Time could not be more opportune than now to focus on our Special Forces capability. The external threats of irregular war are looming large with some 300 plus Indian youth having joined the ISIS, Ayman Zawahri’s call to establish an India Wing of al Qaeda, Pakistan’s continued state policy of terrorism, Chinese indulgence in irregular war, US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and above all lack of international pressure on Pakistan to stop spawning terrorism. Condemnation of Pakistan is only lip service as Pakistan’s ISI will always retain the strategic potential to assist the West in its containment of Russia and China through her proxies, in tandem with her global terrorist links. Both Pakistan and the West know it and West will always forgive Pakistan all her trespasses as they did in the case of Osama bin Laden. This equation may only change if major catastrophe occurs in the West that is traced back to Pakistan. China too is optimising Pakistan’s this evil potential, in addition to herself directly indulging in irregular warfare. That is what led to Ashley Tellis of Carnegie Foundation say two years back, “India being continuously subjected to terror actually suits many …… India is a sponge that absorbs terrorism.”
Expansion of Special Forces
Globally, expansion of Special Forces follows a set of norms, explicitly followed by developed countries with modern armies and Special Forces. Significantly, expansion of Chinese Special Forces too has been undertaken in very controlled fashion. These norms are: one, Special Forces cannot be mass produced; two, quality is better than quantity; three, humans are more important than hardware, and; competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. Expansion of Special Forces in foreign militaries is very deliberate. In the case of US Special Forces, authorised annual expansion rate in the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is fixed at 1.8 percent. However, additional bids can be made which are considered as on the basis of requirement.
For example, Admiral Olsen, then Commander SOCOM had bid for 2.5 percent expansion in 2011 because of global engagements including in Afghanistan and Middle East. Similarly, his successor Admiral McRaven, who oversaw the Abbotabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden, had asked for an addition of 3000 due to increased responsibilities, but this included support elements also. The ratio of ‘support elements’ including civilian teams (like for psychological operations) is two third to one third, latter being actual Special Forces operatives – the cutting edge.
The US SOCOM strength stands today at about 66,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defence (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified command. In February 2014, DOD issued the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2014 QDR called for 3,700 personnel to be added to the SOCOM strength but SOCOM’s FY 2014-2015 budget request of $ 9.913 billion though with four percent reduction over the previous year may not be met completely. This proposed expansion is in accordance with SOCOM proposal to be given additional responsibility for synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, employment of special operations forces globally, broader responsibility beyond counter-terrorism activities, to include activities against other threat networks. Even with the additions, the actual Special Forces operatives would just amount to some 22,000 approximately 660 special operations teams (includes, Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) platoons.
Chinese Special Forces numbering an estimated 14,000 are specialized in rapid reaction combat in a limited regional war under high-tech conditions, commando operations, counter-terrorism, and intelligence gathering. They are organized in a number of units and sub-units like: Guangzhou Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1988 and expanded in 2000 as first PLA special operations unit capable of air, sea and land operations; Chengdu Military Region Special Forces Unit established in 1992 and specialized in target surveillance, target designation, airborne insertion, sabotage, offensive strike, rescue, and has experimented new concepts, tactics, equipments including digitized army soldier system and high-mobility land weapon platforms; Beijing Military Region Special Forces Unit established in early 1990s and holds high-tech equipment including UAVs, modern demolitions, laser designators and laser dazzlers; Shenyang Military Region Special Forces Unit; Nanjing Military Region Special Forces Units (two of them), Hong Kong Special Operations Company known as five minute Response Unit; and the Macau Quick Reaction Platoon. In conflict scenarios, Chinese Special Forces will likely be deployed in conjunction with China’s Airborne Corps. However, in non-war period Chinese Special Forces would be covertly deployed for information support operations, strategic surveillance, training, arming and advising dissident / terrorist / insurgent groups in target countries, and perception management.
