Must the European Union be a military power to achieve superpower status?

By Gemma Pipes  

December 30, 2014

The prospect of the European Union becoming a military power has been on the agenda in some circles almost since its inception and, as one of the designated potential superpowers, the lack of a military is often cited as the key factor holding it back from reaching ultimate global power.

Though there are undoubtedly several potential benefits for a militarily powered Europe, the notion it will increase the EU’s potential of achieving superpower status is contentious and, in fact, there is a distinct possibility that a move towards military attainments serves to completely alter the dynamics of the EU and not in a positive way. Beyond the more practical considerations such as the huge costs and difficulty in achieving consent on any military action from the member states, it would lose its unique status as a normative and “ethical” actor and this could pose a huge risk to its standing. It is precisely this prestige that has played a huge role in the EU being elevated to its current position; it provides enormous amounts of humanitarian aid and development assistance.A military power threatens to completely alter the character of the European Union and this may be too its detriment. This article considers the background of the quest for a European independent military; highlighting in particular the introspection after the carnage of the Yugoslav Wars and tensions with being obliged to rely on the U.S.-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for much of their security and defence needs. It then considers the flaws of the main arguments in favour of the EU becoming militarily independent before concluding with a discussion on the potential damage to the current normative actor and the prospective costs to the EU’s standing within the international community.

Superpower status has long been considered the zenith for a state; the utmost representation of its global power and influence. It ensures states’ major geo-political influence and strokes along with the huge benefits such eminence provides. Given the ever-changing dynamics of the international system, superpowers are not permanent and can be destroyed fairly quickly. The British Empire and the Soviet Union are just two examples of collectives who crumbled after decades as a world leader in supremacy and clout. Thus far in history, the only superpowers have been states but there is no guarantee that this will remain the case. The European Union may break the mould; becoming the first international organisation to achieve superpower status. With enormous trade power, a vast population and significant political influence, it possesses many of the characteristics that make it a prime candidate. However, the EU’s main burden in reaching this level is that it lacks an independent military; a unique scenario to any other superpowers historically and today. Former Belgian Prime Minister Mark Eysken would famously remark that “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm”. The decisive question is whether this lacking is pivotal to preventing the attainment of superpower status by the European Union.

Since the inception of the Westphalian system in 1564, the assumption has always been that a state requires a military capability to assure its own position. Even as the 20th century saw the move towards collective security agreements such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there was still the underlying recognition that states needed their own military for security. Realism’s dominance promotes the notion that communal policies are all well and good but ultimately it’s every state for itself. This mutual distrust underpins every interaction and can hinder joint operations. The conventional wisdom is that a strong military is a state’s guarantee as its national interest takes the ultimate priority. It has no guarantee that its national interest will coincide with even nations it considers firm allies and so need an independent military power to prosperity and safety. The international system is never static and though since the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States has reigned as the sole superpower, in recent years multiple powers have moved to assert themselves on the international stage. Beyond the EU, the rising BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have demonstrated the greatest rise in influence and China in particular looks to be the most likely contender for the next superpower. Is a military power what the European Union needs to assure its ascent to superpower status?

For much of the European Union’s existence, acquisition of a military power had been a strictly intangible concept. The overwhelming spectre of the Cold War and the bipolar system kept the majority of conflict at bay and tensions under control. There had been tentative steps towards establishing a military power base but most had lost momentum before palpable steps had been taken. There had long been plans for a European Defence Community, for example, a pan-European collective mainly aimed towards countering a potentially unified Germany. However once West Germany joined NATO in 1955 these plans quickly fell from the agenda. Many attempts to introduce defence to the European agenda would follow the same pattern; initial enthusiasm before being disregarded. The Maastricht treaty saw the first concrete move towards the ratifying of an EU mission; containing an explicit reference to the framing of a joint defence policy but limited explanations of how this would be achieved.

This ineffectual pattern may have continued had it not been for the events following the end of the Cold War. Following the USSR’s collapse the 1990’s represented a huge transition period and the rise of civil and national conflicts as the world sought to adjust to this new status. Rising ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia quickly descended into violent chaos; the first of this kind in the region for decades. Conflict within Europe was no longer just a possibility or an event to potentially prepare for in the future. The EU no longer had the benefit of time to plan and instead were faced with an horrifically brutal civil war and genocide in their own backyard. As casualties stacked up and refugees numbered in the tens of thousands, the EU found itself ineffective and marginalised.

