How internet is helping the ‘Islamic State’

Robert Fisk

The Isis has turned the internet into the most effective propaganda tool ever. Propaganda war of Islamic extremists is being waged on Facebook and internet message boards, not mosques

Smoke rises from the Syrian town of Ain al-Arab, known as Kobane by the Kurds, after a strike from the US-led coalition.

EVER since the Pentagon started talking about Isis as apocalyptic, I've suspected that websites and blogs and YouTube are taking over from reality. I'm even wondering whether "Isis" - or Islamic State or Isil, here we go again - isn't more real on the internet than it is on the ground. Not, of course, for the Kurds of Kobani or the Yazidis or the beheaded victims of this weird caliphate. But isn't it time we woke up to the fact that internet addiction in politics and war is even more dangerous than hard drugs?

Over and over, we have the evidence that it is not Isis that "radicalises" Muslims before they head off to Syria - and how I wish David Cameron would stop using that word - but the internet. The belief, the absolute conviction that the screen contains truth - that the "message" really is the ultimate verity - has still not been fully recognised for what it is; an extraordinary lapse in our critical consciousness that exposes us to the rawest of emotions - both total love and total hatred - without the means to correct this imbalance. The "virtual" has dropped out of "virtual reality".

Dangerous forum

At its most basic, you have only to read the viciousness of internet chatrooms. Major newspapers - hopelessly late - have only now started to realise that chatrooms are not a new technical version of "Letters to the Editor" but a dangerous forum for people to let loose their most-disturbing characteristics. Thus a major political shift in the Middle East, transferred to the internet, takes on cataclysmic proportions. Our leaders not only can be transfixed themselves - the chairman of the US House Committee on Homeland Security, for example, last week brandishing a printed version of Dabiq, the Isis online magazine - but can use the same means to terrify us.

Laptop and jihad

Stripped of any critical faultline, we are cowed into silence by the "barbarity" of Isis, the "evil" of Isis which has - in the truly infantile words of the Australian Prime Minister - "declared war on the world". The television news strip across the bottom of the screen now supplies a ripple of these expressions, leaving out grammar and, all too often, verbs. We have grown so used to the narrative whereby a Muslim is "radicalised" by a preacher at a mosque, and then sets off on jihad, that we do not realise that the laptop is playing this role.

In Lebanon, for example, there is some evidence that pictures on YouTube have just as much influence upon Muslims who suddenly decide to travel to Syria and Iraq as do Sunni preachers. Photographs of Sunni Muslim victims - or of the "execution" of their supposedly apostate enemies - have a powerful impact out of all proportion to words on their own.

ISIS Flags in Kashmir: Dangers ensconced in mass appeal

ByDanvir Singh

16 Oct , 2014

ISIS Flags appeared in Kashmir during protests after Eid prayers

On Oct 14, Indians were shocked by the visuals on their television sets of a stone pelting ritual in Srinagar. An event generally played out after the Friday prayers, however this time occurring on a Tuesday. This not being the only difference, the stone palters also waved Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) flags alongside a Pakistani flag. The Jammu & Kashmir chief minister, Mr Omar Abdullah however denied the presence of ISIS elements in the state. He stated that the waving of ISIS flag in the valley was just an act by “some idiots” that “unfortunately” caught the media’s attention.

It is not a mere coincidence that the fugitive Al-Qaeda commander Ayman al-Zawahari announced the formation of a new wing of the feared terrorist group dedicated to waging jihad in the Indian subcontinent just a month ago.

I wonder if this could be taken so inconsequentially. But then on the downside of democracy, protracted apathy and inaction on the issue of security due to varied political compulsions is a reality. The incident of Oct 14 should therefore not be viewed in isolation; rather it should be clubbed with the ideological dynamics of Islamic State and Al Qaeda.

It is not a mere coincidence that the fugitive Al-Qaeda commander Ayman al-Zawahari announced the formation of a new wing of the feared terrorist group dedicated to waging jihad in the Indian subcontinent just a month ago in September this year. The new branch, he says is in particular “a message that we did not forget you, our Muslim brothers in India”. He says al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS, “break all borders created by Britain in India”, and called on all Muslims in the region to “unite under the credo of the one god”.

Many would say it was a desperate attempt to revive the fading influence of Al Qaeda in face of the lightening gains of ISIS in the recent months. I tend to agree here to Muhamad Amir Rana, a commentator on strategic affairs from Pakistan who thinks that any analysis to suggest a decline of al Qaeda in the rise of ISIS, while analysing the recent developments happening in Iraq and Syria is a mistake. He says, they may have differences over strategies but ultimately they will overcome these. Al Qaeda might feel stunned over the ‘victories’ of ISIS but now, instead of arguing with ISIS over strategies, they will prefer to develop a consensus over a model of caliphate.

For us Indians we need to understand and identify the cord that connects the ISIS to Al Qaeda and relevance of Kashmir in their concept of political Islam. Their intended aim they plan to achieve by convincing the innocent Muslim youth through their stylized interpretation of Ahadiths. It is only then we will realize that the Tuesday’s display of ISIS flags is not the handy work of a few idiots as claimed by Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir but far more than what meets the eye.

…the Tuesday’s display of ISIS flags is not the handy work of a few idiots as claimed by Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir but far more than what meets the eye.

In these Ahadiths of Islamic Prophecies the reference of Khorasan is something that connects these organizations and establishes a links with the Kashmiris. To make this argument, we need to refer to three Ahadiths interpreted by Islamic scholars from Pakistan in trying to justify Islamic Caliphate.

