29 Jan , 2015
Events such as the Purulia arms drop, use of hijacked airliners as a lethal arm of terrorism, disappearance of a civil airliner from the radar screen and proliferation of tactical and intermediate range ballistic missiles across our western and northern borders, are pointers for us to take a holistic look at our air defence capabilities. To address these issues, which are essentially of peacetime policing, steps have been initiated for closer integration of surveillance and regulatory activities by diverse agencies such as DGCA, AAI and other Services, with the IAF. The indigenously developed IACCS, wherein data provided by all these agencies will be synthesized and analysed to minimise detection-to-interception time, by the most optimum means, is in place in the sensitive areas. Importantly, the IACCS, with new radars, will also bring AD coverage to the Southern peninsula. However, the detection of missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction, has not yet been adequately addressed.
There is an accepted need for instituting efficient and extended airspace management…
India is a large sub-continent with about 33,00,000 sq. km. of territory, land frontiers running over 15,000 km and a coastline of over 7000 km. The national airspace hence, spans a much larger sphere and is estimated to be about over 40 million cu. km. India also sits across vital inter-continental air traffic routes. With a rapidly growing economy the recorded growth of the last few years notwithstanding, India is an important player in the region and the world. Its geographical location with its island territories, places it at a strategic point to keep an eye on some important maritime trade routes that traverse through the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. Inadequate surveillance and air defence capabilities present serious complexities in the air defence and airspace management of such a large area, which has ever-hostile borders and an increasing density of air traffic.
The infamous Purulia arms-drop incident of 1995, wherein an aircraft apparently on a routine over-flight used the Indian airspace for an unauthorised arms drop, highlighted the weakness in our surveillance and reporting system. A few years later in 1998, India had the dubious reputation of not detecting an enemy aircraft, which had intruded deep into its airspace nearly up to the airfield at Bhuj in Gujarat. That the Indian Air Force (IAF) finally succeeded in shooting it down by surface-to-air missiles is another story. The IAF, however, redeemed its reputation just after the Kargil episode, when its fighter aircraft shot down a PAF surveillance aircraft in the same area, with excellent coordination between ground control and the aircraft. The 9/11 incident in the US, the mysterious disappearance of the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH 370 a few months ago and the downing of another Malaysian Airlines Flight MH 17 over Ukraine, have added a new dimension to the problem of air defence and airspace management.
Every country takes prudent measures to ensure safety and security of its land frontiers as well as its airspace. Additionally, nations regulate and provide proper and safe services on air traffic routes within their airspace. Hence, infrastructure has to be in place to ensure that similar incidents, be they of 1995 vintage or the more recent ones of 2001 or 2014, do not recur in Indian airspace.
To create an environment of effective Air Defence, one must rely on the fundamentals of defensive action…
Component Functions of Airspace Management
For reasons mentioned earlier, there is an accepted need for instituting efficient and extended airspace management. This is not only for the requirement of air traffic management, but also to safeguard India’s strategic security interests, to institute proper air-space surveillance, to promulgate and enforce appropriate Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) and to monitor, regulate and control air traffic over the entire Indian airspace. Airspace management is, therefore, a combination of air defence measures implemented by the IAF with the assistance of Army and Navy in certain areas and Air Traffic Services (ATS), provided by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), the IAF and to a limited extent by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Indian Army and the Indian Navy. Airspace management encompasses the following:
Regulatory functions which include promulgation of ADIZs, Flight Information Regions (FIRs), air routes and reporting points along with relevant aeronautical information and rules and laws of the air.
Surveillance of the entire airspace at low, medium and high altitudes by surveillance radars, both military and civil.
Control mechanism for enforcing sanctity of airspace, monitoring surveillance information, enforcing ADIZs through technical, military and administrative measures in addition to the regulatory measures mentioned above.
Weapon Systems and Interceptors to deter, intercept, and if the need arises, destroy intruders in Indian airspace, or other such aircraft that do not adhere to the regulations.
Air Traffic Control which involves monitoring and control of air traffic in Air Routes, controlled areas, approach and departure and in the aerodrome zones.
The sole responsibility of the country’s Air Defence (AD) rests with the IAF…
The IAF and to some extent the AAI, are entrusted with the responsibility of the management of the entire Indian airspace. Military enforcement of ADIZs is solely the responsibility of the IAF and the task is executed through a chain of radars as well as a Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) organisation. Aircraft and surface-to-air missiles of the IAF, with elements of the Army and the Navy participating in their specific areas, where required, carry out interceptions. Civil aviation authorities, in conjunction with the IAF, also assist in this process by ensuring regulatory and control measures, such as assignment of Air Defence Clearance (ADC) numbers to aircraft entering or operating in Indian air space and by confirming the ADC of the incoming traffic, where necessary.
