Walking into Dragon’s jaws!

The Statesman

20 Sep 2014

Contrary to popular perception, this writer considers President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to have ended in disaster. China got everything it sought. India got nothing it needed. China toyed with the Indian PM as a tiger would with a rabbit. But Beijing’s strategy was so subtle that our so-called experts in the foreign ministry and security establishment do not know how they were taken for a ride. President Xi came after Mr Modi’s visit to Japan. The leverage earned by India through cooperation with America in the oceans and with Japan in business and security was squandered. During Mr Modi’s Japan visit the Chinese media and officials were announcing a $ 100 billion investment by President Xi to dwarf Japan’s $ 35 billion. With the capitulation displayed by Prime Minister Modi on all substantive issues President Xi offered only $20 billion. There was no need to buy India’s cooperation. It was already bought

Coinciding with President Xi’s visit was incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh. President Xi is Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and his wife is Major General in the People’s Liberation Army. It would be foolish to think the troops encroached without his blessing. This manoeuvre was adopted to test Indian will. At the extreme level India could have threatened cancellation of visit. Or at least India could have been blunt in the talks about Beijing’s policies threatening India’s national security. India was silent. The joint press conference of the two leaders at the end of talks was laughable.

Newspapers reported that the PM took a tough stand on the border. Really? How? He demanded that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) be clarified. For umpteen years meetings between both nations have continued to address the border dispute.

President Xi remarked that such incidents can always happen and should be settled peacefully. To end the controlled Chinese manoeuvre on the border the Chinese troops withdrew. Hurrah! We are moving towards peace. How does this change the status quo? The drama on the Ladakh border and indeed the entire issue on the LAC was a lollipop for the Indian public. The real concerns of this nation were ignored.

Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing continues to claim Arunachal Pradesh despite its written undertaking given in 2005 to not disturb any settled population while discussing the boundary dispute? No he did not. Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing arms Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles aimed against India? No he did not. Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing arms other SAARC neighbours to encircle India? No he did not. Did Mr Modi mention that Taiwan, Tibet and Xingjian are all disputed territories between Beijing and the inhabitants of these regions, and that unless Beijing stops meddling in Pakistan and other nations India will change its policy towards these territories? No he did not. Did Mr Modi ask why Beijing provides sanctuary and arms to anti-India insurgents and separatists? He did not.

STATES OF PROGRESS

Some successful chief ministers

Politics and play - Ramachandra Guha

In the summer of 2011, the anti-corruption campaigns cruelly exposed Manmohan Singh’s deficiencies as prime minister. It was known (or at any rate believed) that Sonia Gandhi would not be ruthless enough to replace him. Almost three years remained till the next general election. Yet, the debate had already begun as to who would — or rather, should — be India’s prime minister.

In 2012 and 2013, as I visited Mumbai, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Kochi and other cities, I partook of dozens of conversations on politics. Almost all were centred on the ‘Narendra Modi versus Rahul Gandhi’ question. As Singh became weaker, and the economy slid further, middle-class Indians were waiting desperately for him to go. The hope was that with a younger, more active, prime minister, the economy would be turned around, and corruption would be stopped or at least stemmed.

The remarkable thing about these conversations was that they were all centred on national issues. I wasn’t asked or informed about Kerala- specific questions in Kochi, or Maharashtrian concerns in Mumbai.

India is a union of 29 states, many of which are as large — or as populous — as an important European country. Yet, wherever I went in 2012 and 2013, the popular discourse on politics was overwhelmingly Delhi-centric.

When asked who I preferred, Modi or Rahul, I declined to choose. Modi’s bullying side did not appeal to me — nor his sectarian past. But Rahul seemed lazy and unwilling to shoulder responsibility, and of course the dynastic culture of the Congress disgusted me. I also rationalized my refusal to ‘prefer’ a particular prime ministerial candidate on the grounds that what India needed was many better chief ministers, rather than a single charismatic, redemptive, figure at the helm in the national capital. Education, law-and-order, health, were all state subjects. With economic liberalization, the states now had more responsibility than the Centre in promoting investment and job creation. Therefore, good leadership mattered as much — arguably more — in state capitals than in New Delhi.

Pursuing this more federal approach to political analysis, I offer, in this column, a provisional listing of India’s finest chief ministers since Independence. This is based not on systematic research, but on soundings gathered in four decades of travelling through this country. These travels suggest that, when one looks at ‘development’ more broadly, incorporating social indicators as well as economic ones, perhaps the three most progressive states in India are Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh. How much of the progress in these states can be attributed to particular chief ministers?

At the beginning of the 20th century, Kerala was one of the most unequal parts of India. Land ownership was highly concentrated. Caste discrimination was extreme — some castes were not just ‘untouchable’, but ‘unseeable’, their very sight considered polluting. The move towards a more just society was hastened by popular social movements — such as the one led by the great reformer, Narayan Guru — and by organized Left politics. These struggles led to high expectations being placed on elected leaders, whose actions were rigorously scrutinized by an educated and alert citizenry.

Perhaps the best among Kerala’s chief ministers were E.M.S. Namboodiripad and C. Achutha Menon [picture]. E.M.S. gave up his ancestral wealth to embrace a principled asceticism that might have made Gandhi proud. And he actively promoted decentralization of governance, even though it ran antithetical to the Leninist dogma of ‘democratic centralism’.

Talking trade and peace with China

SRINATH RAGHAVAN

September 20, 2014 

From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia

Xi Jinping’s visit was billed as the third by a Chinese President. This may be right in a technical sense; not so from a historical perspective. Mr. Xi is actually the fourth Chinese President to visit India. The first was Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Republic of China.