One “Narrated by Abdur Rehman Al-Jarshi that I heard companion of Prophet (SAW), Hazrat Amr Bin Marra Al-Jamli (RA) that Prophet (SAW) said: Surely Black Flags will appear from the Khorasan until the people (under the leadership of this flag) will tie their horses with the Olive Trees between Bait-e-Lahya and Harasta. We asked are there any Olive trees between these places: He said, “If there isn’t then soon it will grow so that those people (of Khorasan) will come and tie their horses there.” [1]

Two“Abu Huraira (RA) says that Rasul-Ullah (SAW) said: (Armies carrying) black flags will come from Khorasan, no power will be able to stop them and they will finally reach Eela (Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) where they will erect their flags” [2]

Three“Anas ibn Malik narrated that Allah’s Apostle (peace be upon him) said: The Dajjal would be followed by seventy thousand Jews of Isfahan wearing Persian shawls.” [3]

Going by the analysis of these Islamic prophecies the territories of Khorasan that lay North of Hindukush in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Western Iran is that place indicated by the Prophet where Medhi will raise an army of believers and march across the Middle East to reclaim Israel. In these prophecies the Pathans living South of Hindukush and Kashmiris in the Valley are the displaced Khorasais who will form part of this army.

Indian Government Plans Highway Along Disputed China Border

By Ankit Panda

October 16, 2014

The Indian government announced a proposal for a 1,800 km road along the disputed Arunachal Pradesh border with China.

The Indian government will continue a spate of development activity in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh by building a 1,800 km long highway that will run parallel to the Chinese border. Arunachal Pradesh is administered by India, but is the subject of a territorial dispute between India and China — China claims almost the entirety of the state as its territory. The highway — currently a Home Ministry proposal — follows up on recently announced plans by India’s new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to encourage settlements in the disputed region as well as major infrastructure projects amount to $830 million.

According to the Indian Express, the initiative, like other plans for India’s northeastern development, was put forward by Home Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju. Rijiju, a native of India’s northeast, has been outspoken about actively countering what he perceives as Chinese attempts to gradually assert a claim to Arunachal Pradesh. Rijiju, in an interview in September, noted that India “will not sacrifice any portion of our territory. Unlike in the past, Chinese military would come inside and we would surrender and keep quiet. It is not like that now. We will not show any weakness.” Current reports indicate that the highway would pass through the following border areas of Arunachal Pradesh: Tawang, East Kameng, Upper Subansiri, West Siang, Upper Siang, Dibang Valley, Desali, Chaglagam, Kibito, Dong, Hawai and Vijaynagar.

Rijiju notes that constructing the highway will be a challenge: “The construction of the road will be a huge challenge considering the rough and hostile terrain, mostly snow-fed, through which it would pass, and will be the biggest single infrastructure project in the history of India with an estimated cost of over Rs 40,000 crore (approximately $6.5 billion).” During its second term, India’s previous government began a highway construction project in Arunchal that is lagging behind considerably due to these factors. Only 230 km of a planned 2,400 km of that highway has been completed. “The aim is to construct a seamless travel from one part of the state to another. As the terrain is not smooth along the border areas, we will intersect the highway with tunnels so that the link is not broken anywhere,” noted another Home Ministry official.

India’s decision to construct this highway mirrors China’s strategy to bolster its claim to Arunachal Pradesh by constructing highways in southern Tibet. For example, in November 2013, a week after India and China signed a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement to prevent misunderstandings and create deescalation mechanisms on their border, Beijing announced the completion of a highway linking Medog in Tibet with the rest of China. Given New Delhi’s historic reluctance to promote infrastructure development in Arunachal Pradesh, particularly under past Congress governments, China embarked on several construction and infrastructure projects on its side of the disputed border to assert a stronger administrative claim to the territory. India’s new government seems to see the value in this strategy and is putting considerable capital toward developing Arunachal Pradesh.

Al Qaeda’s India Threat

ByLt Gen Prakash Katoch

15 Oct , 2014

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Immediately post Ayman al-Zawahiri announcing establishment of an India Wing of Al Qaeda, prompt came a US media report quoting US counter-terrorism expert Bergen that there is no evidence of Al Qaeda presence in India. Interestingly, link to this news report was pasted on Twitter by a Pakistani national with the comment that other similar US experts had said not long back that there is no ISIS in Syria. Al-Zawahiri’s video broadcast was reportedly from a location close to the Af-Pak border, most likely inside Pakistan. With the hospitality extended to Osama-bin-Laden, there is no reason why al-Zawahiri would not be lodged in a ‘safer’ safe house than what Laden had.

Experts question the video message of al-Zawahiri; some speculating this could be on ISI instance to divert attention from an imploding Pakistan, others feeling it would not be easy for Al Qaeda to establish in India.

Al-Zawahiri said it had taken two years to unite various Mujahideen groups in India, while nominating Asim Umar, a Pakistani radical Al Qaeda’s South Asia head. Shaped in radicalized seminaries and madrassas of Pakistan, Asim Umar distinguished himself by facilitating Osama-bin-Laden’s covert move to the safe-house in Abbotabad till Seal Team 6 killed him. Umar is tasked with Al Qaeda operations from Afghanistan to Myanmar, his mother organization HUJI having cells in Kashmir, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Al-Zawahiri had earlier warned his fighters against attacking Sikhs, Hindus and other religious groups, saying Al Qaeda’s only interest in India was Kashmir. But in recent times Sikhs are being forced to flee Afghanistan and being killed in cold blood in Peshawar right under the nose of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) that came up with radical support. Not very long back Imran Khan himself was voicing support for rule of Sharia – read Islamic Caliphate, not democracy.

