23 Jan , 2015
In the foreseeable future extending up to the next 20 years or so, the IAF will have to prepare for the eventuality of a hostile adversary continuing a low intensity campaign using expendable manpower and based on inexpensive low level “donkey, tent and AK-47 technology”. Due to national political compulsions, it is likely to be a reactive defense on the part of the IAF, with restrictions on cross border retaliation. We need to develop a response which uses available technology to make the tasks of intelligence gathering, target acquisition and neutralisation easier without suffering avoidable casualties.
Weapons of greater accuracy and lethality are an answer to increased vulnerability…
In the mythology of a number of religions, the aerial weapon of the Gods has been frequently mentioned as the ultimate weapon. For example, the Vajra of Indra – “Aayudham Aham Vajram – Of all weapons, I am the Thunderbolt”. In modern times, the air delivered weapon had to perforce wait for the invention of the carrier or launch vehicle, the aircraft, since mere mortals cannot hurl thunderbolts from the skies by themselves.
Evolution and Development
World War I saw the emergence of the aircraft as a weapon system. Starting with unarmed visual reconnaissance, aircraft were soon fitted with machine guns. Efforts to position the aircraft to enable the weapon to bear on enemy aircraft led to the evolution of air combat tactics. Air-to-surface weapons started off as grenades and small bombs dropped over the side of the cockpit by hand to target enemy forces on the ground. By the end of this war, large aircraft and airships capable of carrying heavy bombs were in service and the “Thunderbolt” of antiquity began to come closer to reality.
Between the two World Wars, rapid firing machine guns, cannons, unguided rockets for air-to-air and air-to-surface use, high explosive, armour piercing, fragmentation and incendiary bombs as well as mines and torpedoes entered the inventories of major powers. World War II saw all these being used extensively. Towards the later stages of the war, some types of air-to-surface guided weapons made their appearance in limited numbers and effectiveness. The culmination was the use of air-dropped unguided atomic fission bombs on Japanese cities in August 1945.
The post-war years have seen the emergence of guided weapons, in the air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air roles. In the early years of the cold war, the high altitude manned bomber carrying unguided thermonuclear weapons was the biggest threat. The air-to-air guided missile evolved to counter it. The United States Air Force (USAF) even developed an unguided air-to-air nuclear armed rocket. Vietnam and the Arab–Israeli wars showed that the aircraft cannon was essential in close range air combat. Subsequent development has included integral guns in all fighter aircraft. The Indian Air Force (IAF) realised the disadvantage of not having integral guns in its fleet of MiG-21 combat aircraft during the 1965 and 1971 wars.
In the post-war years, helicopters began to be armed with air-to-surface weapons. When air-to-air guided weapons emerged on the scene, these were also fitted on selected rotary wing platforms giving them a limited air-to-air combat capability.
In Vietnam, the USAF used modified C-47 and C-130 transport aircraft with side-mounted traversing Gatling guns and even heavier caliber 105mm guns to provide supporting fire to ground forces. In 2013, the European Aermacchi group began trials of a gunship version of their C-27J Spartan twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. In a scenario of opposing forces deploying man-portable passive Infra Red (IR) sensor equipped SAMs, the vulnerability of such relatively large and slow moving fixed-wing transport aircraft is of concern.
World War I saw the emergence of the aircraft as a weapon system…
Aircraft costs have shot up astronomically and the ability of even major powers to deploy thousands of aircraft, as they had in World War II, receded into history. Defence against aircraft, both by aerial platforms and surface-based weapons systems, coupled with advances in detection technology increased the vulnerability of attacking aircraft to a greater extent than their ability to evade or absorb battle damage. Reduction in numbers of aircraft available worsened the situation.