Chiang visited India in early 1942 — soon after Japan entered the Second World War. As the Tokyo typhoon swept Southeast Asia, India became vital for China’s survival. Chiang travelled to India seeking to persuade the Indian National Congress to fully support the British war effort. His long meetings with Nehru and with Gandhi did not yield much. And Chiang returned with little more than the spinning wheel that Gandhi had gifted to his wife.

India’s strategic role

Yet the visits by Presidents Chiang and Mr. Xi have more in common than the Gandhian spinning wheel. For one thing, they underscore India’s importance in any Asian security architecture. In the 1940s, when the hegemon in Asia — Britain — was knocked off its perch by a rising power, India played a pivotal strategic role in stopping Japan in its tracks. Today the situation is very different. Yet, as China’s swaggering rise rattles its neighbours, India is seen as a key player in ensuring a balanced regional order.

Further, both the visits point to the strategic quadrangle of China, Japan, India and the United States. In 1942, China sought American assistance in enabling India to hold Japan at bay. Now it is India and Japan that are working together against any unilateral Chinese attempt to rewrite the rules of the game in Asia. And the Americans are keenly backing their moves.

These wider considerations clearly underpin Mr. Xi’s desire to woo India. At any rate, his visit may turn out to be rather more successful than the maiden foray by Chiang. From China’s standpoint, India now appears an attractive destination for investment. Prime Minister Modi has given unprecedented political salience to infrastructure and industry. So, the Chinese are well placed to play to their strengths. From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia.

In commerce, testing the waters

Orbital Jumps, But How?

By Bharat Karnad

19th September 2014

In Beijing to prepare the ground for the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping summit, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval talked of Sino-Indian relations as being primed for an “orbital jump”. Seeing these bilateral ties as a satellite in a low-earth orbit which, presumably powered by the success in the apex level talks, will be thrust into a high-earth or more strategic orbit is fine. The problematic part is to know what will push the ties into that more desirable state.

Low-earth orbit satellites have relatively short life because pulled by the gravitational force they eventually collapse back into the earth’s atmosphere and burn upon re-entry. But a low orbit policy, metaphorically and otherwise, hews more closely to ground reality which is that, with the border dispute, the India-China relationship is dictated by the line of actual control (LAC) and what transpires around it.

The ongoing incident in Chumar with Xi in India, suggests China is playing a different game to what New Delhi believes it is in. For Beijing its territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh and in Aksai Chin are uncompromisable (hence, “stapled visas” for Arunachalis) because accepting the status quo as boundary solution with India would pressure Beijing into accommodating several Southeast Asian nations on its extensive “nine-dash line” claims in the South China Sea. So, a resolution of the dispute can be safely pushed out to the remote future, with Special Representative talks only offering cover for lack of progress. 

Modi’s plea for increased Chinese investments in infrastructure and manufacturing sectors and for shifting Chinese manufacturing plants to India as means of balancing Sino-Indian trade grossly favouring China was met partially with promises of foreign direct investment in industrial parks, etc. But there’s an irreconcilable clash of visions here.

Modi’s view of turning India into an international manufacturing hub generating massive employment runs smack into Xi’s vision for an “Asian century of prosperity” premised on coupling China’s “workshop” to India’s “backoffice”—the hackneyed Indian software wedded to Chinese hardware type of thinking. In other words, Xi is for freezing China-India economic ties on the basis of current national strengths, which surely is unacceptable.

Russian fighters intercepted by US near Alaska

Sep 20, 2014

WASHINGTON: Two Russian fighters entered a US "air defense identification zone" two days ago and were intercepted by American F-22 jets near Alaska, military officers said on Friday.

The incursion on Wednesday was followed by a second incident on Thursday involving two Russian long-range bombers, which flew into Canada's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), officers said.

Two Canadian F-18 fighter jets intercepted the bombers, which flew out of the area without incident, according to Major Jamie Humphries, a spokesman for the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The Russian warplanes on Wednesday at no point entered US sovereign air space or Canadian air space, Humphries told AFP.

In Wednesday's encounter, the Russian fighters were accompanied by two refueling tankers and two long-range bombers, he said.

Although Russian aircraft have entered the zone previously it was "the first time in a long time" that fighter jets passed through the area, said a US defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

To safeguard a country's air space, air defense identification zones extend beyond territorial air space and are designed as a buffer to give a government more time to respond to potentially hostile aircraft. But the zones do not fall under international treaties and are not regulated under international law.

The Russian aircraft flights coincided with a visit by Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko to Washington, where he made an impassioned address Thursday before a joint session of the US Congress, denouncing Russia's military intervention in his country.

But Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby said there was no indication of a link between Poroshenko's visit to Washington and the air incidents.

"We've faced these kinds of incidents before. We take them very, very seriously. And we routinely intercept them," Kirby told CNN.

"We'll make our intentions known to Russia as we always do and we'll certainly discuss our concerns with them at the appropriate time and in the appropriate venue."

It was unclear if the Russian aircraft were in the area due to exercises announced by Moscow in far-eastern regions, including the off-shore naval training grounds of the Kamchatka region.

The Vostok-2014 exercise started on Friday and was scheduled to last through September 25 and included 100,000 troops and 120 aircraft, according to the Russian defense ministry.

Obama anti-IS coalition takes shape as France joins war

Sep 19, 2014

French jets carried out their first air strike against Islamic State militants in Iraq.

BAGHDAD: France carried out its first air strike against the Islamic State group in Iraq on Fridat, boosting US-led efforts to unite the world against the growing threat posed by the jihadists. 