Recently, a report by Dean Nelson in the Telegraph said the newly formed India Wing of Al Qaeda attacked what they believed was an American aircraft carrier with the intention of taking it into custody, but instead found a Pakistan Navy frigate and suffered three killed and four captured dismally failing in the attempt, while two Pakistani navy guards were wounded. This is unlike Al Qaeda operations. Why would the India group strike a Pak frigate so poorly in Karachi when al-Zawahiri has access to the ISI directly as well as through the Haqqani Network? Besides it is known that Al Qaeda had trained its fighters with the Sea Tigers of LTTE years back and as early as 12 October 2000 had undertaken suicide bombing of US Navy’s guided missile destroyer (USS Cole) killing 17 US sailors, injuring 39 and creating a 40 feet by 60 feet gash on port side of the ship.

The report emanating from Islamabad in the Telegraph was likely mere ISI propaganda, reinforced by another contradictory report two days later that the Pakistani frigate had actually been seized by Al Qaeda fighters.

Would it not be outright stupid to ignore this (PFI) Al Qaeda base which is lying dormant perhaps in accordance with an overall plan that would be activated at the chosen moment?

Simultaneous to raising Taliban in Pakistan to oust Soviets from Afghanistan, the US-Saudi-ISI nexus also raised Al Qaeda in Afghanistan for the same reason, as admitted by Hillary Clinton. It is well known that despite the show of killing Osama-bin-Laden, the US has been using Al Qaeda against Libya, Syria and Iraq, and that the ISIS itself is a creation of the US-Suadi Arabia nexus targeting Syria, Iraq and ultimate objective being Iran. Experts question the video message of al-Zawahiri; some speculating this could be on ISI instance to divert attention from an imploding Pakistan, others feeling it would not be easy for Al Qaeda to establish in India. But would SIMI and IM not be more than ready to do Al Qaeda bidding because of radical ideology and just the money? With tons of narcotic finances, when Afghan Taliban help TTP financially, why would they not fund Al Qaeda operations in India with al-Zawahiri reiterating support for Mullah Omar?

India Considers China Import Duties

By Ankit Panda

October 15, 2014

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In a bid to reduce its trade deficit with China, India considers import duties on Chinese goods.

On Monday, India officials said that they would consider imposing import duties on Chinese goods to rein in the growing trade imbalance between the two countries. India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) Secretary Amitabh Kant noted that India “will do this because [India] can not sustain this [trade deficit] for over a long period.” While India and China share a massive trade volume, the balance is heavily in China’s favor. Last year, New Delhi exported $15 billion worth of goods to China while importing $51 billion in return.

“This trade deficit [between India and China] is not sustainable in the long run and therefore it is very important to understand for Chinese companies that in the coming years, India will have to put some kind of safeguards,” Kant added.

The trade imbalance issue is important for the Indian government and featured prominently during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent September 2014 visit to India. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted that he “raised the issue of [the] trade imbalance between the two countries.” He added that he “urged President Xi to give our companies better market access and investment opportunities in China.” Although that visit did not result in any immediate measures to help balance India-China trade, Xi assured Modi that he would take “concrete steps” to help reduce India’s deficit.

The Indian government has additionally invited Chinese firms to begin manufacturing goods in India. “Chinese companies should actually manufacture the same goods [that they export to India] in India. We welcome Chinese companies. You please invest and manufacture in India. We will welcome telecom equipment, power equipment but kindly manufacture in India,” Kant said.

Beyond the current rate of growth of the trade deficit, Indian officials remain concerned that matters could worsen as China begins dumping cheaply manufactured goods in the Indian market at prices below market rates to push out domestic competitors (with plans to eventually raise prices again). In a similar case, the United States Department of Commerce placed import duties on Chinese solar products, drawing Beijing’s ire.

Should India move to place tariffs on Chinese goods, the issue could drive a wedge between China and India. Beijing would likely perceive the decision as protectionism and condemn India for stifling the competitiveness of Chinese firms.

Indo-China relations: Some Plain Speaking by the Indian PM

Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal

Date:13 Oct , 2014

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

Even as President Xi Jinping was being entertained by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the bank of the Sabarmati River in Ahmedabad, Chinese and Indian troops were once again engaged in a tense face-off at Chumar in Ladakh. Eventually, soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) blinked first and backed off when confronted with show of force by an Indian infantry battalion. So far this year there have been an unprecedented 335 transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by the PLA.

The LAC between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. This is a major destabilising factor as it leads to frequent transgressions.

It was no wonder then that in the press statement after his meeting with the Chinese President, PM Modi expressed ‘serious concern over repeated incidents along the border’. He pointed out that ‘clarification’ – or demarcation – of the LAC would enhance ‘efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity’. And, he sought an ‘early settlement’ of the territorial dispute. In turn, President Xi Jinping said China is determined to ‘work with India through friendly consultations to settle the boundary question at an early date,’ and to ‘maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas’ till the dispute is resolved. No Indian Prime Minister has used such strong language in a summit meeting with a Chinese President before, but given the rather aggressive border management policies of the PLA, the Chinese had it coming.

Relations between India and China have been fairly stable at the strategic level since then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s summit meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1988. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly. Bilateral trade is now worht US$ 65 billion and is expected to cross US$ 80 billion by 2017 even though the balance of trade in heavily skewed in China’s favour. India and China have been cooperating in international for a like the WTO and climate change negotiations. Limited cooperation has taken place in energy security. However, the security relationship has not kept pace with the growing political and economic relationship. China’s political, diplomatic and military aggressiveness at the tactical level is acting as a dampener.

