Fourth Generation Warfare is a decentralised form of warfare, where nation-states lose their monopoly over violence and the adversaries are driven to non-conventional warfare and blurs the dividing line between civvies and the combatants
“4GW is not new but return to warfare before emergence of nation states. It is mostly characterised by conflicts which not just nations but many groups will wage – It will be fought for many reasons beyond Clausewitzian explanation of war as an extension of politics by other means.” —William S Lind
As the world progresses into the twenty-first century, the character of international security and its management appears to be in the midst of a revolutionary shift, with the forces of technology, media, ideology and globalisation, threatening to transform the theory and practice of war.
Our nation is also coming to recognize that we are at an inflection point in our history. Multiple forms of attacks upon the Indian State are incubating and a multitude of manifested threats, with one common purpose to denigrate the power of the state and the will of its people, are being used simultaneously against India, at multiple levels, through resolute, sophisticated and adaptable adversaries. These adversaries understand that conflict for domination and influence occurs across a variety of forms and through platforms which could be structured to fit one’s goals, at any particular time.
Defining the Fourth Generation:
Fourth Generation of Warfare, as envisaged by William S Lind and others, primarily focuses on the fact that there are four principal ideas from previous generations of warfare, which would carry over into this fourth generation. The first idea incorporates the battlefield, which now extends beyond traditional conflict zones to the whole of an enemy’s landmass and society. This implies dispersion coupled with increased importance for actions by small groups of combatants across the geographical matrix will emerge. The second idea pertains to the decreasing dependence on centralised logistics. Dispersion coupled with increased tempo of operations will necessitate an ability to live off the land. The third idea emphasises on manoeuvre. Smaller, compact groups and forces, which are highly manoeuvrable and agile, will tend to dominate the battlefield and cause an internal collapse, instead of destroying the enemy physically. Identification of enemy’s centers of gravity will be highly important.
While Lind and other authors on the subject outlined the tactical changes between the generations of modern war, what actually causes these, is even more relevant. The true drivers of generational change probably lie in the political, social, ideological and economic contexts which are resident in the society, of that time. Each of these casts a pivotal influence and widens the impact, on account of information revolution amplifying the effect on aspirations, tactics and weapons of the contestants, in the contest between wills.
The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of geopolitics through the influence of military hard power especially in the context of scientifically advanced European nation states. In contrast, the fourth generation of war globally, is still coming of age in the framework of globalisation characterised by balance of power deficit and in a world dominated by a single superpower—and a military hegemon. Exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene impacted by the compression of geography and distance due to revolution in the information dominated world has further exaggerated the effect. Media intrusiveness and transparency has raised the bar of international law and humanitarian code stringently on the use of force, especially against insidious agents who consider themselves as freedom fighters instead of terrorists and acts as a catalyst in their proliferation. Privatisation of war and emergence of non-state actors (NSA) empowered by the globalisation and motivated by radical ideologies with access to finance and open source technology, facilitate such an altered strategic context.
While nation states still remain the primary actors, there is the presence of non-state international actors in the form of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, European Community, Organisation of African Unity, besides a wide variety of non-governmental organisations whose influence is felt in the international arena. In addition, there are transnational actors in the form of the media, religious movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and others, who have also acquired the ability to influence international relations. Finally, sub-national groups have attempted to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern by exploiting the networks which they create, sustain and generate.
Socially as human actors, we are also constantly developing and expanding national/ international networks in virtually every field of endeavor. There has been an exponential increase in the number of transnational business associations, research groups, academic societies, and even hobbyists, who maintain contact through a wide variety of media. These networks with a common cause and purpose tie people together in distinctly nontraditional ways. Further, these associations provide a rapidly increasing flow of nonofficial information between societies resulting in the weakening of the links which tie the citizen to his nation state. As national bonds become less important, allegiance to sub national groups based on ethnic, religious, or cultural ties increases. Nation states therefore are likely to find themselves torn in two directions – upward toward the international security, trade, and social organizations; and downward, by sub-national movements that want to splinter the state, at ease with the tools of the evolving information age in collaboration with other tools of non-kinetic and kinetic medium.
Indian Subcontinent and its Fourth Generation Variant:
The South Asian region historically has been a conflict-prone region on account of colonialism and the bloody partition of India. Breakup of Pakistan has further increased the turmoil. An unsettled border of India with China and increasing competition has the potential to turn competing influences and interests, into rivalry. Discord amongst ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, criminalisation of politics and demographic shift and movement add to the instability in the region. South Asia has been termed as the most dangerous place in the world. Under the conditions of strategic stability/instability continues to prevail as the states facing financial and legitimacy crises begin to lose their monopoly to wage war.
