The wordsmith as public intellectual

June 2, 2014

Mushirul Hasan

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-wordsmith-as-public-intellectual/article6072420.ece

THE HINDU ARCHIVESVERSATILE WRITER: As a lover of words and phrases which he used to express, intelligently and in ordered sequence, Nehru emerged as a public intellectual whose opinions mattered.

Nehru’s books make public his remarkable erudition in dealing with a range of subjects

The French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), talked about the part played in French political thinking by men of letters. In the second half of the 19th century, Bengal witnessed a “renaissance” to which literary men, reformers and journalists contributed their bit. Literary works in Urdu and Hindi had a striking impact in raising mass awakening. In this connection, I recount the creative writings of Jawaharlal Nehru to mark his 50th death anniversary (May 27). Most of his books were written in jail. His love of learning was too strong to be quenched by disabilities in jail.

“Long periods in prison,” Nehru wrote, “are apt to make one either a mental and physical wreck or a philosopher. I flatter myself that I kept myself very well during all these years.” As a lover of words and phrases which he used to express, intelligently and in ordered sequence, he emerged, perhaps unknowingly, as a public intellectual whose opinions mattered. And his books held an approach to life compounded of buoyancy and optimism, a humorous tolerance towards life’s foibles and even its trials.

Nehru read 55 books from May 21, 1922 till January 29, 1923 alone. Oscar Wilde’s The Ballad of Reading Gaol had a magical sway over him. Plato’s The Republic stimulated him, whereas To the Lighthouse by Virginia Woolf opened his eyes to many scenes of life. As a man with socialist leanings, he perused Beatrice Webb, a Fabian socialist, and Sidney Webb. Besides, he delved into philosophy, and turned the pages of history to illuminate his understanding of ideas and movements, which stood apart as the catalyst for momentous changes. As with the French Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution, he wanted to know what lay behind people’s upsurge. For the histories of colonialism in India, he read a great deal more on the subject.An antidote to isolation

GENEROUS NEIGHBOUR

India has to take a long hard look at its foreign policy

Kanwal Sibal

Internally, much can improve with the spectacular electoral success of the Bharatiya Janata Party. India can now look forward to a strong and stable government at the Centre which the weak coalition governments of recent years failed to provide. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is seen as strong-minded, resolute and purposeful, raising fortified prospects of effective decision-making, policy implementation, economic management and internal security superintendence.

Externally, this will bring dividends too, given the linkage between domestic strength and confident conduct in foreign affairs. But triumphing over adversaries abroad is different from defeating political opponents at home. Internally, local insurgencies apart, issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity are not in contention. The country’s Constitution provides legal authority to deal with opponents, which is not available in dealing with external challengers, as international law is frequently violated and enforcement is weak. The size of the electoral victory can change the rapport of political forces at home, but other than strengthening the political image of the leader abroad in the short term, it does not affect external equations durably. In democracies, military strength is not needed to assert political authority at home; but to assert it abroad, military muscle is vital. Alliances erected against one’s country by enemies cannot be countered merely by electoral success at home, however impressive. Threats emanating from terrorism, religious extremism and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cannot be repulsed by the strength of the electoral mandate; nor does that provide an answer to energy security issues.

The nature of external challenges being different from internal ones, the acumen in understanding domestic politics may not be sufficient for grasping the complexities of international affairs, though a clear-headed leader with a discriminating mind can always handle foreign affairs competently with experience and good counsel.

The uniting bonds of citizenship and shared commitment to the nation can justify kindness towards domestic political opponents, but generosity towards foreign countries is not an established principle guiding foreign relations. Externally, all countries are expected to pursue their interests single-mindedly because it is considered axiomatic that in international relations there are no friends or enemies, only permanent national interests. In other words, there is no room for sentimentality and unrequited benevolence. This applies to neighbours as well as others.

Look Middle East Policy

C. Raja Mohan

June 2, 2014

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/look-middle-east-policy/99/

Prime Minister Narendra Modi must reach out to a region as critical to India as the subcontinent — the Middle East.

SUMMARY

Modi must reach out to the region, make a pragmatic break with the past.

After the impressive diplomatic start with the neighbours last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi must reach out to a region as critical to India as the subcontinent — the Middle East. Despite its vital economic importance, cultural and physical proximity, and shared security concerns, the Middle East does not figure high on the list of New Delhi’s diplomatic priorities.

