Joshua Noonan
January 17, 2015
On 26 December 2014, the Russian Federation released its newest military doctrine. This doctrine has shifted five times since the collapse of the USSR, changing twice in the first years of the country under President Boris Yeltsin seeing a simulacrum of Soviet military doctrine and then three times under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin with more dramatic changes following each iteration of policy showing the restoration of Russia’s initiative to act, the hubris that followed, and the nemesis of the current standoff and economic hardship.
In 2000, territorial integrity, Russia’s role in conflict mediation, a privileged sphere of influence in its “near abroad”, as well as the desire for Russia to participate as a pole in an emerging multipolar global order. In 2010, the focus shifted from a massive NATO-led attack to specific threats the of anti-ballistic missile systems to Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal, NATO’s encroachment on Russia’s borders, color revolutions as a source of destabilization, and the violation of the UN charter in actions against states such as Iraq. These were driven by the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, theOrange, Rose, and Tulip revolutions, and the proposed placement of anti-ballistic missile systems inPoland and the Czech Republic. 2010 was the first time that the Russian federation stated that they reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against an existential conventional attack against the Russian Federation. The later of these policy developments was foreshadowed by the 2009 simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw by war-gaming Russian and Belorussian forces in “Operation West”.
The 2014 doctrine was published in light of the annexation of Crimea, the Ukraine conflict breaking-out again, and the paranoia of color revolutions continuing throughout the post-Soviet space. In the 2014 document, US military attempts to expand superiority via platforms such as global strike and space weapons were singled out as a threat to strategic stability. Another focus of the document was the highlighting of subversive elements seeking to undermine youth in Russia. Dovetailing with the Russian foreign agent act of 2012, foreign actors i.e. NGOs and military special forces via hybrid warfare were seen as a serious threat.
Within the document other shifts were notable. The first is the development of a policy protecting Russia’s interest in the Arctic. This includes the creation of special military units and re-equipping various bases on the Arctic. Moreover, Russia’s Pivot to Asia is highlighted as well as the role of the BRICs in creating multipolarity. This is catching military doctrine up to the political and economic actions that have been taking place with the Sino-Russian oil, gas, and finance deals of 2014 as well as the development of the BRICs Bank.
Finally, unlike 2010’s statements concerning the nuclear capacity, the 2014 doctrine states the deterrent capacity of Russia’s’ conventional forces. This is tied to the equipment seen in the Russian military lately as well as a potential reversion to Soviet ideas concerning the power of conventional forces. It must be noted that it was as much the Soviet tanks threat via the Fulda Gap as nuclear weapons that menaced Europe during the Cold War. While Russia continues to change parts of the post-WWII settlement, many of these actions are marginal and politically driven. I will focus on the shift to the Arctic in my next article, as this is one of the more forward-thinking parts of the new doctrine.
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