China has a clandestine nuclear warheads-ballistic missiles-military hardware technology transfer relationship with Pakistan that causes apprehension in India. In fact, Pakistan’s proxy war against India is seen by many analysts as China’s proxy war as Pakistan cannot sustain it without China’s support. The fragile security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains.

Early demarcation of the LAC without prejudice to each other’s position on the territorial dispute would be an excellent confidence building measure.

In recent years, China has raised the ante by way of frequent transgressions across the LAC, unprecedented cyber-attacks on Indian networks and the denial of Visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that they are Chinese citizens. China’s behaviour is in keeping with its recent assertiveness in the areas of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Also, despite prolonged negotiations at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute between the two countries, there has been little progress on this sensitive issue.

China continues to be in physical occupation of large areas of Indian territory. On the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 sq km of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. In addition, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of territory in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir to China in1963 inthe Shaksgam Valley, north of the Siachen Glacier, under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through part of this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xingjian, Tibet and Pakistan. China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet. Chinese interlocutors have repeatedly claimed that the Tawang Tract, in particular, is part of Tibet and that the merger of this area with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s official position is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty for the PLA.

Populism’s second coming in Pakistan

I A Rehman

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It is for the second time in Pakistan’s history that populist politics is being offered as the panacea for all ills. Populism fails because it assumes the possibility of change as a push-button operation, without the support of social forces that understand the dynamics of change.

POPULIST rhetoric has been used to sustain the Islamabad dharnas long enough to justify an inquiry into its impact on the country’s politics.

This is the second time in Pakistan’s history that populist politics is being offered as the panacea for all ills, the first one being the populism of the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) 47 years ago. A comparison between the two populist waves should be quite rewarding.

The PPP’s populism had quite a few extraordinary features. It had its roots in great turmoil at home and abroad. The people had taken to the streets not only to seek Ayub Khan’s ouster from power but to replace the system of controlled democracy imposed by the dictator with a representative government. They had risen in revolt against exploitation by the 22 privileged families.

Pak’s populist cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri addresses followers during the anti-government protests outside the Parliament in Islamabad. AFP

The movement had also received a boost from the Vietnamese people’s heroic resistance to a superpower that had broken all records of aerial bombardment. The anti-imperialist wave that was sweeping the globe had not bypassed Pakistan. No discussion on the people’s plight was possible without reference to the country’s dependence on the controllers of the world capital. The people had acquired ideas of freedom from Cold War shackles, the right to self-rule and social justice before they were picked up by political parties. One has to take a look at the political parties’ election manifestos of 1970 to realise the extent to which all parties, including conservative religious groups, were trying to woo the electorate from Left-of-Centre planks.

The founders of the PPP tried to harness public yearning for an egalitarian order by spelling out, in their foundation papers, the nature and scale of the change they wanted, or they thought the people wanted. It was in this milieu that matchless slogans, such as roti, kapra aur makan — food, clothing, and shelter — and jera wahway ohi khaway, (as you sow so shall you reap) gained currency.

This populist upsurge produced significant changes in social behaviour, especially among the underprivileged. The common man found his voice. The worker had learnt to talk to the employer during the anti-Ayub movement, now the tenant began to challenge the landlord.

Since the PPP’s populist demands were derived from the people’s experiences they helped the party secure an electoral victory beyond its expectations, thanks to its success in winning over activists from older parties who had been struggling for socio-economic change for many years. Even this robust populism fizzled out. How this came about is not the subject of this piece. It is, however, necessary to point out that populism fails because it assumes the possibility of change as a push-button operation, without the support of social forces that understand the dynamics of change and are also capable of throwing up qualified cadres. These change-makers must be strong enough to defeat the forces of the status quo. The present wave of populism is manifestly different from the earlier phenomenon. It comprises two different tracks. While Dr Tahirul Qadri has from the very beginning called for a change of the system of governance, Imran Khan’s objective at the start of his march was only the removal of the prime minister, followed by an independent probe into his allegations of rigging during the 2013 election. This process could lead to a fresh election but that was not an explicit part of the agenda. Both the challengers have been relying on populist rhetoric with a view to strengthening their claim to power. Piqued by the criticism that his assault on the Sharifs represented a split in the Punjab elite, Imran Khan began recognising other federating units. As hopes of a quick victory faded away, both Qadri and Imran Khan began discovering the plight of the underprivileged. When they talk of corruption and favouritism in administration or denial of education and employment to the youth or the failing economy of the agricultural community they touch on matters the people wish to see resolved without delay. This populism without limits amounts to preparing a huge wish list that neither of the two challengers has tried to present in the form of a credible programme of action — and one fails to notice among the dignitaries that assemble on the containers for the daily drill the human material needed to translate dreams of a social revolution into reality.

In Pakistan, 'Blasphemers' Like Me Receive Militant ‘Justice’

By Raza Rumi

October 14, 2014

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Like so many others, I was recently targeted in a cold-blooded assassination for speaking out against extremism.

Pakistan has acquired a strong reputation of imprisoning a large number of men and women accused of “blasphemy.” Far from a fair trial, most of the accused are not even safe from mobs and vigilantes who assume the powers of both judge and jury. For a country that is ostensibly governed by a written constitution, this is extremely worrying. More so, when the state as an arbiter of human rights is silent, or even complicit in such human rights abuses.

The latest victim of the zealots’ ire is Mohammed Asghar, a 70-year-old man who also happens to be mentally ill. It is not surprising that there are some in Pakistan who want to see him dead. Asghar has been sentenced to death for blasphemy for various acts which, given his mental condition, he may not be aware of.