The consequences were two-fold. Firstly, the aircraft had to evade surface-based defences of greater lethality by limiting exposure time and by staying further away from the target, although this would markedly reduce the accuracy and destructive power of air-to-surface weapons. Secondly, the amount of air delivered weapons carried by an aircraft would have to increase since the number of aircraft available had reduced. In the air-to-air scenario, an aircraft with inferior performance but operating under a better air defence detection and control system, would be able to achieve a positional advantage over a more capable aircraft and could inflict fatal damage on its adversary. The advantage that sheer numbers confer began to diminish as the inventories of combatants began to reduce. This trend is likely to accelerate in future with costs increasing exponentially.
UAV designs for high speed flight, agility and load carrying capabilities akin to manned aircraft are already being developed…
Increase in attrition rates in air-to-surface attacks began to be evident starting from WW II. In the Vietnam War, sophisticated US aircraft took significant losses from light and heavy machine guns and WW II vintage anti-aircraft weapons of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. A repeat on a smaller scale took place in Afghanistan where man-portable SAMs also made their battle debut. The only plus point if it can be called that, is that conventional or nuclear wars may not last long since evenly matched combatants would have destroyed one another in a short time or run out of resources. Long drawn conflicts between asymmetric forces have dragged on for years – Vietnam and Afghanistan, with Iraq joining the list now.
Weapons of greater accuracy and lethality are an answer to increased vulnerability. Accuracy degradation in combat has very often been underestimated by planners who have based weapons effect calculations on peacetime results where the target on a familiar peacetime training range is not shooting back! Training can only reduce errors to some extent. To eliminate most human error factors, some form automation of weapons delivery followed by post-release guidance is the only sure answer. This led to the start of development of guided weapons during the later stages of WW II.
The other answer is to stay outside the kill envelope of enemy defence weapons or at least minimize the time spent in this envelope. This obviously calls for releasing at longer ranges from the target and having weapons that could reach and accurately hit targets from these extended ranges. Dubbed as stand-off weapons, these weapons had the ability to accurately acquire the target from longer ranges. Making post-release guidance independent of the launch aircraft, the fire-and-forget concept also minimizes exposure time. Early acquisition at greater-than-visual acquisition ranges using electronic systems and post-release guidance offer another solution.
Weaponisation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for the air-to-ground strike role is already an operational reality…
Night fighting capabilities and adverse weather capabilities on land, at sea and in the air were virtually non-existent in WW I and developed slowly in WW II. It has become the norm in modern wars so that military action now is not as restricted by terrain or visibility as was the case even 25 years ago. This ability requires sophisticated target acquisition capabilities coupled with weapons that can achieve accurate results without endangering friendly forces in conditions where surface and air forces operate at night and in adverse weather.
The Present and Near Future
Modern air forces have the above capabilities to a lesser or greater extent depending on their technological sophistication and training levels. Most air superiority aircraft have strike role capability as well as close air support capability since dedicated aircraft for each role is a luxury most Air Forces cannot afford.
Weaponisation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for the air-to-ground strike role is already an operational reality and combat validated. Trials of integration with manned aircraft and carrier operations have been successful. UAV designs for high speed flight, agility and load carrying capabilities akin to manned aircraft are already being developed. A revolutionary concept called the FQ-X which envisages the development of an autonomous robotic air combat drone has been mooted. If similar weapons that are carried on manned aircraft can be delivered by remote human control and by intelligent systems even acting without human interaction, operational flexibility increases manifold.
Various Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Pictured are (front to back, left to right) RQ-11A Raven, Evolution, Dragon Eye, NASA FLIC, Arcturus T-15, Skylark, Tern, RQ-2B Pioneer, and Neptune.
Air-delivered weapons have been automated to an extent that target acquisition, weapons launch and guidance till impact require no human inputs. Getting the launch platform to the combat zone and recovering it to base is being done daily in routine UAV operations with limited human inputs. If both processes get fully automated, only target selection and attack decisions will require human intervention. The world over there has been an increase of conflicts where ground intervention is not a viable option. UAVs are increasingly being used is such situations. The UAV will evolve to be as potent as a manned aircraft in the strike role at first and inevitably in the air superiority role later. All air-delivered weapons can be UAV-delivered with no modifications to the weapons themselves.