More than a decade after Paris famously refused to back the invasion of Iraq, France became the first nation to join the US aerial campaign in the war-torn country. 

"This morning at 9:40, our Rafale planes carried out a first strike against a logistics depot of the terrorist organisation Daesh (IS)," President Francois Hollande said. 

The statement from his office said the target was in northeastern Iraq but did specify exactly where, only adding: "The objective was hit and completely destroyed." 

France, as well as Britain, had already sent aircraft into Iraq's skies for surveillance missions but today's strike was its first offensive operation against the jihadists. 

US aircraft have carried out more than 170 strikes since August 8 but President Barack Obama has been keen to build a broad international coalition. 

The bombing campaign was launched to protect Iraqi Kurdistan from advancing jihadists and attempt to help the autonomous region's troops retake the ground they lost. 

Jihadists who had already controlled large swathes of land in neighbouring Syria took the city of Mosul, Iraq's second largest, on June 10 and swept through much of the Sunni heartland virtually unopposed. 

In a second push in August, they dealt Iraq's Kurdish peshmerga forces a string of military defeats and attacked various minority groups, demolished heritage sites and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. 

Footage of the beheading of two US journalists and a British aid worker in Syria sparked international outrage and spurred calls for tougher action against what is widely regarded as the most violent and powerful organisation in modern jihad.

Talking trade and peace with China

SRINATH RAGHAVAN

From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia

Xi Jinping’s visit was billed as the third by a Chinese President. This may be right in a technical sense; not so from a historical perspective. Mr. Xi is actually the fourth Chinese President to visit India. The first was Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Republic of China.

Chiang visited India in early 1942 — soon after Japan entered the Second World War. As the Tokyo typhoon swept Southeast Asia, India became vital for China’s survival. Chiang travelled to India seeking to persuade the Indian National Congress to fully support the British war effort. His long meetings with Nehru and with Gandhi did not yield much. And Chiang returned with little more than the spinning wheel that Gandhi had gifted to his wife.

India’s strategic role

Yet the visits by Presidents Chiang and Mr. Xi have more in common than the Gandhian spinning wheel. For one thing, they underscore India’s importance in any Asian security architecture. In the 1940s, when the hegemon in Asia — Britain — was knocked off its perch by a rising power, India played a pivotal strategic role in stopping Japan in its tracks. Today the situation is very different. Yet, as China’s swaggering rise rattles its neighbours, India is seen as a key player in ensuring a balanced regional order.

Further, both the visits point to the strategic quadrangle of China, Japan, India and the United States. In 1942, China sought American assistance in enabling India to hold Japan at bay. Now it is India and Japan that are working together against any unilateral Chinese attempt to rewrite the rules of the game in Asia. And the Americans are keenly backing their moves.

These wider considerations clearly underpin Mr. Xi’s desire to woo India. At any rate, his visit may turn out to be rather more successful than the maiden foray by Chiang. From China’s standpoint, India now appears an attractive destination for investment. Prime Minister Modi has given unprecedented political salience to infrastructure and industry. So, the Chinese are well placed to play to their strengths. From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia.

In commerce, testing the waters

Yet, for a range of reasons, it may be prudent to temper expectations. First, China is not rushing to open its coffers to India. Prior to the visit, Chinese officials had claimed that Mr. Xi would commit to invest at least $100 billion. But the five-year plan inked by the two sides envisages $20 billion of Chinese investment. Clearly, Beijing is waiting to see if New Delhi can walk the talk. This is not surprising. Outside of Gujarat, China’s experience with big ticket investments has not been encouraging. This is precisely why the Prime Minister received Mr. Xi in Ahmedabad. Moreover, China — unlike Japan — does not have long experience of working in India.

Nevertheless, China’s inclination to test the waters implies that India’s trade deficit may not be adequately offset by capital inflows. To be sure, the Chinese have also agreed to improve market access for Indian firms. But it remains to be seen whether they will deliver on this. The economic imbalance between India and China, then, may not be set right anytime soon.

Xi Jinping in India: A Breakthrough in Relations?

By Saurav Jha

September 18, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/xi-jinping-in-india-a-breakthrough-in-relations/ 

The Chinese president is in India hoping to manage a complex economic and security relationship. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting an India that for the first time in 25 years has given a clear mandate to a single party. He is meeting with a prime minister, Narendra Modi, who is known both for his hardline nationalist stance on foreign policy issues and a geo-economic sagacity. Moreover Modi’s government is also being actively courted by Shinzo Abe’s Japan at a time when the new normal for Sino-Japanese ties involves dangerous maneuvers in disputed East Asian waters.

As such, the Chinese side is clearly keen to position itself as an alternative capital and economic partner for an India looking to boost industrial growth and employment. Modi’s recent visit to Japan has created in China concern that an investment relationship between India and Japan might lead to a full-blown “democratic” alliance in the waters of the Indo-Pacific. India, though keen to develop its commercial partnerships in East Asia, will remain committed to freedom of navigation on the high seas and will adopt an increasingly reciprocal stance vis-à-vis China on economic and security issues. Indeed, while the visit will see much stress on economic complementarity and bonhomie with respect to institutions that promote a multi-polar world, the jostling for incremental advantage in the Asian panorama between India and China will continue.

India and China are expected to sign up to 20 agreements during this visit, many focused on cooperation in infrastructure, energy and water. The economic context was made somewhat explicit when Xi announced on the eve of the visit that China intended to invest $100 billion in India over the next five years. This was clearly aimed at upstaging Japanese investment plans of some $37 billion in India in the coming years. The Chinese are also stressing their ability to complete mega projects more cheaply and speedily than anybody else.