With China, India faces two types of threat. The first is on the immediate unsettled land borders, where China has strengthened its infrastructure, and the second is on account of being sucked into regional power play as China starts to assert itself in South and East China seas and seeks to enter India ocean region under the garb of preventing maritime piracy.
Joint war fighting, integrated across the streams, as envisaged by its strategic luminaries, forms the basis of its ‘military modernisation’. ‘Informationalisation, and localised conflict mixed and matched with the calibrated reliance on facets of ‘unrestricted warfare’ is planned to provide the framework of Sun Tzu war winning dictum “winning without fighting” or at least cost. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army of China in their highly publicised book “Unrestricted Warfare” have also championed the art of “asymmetrical warfare.” The recommended conduct involves asymmetric or multi-dimensional attacks on almost every aspect of the opponent’s social, economic and political system. People’s Liberation Army concept of war fighting for the “New Period” focuses towards this construct by incorporating asymmetric warfare means in all phases of its campaign planning process.
Pakistan is the current epicentre for major Fourth Generation Warriors (4 GW) –since India has always been a ready battleground for the al Qaida, Taliban, Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), Indian Mujahideen and its affiliates such as SIMI and Lashkar-e Taiba (LET), supported by the Pakistan Army and the ISI to wage attacks. The main thrust has been to create such conditions in J&K where its continuation with the Indian Union appears prohibitive to Indian polity. There have been multiple terrorist attacks against India which besides causing widespread loss of lives and property has caused wide spread polarisation between communities. Several train and marketplace attacks, across several Indian cities including Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore coinciding with religious festivals have been undertaken more for the purpose of impacting human minds and polarising the communities, than really for a few casualties. These and many more including the macabre drama in the Parliament were done to show the incompetence of the State to defend itself. Employment of Fourth Generation asymmetrical tools and irregular means to undermine commitment of India will continue to be her preferred strategy and regularity of this irregular war will continue to haunt India in time ahead.
The announcement by Ayman Al Zawahiri in setting up of Al Qaeda’s new terror wing for the Indian subcontinent to “raise the flag of jihad” and illusion of ‘Khorasan” now becomes even more significant. It appears that the Pakistani military is “stage-managing” the terror outfit’s latest advance into India. There is “no doubt” that the announcement of a terror wing of the Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent backed by the ISI will assume significance in future for India as the advantages of their actions will directly be reaped by the Adversary State – Pakistan.
Strategy Tactics and Technology:
4GW has moved much beyond the 26/11 paradigm. As known now, the means encompassed by 4GW go much beyond the military and include economic support to finance the movement, of which counterfeit currency, drug trade, money laundering facilitate support of terror activities. Subversion of youth, high pitch religious bigotry, instigating or raising of contentious issues, with the aim of disturbing public peace and keeping some region or other in turmoil through sub-conventional means, keep the networks active. Support to terrorists, their training and equipment, at levels comparable or even more advanced, than what is provided to our security forces keeps the pot boiling by providing the kinetic punch to their non-kinetic endeavours. Use of commercially available technology could be exploited for enhancing the impact of effect based operations. Following deductions therefore emerge:-
(a) 4GW is a return to the way war was fought before the rise of the state. Lines are blurring as there is no defined battlefield .Many different entities wage war through different forms and formats, for many different reasons but towards one purpose.
(b) Military campaigns supported by information operations are being supplanted by strategic communication campaign, supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations.
(c) Many different tools to fight war, employing irregular and asymmetric means and tactics are likely to be used to deal with the adversary. These may not be new and many could be standard guerrilla tactics.
Strategy and tactics used will be dictated by the disparity resulting in exploitation of weakness and undermining of strength.
(e) No state military has succeeded recently in defeating a non-state enemy. Jury is still out whether U.S. will succeed against ISIS?
Trends in Equipping of Forces for Combating 4GWs:
The US military’s commandos are among the most proficient and best kitted in the world in dealing with the fourth generation threats but to become even better, U.S. Special Operations Command recently issued a formal request for “Advancement of Technologies in Equipment for use by U.S. Special Operations Forces”. An examination of their requirement is instructive as it suggests their quest of capabilities for becoming even faster, lighter, deadlier force, which could then be examined for consideration by Indian Security Forces.
While Special Forces seek 338 Lapua magnum anti-materiel ammunition that would be fired from the Precision Sniper Rifle at ranges from 500m-1500m to penetrate Level IV body armour (500m Threshold, 800m Objective), their interest in purchase of Collapsible Concealable/ Take Down Urban Sniper Rifle (CUSR) continues. The CUSR is a small and light sniper rifle that can be rapidly disassembled for concealed carry and rapid reassembly by the operator to engage targets. Compatibility with current suppressors or use of suppressed barrels continues to be preferred.