Reactive crisis management is a good skill but as a fall back option and not as a substitute for flawed threat assessment…
The cost of manned aircraft has a significant element which has to cater for life support systems and redundancies for crew safety. UAVs can do without this, thus reducing costs as their development advances. The political leadership will be able to use plausible deniability and system failure to explain when things go wrong in UAV operations and there will be no risks with own personnel being killed or captured. They will certainly be a major force multiplier provided UAV weapon capabilities match those of manned aircraft.
The Path Ahead for the IAF
Up to the end of the 1965 conflict and to some extent in 1971, the IAF had limited all-weather and night capability. The IAF had WW II vintage weapons on aircraft of a later generation thereby restricting the latter’s full potential. This was partly because acquiring state-of-the-art weapons took a back seat when compared to the IAF’s quest for state-of-the-art flying platforms. This malaise is common to all three Services.
The IAF went to war in 1965 with WW II weapons barring the Soviet K 13 IR air-to-air missile which was ineffective in close range air combat. 1971 was more or less a repeat. Ground-based air defence weapons of the adversary were not state-of-the-art and so we could prevail with some innovations. In Kargil, in 1991, we found that unguided rockets had neither the accuracies nor the capabilities to perform as expected at high altitudes. Usage of precision guided bombs, the latest weapons in our inventory, was effective but only after some out-of-the-box innovations were employed to correct weapons errors at high altitudes. We should have foreseen that there was a possibility of conflict in our high altitude border terrain and validated our weapons before the conflict, not during it. Reactive crisis management is a good skill but as a fall back option and not as a substitute for flawed threat assessment.
The IAF went to war in 1965 with WW II weapons barring the Soviet K 13 IR air-to-air missile which was ineffective in close range air combat…
In the foreseeable future extending up to the next 20 years or so, the IAF will have to prepare for the eventuality of a hostile adversary continuing a low intensity campaign using expendable manpower and based on inexpensive low level “donkey, tent and AK-47 technology”. Due to national political compulsions, it is likely to be a reactive defense on the part of the IAF, with restrictions on cross border retaliation. We need to develop a response which uses available technology to make the tasks of intelligence gathering, target acquisition and neutralisation easier without suffering avoidable casualties.
UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition and armed UAVs with unguided rockets can support counter insurgency forces on our borders. If the intensity of border skirmishes escalates as it did in Kargil, UAVs can firstly cover far more area faster in the reconnaissance role than foot patrols and armed with rockets, can provide critical fire support at short notice when compared to artillery, provided the capability is validated beforehand in peace time. If the option of cross-border interdiction of staging areas is allowed, the first option could be UAVs armed with precision guided munitions such as laser guided missiles and laser guided bombs. This provides the IAF with a graduated escalation option with the ability to use the same type of weapons to achieve similar results as with manned aircraft. This is nothing new and is being done in conflict zones in Iraq and Afghanistan now.
The other contingency is a short duration armed conflict in the West or the North or both along with conflict at sea. This is a conventional war and all options barring a nuclear first strike one are available. Considering the capabilities of the likely adversaries, use of precision guided stand-off weapons including cruise missiles in the air-to-surface strike role is inescapable to ensure results while avoiding unacceptable attrition levels. This is essential in attacks on strategic assets and in deep strike and interdiction since targets will be heavily defended. Attacks at low levels even by night with weapons which require attacking aircraft to overfly their targets caused unacceptable levels of attrition way back in the Iraq war in 1991 and are definitely not workable now.
Military might cannot be built up at the cost of a nation’s economic survival…
For close air support especially in the plains with enemy armoured and mechanised forces present, attacks using short-range unguided rockets, guns and free fall as well as retarded unguided bombs will not be viable except in rare cases. Precision guided missiles with stand-off capability, cluster weapons with a guidance capability (the Joint Stand-off Weapon type is an example) and with either target illumination provided by UAVs, ground- based devices or by aircraft at stand-off ranges will be needed. In areas with lower threat levels or in situations where enemy ground defences have been suppressed by stand-off weapons, attacks at closer ranges with unguided weapons may be possible as also the use of helicopters in the strike role. Helicopter gunships are likely to be effective in surprise attacks on targets with lower levels of air defence protection, such as forward located early warning radars.