Asghar was formally sentenced to death in 2014. Despite his diagnosis in the U.K., of suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, the court chose to declare that he was competent to stand trial. However, late last month, a prison guard driven by self-styled zealotry burst into Asghar’s cell, and shot him in the back. The guard fired a second shot, narrowly missing. Restrained by others, the assailant nevertheless managed to get a good kick in as Asghar was taken to the hospital. Eyewitnesses have revealed that the guard chanted, “Death to the blasphemer!” as he swung his boot at the old man.

Asghar, I am told, is on the road to physical recovery. Nonetheless, I would not rate very highly his chances of surviving. Prison officials briefed the media that Asghar would return this week to the same prison where he was lynched and almost died. Also being held in the same prison is Zaffar Bhatti, a Christian pastor who has been on trial for blasphemy since 2012, and whose life is also in danger.

For me, all of this is rather personal. In March, I was targeted in a cold-blooded assassination attempt. My views on the persecution of minorities, and opposing the interpretations of Islam by extremists, were not acceptable to the armed militias; and they used violence to try and silence me. A few assassins shot at least a dozen bullets at my car. I was lucky enough to be able to duck under the car, where I lay motionless pretending I was dead. My driver, Mustafa, was not as lucky and was brutally killed in the attack. A human life was lost and another fellow traveler in the ambushed car was seriously injured. Asghar’s plight is mine too. Beyond the threat of violence, militants receive impunity for their crimes, and the state refuses to protect their victims. I was fortunate to survive but hundreds of Pakistanis have been targeted by ideologues, who think the world has to be purified of those who are “infidels,” “blasphemers” or their “sympathizers.”

The only thing necessary for evil to succeed in the world – said a wiser person than me – is for us to remain silent. For this reason, even though I do not know Mohammed Asghar, and I may never meet him, it would be wrong for me to remain silent today.

The government of Pakistan is running scared of extremists. There is good reason – I am just one of several people whose deaths were meant to promote a skewed interpretation of Islam. In 2011, the world witnessed how Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer was shot by his own guard for opposing the misuse of the blasphemy law. Other victims have been burnt alive. A Christian minister was gunned down later and another politician was hounded in the courts for having the gall to question the very questionable blasphemy laws on television! Earlier this year, a lawyer was killed for taking up the case of a bright young man languishing in jail due to allegations of blasphemy. Deaths in prisons have occurred with no accountability or punishment.

Putin, Poroshenko to discuss gas deal, peace moves in Italy

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/15/us-ukraine-crisis-putin-poroshenko-idUSKCN0I40BE20141015?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

BY ALEXEI ANISHCHUK AND PAVEL POLITYUK

MOSCOW/KIEV Wed Oct 15, 2014 

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko (front) visits the defence ministry headquarters in Kiev, October 15, 2014.

(Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian leader Petro Poroshenko will look for ways to settle a dispute over natural gas supplies and end months of conflict in east Ukraine at talks in Italy this week.

The meeting in Milan on Friday, is an encouraging sign for Moscow, Kiev and Brussels, which fears Russia's decision to cut supplies to Ukraine because of unpaid bills could threaten disruptions in the gas flow to the rest of Europe this winter.

European leaders hope the presidents' third meeting since Poroshenko was elected in May can help the sides build on a much-violated ceasefire agreed by government forces and pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine on Sept. 5.

"I think there are some positive signs. It seems like we are entering a more promising and positive chapter of the whole puzzle about the crisis in and around Ukraine," said Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union's ambassador to Russia.

But he told Reuters the 28-nation bloc wanted "sustainable efforts, and concrete outcomes and tangible results."

Although Putin announced this week that Russian troops near the border with Ukraine would be pulled back, Western officials want to see clear evidence that Moscow is withdrawing troops and military equipment from east Ukraine.

Moscow denies arming the rebels or sending troops, despite what the West says is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The Kremlin said Putin and Poroshenko had discussed peace moves in a phone call on Tuesday.

Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi will host the meeting between Putin and Poroshenko during a summit of European and Asian leaders, Renzi's office said.

The meeting will also be attended by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, British Prime Minister David Cameron as well as Herman Van Rompuy, the chairman of European Union leaders, and EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.

A Putin aide, Yuri Ushakov, did not rule out the possibility of a separate one-on-one meeting afterwards and said Putin would also meet Merkel separately.

Poroshenko said "the whole world has high expectations" of his talks with Putin.

China Signals No Compromise on Hong Kong

By Zachary Keck

October 15, 2014

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There are growing signs that the CCP has no intention of compromising with protesters in Hong Kong.

There are growing signs that the Chinese Communist Party has no intention of compromising with Hong Kong protesters.

Soon after the protests began in Hong Kong, the Pacific Realist took to these pages to argue that Occupy Central was doomed to fail. In that article, I argued that the CCP had already deemed completely free and fair elections in Hong Kong a threat to its existence, and the Party never compromised on its core interests. Mass protests wouldn’t change this assessment, and would instead likely harden Beijing’s resolve. Specifically, it would signal across China that mass protests can force the Party to compromise on its core interests, a notion the CCP has always worked hard to suppress.

“The Party giving in on a core issue because of mass protests would, without question, set a dangerous precedent for the CCP’s grip on power in mainland China. It therefore will not be done,” I wrote at the time. Nonetheless, I also noted that the CCP would do all it could to avoid using armed force to suppress the protests, but would in the end resort to violent suppressing the protesters before compromising on its bottom line.

There is growing evidence to support this argument.