Surveillance, Airspace Control and Air Defence for India
To create an environment of effective Air Defence, one must rely on the fundamentals of defensive action that includes detection of intrusion by enemy forces and appropriate reaction by own forces and then apply them to the airspace. To respond to the double restraint of early detection and quick reaction, the defensive must have in place an early warning network and reaction procedures clearly stipulated.
India is plagued by an unstable neighbourhood that dictates the necessity to have a credible and a deterrent air defence capability in place, both peace and war time. The volatility of the neighbourhood also implies that conflict situations can develop rapidly. The IAF possesses capable enough air defence mechanisms, which have been called into enhanced states of readiness at short notice, several times in the past, be it for an airspace violation by an adversary nation or the straying of a civil aircraft from its designated route. Even so, no air defence system can be foolproof and impermeable. Because of this, we must ensure that the risk for the intruders or for aircraft wishing to deviate from their flight plans, willingly or inadvertently, to undertake a hostile/nefarious activity, is extreme for it to be a deterrent. Appropriate and effective surveillance, radar integration, command, control and communications, information flow, procedures and responsibilities, rules of engagement, weapon systems, alert status and delegation of authority, are needed to further the credibility and deterrent value of the air defences and airspace management.
A study for the integration of radars in the Southern zone was also ordered but progress has been slow…
Surveillance Capability of the IAF
As enshrined in the Union War Book, the sole responsibility of the country’s Air Defence (AD) rests with the IAF. For this purpose, the IAF has a large number of high, medium and low-level radars integrated into an efficient AD system. The coverage of the entire Indian airspace at high level is extensive with near-complete high-level cover even in the Southern Peninsula. Towards the North, over some parts of Tibet, radar cover is available only at high altitude.
At medium levels of above 10,000 ft, there is adequate coverage along the borders. However, radar cover over Tibet and Myanmar is negligible. Only single-tier low-level radar cover (60 km depth) exists along the Western border with a two-tier radar cover in some important areas. There is practically no low-level radar cover in the entire peninsular region, neither does an adequate overlap exist between low, medium and high levels of radar coverage. While the Air Defence Ground Environment System (ADGES) has ensured some degree of integration, indigenous real-time integration planned by the IAF, is still underway. In-principle approval for the multi-crore project for real-time integration of radars in the North and West of the country was accorded some time ago. This was as a part of an overall multi-phased radar induction and integration, covering the entire Indian airspace. In addition, a study for the integration of radars in the Southern zone was also ordered but progress has been slow.
Air Defence
India’s air defence network is essentially divided into two parts – the ADGES and the Base Air Defence Zones (BADZ). These two components are closely linked and share information relating to air defence tasks. The ADGES network is responsible for overall airspace management and detection of intruders. The ADGES also controls and coordinates the air defences for large area targets. The BADZ, as the name implies, are tasked with the defence of high value targets – air bases, nuclear installations and key military installations. The BADZ is a scaled down ADGES network, limited to an arc of 100 km. The BADZ is a far more concentrated air defence environment than the ADGES and provides the only gap-free air defence cover in most sectors.
The current communication network of the IAF – the AFNET, is already in place and is the present system’s strength…
The deficiencies in the air defence capabilities of the country are being compounded due to increasing numbers of Vital Areas (VAs) and Vital Points (VPs), galloping obsolescence of radars, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems and aircraft, and need to be urgently addressed. The surveillance and C3I aspects of air defence are of prime importance. Several studies in the past have brought out various requirements, some of which are highlighted below.
Need for acquisition of additional aerostats as national assets, for combined airspace surveillance by IAF and AAI.
Hastening the induction and early operationalisation of additional High Power Radars (HPRs)/Medium Power Radars (MPRs), for effective surveillance by IAF and AAI and Low Level Transportable Radars (LLTRs) and Mountain Radars, for seamless surveillance of the Northern, Western and North-Eastern borders, peninsular India and the islands.
Need for early integration of inputs from AAI radars, as well as those of Army and Navy. These need to be integrated into the national airspace management system, with an effective communication system. The indigenous Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), set up by the IAF across the country, is a step in this direction.