India’s Soft Power Advantage

By Kadira Pethiyagoda

September 17, 2014

Deeply entrenched factors make India a uniquely attractive great-power partner. 

During Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s recent visit to India, he was asked to justify Australia’s signing of a deal to sell uranium to the country. In response, theprime minister said, “India threatens no one” and “is the friend to many.” This was no mere diplomatic nicety, but a carefully chosen answer based on India’s international image. It is an image that is rare amongst great powers of India’s size and strength, and will give Delhi a unique soft power advantage in the future multipolar world.

Much of the globe sees India as a relatively non-violent, tolerant and pluralistic democracy with a benign international influence. Its values are seen as largely positive.

The U.S., with its Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, accorded India special treatment in nuclear cooperation. The deal provided benefits usually reserved for Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories. Washington justified cooperation with India by highlighting Delhi’s impeccable non-proliferation record. This stance was replicated by other states, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states who allowed India’s participation in international nuclear commerce and supported the Indo-U.S. deal. The NSG decided to re-engage with India following an India-specific safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA’s Board of Governors endorsed a nuclear safeguards agreement with India by consensus that would permit Delhi to add more nuclear facilities to be placed under the IAEA safeguards framework. India did not have to have an Additional Protocol like the non-nuclear weapons states who are NPT signatories. India also received favorable treatment from Canada (which agreed to supply “dual-use items” that can be used for civilian and military applications), Japan and South Korea.

This cooperation was not merely driven by these states’ strategic relationships with the U.S. Russia has long cooperated with India on nuclear technology. Even China, as a member of the NSG, did not oppose the group’s decision on India. Today, India is the only known nuclear weapons state that is not part of the NPT but is still permitted to engage in nuclear commerce globally.

Speculation On Who Will Be the Next Chief of Pakistan’s ISI Intelligence Agency

New ISI chief to be named soon: Report

PTI, September 19, 2014

ISLAMABAD: The new chief of Pakistan’s powerful spy agency ISI is likely to be named next week amid political turmoil in the coup-prone country, according to a media report. 

The appointment is expected as current Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lt Gen Zaheerul Islam and five Lieutenant Generals are scheduled to retire from service in the first week of October. 

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been considering a couple of names for the top intelligence slot, BBC Urdu quoted sources close to the Premier as saying. 

The name of the new ISI director general is likely to be announced next week, the report said. 

Those being considered for the position are Lahore corps commander Lt Gen Naveed Zaman and President National Defence University Lt Gen Javed Iqbal Ramday, it said. 

The names for the ISI chief’s slot circulating in military circles are Maj Gen Nazeer Butt and Maj Gen Rizwan Akhtar. 

Army Chief General Raheel Sharif also wants to promote certain military officials from the rank of Major General to that of Lieutenant General, the report said. 

These appointments are likely to come before the naming of the new ISI chief so that one of these Lt Generals may be considered for the top intelligence slot, it said. 

The appointments are coming at a time when the army has been accused of meddling in politics and although the retirements and subsequent appointments do not appear suspect, they are drawing much interest particularly on account of their timing. 

The military officers retiring in October include ISI chief Lt Gen Islam, Mangla corps commander Lt Gen Tariq Khan, Gujranwala corps commander Lt Gen Saleem Nawaz, Peshawar corps commander Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani and Karachi corps commander Lt Gen Sajjad Ghani. 

All five positions are of paramount importance in the military but the chief of the ISI is regarded as the army’s most important official after the Army Chief himself. The ISI chief is appointed by the Prime minister, traditionally on the advice of the army chief. 

Imran Khan and fiery cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri have been protesting against Pakistan government since August 14, demanding Sharif’s ouster. Khan wants Sharif’s ouster over alleged rigging in last year’s poll which his party lost, while Qadri wants to bring a revolution in the country

Al Qaeda's Worrying Ability to Infiltrate the Pakistani Military

By Ankit Panda

September 18, 2014

Source Link

Al Qaeda’s recent attempt to steal a Pakistani frigate is a reminder of the Pakistani military’s infiltration. 

On Saturday night, this past weekend, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) staged its first major attack within the region, laying siege to a Pakistani naval dockyard in a brazen attempt to seize the frigate, PNS Zulfiqar. While the details of the attack have been widely reported, what is most concerning is the manner in which the attack was carried out. AQIS managed to recruit Pakistani naval officers, allowing its agents to infiltrate the dockyard.

The group boasted about its ability to recruit inside the Pakistani military in a statement released on September 11, three days ahead of the attack. Usama Mahmood, AQIS’s spokesperson, issued a separate statement in Urdu following the attack in which he declares: “The Naval officers who were martyred on Saturday in the attack in Karachi were al-Qaeda members. They were trying to attack American marines and their cronies.” The statement confirms that AQIS has not abandoned Al Qaeda’s core strategy of attacking the Western governments that the group perceives as supporting unjust and corrupt regimes in the Middle East (contrast this with ISIS,which concentrates its fight on the “close” enemy instead of the “far” enemy).

The statement after the attack detailed the attack (at least from AQIS’s perspective): “[The attackers] had taken over control of the ship and were proceeding to attack the American carrier when they were intercepted by the Pakistan military … These men thus became martyrs. The Pakistani military men who died defending enemies of the Muslim nation, on the other hand, are cursed with hell.” The Pakistan Navy noted that four attackers were arrested, and Pakistani news outlets reported that among the arrested were two naval officers. In what is very likely a first for Pakistan’s defense ministry, the defense minister acknowledged that insiders were culpable in enabling this attack: ”Without assistance from inside, these people could not have breached security,” Defense Minister Khawaja Asif noted in parliament.