Indian Special Forces
The major part of the Indian Special Forces comes from the Army. Then there are the Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Navy, the Garud of the Air Force, the Special Groups of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and the Special Action Groups of the National Security Guard (NSG). Rapid expansion has taken place in recent years and is still ongoing – all racing up to match the numbers of cutting edge Special Forces of SOCOM without taking into account global employment of US-SF vis-à-vis our inward policy of not deploying Special Forces abroad other than on UN missions, the only exception being deploying all the then three para-commando (later renamed Special Forces) battalions under the IPKF in Sri Lanka. There is an apparent void of a holistic appreciation at the national level to question: what magnitude of Special Forces does India require; with our tendency to numerically go on expanding our Special Forces numbering those of the USA, where are we in terms of resources and technology compared to them; would it be more prudent to have smaller Special Forces with effective reach within areas of ‘our’ strategic interest; should we not optimize our Special Forces potential with available technology and indigenous content, and; what deliberations are required in selection of manpower, equipping, training and most importantly command and control?
Army Special Forces
Ironically, the Army Special Forces went in for a 120 percent increase during period 2001-2004 including converting three Parachute battalions to Special Forces and adding the fourth assault team in all Special Forces units, completely disregarding the global norms with regard to expansion of Special Forces. This rapid expansion was pushed through by two successive Colonels of the Parachute Regiment (both never having served in Special Forces) to somehow convert the entire Parachute Regiment to Special Forces with the aim that every paratrooper gets entitled to the Special Forces Allowance and gets to wear the distinctive ‘Balidan’ badge authorized to the Special Forces personnel, throwing to the wind the consequences of such rapid expansion and the shortage it would create in number of parachute battalions, now being rectified by raising additional units of this category since regular turnouts in the Parachute Brigade became impossible and parachute battalions were going without counter insurgency experience from six to nine years at a stretch.
The rapid expansion was actually set in motion during the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by somehow convincing that the US had deployed some 20,000 US-SF in operations by counting operations by US Airborne Divisions, who actually were not Special Forces in the first place. But this was not all.
Discounting a 2001 comprehensive study on modernisation of Indian Army’s Special Forces that was approved along with the recommendation to consolidate on existing number of Special Forces, the then Colonel of the Parachute Regiment who also had never served with Special Forces headed a study to recommend that every army Corps should have its own Special Forces battalion – a case of gross misunderstanding of establishment of effective Special Forces and more importantly complete lack of sense about strategic employment of Special Forces in 21st century conflict environment. As a result, the Army already has nine Special Forces battalions and establishment of the tenth one is on the anvil. But the fallout of the rapid expansion has been adverse.
Manpower
Every time an additional Special Forces unit is created, existing Special Forces are required to provide a nucleus of officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. This breaks the cohesion of existing units, a fact not well understood by anyone who has not served with Special Forces, since even continuity in a five man assault squad contributes to success of missions.
Then is the shortage of officers. First, the Special Forces units are already sharing the poverty of shortage of officers within the army. Then shedding officers to new units is taxing especially these are young majors and captains who have been in operations, and most importantly when almost all Special Forces units are not even posted with one third of the authorised strength of 48 officers. Less the officers, less will be the combat output since Special Forces operations are designed for precision and high gains through officer led small subunits, lowest being the five-man assault squad not counting still smaller two-man surveillance missions. The Special Forces battalions are almost down to the void of one assault team.
Hardware
Planners need to understand that Special Forces equipping must be ‘packaged’. The concept of ‘packaged equipping’ simply implies that equipping cannot be piecemeal. For example, if an assault squad is authorized ‘X’ weapons and ‘Y’ equipment, all of them have to be provisioned together if the expected mission outcome and combat capability is to be achieved. For example, hand-held laser target designators have been authorized to army’s Special Forces since last 10 years but have not been provisioned yet. The army has also had the problem of re-supply / replacement of imported special equipment since concurrent action of ‘introducing’ the equipment into service has not been taking place. There is apparent lack of forethought and standardisation of equipment as well, leave aside measures like centralised special equipment procurement for the military and similarly for the non-military Special Forces.