The Yugoslav Wars concentrated minds and led the EU to truly assess and question its military ineptitude for the first time. The brutality, media images of the appalling human rights abuses and enormous number of fatalities produced a harsh impetus for the move towards a concrete policy. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1995 was introduced as a direct response to the events in Yugoslavia and proved to be the most concrete strategy towards a militarised Europe. It created common strategies on key regions, greater capacity to act and more control over foreign policy instruments.The headline goal was the establishment of the European Security and Defensive Policy which would be expanded by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 to incorporate both input from both the council and the commission. A decisive component, likely introduced to appease the member states sense of sovereignty, was the “emergency brake”, enabling states to voice opposition on the grounds of national interest.

Concurrently, the Yugoslav Wars was the first concrete proof that relying on the American-dominated NATO as their main source of security could be a limitation as the EU were ultimately tied to US military policy. Burned by the politically disastrous humanitarian intervention into Somalia where the Battle of Mogadishu saw the loss of 18 troops, the American administration were extremely reticent to take part in another intrusion into a civil conflict thousands of miles from home that offered no real tangible benefit. The EU had a far greater vested interest in the conflicts being resolved and the region stabilised for purely pragmatic reasons. Though NATO would eventually intervene in 1995 after the war had been raging for almost 3 years, it was then-US President Bill Clinton who got the credit and Europe was left to take a secondary position.

The Yugoslav Wars are not the only incident where American and European foreign policy interests have clashed and it is likely this plays a key role in the sentiment that the EU needs the independent ability to engage in military action. The differences in attitude are manifest and impact many of their interactions. The US narrative that they saved Europe during the Second World War plays into this notion that America is strong and decisive while Europe is weak and needs protecting. France in particular has found itself tarred with the label of being a feeble quitter. As such, there is strong anti-American sentiment in the EU over their aggressive foreign policy. A particularly prevalent metaphor adopted by US academics is that Europe and America are fundamentally opposed as the USA is Mars (the God of War) while Europe is Venus (the Goddess of Love). Besides playing into the gendered notion of masculinity as strength and femininity as weakness, it also supports the American perception of their own superiority in action rather than just lip service. As Javier Solana, then- EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, would rather mockingly comment shortly after the Iraq invasion, “I am from Venus, which, according to its detractors, is faint-hearted, soft- headed and militarily and politically weak. You are from Mars, which I am told is powerful, virile, dynamic: a land of moral clarity and resolute action.”

Given such tensions, it is clear that the European incentive for joint defence with the United States is based mainly on pragmatic reasons. With no stable military security of its own, attaching to the world’s greatest military power makes logical sense. However, for the EU, it appears very much to be a marriage of convenience; the negative of being reliant on American foreign policy countered to a certain degree by the protection of the alliance. The friction at place is likely to be a major incentive for military independence from NATO. But do the enormous financial and political costs make the project worthwhile?

A related question is that, even if the EU did achieve its own independent military capability, would the member states ever agree to any joint intervention? Any military activity is likely to acquire a majority vote if not total support and so states’ various vested interests and general foreign policy positions are likely to collide, for example, Germany’s legendary pragmatism clashing with Britain’s occasional notions of itself as a spreader of democracy. The greatest demonstration of these potentially problematic dynamics is the debates leading up to the Iraq invasion in 2003. Britain was able to take a dominant position in the deliberations only because of its “special relationship” with the United States. Had the discussion only involved Europe the war would have never occurred as Germany and France, the EU’s apex players, were firmly opposed.

The most pressing incentive for an EU military is likely to be some form of protection against an external threat. However, the incidence of inter-state war has rapidly decreased since the end of the Cold War as civil, ethnic and asymmetric wars have become the dominant form of conflict in the modern era. Increased interconnectedness and trade agreements mean that for most states a war must truly concern their national interest and pose a real threat to them. The extensive costs, both financial and otherwise, mean wars of choice are simply not worth it. Indeed an argument in support of the European Union gaining a military capability is that hypothetically a joint defence would result in significant economic savings and so appeal to the member states. Military expenditure is one of the greatest financial burdens a state endures and cutting costs has been a policy adopted by most EU states since the global financial crisis.

If not necessary for its own defence then perhaps a military-powered EU could concentrate solely on humanitarian interventions so it is never again left stood idly by as another Yugoslavia burns. However, the recent experiences of such endeavours seem to thwart this proposal. The lessons of the ill-fated excursion into Iraq, ostensibly in some part on humanitarian grounds, has discouraged the West to stage military interventions into Syria, Libya and other nations that went through incredibly violent uprisings and civil wars during the Arab Spring, not to mention the current situation in Crimea. This seemingly is due to the fear of getting bogged down for years with little chance of achieving objectives as civil war rages around them until finally they have to withdraw with their tail between their legs; as was the Western experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise such campaigns quickly lost public support and saw the political leaders who supported the campaigns ousted.