China's President Should Have Visited Afghanistan

By Ankit Panda

September 18, 2014

Xi Jinping missed an opportunity in not visiting Afghanistan during his South Asia tour. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping is currently on the final leg of a South Asia tour that included stops in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and finally, India. He was originally also scheduled to stop by in Islamabad, but political instability in Pakistan resulted in that visited being postponed. Nevertheless, China missed a major opportunity by failing to schedule a presidential visit to Afghanistan: a country facing daunting political and military transitions this year. Xi could have substituted his planned stop in Islamabad with a stop in Kabul, but he chose not to.

In February, when incumbent Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke with Xi on the sidelines of the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in Russia, Xi conveyed that China “hopes that the Presidential election in Afghanistan will go smoothly and that Afghanistan will achieve a steady transition and move towards lasting peace and stability.” As events over the summer have demonstrated, this has not been the case. Afghanistan’s two presidential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, remain in a dispute over the ongoing audit process of the votes cast in June as well as the issue of forming a national unity government following the election. Xi could have conveyed China’s interest in seeing the candidates abide by the U.S.-sponsored plan.

Additionally, amid reports that the Afghan government is on the cusp of insolvency, offers of Chinese assistance–either immediately or in the future–would have paid off handsomely for Beijing. China is already a major investor in Afghanistan, but its contribution in direct foreign aid terms remains small. Although investments like the $3.5 billion Chinese stake in Afghanistan’s untapped natural resources demonstrate China’s growing commitment there, Beijing could do more to pitch itself as a major partner for the country following U.S. and NATO withdrawal.

Xi could have also used a stopover in Afghanistan to counter perceptions that China’s overarching interest in Afghanistan is in security. In a visit to Afghanistan earlier this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi left the impression that counter-terrorism, particularly denying Afghan territory as a safe-haven for terrorists who operate in western China, was Beijing’s top priority. While security cooperation is important to China, surely Beijing recognizes the perils of governance deficits and political instability for the future security of Afghanistan. As NATO and the United States prepare to leave, with no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) in sight, Beijing’s continued support will prove invaluable.

Scotland Votes to Stay the Same, and for Change

Catherine Mayer ,Megan Gibson 

Yes campaign supporters in the Scottish referendum gather in George Square in Glasgow, Scotland Friday, Sept. 19, 2014.Lynne Cameron—AP

The independence movement has lost the vote but won the argument

The U.K. remains just that, united. “I’m deeply disappointed like thousands across the country,” said Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s deputy first minister and a leading member of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which engineered the referendum. It was 5:30 a.m. and although the final tally had not been calculated, with 26 of 32 voting districts declared, the proponents of Scottish independence recognized defeat was now inevitable. Scots had voted by 55% to 45% in favor of retaining a status quo that has lasted 307 years.

So, a return to business as usual? Not after the surge in support for independence that today leaves almost half of Scotland, like Sturgeon, deeply disappointed. It will also taste bitter to independence movements across the world that had seen in Thursday’s referendum a model for their own efforts to shake free of a larger state. There is, said Sturgeon, “a clear appetite for change” and she’s right. Scotland may have opted for reform rather than revolution, but nobody who has observed the campaigns at close quarters believes this has given the U.K. government in Westminster a free pass to keep on keeping on as before.

The Forthcoming Ground War Against ISIS Fighters in Iraq Will Be Tough, and May Require US Troops

U.S. Faces Tough Struggle on Ground to Oust ISIS

Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper

New York Times, September 19, 2014

WASHINGTON — The American air campaign to thwart the advance of fighters from the Islamic State has been the easy part of President Obama’s strategy in Iraq and Syria. Soon begins the next and much harder phase: rolling back their gains in Mosul, Falluja and other populated areas, which will require American advisers to train and coordinate airstrikes with Iraqi forces.

Pentagon officials are more willing than their counterparts at the White House to acknowledge that this will almost certainly require American Special Operations forces on the ground to call in airstrikes and provide tactical advice to Iraqi troops. “There is no one in this building who does not know that clearing out the cities will be much harder,” a senior Defense Department official said in an interview. “That’s when the rubber is going to meet the road.”

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this week described this phase as “extraordinarily complex.”

Urban warfare in Iraq has been challenging for the United States, which had 70 troops killed in the second battle of Falluja in 2004 and fought hard to regain control of cities like Mosul, Baquba and Baghdad. So it will be even harder for the Iraqis, who have so far proved ineffective in combating the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

Military officials say they plan to use Iraqi security forces, Kurdish fighters and local Sunnis — whom they hope to turn against the militants — to roll back the Islamic State’s gains. They see the Sunnis as playing a similar role to what played out in the Sunni awakening during the surge in Iraq.

Assembling those ground forces, however, will take time. General Dempsey said that of the 50 Iraqi brigades whose readiness the United States had closely examined, 26 “were assessed to be reputable partners,” with adequate equipment and leadership, to be loyal to the government and not overly sectarian.

But many of the Iraqi units will require training and re-equipping before they are ready to begin a major counteroffensive.

The United States is trying to institutionalize the Sunni tribal awakening by establishing new national guard units that it would have a crucial role in training and equipping. The idea is to avoid the need to send a largely Shiite army to Sunni areas and to win the allegiance of local Sunnis. In their attempt to seize urban areas from the Islamic State, the Iraqis’ firepower will be limited. On Saturday, Iraq’s new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, said that the Iraqi military would not use artillery or carry out airstrikes in populated areas — an effort to reduce the risk of civilian casualties and avoid alienating the Sunni population.