Personnel Defense Weapon (PDW is significantly smaller and lighter than the M4A1) with capabilities beyond any pistol. There are two types of interest, those based on operator/unit armor modifications to a M4A1 carbine and those based on a unique weapon design, both of which must fire standard 5.56mm X 45mm NATO ammunition.
Small unit organic munitions capable of delivering highly accurate kinetic effects on stationary, moving, soft targets, on the interiors of hardened targets, at ranges beyond crew served weapons effective range, is being explored. Potential material approaches are likely to include guided 40mm tube launched grenades; self-propelled, precision-guided, handheld grenades; guided 84mm Carl Gustav munitions; and handheld guided kinetically armed unmanned aerial systems.
Technologies that stop/disable individuals for an extended duration and are less lethal and capable of being used on combatant and non combatant, continues to find favour with the Special Forces.
Heads-up Display (HUD) technology for day or night operations which can securely and wirelessly support full motion video data feeds besides supporting augmented reality; integrated sensors configurable with software applications (“apps”) also figures in the demand list. Such capabilities will enable soldiers to be networked through actionable battlefield information, by possessing map displays with situational awareness data. To enable processing speeds, requirement for boosted brainpower, via drugs or other means considered to be an advantage continues to be sought.
Indian Military Modernisation and Equipment Policy
Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme initiated by the Indian Army to modernize its 359 Infantry battalions and 66 associated RR battalions is moving forward at a snail’s pace. It was meant to provide a fully networked, all terrain, all weather personal equipment platforms with enhanced fire power and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future. It was to include a modular weapon with a thermal imaging sight. Under Barrel Grenade Launcher and Laser range finder were the additional components. A combat helmet equipped with a head up display and communication hand set; a smart vest with a body monitoring system; a back pack with an integrated GPS and radio and protective gear are expected to be a part of the complete programme. Replicating the U.S. Army Land Warrior programme, and being built around COTS components, it is expected to cost around Rs 50,000 crores with capability being sought urgently and on priority in the 12th plan. Capability for the soldiers will also include hand held surveillance and thermal imaging devices for observation at night. Standalone intrusion devices will also be needed in sufficient numbers. The DAC has already approved a new assault rifle of 5.56 calibre and a new generation carbine. The manufacturers who appear to be in race are IWI Galil Ace carbine, Italy’s Beretta with its ARX 160 and the United States Colt and Sig Saur offering the M4 AND 516 Patrol models. These weapons are undergoing the field trial. In the case of carbines the selected vendor will be required to transfer technology to the OFB to license build the weapon. The RFP for modular bullet proof vests and an equal number of helmets has already been issued and it seems that tenders for knee and elbow protection pads await finalisation. The search of Alternate NVD’s with FOM of 1800 continues. Over-all the F-INSAS programme of the Army and its mission of networking all entities will go a long way in building a counter network capabilities of war fighters in combating 4GW. Along-with the desire to acquire better weapons, thrust is also to seek new generation ammunition, multi spectral camouflage suits, battle -field management system and seek more UAVs and their upgrade in the field of communication and SATA capability.
The Special Forces whose tasking includes dealing with asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare and specialist operations have been equipped with modern weapon systems along with surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) devices as part of the capability enhancement to conduct their tasks. Equipping of Special Forces lags woefully behind, as packaged equipping of subunits has not taken place and critical equipment is yet to be provisioned. With new technology coming in, development of SF capability will continue to remain, a priority ongoing task. On similar lines a ‘Ghatak Brick’ has been authorised to each battalion for creating a composite package of additional capabilities. This up-gradation will facilitate the platoons to do their task with enhanced efficiency and comparative ease in conventional and sub-conventional operations.
The capability of Indian Army will be augmented by para-military and joint forces. Ten battalions of COBRA of CRPF are already ready and can be used for combating 4GW. Two battalions of National Security Guard could similarly be used for intelligence-led operations. Similarly Cyber Command, should it get established in the 12th Plan (2012-2017), will greatly contribute to military’s mission for dealing with these threats in the non-kinetic domain.
Future conflicts therefore are expected to be multi-model or multi-variant rather than through characterisation of one form of warfare. The construct involving more blurring and blending of war forms in combination of increasing irregular with regular with increasing probability, is what will be confronted by us.
Studies show that fourth generation tactics are rarely employed exclusively. Rather they exist side by side with the tactics of earlier generations. Therefore, it will be essential for military leaders and security experts to make an accurate analysis of how to deal with the problem of constructing a full spectrum capability.
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