just stick it out a little longer.
America at one time understood effective policy. We understood war making to achieve clear and definable objectives. We used to understand international relations for vital interests. We understood strategy development, coalition warfare, labeling true friends and real enemies, and being true to our traditions. We also used to win wars.
LTC Jeremy Kotkin is an Army strategist who, as an Afghan hand, was deployed twice to Afghanistan at the strategic level, once embedded in the Afghan National Security Council and once negotiating non-military aspects of the ISAF OPLAN with the Afghan government and international community ahead of ISAF's end of mission. He currently serves on HQ Army Staff. This article contains his personal opinions, which are not necessarily those of the Army, the Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
This one stands out. And believe me, brother, I’ve attended tons of them. You can catch it live streamed on CNN.com. **Tuesday February 24, 2015** 8:00 – 8:30: Registration and Breakfast 8:30 – 8:50: Welcome and Opening Remarks Dr. Michael Crow – President, Arizona State University.
The other day, “Ekofisk,” who I think is new to the site (at least in commenting), wrote, “Why didn’t we pull out in 2002 or 2003, following the successful foray against the Taliban (again, OBL should have been killed at Tora Bora), and come back with JSOC interdiction again if the situation warranted?” This made ...
By George Minde Best Defense guest columnist Former Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf made some news Friday with his public admission that Pakistan has supported insurgent “proxies” in Afghanistan. He also claimed that India had been supporting proxies as well and called for both sides to stop. “In President Karzai’s times, yes, indeed, he was damaging ...
Best Defense office of autonomous weaponry
Lt. Gen. Edward Cardon, the new commander of the U.S. Army’s Cyber Command, said in a talk last week that two things he is focusing on are increasing transparency between the military and private companies and finding the right soldiers for his command.
The cyber general, speaking at Georgetown University, said that he himself is new to the cyber world and is learning something every day about the branch. With the increasing number and complexity of threats, coupled with the ease and ingenuity of today’s cyber aggressors, he said: “You can’t move fast enough.”
He argued that transparency between the U.S. military and private industry is better than keeping cyber vulnerabilities a secret. He argued that transparency between the U.S. military and private industry is better than keeping cyber vulnerabilities a secret. Openness in the private sector, he argued, will help promote better protection against threats by giving a more accurate picture of the types of attacks that are occurring. He added that this cooperation could also give the military a better idea of what it needs to protect against.
rder to fill the branch with “technical talent,” Gen. Cardon said he supports an aggressive recruiting program in the private sector. He said he believes that the allure of elite training, cutting-edge technology, and working in a branch that values cyber skills should help keep people in for a six-year commitment. He noted that it would be a great resume builder for when those soldiers are looking for jobs after leaving the Army. To curtail the tendency to shunt cyber warriors into more supportive roles in other units, Cardon said he must approve personnel movements in and out of the branch. In addition to private industry recruitment, thirty cadets from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and ROTC programs will be placed in the branch upon this spring’s commissioning.
U.S. Army
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