The acquisition of additional Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and the indigenous AEW&C aircraft for effective surveillance by IAF is an urgent need. AWACS would be a more cost effective option as it would also provide low-level cover deep inside enemy territory, not only to direct own forces but also to track hostile aircraft departing for missions from their bases, thus facilitating positive identification and substantially increasing the reaction time available to the air defence system.
The current communication network of the IAF – the AFNET, is already in place and is the present system’s strength. The ability of airborne and land-based sensors to exchange data and resolve anomalies needs to be built-in, or worked on, when purchasing a new sensor, to ensure seamless integration, with further induction of modern communication systems for efficient airspace management.
Induction of additional long-range all-weather interceptors and point defences in the form of SAMs and other low-level quick reaction weapon systems.
The sensors of the BMDS can provide early warning against approaching ballistic missiles and manned aerial threats…
Whilst it is agreed that steps have been initiated and inductions have commenced, but more needs to be done and at a faster pace to provide seamless cover, which would reduce the IAF’s reaction time and greatly enhance its response to even peacetime air intrusions such as hijacking or any other contingency.
Need for a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS)
This is an area where not much information is available in the public domain, nor is the subject debated or commented upon frequently. A study on the requirement of an anti-missile defence (range up to 1,000 km) for India was conducted in 1996. The study had opined that there was a need for a mix of credible and potent strategic offensive and defensive capabilities in terms of IRBMs of Agni II class, with a reach of 3,000 km or more, as well as anti-ballistic missile defences. Another study on the subject, in 1998, endorsed the earlier recommendations.
The requirement is to detect the launch and track the ballistic missiles during their passage in space and on re-entry into the atmosphere and then to home onto the target. This requires a series of space-based radars to cover the areas of interest, in conjunction with special ground-based radars, which would take over the task of tracking missiles as they enter its coverage area to launch anti-ballistic measures. The 1998 study recommended that the elements of the BMDS be procured in the type and capability, in consonance with the available funding, but with due urgency, to defend vital target systems of India.
Integration of BMDS with AD Architecture
The sensors of the BMDS can provide early warning against approaching ballistic missiles, as well as manned aerial threats, thus performing a dual role. We, therefore, could keep a watchful eye on the aerial and space-based activity of our neighbours. The Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) would benefit immensely from the target-data information from the BMDS network. Similarly, the target-data available from a large number of AD radars at the IACCS would provide useful input on air breathing targets to the BMDS. Battle management, by using the BMDS, would enable enhanced situational awareness and result in its most optimal exploitation. The system should contribute and derive intelligence from the centralised C3I structure of the existing AD system. It is, therefore, essential that the BMDS be integrated with the AD architecture to exploit its dual capability, as it would create an ideal seamless air defence network that could ultimately be linked to the National Command Post.
There is a requirement for an effective interface between all military radars with their civilian counterparts…
Conclusion
Events such as the Purulia arms drop, use of hijacked airliners as a lethal arm of terrorism, disappearance of a civil airliner from the radar screen and proliferation of tactical and intermediate range ballistic missiles across our western and northern borders, are pointers for us to take a holistic look at our air defence capabilities. To address these issues, which are essentially of peacetime policing, steps have been initiated for closer integration of surveillance and regulatory activities by diverse agencies such as DGCA, AAI and other Services, with the IAF. The indigenously developed IACCS, wherein data provided by all these agencies will be synthesized and analysed to minimise detection-to-interception time, by the most optimum means, is in place in the sensitive areas. Importantly, the IACCS, with new radars, will also bring AD coverage to the Southern peninsula. However, the detection of missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction, has not yet been adequately addressed.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has acquired and integrated the long-range detection tracking and fire control technologies. Development activities and trials are underway for interceptor missile development. Considering the complementary nature of the radar and missile systems of the BMDS, it would be most advantageous to expeditiously integrate them into the AD network of the IAF, with simultaneous dissemination of information in real time to the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and National Command Post. Thus, a fully integrated aerospace defence capability would be developed from sea level to the exosphere, against a vast multitude of targets such as the very low speed UAVs, through subsonic and supersonic range of manned aircraft, to hypersonic ballistic missiles, in a cost-effective manner.
There will be problems related to working on source codes of different radars to arrive at an integrated radar picture. Communications protocols would have to be notified within the Services and with the Civil Aviation authorities. There is a requirement for an effective interface between all military radars with their civilian counterparts, with an overarching command and control set up, which may step on the toes of the numerous users, will require a mature resolution, without parochial considerations!
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