The absence of corner shots with the NSG employed during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack was conspicuous although this equipment was held with the Special Group of the SFF for past few years. Surveillance, communications and night- vision equipment though authorised can be improved both in quality and quantity. When the Tavor assault rifles were initially contracted, only one night-vision was bought per four assault rifles knowing full well every Special Forces operative’s assault rifle must have a night sight. Mercifully, this folly was rectified subsequently. Presently, equipping voids exist from the very basic to bigger operational requirements.
The basic rucksack provided officially is as inferior as the basic web equipment that was supplied to the army with much fanfare. The material was so inferior and the stitching thread so inferior that first time a soldier went through the obstacle course, it ripped open in places. Special Forces units are presently using their own funds to buy good quality rucksacks. Similarly, no worthwhile rappelling gloves and rappelling ropes are officially supplied, both in quality and quantity.
A major void exists in the provision of a battlefield information system that would enable multiple Special Forces detachments operating widespread over long distance and deep inside enemy territory communicating with a special operations command post at the parent battalion headquarters, Corps level FMCP and directly to the air-force for calling airstrikes including armed UAV’s. Equipping should be viewed in the backdrop that they must have all weather, all terrain operability and survival capacity for strategic tasks including surveillance and target designation in areas of our strategic interest.
Akin to shedding officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers to new raisings, the hardware of Special Forces units has taken a heavy toll on their combat potential especially when coupled with existing and never ending equipment voids and shortages. Worst hit is the holding of Tavor Assault Rifles and the ammunition as replacements are not forthcoming. So each Special Forces unit has shortages of Tavor assault rifles, made up with AK 47s in some case. But the worst problem is severe shortages in supply of training ammunition for this rifle which is entirely dependent on import and not even 50 percent of the annual requirement is being met. There is also a ‘complete void’ against authorised quantities of hardware, major ones being: heavy machine guns; underwater rifles; 60 mm mortars, disposable anti-tank rocket launchers; disposable flame throwers; satellite phones; airborne SAR systems; VHF repeaters; solar panels for charging; light strike vehicles; GP delivery system (GPADS) 2 ton category; GPADS 4 ton category; underwater cameras; underwater driver propulsion vehicles; digital compasses; GPSs; laser target designators; video cameras for HX transmission; still cameras for HX transmission; night scope with adapter; remote detonator transmitters; remote detonator receivers, and; radio controlled detonators.
In addition, major deficiencies exist in: assault rifles with night sights; GPMG with night sights; AGL with night sights; 40 mm UBGL; pistols; ATGM with TI; SAM with night sight: carbines with night sight; tactical computers; ground to air LUP; radio transmitter beacons; combat military free-fall parachutes and compatible oxygen equipment; high resolution binoculars; passive night vision binoculars; night vision binoculars with communication and range finder; HHTIs, and; passive night vision goggles.
On balance
The Army has periodically toyed with the ideas of raising more armoured regiments with just 30 tanks instead of the 46 presently authorized and even raising more infantry battalions with three rifle companies instead of the authorised four rifle companies. Luckily these idiocies were not put into effect. However in going in for rapid expansion of Special Forces, the army has landed up doing just that. The utter neglect to equipping can be gauged from above. There is little movement on the equipment front and no provision of a separate Special Forces Budget as most countries have.
Special Forces units in Northern Command are slightly better off because they can get some special equipment through Army Commander’s Special Financial Powers but this too is ad-hoc arrangement. There is no concept of ‘support elements’ and integral or dedicated insertion/extraction means either. Ironically, no corresponding increase in advance specialist training facilities has been undertaken either. Rapid expansion ignoring global Special Forces norms has proved to be a recipe for diluting the manpower of Special Forces, their equipping and most importantly their overall combat capacity.
No comments:
Post a Comment