29 Dec , 2014
The vice-like grip of Pakistan’s nuclear choreography is so mesmerising that India seems to be unable, or unwilling, break free of the spell it has cast, and so be able to evaluate hard facts and logical, eminently sensible, inferences in shooing the hobgoblin of strategic fears away. Maybe a time has come for India to shed her petrified inertia and end this exasperating farce. Hobgoblins, after all, are but big bubbles of void, and having no material or mass, are liable to be consigned to oblivion with just a slice of whip in the air.
Pakistan’s nuclearisation is one such hobgoblin which seems to hover over India’s lines of strategic thinking…
A Strategic Hobgoblin
Hobgoblins germinate in one’s mind and then fanning out to assume overbearing forms in the hapless owner’s pseudo-consciousness, loom threateningly to scare the wits out of him. That is a situation in which a captive’s mind is goaded into self-petrified paralysis. Pakistan’s nuclearisation is one such hobgoblin which seems to hover over India’s lines of strategic thinking. Thus, over the past decade we are struck with many cliché-riders that seem to have ensconced into our strategic perception and even if proved stale and irrelevant after many debates, continue to behold many of us to certain self-inflicted bindings.
The vice-like grip of Pakistan’s nuclear choreography is so mesmerising that India seems to be unable or unwilling, break free of the spell it has cast and so be able to evaluate hard facts and logical, eminently sensible, inferences in shooing the hobgoblin of strategic fears away. Maybe a time has come for India to shed her petrified inertia and end this exasperating farce. Hobgoblins, after all, are but big bubbles of void, and having no material or mass, are liable to be consigned to oblivion with just a slice of whip in the air.
Pakistan’s Compellence
Pakistan’s nuclearisation, as it is made out to be, is not just a simple matter of her survival against a neighbourhood enemy who is ostensibly out to gobble her up, as her rulers claim. It was and continues to be founded on certain self-realisations among Pakistan’s ruling class. These are: one, an innate impulse that would never let Pakistan reconcile with Kashmir or any part of it, being a part of India; two, the purported ordination that calls for them to ‘reclaim’ Muslim rule over the Indian sub-continent and three, a similarly ordained hostility towards the followers of Hindu faith – with which they are compelled to identify India just to keep their moribund ‘two nation’ theory alive. That these propagations are misplaced and nothing to do with Islam, does not improve the situation, implanted deep as these have been into the psyche of their citizenry and nurtured over the generations to merge into their gut. Pakistan’s state policies are but the manifestation of that innate compellence – that of compulsive anti-India obsession.
Pakistan’s state policies are but the manifestation of that innate compellence – that of compulsive anti-India obsession.
Pakistan’s rulers realise that their gut-ingrained anti-India obsession would never permit them to let India live in peace; that is but a culture and a habit to which they have converted their nation and from which there can be no escape. In other words, their core conviction implies that the ‘idea of Pakistan’ cannot flourish unless it is founded upon gross animosity towards the ‘idea of India’. It is, therefore, a foregone conclusion that just as they are compelled by their nature to undermine India no matter what misery it might bring to them, India too would be left with no option but to retaliate aggressively whenever an opportunity came her way. Break up of her Eastern wing in 1971, even if triggered by her own misdeeds, was thus viewed as a manifestation of India’s opportunistic intent. The Pakistani nation is thus trapped in an instinctive compulsion from which there can be no relief in the foreseeable future.
It is in reaction to that compellence that Pakistan had to go nuclear “even if we have to eat grass”, as Bhutto had promulgated and then continue to disproportionately expand her arsenal. The purpose is to acquire a safety-shield in the same manner that any habitual offender fortifies to save himself from the adverse consequences of what he cannot refrain from doing; if an opportunity ever comes to use that shield in destroying the enemy, so much the better.
Pakistan’s Nuclear License
The nuclear shield, even if made up of bits acquired by theft, black-marketing and pawning sovereign rights, has enamoured Pakistan’s strategists to no end. The satisfaction is particularly well served when her nuclearisation is viewed with more fear than it was ever expected to – by the Americans, Indians, and now even the Chinese. But even then, Pakistan’s rulers are smart enough not to lay store on that fear alone; they have undertaken to exacerbate that fear to the level of seizure. Thus setting out the nuclear hobgoblin to seize the Indian mind, they have proceeded to goad the expediency-driven Western powers to wean India away from whipping that hobgoblin into oblivion.