Shangri-La: Consuming Paradise

By Brennan O'Connor

September 18, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/shangri-la-consuming-paradise/

A former logging town in Tibet, now a tourist trap, is a world away from its fictional inspiration.

Re-named after James Hilton’s famous novel, Lost Horizon, China’s Shangri-La is a world away from the fictional earthly paradise Hilton once wrote about. In his cult classic published in 1931, Hilton described people whose “prevalent belief” was in “moderation.” But in this former logging town, part of the Dêqên Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan, moderation has been thrown out the window. Streets along the old quarter are crammed with shops selling cheap trinkets, some are quasi-Tibetan cultural items for the consumption of the mainly Han Chinese tourists. In other parts of town large hotels embrace the sky fashioned in quasi-Tibetan architectural style. Fancy new restaurants dish out Yak meat every night of the week. Traditionally Tibetans in this region raised Yaks for their milk, eating them mainly on special holidays and weddings.

Shangri-La’s (formerly Zhongdian) economy was failing after the logging that caused flooding along the Yangtze River was banned. When the government came up with the name change scheme, clearly trying to replicate the massive economic success of tourist magnets Lijiang and Dali, whose old quarters have come to resemble ethnic Disneylands, Zhongdian stepped up to the plate, winning over competing towns.

It is in the surrounding countryside, with impressive Himalayan foothills nearly encircling the town, where one could truly imagine the paradise Hilton vividly described. Historically, this part of Tibet was known as Kham, and its people the Khampas.

Since the 2008 uprising, Beijing has tightened the screws in the Tibet Autonomous Region. This has not prevented sporadic demonstrations from breaking out. Tragically at least 131 Tibetans have set themselves on fire since 2009 in protest against what they consider China’s heavy handed rule.

A young tourist poses in rented Tibetan clothing in the old quarter of Shangri-La. Most tourists visiting the town are Han Chinese, the dominant ethnic group in China.

Image Credit: Brennan O'Connor

56 Percent of Chinese Say Environment More Important Than Growth

By Maryan Escarfullett

September 19, 2014

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Development and emerging social issues are changing the values of Chinese citizens.

In the past 25 years, China’s citizens have become more liberal, materialistic and wealthy. This change in social and political ideologies is not reflected in thepolitics of the Chinese Communist Party.

However, an in-depth study of the 6th cohort of the World Values Survey (WVS) via its online analysis toolshows that for the first time Chinese citizens are more liberal than ever before, displaying unprecedented and diverse political values.

Interestingly, the majority of Chinese now prioritize protecting the environment even at the expense of economic growth. They also believe fighting inflation is more important than traditional beliefs on spending for national defense and uninhibited economic competition.

The WVS, originally designed by political scientist and modernization theory pioneer Ronald Inglehart, measures the values and views of citizens in over 200 countries. Released every five years, it comprehensively measureshow citizens feel towards socioeconomic and political problems.

This year the survey was released in May. Comparing the 6th cohort’s survey results with the first survey released in 1990 sheds light on how China’s economic growth has affected citizens’ at the individual level.

In 1990, 66 percent of citizens believed that the country’s national priority should be economic growth. Another 19 percent of citizens prioritized strengthening China’s military. By 2014 only 47 percent of citizens put economic growth first, though prioritizing military capabilities had increased three points to 22 percent.

When asked by WVS researchers what their aim for society was, 66 percent of Chinese citizens in 1990 answered that they wanted to “protect social stability and order.” By 2013 that number had fallen to just 27.2 percent.

Instead, 52 percent of Chinese citizens stated that “fighting inflation” was their biggest concern in 2014. These changing values are reflected in other social issues such as pollution, education, economic inequality, and philanthropy as well.

Shangri-La: Consuming Paradise

By Brennan O'Connor

September 18, 2014

A former logging town in Tibet, now a tourist trap, is a world away from its fictional inspiration. 

Re-named after James Hilton’s famous novel, Lost Horizon, China’s Shangri-La is a world away from the fictional earthly paradise Hilton once wrote about. In his cult classic published in 1931, Hilton described people whose “prevalent belief” was in “moderation.” But in this former logging town, part of the Dêqên Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan, moderation has been thrown out the window. Streets along the old quarter are crammed with shops selling cheap trinkets, some are quasi-Tibetan cultural items for the consumption of the mainly Han Chinese tourists. In other parts of town large hotels embrace the sky fashioned in quasi-Tibetan architectural style. Fancy new restaurants dish out Yak meat every night of the week. Traditionally Tibetans in this region raised Yaks for their milk, eating them mainly on special holidays and weddings.

Shangri-La’s (formerly Zhongdian) economy was failing after the logging that caused flooding along the Yangtze River was banned. When the government came up with the name change scheme, clearly trying to replicate the massive economic success of tourist magnets Lijiang and Dali, whose old quarters have come to resemble ethnic Disneylands, Zhongdian stepped up to the plate, winning over competing towns.

It is in the surrounding countryside, with impressive Himalayan foothills nearly encircling the town, where one could truly imagine the paradise Hilton vividly described. Historically, this part of Tibet was known as Kham, and its people the Khampas.

Since the 2008 uprising, Beijing has tightened the screws in the Tibet Autonomous Region. This has not prevented sporadic demonstrations from breaking out. Tragically at least 131 Tibetans have set themselves on fire since 2009 in protest against what they consider China’s heavy handed rule.