Consider, for example, the fact that former prime minister Manmohan Singh had hardly visited the region. He travelled just once to Iran and Egypt — to attend the summits of the non-aligned movement. Singh’s bilateral visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman — once each in the last decade — did not match India’s high stakes in the region.

Modi is in a good position to change this and take a strategic approach to the Middle East. Any reference to the region and the BJP government in the same sentence, however, leads us inevitably to Israel. For a variety of reasons, the BJP in the past tended to attach special importance to Israel. Criticising the Congress governments for their neglect of Israel, the BJP ideologues tended to privilege the relationship with Tel Aviv in the Middle East.

Recall the remarks of Jaswant Singh during a visit to Israel in 2000, the first by an Indian foreign minister, affirming that Delhi’s policy towards the Middle East was a victim of “vote-bank” politics at home. The NDA government hosted the first and only visit to India by an Israeli prime minister in 2003. The return of the Congress to power in 2004 saw the downgrading of the political engagement with Israel, even as security cooperation with Tel Aviv flourished under UPA rule.

There is a widespread perception today that Israel will be at the top of Modi’s diplomatic agenda. Israel is one of the few countries that Modi visited as the chief minister of Gujarat. And if he chooses to visit Israel again, he will become India’s first prime minister to do so.

Getting down to the energy business

Vikram S Mehta

June 1, 2014

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/getting-down-to-the-energy-business/99/

The government should bring consumers into the energy debate and harness the ‘soft power’ of public opinion to get politicians to do what is right and not just what is perceived tobe popular. Source: CR SasiKumar

SUMMARY

This may be the right political moment to resolve the dilemmas surrounding the energy policy.

Energy sits at the nub of every politician’s deepest dilemma. How to meet the demands of the electorate for affordable and reliable fuel without pushing government finances into a deep hole? In the specific context of India, this dilemma has been about providing cheap (if not free) power to farmers, subsidised LPG and kerosene to householders and affordable diesel to transporters and, at the same time, keeping a check on government finances. So far, politicians have done a poor job in striking the right balance. They have concentrated only on meeting populist demands. As a result, the energy sector is in crisis and the exchequer faces a high fiscal deficit.

The most experienced brains in the country have sought to resolve this dilemma over the past few years. Vijay Kelkar (former petroleum and finance secretary), C. Rangarajan (former governor of the RBI), B.K. Chaturvedi (former petroleum secretary, cabinet secretary and member, energy, Planning Commission) and Kirit Parikh (energy economist and also former member, energy, Planning Commission) have, at some point or the other, headed a committee of experts to look into this issue. The terms of reference for these committees have been different but their underlying purpose has been to lay down a route map for the government to meet the legitimate and understandable demands of the poor while also complying with the macro demands of financial prudence. Had previous governments implemented even part of the suggestions recommended by these committees, the current administration would not have inherited such a mess. Unfortunately, they did not or could not, because they had a fractured and unstable mandate.

Today, the political conditions are different. The government is not shackled by coalition politics, the next election is five years away and the prime minister has been elected to put the economy back on the rails of sustainable growth. There could not be a more propitious combination of circumstances to correct the imbalance. I list six initiatives below that I believe will help the government move in that direction.

One, energy prices should be market-oriented and energy subsidies should be scaled back. It would be socially and economically harsh to withdraw them totally. The poor cannot afford the current market prices, especially for LPG and kerosene. The structure of disbursement should, however, be altered. Currently, the PSUs make the initial payout. The government subsequently reimburses them, but the lag imposes an interest burden on their bottom line. Subsidies should henceforth be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India. They should be disbursed through direct cash transfers, using the platform of Aadhaar, and the distributor intermediaries should be totally excised from the process.

Two, the government should continue the current system of graduated increase in diesel prices, by 50 paise per month, until such time as the domestic price is aligned to the market. In addition, it should contemplate raising the price of the higher grade BS1V to import parity levels as soon as practically possible. This is the grade consumed inter alia by owners of SUVs and sedans. There will, no doubt, be leakages and diversions. It is never easy to manage a dual-price regime, but the benefits should outweigh the costs. It is estimated that this initiative could save the exchequer upto Rs 10,000 crore. The supply of subsidised diesel for fuelling generator sets and telecom towers should also be choked off.