The ‘idea of Pakistan’ cannot flourish unless it is founded upon gross animosity towards the ‘idea of India’…
The many self-effacing analyses that one reads and hears in the Indian discourses emanate from that kind of psychological conditioning that is initiated by Pakistan’s strategists and their captive benefactors – mainly the USA and her lackeys and China. Ironically, in all such analyses, Pakistan’s ruling class, intransigent, irrational and rogue as they may be, come out as clear winners in their performance of nuclear choreography. India, on the other hand, is tutored by her Western sympathisers on the spirit of sublime propriety and so is expected to cower under the debris of nuclear devastation and desist from retaliating after Pakistan has fulfilled her promise of ‘first use’ across a ‘threshold’ that is to be determined by Pakistan’s rulers as and when they are inclined to do so! That is the farce of Pakistan’s nuclear licence.
Pacifist Narratives
Let us now put to test some of the most debilitating theories regarding the nuclear equation in our neighbourhood that often circulate in spoken and written discourses.
Narrative on Future War
The foremost argument regarding the reason for Pakistan’s nuclearisation has already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. To reiterate, Pakistan has gone nuclear not to save herself from India’s ‘aggression’ even if that is the narrative she parrots for the consumption of the world and her own people. That step has been taken to fortify herself from the consequences of her uncontrollable urge to keep gnawing at India’s core nationhood which would at some stage oblige India strike at her offending hand.
Therefore, the idea, that Pakistan’s nuclearisation has negated the prospects of military confrontation between the two neighbours, is banal. For that welcome situation to manifest, Pakistan’s rulers, and more importantly, their brainwashed citizens who have now come to be counted, have to break free of their anti-India obsession. Notwithstanding the hug of cosmetic bonhomie which is played out whenever the elites of the two nations meet, that situation is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Pakistan’s torment of India and consequently the prospects of an Indo-Pakistan war therefore exist as ever. If it was not so, then Pakistan, having no other enemy – barring the terrorists owned by her – would be foolish to so assiduously continue to build up her conventional, India-centric military power.
The idea, that Pakistan’s nuclearisation has negated the prospects of military confrontation between the two neighbours, is banal…
Narrative on Limited War
It is propagated that Pakistan has had to take to nuclearisation to blunt what is claimed to be India’s ‘conventional military superiority’. The purpose, it is claimed, is to prevent India from applying that superiority to bring about the collapse of the Pakistan state. The reason for India to indulge in such a strange venture is left unstated, of course. The interesting part is that this idea has rattled many Indian analysts, who when confronted with the unnerving prospects of finding little employability for India’s 1.2 million military establishment, literally have to plead a proposition that, as it is pronounced with some sagacity, “There is still left a space for limited war under the nuclear overhang” (sic).
On their part, Pakistani analysts seem to accede to the entreaties of their Indian counterparts. In so doing, they refer to certain unspecified ‘threshold’ crossing of which by India’s conventional forces would trigger Pakistan’s ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons. Both sides having thus found their cause celebre, there is satisfaction all around. That leaves the matter of Pakistan’s ‘threshold’ in deliberate ambivalence; at some point, India’s so-called ‘occupation’ of Kashmir or insinuated ‘diversion’ of Jhelum waters could well be construed by Pakistan to be on the wrong side of her ‘threshold’!
The point is that having her conventional deterrence repudiated thus, it is India which stands to lose. If India’s conventional military strength and her national resources are to be brought to bear to deter a habitually intransigent Pakistan, this argument of “some space for limited war… etc.” has to be discarded in favour of prosecuting war, if and when unpreventable, in which duration, intensity, depth and spread of operations would be decided in consonance with India’s advantages at that juncture.
There is no sense in India speculating about Pakistan’s ambivalent ‘threshold’ and imposing deterrence upon herself in the process. All wars, even the ‘all-out’ variety, are ‘limited’ in some sense or the other in any case, and therefore, it is by default that the more powerful party decide that ‘limit’ to which it will go to punish its enemy. Allowing a lesser power to set a ‘threshold’ is but a travesty of a nation’s strategy.
Narrative on Proxy War
Having reconciled – in spite of the bombast of their racial and religious superiority – to not being able to wrest Kashmir through conventional wars, Pakistan’s rulers devised an undeniably competent strategy of ‘warfare through proxy means’. It was a strategy that brought heavy monetary contributions from their co-religious clients and marshalled heavily armed fanatics to promote their agenda at no cost to themselves. On the other hand, the narrative purports that India’s options of making Pakistan pay for the Proxy War is negated by the internal fissures within India and her ‘hollowed’ military capability, so to say. The narrative further propounds that Pakistan’s nuclearisation and her brandishing of ‘nuclear irrationality’ has removed whatever vestige of military retribution that could still be considered by the hapless Indian government. No doubt it is a ‘win-win’ albeit illusionary situation for Pakistan.