Indo-China Relations: The bottom line is military might

ByCol Jaibans Singh

17 Sep , 2014

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A leadership change took place in China in March, 2013; this was a once in a decade transition. The recent parliamentary elections in India gave a clear majority to a single party with a strong leader – Narendra Modi. It becomes quite evident that incumbent governments of the two Asian giants will be dealing with each other for a sustained period of time. Foreign policy does not see drastic changes with a change in leadership, yet, personalities and perceptions do play a major role. So it will be with India and China.

Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are two more neighbouring countries that India now needs to look at for enhanced bilateral engagement with China in mind.

While dealing with bilateral issues that hinge on trade and a debilitating border dispute the two countries are also interested in maintaining their regional and global interests. In this regard, the undercurrents are palpable.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has realised the need to offset some of the influence that China has managed to garner in the immediate neighbourhood due to its economic muscle and an unfortunate “couldn’t care less for the poor cousins” attitude of the outgoing UPA government towards the neighbouring countries.

Prime Minister Modi’s choice of Bhutan and Nepal as his first two foreign visit destinations is based on an assessment that the countries can be drawn out of the stranglehold of the Dragon. The common perception is that he succeeded to a great extent.

Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan may have a personal motivation of friendship but here also lingered the need to get the “outer string of pearls” in place. The nationalist approach of the Japanese premier, Shinzo Abe, manifests itself in his determination to find a counter to Chinese belligerence through strategic alliances. Creation of a Japan-US-India alliance is just what he wants to further his objectives. The highly successful visit by Prime Minister Modi to Japan would have given a considerable boost to the strategic objectives of the Japanese government. The flip side is that it would have raised a considerable degree of concern in China.

Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are two more neighbouring countries that India now needs to look at for enhanced bilateral engagement with China in mind.

Bangladesh is also extending support to the “one China policy” with regard to Taiwan, Tibet etc. Such an approach by Bangladesh goes against what India…

Sri Lanka is not very happy with India for its stand on the United Nations Human Rights Commission on accountability of the incumbent government in the matter of war crimes against the Sri Lankan Tamils. China has been quick in taking advantage of the situation and has entered Sri Lanka in a big way both politically and economically. It has signed a Strategic Cooperative Partnership (SCP) agreement with Sri Lanka and cemented sea based access in what is being termed as the ‘Maritime Silk Route’ (MSR) through the Indian Ocean. India is, quite naturally, worried; it is common knowledge that every economic activity that China indulges in has a long term strategic consequence in power projection.

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, visited China in June this year; significantly, this was her second visit as head of state in four years. In accordance to its time tested policy China has launched an economic torrent in Bangladesh. It came up with massive proposals for development of infrastructure in the country; it has also given broad hints at improving upon Bangladesh exports by channelling them towards its growing domestic demands. This is what Bangladesh needs most at the moment.

Project Mausam: India's Answer to China's 'Maritime Silk Road'

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri

September 18, 2014

India is using its history, culture and geography to compete with China’s “Maritime Silk Road.” 

This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping is visitingIndia. While relations between India and China are expected to improve as a result of Xi’s visit, India and China will continue to compete for influence in the region. This is evidenced by the fact that India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will soon launch a new initiative designed to compete with China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), known as Project Mausam.

As Shannon pointed out yesterday, Xi Jinping is pushing China’s MSR in India’s backyard with the eager support of countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Even India is interested in potentially joining the MSR as the plan is a boon to the economies of the entire region. However, India has to look out for its own strategic interests as well.

As myself and others on The Diplomat have argued, India is uniquely placed to play a major role in Indian Ocean security and trade. India’s location and power can serve to organize the states of the Indian Ocean littoral. Understanding this, Modi’s government is currently shaping Project Mausam.

The project is considered the Modi government’s most significant foreign policy initiative designed to counter China. It is inspired by India’s historical role as the focal point for trade in the Indian Ocean. In pre-modern times, sailors used seasonal monsoons (mausam, मौसम means weather or season in many South Asian languages) to swiftly journey across the Indian Ocean. This trip usually involved starting from one of the edges of the ocean, around today’s Indonesia or east Africa, sailing to India, stopping, and allowing another crew to wait for another monsoon to sail to the other edge of the Indian Ocean, as different monsoon winds blew in different directions at different times of the year. Crews would frequently winter for months in India or at one of the edges of the ocean waiting for another season of monsoons. This allowed for significant cultural exchanges as diverse people from different places would often spend months at a time living in foreign countries (Islam is said to have entered Indonesia in this manner).

Project Mausam would allow India to reestablish its ties with its ancient trade partners and re-establish an “Indian Ocean world” along the littoral of the Indian Ocean. This world would stretch from east Africa, along the Arabian Peninsula, past southern Iran to the major countries of South Asia and thence to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.

According to the Times of India, Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh discussed how to give shape to the project with Culture Secretary Ravindra Singh. The project is supposed to have both a cultural and serious strategic dimension. Perhaps one thing India could consider is seriously developing its Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a security and trade zone. The Economist recently reported on some Indian steps to do just that, which is sensible given the islands’ location close to the strategically important Straits of Malacca and Thailand. However, India has yet to reveal actual details on the policies and projects that it intends to pursue to advance Project Mausam.

It is clear that India’s government intends to expand its maritime presence, culturally, strategically and psychologically (in order to remind the region why the ocean is called the Indian Ocean). Despite the lack of details, Project Mausam seems like a positive step in that direction and one that will generally be well-received. It is to be hoped, however, that the project is meaningful and does not lack teeth, like many other Indian initiatives of the past. The fact that Narendra Modi’s government is initiating Project Mausam, however, at least gives one assurance that the Indian government is not launching another arbitrary and half-hearted initiative.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/project-mausam-indias-answer-to-chinas-maritime-silk-road/

India-China Relations – An Introspection

by ISSSP

Author: Amb Saurabh Kumar

The report attempts a quick appraisal of India’s equation with China from a forward looking strategic standpoint, for charting the way ahead, in light of the ongoing visit of the Chinese President, Xi Jinping to India.