On Wednesday local time the, Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that Zhang Xiaoming, director of the Chinese government’s liaison office in Hong Kong, met with pro-establishment Hong Kong lawmakers on Tuesday. According to the report, Zhang joined one of his predecessors, Chen Zuoer, and China’s Vice-Premier Wang Yang in labeling the protests a color revolution being manipulated by foreign powers. Zhang also said that the CCP expects the protests to drag on “for some time” and is “prepared for the worst.”

Together these comments suggest that the CCP will not compromise on the core issues at stake in Hong Kong. By labeling the protests a color revolution, the CCP is suggesting that the U.S. is behind the protests, and is trying to overthrow the Hong Kong government to replace it with one that is friendly to American interests. This would in effect give the United States a strategic foothold on China’s doorstep, something that the CCP undoubtedly views as unacceptable.

This is a consistent with a new report by Reuters which, citing “three sources with ties to the Chinese leadership,” says that Xi Jinping convened the new National Security Commission earlier this month to discuss the situation in Hong Kong. According to the report, at that meeting the top CCP leadership decided that offering any further concessions to the protesters would set a dangerous precedent that could reverberate in mainland China.

Reuters asked one of its sources whether the CCP might make minor concessions to the protesters, to which the source responded, “”Dialogue (with protest leaders) is already a concession.” Referring to the CCP’s decision to vet all Hong Kong chief executive candidates, which sparked the initial protests, another source said: “The central government’s bottom line will not change.” The same source further added, “Hong Kong is not high on the list of the central government’s priorities.”

The rationale for this hardline position, according to a different Reuters source, is that the CCP fears that giving into the demands of the Hong Kong protests will create a ripple effect across mainland China, in particular in Tibet and Xinjiang. “”(We) move back one step and the dam will burst,” another CCP source told Reuters. Still, the same source contended that the CCP was doing all it can — short of making concessions of course — to avoid having to use armed force to disperse the protests. “There won’t be bloodshed like June 4,” the source said, adding: “The People’s Liberation Army will be dispatched only as a last resort if there is widespread chaos – killing, arson and looting.”

Finding Allies for China

By Asyura Salleh

October 16, 2014

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China needs to build more alliances to challenge the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.

China’s rapid industrialization as an emerging power has prompted much discussion of a power transition, in which a rising China displaces a declining America with potentially dire consequences in the process. Internal capabilities, particularly domestic industrialization, are an essential ingredient in national power. China has been industrializing rapidly, and could within the foreseeable future reach a rough parity in national power with the U.S., signaling the start of a power transition.

However, Woosang Kim goes beyond this internal capability argument to include external factors. He argues that alliance formation is also important in strengthening national power. In this argument, rising powers like China that seek to achieve power parity with the U.S. need to bolster their national power by pursuing both domestic industrialization and external alignment relationships. China has already made impressive strides in expanding its share of global GDP and trade. To further augment its national power, it should focus on aligning with other countries, especially with neighbors that are inside its targeted sphere of influence.

However, China’s recent behavior toward its neighbors has moved it in the opposite direction. Rather than aligning themselves with China, countries in the Asia-Pacific are turning to the U.S. How then, can China continue its pursuit of regional hegemony without inflaming regional fears? Instead of pursuing assertive actions against regional neighbors, China will need to consider an alternative approach, one that attracts potential allies, instead of repelling them. And in fact this would be possible, if China observed the alignment preferences of weaker regional neighbors such as the Philippines.

The Philippines: U.S. Over China 

China’s behavior toward the Philippines provides an opportunity to display the alignment preferences of China’s weaker neighbors. Lacking a credible defense capability, the Philippines cannot rely entirely on its own military strength for national security. Military spending accounts for just 1.3 percent of the country’s GDP, and most of its naval equipment is in dire need of modernization. As a result, in the face of a perceived threat, the Philippines finds itself resorting more to external balancing strategies by aligning more closely with the U.S.

This alignment behavior was demonstrated in two recent instances of Chinese assertiveness against the Philippines. The first was when China announced the Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1992, which claims the disputed Spratly Islands as Chinese territory. The second was the 2011 Reed Bank Incident, in which a Chinese vessel allegedly harassed a Philippine vessel.

The Philippines’ alignment preferences in each of these instances reflect assessments of both relative power capabilities and threat perception. This echoes the alliance theories of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. Waltz’s balance of power theory is based on relative calculations of power, in which he argues that secondary states are more likely to balance against the more powerful state. This is based on the assumption that the country with the most national power is by definition the most threatening.

Meanwhile, Walt believes that alignment preferences are determined by factors beyond simple relative military capabilities. He shows that states generally balance against the country perceived as most threatening, which is determined by many factors such as relative power and geography.

Therefore, Waltz would expect the Philippines to balance against the more powerful state, which would be the U.S., by forming a coalition with other regional states. On the other hand, Walt would expect the Philippines as the weaker state to tighten its alignment with the U.S. as China is the greater threat to its territorial integrity.

China's Navy Is Already Challenging the US in Asia

By James R. Holmes

October 16, 2014

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The PLA already contests maritime Asia with the United States.

Korea-based magazine Global Asia is back with an issue on the geopolitics of Asia. Featured are articles from well-known commentators such as Boston College professor Robert Ross and diplomatic historian extraordinaire Walter Russell Mead. It’s a refreshing read for anyone fascinated by the bareknuckles interactions that ensue when political calculations meet human passions meet geographic facts of life. The Naval Diplomat was jazzed after browsing through.

