http://www.rediff.com/news/column/general-anil-chait-time-to-teach-china-a-lesson/20141001.htm
October 01, 2014
'Demchock and Chumar are important crucibles for both China and India to know about the other. While India 'learns,' she also need to 'teach,' suggests Lieutenant General Anil Chait, one of the Indian Army's most cerebral thinkers, who recently retired as chief of the Integrated Defence Staff.
Why are important visits in the Indo-Chinese context, accompanied by physical intrusions across Line of Actual Control?
Why do nations show tactical aggressiveness under conditions of strategic stability?
Is it because China's People's Liberation Army is a rogue military or is it, because it has become such a professional force, that it does what it thinks is right in spite of being ordered to retrace its futile aggression.
Or is the action a measurable and demonstrable response to what Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in Japan while condemning the revisionist nature of countries in the context of the 21st century.
Large numbers of questions have yet again surfaced and it will take a deeper analysis to understand the intent behind the Chumar incident in Ladakh. The withdrawal as ordered by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who heads the Communist Party of China and is also the Chairman of China's Military Commission, was expected to be completed by Tuesday, September 30, a full 13 days after being informed of the Indian desire to return to the pre-September 10 position, during the visit.
This indeed is the 'strategic baggage' that Xi has left behind, post his India visit. Does it need to be borne or discarded considering the factum of growth, equity and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar initiative? Or, in the context of geo-economics becoming the currency of power, does India need to forget this incident as a one off and build on trade and commerce?
There are several facets to this visit, some very nuanced that need to be examined closely, to understand their import and implications of the 'acne' that India suffered in the past or the incapacitation that can be caused in future by the 'toothache.'
The Chinese would find it very hard to establish that the ingress into Demchock and Chumar was not pre-planned and specifically timed to coincide with President Xi's day of meetings with Prime Minister Modi. The Indian narrative and approach much to their expectation was on expected lines -- accept the dispute and the issue of peace at the borders as a necessary pre-condition to good neighbourliness and keep India boxed into the currents and vortex of South Asia.
The dust raised by the ingresses in Ladakh did impact the discussions in Delhi and though 13 agreements were signed, the overall mass of agreements is short of the expectations and hype, built in anticipation of the visit. The expected 'orbital jump' clearly did not happen. What instead emerged is that activities on the Line of Actual Control for India are the prime determinants of the relations between the two countries.
October 01, 2014
'Demchock and Chumar are important crucibles for both China and India to know about the other. While India 'learns,' she also need to 'teach,' suggests Lieutenant General Anil Chait, one of the Indian Army's most cerebral thinkers, who recently retired as chief of the Integrated Defence Staff.
Why are important visits in the Indo-Chinese context, accompanied by physical intrusions across Line of Actual Control?
Why do nations show tactical aggressiveness under conditions of strategic stability?
Is it because China's People's Liberation Army is a rogue military or is it, because it has become such a professional force, that it does what it thinks is right in spite of being ordered to retrace its futile aggression.
Or is the action a measurable and demonstrable response to what Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in Japan while condemning the revisionist nature of countries in the context of the 21st century.
Large numbers of questions have yet again surfaced and it will take a deeper analysis to understand the intent behind the Chumar incident in Ladakh. The withdrawal as ordered by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who heads the Communist Party of China and is also the Chairman of China's Military Commission, was expected to be completed by Tuesday, September 30, a full 13 days after being informed of the Indian desire to return to the pre-September 10 position, during the visit.
This indeed is the 'strategic baggage' that Xi has left behind, post his India visit. Does it need to be borne or discarded considering the factum of growth, equity and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar initiative? Or, in the context of geo-economics becoming the currency of power, does India need to forget this incident as a one off and build on trade and commerce?
There are several facets to this visit, some very nuanced that need to be examined closely, to understand their import and implications of the 'acne' that India suffered in the past or the incapacitation that can be caused in future by the 'toothache.'
The Chinese would find it very hard to establish that the ingress into Demchock and Chumar was not pre-planned and specifically timed to coincide with President Xi's day of meetings with Prime Minister Modi. The Indian narrative and approach much to their expectation was on expected lines -- accept the dispute and the issue of peace at the borders as a necessary pre-condition to good neighbourliness and keep India boxed into the currents and vortex of South Asia.
The dust raised by the ingresses in Ladakh did impact the discussions in Delhi and though 13 agreements were signed, the overall mass of agreements is short of the expectations and hype, built in anticipation of the visit. The expected 'orbital jump' clearly did not happen. What instead emerged is that activities on the Line of Actual Control for India are the prime determinants of the relations between the two countries.