While the immediate task naturally is to work for early realisation of the potential through mutually beneficial diversification and intensification of ties, tapping all possible complementarities through imaginative arrangements and programmes, it is the political relationship that has naturally to be kept in focus as the driver, and determinant of the reach, of the former.

A summary review of political relations between the two countries identifies two features that deserve note:

(i) The fact of extreme volatility of the relationship – right from the start, and continuing to this day.

(ii) The fact that it is the Chinese diplomatic design (disposed towards generalities and formulations long on lofty rhetoric and abstractions that invariably lend themselves to conflicting interpretations and short on unambiguous specifics) that has been allowed to prevail in the corpus of Agreements/Communiques/Declarations/Statements issued over the years. An alternative, Indian template seeking to cast common understandings and shared agreements in tangible terms instead appears to have not even been imagined.

Two high points of the politico-diplomatic interaction of the two countries – the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement and the 2005 “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” – are taken up, briefly, to illustrate the latter feature marking the relationship, namely of atmospherics projected by the official documents being allowed to run way ahead of substantive content.

It is argued that the “strategic partnership” is just an empty shell. With a recommendation that infusion of some solid content into it is a question that should engage the Indian strategic establishment much more intensely, internally, than hitherto.

Also that the paradigm within which India-China relations have come to be conducted is lacking in balance, and therefore in need of a rejig.

In particular, the approach to the “boundary talks” of the Special Political Representatives – the ‘three-stage road map’ (proceeding ‘top-down’ from abstract principles and parameters to specifics of territorial adjustments) being followed by the Special Political Representatives – is felt to be in need of a reversal (i.e. a ‘bottom-up’ one, beginning with a prior understanding on the specifics of the eventual boundary alignment evolved instead) in the light of the experience of four decades of ‘normalisation’ of relations (of inordinately, and endlessly, ‘delayed gratification’). A truly ‘political’ approach (entailing “negotiations”, not just “talks”, for coming to grips with the nitty gritty of a final settlement) is recommended to break out of the rut relations have got into over the last several years. 

Tibet: The Real Issue

ByMaj Gen Sheru Thapliyal

18 Sep , 2014

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“Following the logic of power, empires in their expansive phases push out their frontiers until they meet the resistance of a strong neighbour, or reach a physical barrier which makes a natural point of rest, or until the driving force is exhausted. Thus through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British power in India expanded, filling out its control of the peninsular sub continent until it reached the great restraining arc of the Himalayas. There it came into contact with another empire, that of China.

In the central sector of frontier zone, where lay petty states and feudal territories, there began a contest for dominance which continues to the present day. In the North-East and North-West where no minor independent polities existed to act as buffers, the British sought secure and settled boundaries with China, which they failed to achieve. The failure was to lead in the middle of the twentieth century to the border war between India and China”.

No wonder that whenever our leaders visit China, the first thing Chinese like to hear from them is that Tibet is an integral part of China.

Contrary to the popular belief, it is not the border question that has bedeviled the relations between India and China. It is the larger issue of resolution of the Tibet problem to China’s satisfaction which is the greatest impediment to normalisation of relations between the two Asian giants. Status of Tibet is the test case for China’s survival as a nation. No wonder that whenever our leaders visit China, the first thing Chinese like to hear from them is that Tibet is an integral part of China. If the Chinese had their way, they would perhaps ask it to be written on a judicial stamp paper and handed over to them at Beijing airport on arrival by the Indian VIP.

Historical Perspective

Historically Tibet has never been a province of China. It has been autonomous over the centuries. China had loose control over it under Manchu Tributary system similar to the one it exercised over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan where their rulers paid tribute to China and possessed Chinese official rank. Not many people may be aware that in AD 763, Tibet conquered large parts of Western China and the then Emperor of China was forced to marry Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan King Song Tsnen Gam Po. Around the ninth century, Tibet came under Buddhist influence and by the thirteenth century, almost entire Tibet converted to Buddhism. The hand that held the sword was now supporting a prayer wheel.

A warrior nation had turned pacifist. Mongols conquered Tibet in thirteenth century and the Tibetan Lamas went into an arrangement with the Mongol rulers known as Cho Yon, meaning Patron-Priest relationship. The Lama became the spiritual and temporal head in Tibet, albeit with foreign support. The concept of the Dalai Lama, which was Mongolian in origin, also came into being during this time. Tibet’s troubles seem to have started with the Lama getting used to ruling with foreign support. The concept of national security was totally neglected with far reaching consequences in 1950-51.

Under Nehru’s myopic policy of appeasement of the Chinese at any cost, there was only a mild protest at the annexation of Tibet by China, which the Chinese rudely brushed aside. The only person who foresaw a future clash was Sardar Patel…

By the beginning of the twentieth century Tibet had become the Great Game pawn between China, Britain and Russia. On the pretext of sending a trade mission to Tibet, British troops entered Tibet, resulting in the conclusion of a Treaty in 1904 between Tibet and Britain. Obviously the Treaty was concluded on unequal terms. China played the role of a bystander totally ignoring her responsibility, if any. The treaty was bilateral and clearly signified the independent status of Tibet. The Manchu court refused to countersign the Treaty as it failed to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. On protracted negotiations, China concluded a treaty in 1906 with Great Britain which prevented Tibet from concluding direct negotiations with any foreign power without the consent of China.