It is propagated that Pakistan has had to take to nuclearisation to blunt India’s ‘conventional military superiority’…
Emboldened by India’s restraint during the Kargil War, Pakistan has taken to proclaiming that her nuclearisation has finally and conclusively closed the prospects of India militarily responding to her sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. What is disconcerting, however, is that many among the Indian analysts have fallen for that misinformation. Thus both groups have, by default or design, failed to acknowledge that the real reason for India not opting, so far, to exercise the military option in response to Pakistan’s complicity in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, Mumbai, Samba, Varanasi and Delhi was that such a step did not promise conclusive achievement of the desired political purpose at the particular juncture.
Indeed, India withholding herself from launching military retribution against Proxy War has nothing to do either with Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence or the limitations of India’s conventional military capability. Determined by time and occasion, this is a decision of political prudence that may well undergo revision.
Narrative on Nuclear Deterrence
Much of the India-Pakistan nuclear equation is viewed through the prism of the ‘Cold War’. This is an obvious mistake because situations and issues are completely different; even the West-East nuclear equation has evolved with time. Besides, there are many incongruities between the West-East and India-Pakistan nuclear postulations. Relevant issues in this context, therefore, call for some discussion.
There is no sense in India speculating about Pakistan’s ambivalent ‘threshold’ and imposing deterrence upon herself in the process…
Pakistan propagates that her nuclear weapons are ‘weapons of war’, meant to counter India’s superior conventional military power. India, on the other hand, declares that her nuclear weapons are not meant for political messaging, not for war-fighting. Both stances are, and have to be, fluid. For Pakistan to use nuclear weapons cannot be what is described as ‘war’ because nations do not go to war to destroy themselves – that, after all, is what is promised in the Indian nuclear doctrine. Similarly, for India to recess her nuclear arsenal into ‘just for show’ category is unlikely to lift her credit-rating with either the enemy or the global observers. For effective deterrence, there has to be a clause of ‘usability’. Certainly, that is the case. Why else would Pakistan continue to build up its second-strike arsenal?
Presently, there goes on a ‘motivational’ campaign to suggest that after being nuked for breaching an unspecified Pakistan-determined ‘threshold’, India may yet be persuaded to desist from executing her doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’. The arguments to buttress that suggestion range from imposition of international pressure or even implied threat from world powers, absence of India’s political ‘will’ to go ahead, and her cultural respect for life, property and humanist propriety (Vasudaiva Kutumbakam), even a cliché that “in nuclear war there are no victors” (sic) is professed in that context.
It is obvious that these suggestions are but banal. India’s record of running the gauntlet of international sanctions (securing Kashmir in 1948-‘49, counter-offensive in Pakistan in 1965, liberation of East Pakistan in 1971 and nuclearisation in 1998) are testimony of her resolve when she is driven beyond a point. In any case, international pressure, which would have failed in preventing Pakistan from resorting to nuclear ‘first use’ in the first place, should not be expected to be acceded to by India.
Similarly, the prophesy of ‘no victor in a nuclear war’ is misplaced, because given her geography and natural assets, India will survive albeit battered, through a nuclear exchange while Pakistan may not. The Western powers that have shied away from warning Pakistan in clear terms to state that her use of nuclear weapons will be unacceptable should not expect to succeed in cowering down India’s deterrence.
Pakistan’s rulers have devised an undeniably competent strategy of ‘warfare through proxy means’…
Maybe this is a method of testing waters with the good intent of preventing use of nuclear weapons and arresting Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. But the flaw in this method is that it places the onus of peace on the intended victim of Pakistan’s nuclear ‘first use’ – India, alone. It permits a universally acknowledged rogue ruling clique to resort to brinkmanship, to hold the world to ransom and dictate terms to its stronger but circumspect neighbour thereby deterring him from using his power to resist the rogue’s unlimited, unending hostility. It will be disastrous for India to entertain such banality.
Narrative of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)
Pakistan has developed TNWs and is, reportedly, building up the numbers. Ostensibly, it is meant to counter to India’s so-called ‘Cold Start’ doctrine by preventing Indian military forces from surprising Pakistan and penetrating deep enough to threaten the latter’s core interests. Purportedly having thus taken away that one recourse, which India still had to make Pakistan pay for her misdeeds, Pakistan’s rulers are a smug, pleased lot. But then there are problems bought by them in the process.
