By Monish Gulati
JANUARY 19, 2015
A bit of encouraging news came in from Afghanistan after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani nominated ministers for his unity cabinet more than three months after he was sworn in.
Ghani’s chief of staff announced the 25 cabinet nominees during an event at the presidential palace in Kabul on Jan 12 attended by Ghani and government chief executive Abdullah Abdullah. The list will now go before the parliament for approval. During the last three months besides juggling various factional, ethnic and tribal interests Ghani has been attempting to establish a working government to tackle the country’s myriad problems. This article looks at some of the significant developments of the past few months which have influenced the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.
The Cabinet
Salahuddin Rabbani, the former head of the country’s high peace council, has been nominated as foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Karimi, the military chief of staff, earmarked for defence minister while former general Noor-ur-Haq Ulomi has been nominated as interior minister. The cabinet contains three women, for the portfolios of women’s affairs, culture and higher education. The composition of the cabinet appears to reflect the two rival camps and contains “prominent ethnic and regional power-brokers”. The cabinet has new faces some of whom are hardly known to the public.
Afghanistan watchers and international observers have hailed the nominations as an important step, viewing the cabinet as a significant step forward rather than who has been nominated to the cabinet and why.
The Taliban Twist
It has been reported that Ghani had offered the Taliban posts in the new Afghan government, which they rejected. Ghani is supposed to have offered the Taliban three cabinet positions, specifically for Mullah Zaeef, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Wakil Muttawakil, the former Taliban foreign minister, and Ghairat Baheer, a close relative of warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The posts earmarked for them included the Ministry of Rural Affairs, the borders, and the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs. Ghani also considered appointing Taliban governors to three southern provinces: Nimruz, Kandahar, and Helmand.
The Taliban leadership declined the offer citing security deals signed by the new government allowing some international troops to remain in Afghanistan post 2014 as the main stumbling block. The Taliban also want changes to the constitution and immunity from prosecution before they would enter negotiations on joining the government.
An evaluation of Ghani’s offer would indicate that it was in tune with ground realities. It sought to hand over to the Taliban the charge of issues they would have liked to steer at the national level and the control of provinces they are either fighting for or have de facto control over. It also came with the hope that the Taliban would relinquish their hold over the areas in the north and north east of the country.
Interestingly, Ghani nominated a close supporter from eastern Afghanistan, Qamaruddin Shinwari, to the ministry of border and tribal affairs, a crucial post that includes counter-narcotics measures. Shinwari had served as an official in the Taliban government before the US-led invasion in 2001.
Post-Peshawar
After the Dec 16, 2014 terrorist attack on the army-run school in Peshawar, the Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif the next day visited Kabul with classified intelligence details to establish that terrorists are using Afghan soil to carry out attacks in Pakistan. He had also briefed the Afghan leadership that the mastermind behind the Peshawar attack had been giving directives to the perpetrators of the attack from Afghanistan. General Sharif also met International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General Joseph Dunford.
General Sharif had sought Afghanistan’s help in eliminating the Pakistani Taliban, which was being targeted by the Pakistan army in its stronghold of North Waziristan. It fascinates analysts as to how General Sharif would have negotiated with Ghani after providing safe havens to the Afghan Taliban in its 13-year-old war against the US-backed government in Kabul. Besides the more obvious offer to cooperate in cross-border counter-terrorism operations, it is expected that Pakistan would have committed to use its influence to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiation table to end the conflict. This was likely to be in the form of outside the country talks or even better, a Taliban commitment to join the government in Kabul. This may have been another reason for delay in announcement of the unity cabinet.
Ghani had since taking over as president had called on China and Saudi Arabia to use their influence over Pakistan to improve relations. The US too had been using its leverage with the Pakistan army, including committing to not conduct operations against the Afghan Taliban on one hand and carrying out drone strikes against the Pakistani Taliban operating in Afghanistan. The post–Peshawar tension appeared to provide that tipping point where Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) would use all their influence to get the Taliban to start negotiating with the government in Kabul.
It was also felt that the growing distrust of Pakistan among the Afghan Taliban and Chinese efforts at brokering talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government might also contribute in softening the Taliban stand on negotiations. Yet it did not happen for possibly two reasons – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and India.
ISIS
The situation in Afghanistan is being further complicated by the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, which has reportedly started operating in southern Helmand. The group is led by a local commander and is operating in Zamin Dawar area of Sangin and also parts of Kajaki district. The bigger worry is the belief that ISIS militants are waiting to position themselves as the anti-peace talk group as soon as the mainstream Taliban factions commence peace talks with the government in Kabul. This could emerge as a new hurdle to Afghan reconciliation and peace.
India Factor
The latest narrative coming out of Pakistan is that India is using Afghan soil to carry out attacks on Pakistan. The aim is to limit any role India might want to play in Afghanistan and provide a counter argument to Pakistan-supported cross-border activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan is under severe pressure, as is evident by the recent statements by US Secretary of State John Kerry in Islamabad and UN Secretary General in Delhi, to not differentiate between its counter terrorism actions on its eastern and western borders. Pakistan will push for Afghan reconciliation only when it feels secure on all counts.
Ongoing Process
However the strategic jockeying is in play. On Jan 11, prior to the announcement of the Afghan cabinet, General Razwan Akhtar, Pakistan’s chief of the Inter Services Intelligence met Ghani in Kabul, in his third trip to Afghanistan in recent months. Afghanistan and Pakistan appear to be increasing coordination to jointly undertake military operations against the militants, despite the failure to break the Taliban impasse on talks. The Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah is expected to visit Islamabad in this regard. Pakistani media reported recently that the Pakistan government has deported hundreds of Afghan students who had come to Pakistan for religious studies.
The situation in AfPak continues to be complex and uncertain. It is imperative that Afghanistan achieves a degree of stability earliest for itself and the region.
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