In the mountains, stand-off and precision guided weapons are an asset since attacking aircraft do not have constraints of positioning for weapons delivery imposed by having to be close to uneven terrain. They can also stay clear of the kill envelopes of air defence systems on high ground. The requirement is to validate the effectiveness of weapons at high altitude beforehand.
In the air-to-air scenario, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and airborne surveillance and Battle Management Systems are high value targets operating within secure airspace under SAM and fighter cover. These high value targets need to be attacked by long and medium range air-to-air missiles with initial guidance by external radar or other sources and final target acquisition by active radar and passive radar homers and IR seekers on the missile. The aim is to at least force the AWACS to shut down its radar, take evasive action and exit the area so that guidance to its own aircraft is lost.
In the Indian context of a war in the West, the lack of geographical depth of that country will force their AWACS assets to their Western borders and beyond if they are to be safe from such attacks. In the North, the adversary AWACS will have blind spots in the valleys leading to the Tibetan plateau unless it is well forward where it can be threatened by long range missiles. For combat at closer ranges, missiles with active built-in radar guidance and shorter range, all-aspect IR homing missiles are needed and are now available. All our fighters also have integral cannon armament.
Air-launched weapons modernisation, acquisition and local R&D have taken a back seat for far too long…
As far as specialist weapons go, radar homing air-to-ground missiles are needed for neutralising surveillance, target acquisition and SAM radars. Thermobaric bombs with fuel air explosives are capable of creating blast over pressures and temperatures close to that produced by tactical nuclear weapons. These are effective against exposed personnel, vehicles and structures. Smart area weapons with sub munitions and stand-off launch capabilities are already entering our inventory. Kits to convert unguided bombs to precision munitions with standoff capabilities such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) with GPS and inertial navigation need to be inducted. Weapons are also required to penetrate fortified and buried structures such as command complexes, missile silos, nuclear weapons storage sites and dams.
In a nuclear scenario, air-launched nuclear weapons are difficult to neutralise before launch since launch aircraft have mobility at high speeds making detection difficult when compared to ground-based platforms. Submarine-based platforms will always be in limited numbers.
Weapons development in India has a dismal history. The IAF still does not have an IR air-to-air missile of local origin deployed. The same is the case with medium and long range missiles. Specialist weapons such as thermo-baric bombs, precision cluster munitions and deep penetration bombs have to be developed locally if we are to have the required numbers available. We could at least divert some more effort towards setting up local sources for smart and specialist weapons.
The IAF does not need another conflict to speed up modernisation efforts in this vital area…
Smart weapons and missiles have much shorter storage lives than older weapons especially as far as propellants and warheads are concerned. Modular designs may be an answer in reducing replacement costs. Stockpiles are therefore low and resupply interruptions by foreign suppliers during conflict situations can cripple our capabilities. The IAF has to develop capabilities in-house and in most cases, the technology is not as complex as stealth aircraft design or spacecraft engine design.
Ultimately, warfare, as almost any other human activity, is influenced by economics. The erstwhile Soviet Union was driven to its break-up partly because it expended national resources beyond sustainable limits in an arms race. Saying that one must have the best weapons in large quantities is fine, but it is never achievable because in the final analysis, military might cannot be built up at the cost of a nation’s economic survival. Political and military decision makers have to strike an appropriate balance.
All the latest generation combat aircraft with fancy performance characteristics are just air show items if they cannot deliver weapons on the target effectively. Air-launched weapons modernisation, acquisition and local R&D have taken a back seat for far too long. The IAF does not need another conflict to speed up modernisation efforts in this vital area.
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