The main value of the military for the majority of Western states today seems mostly coercive and in that sense an independent military could be useful to the EU. However, military might is not the only way to exercise coercion and if anything soft power projection such as economic sanctions is likely to be far more effective in the long-term. The EU is not only the world’s largest trading power but one of the largest donors of humanitarian and development aid. As such it is in a great position to practice coercive diplomacy without a military instrument. Economic power can be translated into various capabilities with which to influence another actor to exercise behaviour according to your wishes.

Given the problematic nature of the arguments in favour of EU’s potential military attainment, the agenda against the organisation becoming militarily powered buoys the argument for those opposed to it. A particularly prevalent contention is that it is precisely the lack of military power that makes the European Union the unique actor that it is and acquisition of such a capability would irrevocably damage its very nature. Currently the EU represents a kind of living experiment as an institution of civilian or normative power relying on political and economic influence over military power. It exercises different conceptions of power to achieve its policy objectives; providing a framework for a new, advanced form of international actor free from the reliance on military might.

The argument for the EU as a normative or civilian is defined, according to Helene Sjursen, by 3 key points; first that the EU represents a different kind of actor within the international system distinct from any other. This is most notably defined as the particularity of the EU, based on the writings of Francois Duchene, who first introduced the notion of a civilian power. The second defining characteristic is the EU’s emphasis on soft power in international affairs and projection of non-military power such as diplomacy, negotiation, regional co-operations and democracy. The final aspect is the somewhat ambiguous role the EU occupies in its position as less than a state but more than an international organization. Such arguments are implicitly tied to debates on the changing international system and whether we have entered the post-Westphalian era of diminishing sovereignty and territoriality within states and the ever increasing role of supranational and international actors.

The inherent assumption that the European Union’s status as a non-military, ethical actor and therefore a source for good within the international system is based heavily on the idea that it represents and projects the norms of the European people (often in contrast to the more aggressive foreign policy of the United States). Norms develop in a social and cultural context and represent common understandings and mutual values within a society that are the key to a stable societal order. Often thought of in terms of states, in this context it is suggested the EU and the civilian populations that comprise it share common norms that shape its foreign policy.

Given that recent developments seem to show that the organisation is looking to establish a far more robust and active security and defence policy. Ian Manners argues this will transform the EU from a normative actor and remove many of the distinct qualities that qualify it as such. Is such a move worth it if it removes much of the characteristics that make it unique? Much of the EU’s self-image is based on its role as a humanitarian, moral actor spreading democracy, human rights protection and peace. Even if the EU did establish an independent military it is likely to be nothing more than a medium level given the enormous resource debates which are likely to occur between the member states. Any financial costs are always hotly debated within the EU and a military is always a hugely expensive endeavour. Perhaps there would be greater incentive if the EU was going to be serious power player but it is still likely to trail behind military leaders.

For Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, it is not a military capability or lack thereof that defines the EU’s potential as a superpower but rather that the union satisfies four distinct criteria to qualify as a global actor. These qualifications are volition, autonomy independent of member states, the ability to employ policy instruments and recognition by others as a supranational actor. From a pragmatic position, the EU has not developed as quickly as expected and a vast capability-expectations gap has arisen. The EU has little chance of achieving superpower status until these fundamental problems are fixed and so the discussion on a military capability could be ultimately academic.

In conclusion, it seems that rather than being a key step in its ascent towards superpower status, the European Union becoming military-capable could in fact damage any hopes of reaching such a level. Though the possibility of the EU developing a military power has been discussed as early as the 1950’s, the decisive event was Europe’s inaction during the conflict in Yugoslavia. The soul-searching that followed focused minds and led to the first steps of truly ratifying such steps towards the EU becoming militarized with first the Amsterdam Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The constant tensions that evolve from Europe being forced to rely on the American-dominated NATO for security and defence is similarly one of the forces driving momentum. However, the main arguments in favour of a military attainment seem flawed. If designed to operate as means of defence against an external threat then it may be nothing more than a costly but ineffectual project as conventional warfare is in a period of steep decline. Similarly, if sought as means to conduct humanitarian intervention, recent history has discouraged such actions and there seems to be a generally agreed international trend to ultimately let states sought out their own problem; even in the face of horrific violence, genocide and human rights violations. The final main incentive for a military power as means to coerce also seems to have limited applicability as other forms of soft power have generally proved to be far more effective in this form of diplomacy. Perhaps the greatest argument against the EU becoming militarised is that it will lose many of the characteristics that define it. The institution occupies a unique role as a normative actor reliant on norms and focusing on economic and political strength or military might. A move towards military attainment could severely damage the EU’s moral basis and the very characteristics it prides itself on. As the international system continues to develop and, according to some scholars, enter the post-Westphalian era, there is a very real possibility that a military power will cease to be a vital component of a superpower and the EU, with its enormous economic, trade, humanitarian and development strength, is in prime position to seize that status.