But (And you knew a but was coming) let me zero in on Professor Ross, who lodges several misleading claims in his tour d’horizon of geopolitical competition in Asia. For one, he starts a discussion of naval trends in the region by contending that the “Chinese Navy cannot yet challenge the U.S. in maritime East Asia.” Really? The People’s Liberation Army, including its seagoing arm, has been mounting a challenge against the U.S. Navy for some years now. It clearly can if it already is. Whether its challenge will succeed remains to be determined. Either way, long-term strategic competition has been joined.

Now, it may be that Chinese sea power—meaning not just the PLA Navy but the shore-based component of Chinese maritime strategy, manifest in land-based anti-ship missiles and tactical aircraft flying from airfields ashore—cannot yet defeat the American naval contingent forward-deployed to Asia in a pitched battle. In a sense, though, that’s beside the point. Four decades back Edward Luttwak affirmed that peacetime “naval suasion” is more about optics than slugging it out with enemy fleets. It’s about displaying ships, warplanes, and armaments in a manner that convinces important audiences your navy would triumph in combat on the high seas.

Armed suasion, then, is about managing perceptions. Physical implements are implements of political discourse. In other words, writes Luttwak, whoever a critical mass of observers thinks would have won an actual battle does win in peacetime encounters, where rival forces face off without actually exchanging fire. Appearances sway observers one way or the other. Perception is king. Outwardly impressive ships, aircraft, and weaponry can make an outsized impression on lay audiences—potentially skewing the results of a peacetime showdown in favor of the lesser contender. To wit, China.

Should China’s navy square off against America’s, moreover, it could prevail by threatening to do massive damage—even in a losing cause. Think about it. Washington is finding it hard to keep up the U.S. Navy’s size—even in a peacetime setting, when ships aren’t being disabled or sunk. What if the fleet suffered heavy losses in combat, and had to replace lost ships, aircraft, and munitions afterward? How much of its navy can America lose and remain a superpower? How fast could the navy regenerate strength, and where would the extra money come from? If U.S. leaders were asking themselves such questions going in, they might hesitate at a critical moment—or forego a worthy effort altogether. That’s deterrence, and a way a weaker foe can successfully challenge the strong. So much for the PLA’s being utterly outclassed at sea.

Bottom line, let’s not succumb to hubris.

Now on to tactical and force-structure matters. Nitpicking, you say? Nope. As strategic big kahuna Carl von Clausewitz vouchsafed two centuries ago, it takes resounding tactical success to yield resounding strategic success. Getting hardware and tactics wrong, conversely, can confound strategy and geopolitics.

So the technical dimension is worth belaboring. Ross maintains that “China has yet to develop an anti-ship ballistic missile capability, which may ultimately be unachievable.” The PLA hasn’t developed an ASBM? Why, yes, it has. Now, whether PLA rocketeers have made that bird into a working implement of war remains an open question four years after it reached initial operating capability. Best we know, the ASBM has yet to undergo testing under battle conditions. That shortfall indeed casts doubt on its efficacy. But dismissing the ASBM outright is premature—which is why the Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military power routinely draw attention to it, and why U.S. Navy mariners fret about it.

The Truth About China’s ‘Big, Bad’ Infrastructure Bank

By Prashanth Parameswaran

October 16, 2014

The focus on the US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific is missing an important point.

Following Jane Perlez’s article in the New York Times a few days ago, China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has become the latest talking point for the cottage industry of experts portending growing U.S.-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific.

Tying any initiative to great power rivalry is a surefire and simple way to grab headlines. Reality, however, is far more complex – particularly when viewed from the region itself.

First, the reason why 21 Asian countries have supported the AIIB has nothing to do with picking sides in a U.S.-China rivalry and everything to do with national economic development. Asia is growing rapidly, and the region will account for almost half of global GDP by 2030. An important part of that growth story is infrastructure, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) calculates regional infrastructure needs at a whopping $800 billion each year for the next decade.

The sheer magnitude of this infrastructure financing means that most individual governments cannot go it alone, but will need to rely heavily on the private sector as well as external sources such as development banks. But even the existing banks like ADB and the World Bank publicly admit that they are increasingly stretched for funds. To take just one example, using some quick math you can calculate that the entire $50 billion that the World Bank now lends every year to all countries barely covers the annual financing gap for Indonesia’s infrastructure requirements alone from 2015 to 2019. Given this massive funding shortfall, it is easy to see why Asian countries would welcome the additional $50 billion in capital initially expected from the AII B. It also suggests that the perceived threat the new bank would present to the existing Bretton Woods institutions may be exaggerated considering how much assistance is required.

Second, while there is reason to be skeptical about the investment standards the AIIB may adhere to given the anecdotes one hears about Chinese infrastructure projects in developing countries, there is still an opportunity for others to shape them as members or partners instead of abandoning the whole idea entirely. As Peter Drysdale over at East Asia Forum has noted, China has explicitly welcomed feedback on the funding, governance, and overall structure of the bank, and countries like Australia or Singapore at least have the ability to push for higher governance and loan standards. Adhering to high international investment standards is also in Beijing’s own interest, since the most efficient way to secure a high credit rating for its bank is to work with existing multilateral development banks, and those banks have already made it clear that it will be difficult to cooperate with a new bank which has lower standards (the irony, of course, is that these banks are themselves reconsidering their own standards to better compete with China and other players today).