TNWs of nominal kilo tonnes of TNT equivalent and short ranges have to be deployed very close to the intended target point and maintained at a high state of readiness. The intended target may be within or across the India-Pakistan border – the jury favours the former option. Considerations of range, protection against Indian attack and redundancy would necessitate multi-point deployment, high mobility and elevated state of readiness of the TNWs. These matters, as any student of nuclear warfare understands, are fraught with self-triggered dangers such as invitation to pre-emptive attack, fratricide, failure of command, control and communications and radiation fallout over own territory.
The most glaring flaw in brandishing TNW, however, is in the availability of equally effective option of use of modern conventional weaponry. Considering the fact that there would be many thrust-lines of the purported Indian offensive and the tactical deployment of attacking forces on ground would be rather well-spread, the number of TNWs to be deployed and used to cause decimation of the Indian forces would be rather large. In a setting like that, the degree of damage caused by low yield, small range TNWs may well be achieved by conventional means also, even if in the latter case the number of strikes have to be many more. In sum, to annihilate the attacking forces before they breach the ‘threshold’, there would be many uncertainties to be catered for.
Pakistan has developed TNWs and is building up the numbers to counter to India’s so-called ‘Cold Start’ doctrine…
Obviously, it would be foolish to expect that India would sit over her stated response of ‘massive retaliation’ – ‘massive’ being a matter of conjecture – against that kind of outrage against her soldiery, even if that occurs in Pakistan’s territory. It is in that sense that the talk of viewing TNW as a trigger for India to deploy and mate her nuclear assets need not be conceded to. We need not be impressed by Pakistan’s TNW toy.
India’s Considerations
India’s strategic demeanour has many nuances. Her peaceful struggle for independence was an asymmetric strategy against British power that found fruition by the fallout of World War II. Her wisdom of peace is obviously and rightly, aimed at concentrating on nation building. Yet, as it must be, she has used force when absolutely necessary. Since 1990, as reports indicate, her conventional military capability is below par for assured political victory in full scale conventional war. Therefore, the talk of India’s supposed overwhelming conventional superiority, that supposedly prompted Pakistan to go nuclear in 1998, is a bit of misinformation.
To reiterate, Pakistan went nuclear – much before her venturing into Proxy War or the end of Cold War or the talk of Cold Start – to find a shield to hide behind after perpetrating attacks in various forms on the foundation of Indian nationhood. At the same time, no nation, revisionist at that, would ever claim that nuclear weaponisation could replace, even to some degree, their conventional arsenal. That is why Pakistan remains engaged in build up of either capability. As for the matter of launching punitive attack operations under particular circumstances, India most certainly has that capability. However, the decision to do so must remain contingent to appreciation of political objective.
In sum, Pakistan’s nuclear hobgoblin may not deter India from protecting her interests, by conventional military force if necessary. Further, India need not dilute her deterrence by falling for Pakistan’s nuclear bluster, nor does she need to make such frivolous statements like “nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting” and “war is not an option”. These are but pleasing pronouncements that are neither true nor taken seriously unless made from a position of strength. India would be wise to take note of that.
Pakistan’s unabashed duplicity compels the international community’s leading nations to humour her by rationalising with her terror agenda…
Tactics of Lunacy
Pakistan’s ruling class seem to have come out as better strategists, even if its strategies are marred by uncontrollable instability and mayhem within. Its well-to-do class live ostentatiously; class disparity is palpable, feudalism thrives and yet there is no popular uprising; its economy and military are propped up by the USA, yet it thumbs nose to its benefactor’s concerns; even attacking American interests and promoting rabid anti-American terror outfits. In its relationship with the PRC, it is fast becoming clear that Pakistan is using China as a bulwark of its destabilising agenda even while sheltering East Turkistan rebels. Pakistan’s unabashed duplicity compels the international community’s leading nations to humour her by rationalising with her terror agenda, the Western powers having to cuddle her while cursing under their breath and China choosing to express solidarity to prevent her from turning totally rogue, as the Chinese policy makers sheepishly inform us.
In the eighteenth century, Muhammad Shah’s appeasement of Nadir Shah only led to the barbarian’s indulgence in the massacre and loot of Delhi. Nearly two hundred years later, Chamberlain’s efforts to satiate Hitler only made firm his territorial agenda before the outbreak of World War II. The US has now been plying Pakistan with weapons and funds in the fond hope of making Pakistani rulers see reason. All appears to have failed miserably. India need not fall into pusillanimity. To be able to progress in peace, she has to take up the cudgel of swiping out Pakistan’s nuclear hobgoblin.
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.
No comments:
Post a Comment