Of course, it may well be that at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting that Beijing is hosting this November or thereafter, we receive more details about the AIIB that confirm that it is a big bad infrastructure bank out to undermine the Bretton Woods institutions and destroy the environment. Or the whole idea could end up being a giant flop. But given emerging Asia’s vast infrastructure needs, and given that China is at least affording member countries the opportunity to jointly shape the AIIB and holding out the prospect of cooperating with other banks, is it so difficult to understand why countries in the region are willing to give it a shot? And by prematurely casting the still unborn AIIB into some superpower rivalry drama, are we not creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and stifling potential cooperation that could help lift millions out of poverty? That’s at least worth pondering.

Chinese Check: Forging New Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan

By Michael Mazza

October 14, 2014

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, residents are identifying less and less as Chinese, a trend that troubles Beijing.

At the time of Hong Kong’s election for its next chief executive in 2017, first-time voters, having been born two years after the 1997 handover, will have known nothing but Chinese rule. When Taiwan’s people elect their next president in 2016, first-time voters will have known nothing but democracy, and will be several generations removed from the 1949 flight from the mainland.

To young Hong Kongers, the city has always been part of China; to young Taiwanese, the idea that the island is part of China is an anachronism. Given these differences, one might expect each community to relate to mainland China in very different ways. One would be mistaken.

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, research centers conduct regular surveys on identity. And in both polities, these studies have revealed long-term trends that must be troubling to the mandarins in Beijing.

Hong Kong University researchers conducted their latest survey in June. Their results are striking. Not only do those identifying themselves as Hong Kongers significantly outnumber those identifying themselves as Chinese, but that divergence seems to be growing.

These trends are evident across age groups, but particularly pronounced within the 18- to 29-year-old cohort. In 1997, 16.5 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds held an ethnic identity of "Chinese," a share which dropped to 3.6 percent in the latest survey. Over the same time, the share of young people holding an ethnic identity of "Hongkonger" [sic] increased from 46.2 percent to 53.1 percent.

Even more remarkable is the ranking of a range of identities that Hong Kongers hold:

If we use "identity indices" ranging between 0 and 100 to measure people's feeling of different identities (the higher the index, the stronger the positive feeling), Hong Kong people's feeling is strongest as "Hongkongers", followed by "Asians", then "members of the Chinese race", "global citizens", "Chinese", and finally "citizens of the PRC".

As far as the Beijing authorities are concerned and as they are wont to remind us, Hong Kong is, and always has been, part of China; according to the Chinese State Council's recent white paper, Hong Kong "returned to the embrace of the motherland" in 1997 [emphasis added]. Yet the people of Hong Kong would prefer to think of themselves as Asians or even "global citizens" before identifying as Chinese or Chinese citizens.

In Taiwan, National Chengchi University's Election Study Center regularly conducts a similar survey, asking respondents whether they identify as Taiwanese, as both Taiwanese and Chinese, or as Chinese. The latest poll, also conducted in June, found that 60.4 percent of respondents identify as Taiwanese, a historic high and up from 17.6 percent in 1992, when the study was first conducted. Only 32.7 percent of those questioned identified as "both Taiwanese and Chinese," down from 46.4 percent in 1992. A measly 3.5 percent identified as Chinese, down from 10.5 percent in 1992.

China Signals No Compromise on Hong Kong

By Zachary Keck

October 15, 2014

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There are growing signs that the CCP has no intention of compromising with protesters in Hong Kong.

There are growing signs that the Chinese Communist Party has no intention of compromising with Hong Kong protesters.

Soon after the protests began in Hong Kong, the Pacific Realist took to these pages to argue that Occupy Central was doomed to fail. In that article, I argued that the CCP had already deemed completely free and fair elections in Hong Kong a threat to its existence, and the Party never compromised on its core interests. Mass protests wouldn’t change this assessment, and would instead likely harden Beijing’s resolve. Specifically, it would signal across China that mass protests can force the Party to compromise on its core interests, a notion the CCP has always worked hard to suppress.

“The Party giving in on a core issue because of mass protests would, without question, set a dangerous precedent for the CCP’s grip on power in mainland China. It therefore will not be done,” I wrote at the time. Nonetheless, I also noted that the CCP would do all it could to avoid using armed force to suppress the protests, but would in the end resort to violent suppressing the protesters before compromising on its bottom line.

There is growing evidence to support this argument.

On Wednesday local time the, Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that Zhang Xiaoming, director of the Chinese government’s liaison office in Hong Kong, met with pro-establishment Hong Kong lawmakers on Tuesday. According to the report, Zhang joined one of his predecessors, Chen Zuoer, and China’s Vice-Premier Wang Yang in labeling the protests a color revolution being manipulated by foreign powers. Zhang also said that the CCP expects the protests to drag on “for some time” and is “prepared for the worst.”

Together these comments suggest that the CCP will not compromise on the core issues at stake in Hong Kong. By labeling the protests a color revolution, the CCP is suggesting that the U.S. is behind the protests, and is trying to overthrow the Hong Kong government to replace it with one that is friendly to American interests. This would in effect give the United States a strategic foothold on China’s doorstep, something that the CCP undoubtedly views as unacceptable.

This is a consistent with a new report by Reuters which, citing “three sources with ties to the Chinese leadership,” says that Xi Jinping convened the new National Security Commission earlier this month to discuss the situation in Hong Kong. According to the report, at that meeting the top CCP leadership decided that offering any further concessions to the protesters would set a dangerous precedent that could reverberate in mainland China.

Reuters asked one of its sources whether the CCP might make minor concessions to the protesters, to which the source responded, “”Dialogue (with protest leaders) is already a concession.” Referring to the CCP’s decision to vet all Hong Kong chief executive candidates, which sparked the initial protests, another source said: “The central government’s bottom line will not change.” The same source further added, “Hong Kong is not high on the list of the central government’s priorities.”