Energy trade with Pakistan

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140602/edit.htm#5

It is the single most effective confidence-building measure

Davinder Kumar Madaan

RECENTLY, a draft of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was handed over by Pakistan to India for a deal to buy 500 MW electricity from India for which an inter-grid connection will be built between Amritsar and Lahore via the Wagah border. Earlier, on January 20, 2014, the Pakistani Cabinet had approved the signing of the MOU. Both countries have constituted a joint working committee to resolve matters related to the technical, commercial, construction and regulatory issues of this deal. If all goes well, electricity trade between the two countries can start by the end of 2014 at a tariff of around Rs 8 per unit. Cross-border trading will be through high voltage direct current, which will ensure that both the grids operate independently. It will be economical to transfer power through Amritsar as Lahore has complete transmission lines and grids, and is near the grid in the Indian Punjab. The project requires 45 km of 220 KV transmission lines on both sides of the border -- 25 km in India and 20 km in Pakistan -- within six months following the signing of a formal agreement. Earlier, the World Bank funded the feasibility study and worked out the imported cost at 10-11 US cents per unit. It offered to provide $300-400 million for installing 220 KV transmission lines to import a total 1200 MW of power from India.

Currently, electricity production in Pakistan is about 15430 MW against an installed capacity of 22797 MW because of poor infrastructure, old plants and theft of electricity. The inefficient transmission and distribution system is costing the taxpayers Rs 1.7 per unit over and above the cost of generation - averaging around Rs 7.3 per unit. Power theft alone amounts to Rs 8,500 crore per annum. Pakistan is producing 36% of electricity from oil, 30% from hydel, 29% each from gas and 5% from nuclear plants. A sharp decline in the share of gas in energy production from 52% in 2005 to 29% in 2014 has increased the cost of power in Pakistan. The country faces 7,000 MW power deficits. This turns out to be 31 per cent of the total annual demand. The decision of the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) at The Hague in February 2013 is likely to hurt its 980 MW Neelum-Jhelum Hydro-Power Project being set up in occupied Kashmir, as the ICA allowed India to divert water from the Kishanganga river (called Neelum in Pakistan) to its 330 MW Kishanganga Hydro-Electric Project on the Jhelum river basin in Kashmir. Given Pakistan's internal energy situation, the total 1200 MW power imports from India will be acute and cannot simply be replaced by other sources. In this way, Pakistan will be more dependent on India for its electricity needs. The country imports 35 MW of power from Iran, and is considering to import another 1000 MW from Tajikistan by 2016. In recent times, China has agreed to invest US$20 billion in Pakistan's energy infrastructure, and in return, it will take ownership of coal plants.

The Indian Ocean: A Great-Power Danger Zone?

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-indian-ocean-great-power-danger-zone-10568?page=show

Five years ago, Robert D. Kaplan detailed the promise and the peril of this vital part of the globe. Will it be a source of tension or trust in the 21st century? 

Nilanthi Samaranayake

May 30, 2014 

In 2009, emblazoned in large red letters on the cover of Foreign Affairs were the words “Rivalry in the Indian Ocean.” In this featured article, Robert D. Kaplan announced to the Western world the growing importance of a long-neglected geographic entity in the study of international politics. His essay, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean” continues to be cited in countless articles and paved the way for his 2010 book, Monsoon. Kaplan’s contribution was to explain the civilizational and political connections of disparate Asian, African and Middle Eastern players in the Indian Ocean. Although Robert Kaplan’s recent work examines the South China Sea, his influential 2009 article on Chinese-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean and U.S. interests in the region deserves to be revisited on its five-year anniversary.

In 2009, Kaplan saw energy security and geopolitics converging in the Indian Ocean. Because roughly two-thirds of petroleum traffic traverses this body of water, it will become increasingly important to numerous stakeholders, whose interests and infrastructure projects he detailed. Other than the United States, the countries commanding most of Kaplan’s attention were India and China. Given their size and growing dependence on the sea lanes for energy supplies and trade, Kaplan saw an inevitable geopolitical “great game” rivalry emerging in the Indian Ocean. As a solution, he argued that the United States should “act as a broker” to mitigate the likelihood of conflict between these two rising economic and military powerhouses, even though he foresaw the superpower as experiencing an unavoidable “elegant decline.”

Now, five years later, what is the state of relations in the Indian Ocean? What has changed and what has not? Has an Indian-Chinese rivalry emerged, as Kaplan envisioned? What is the role of the United States in the coming years? Is the “elegant decline” of the United States that Kaplan discussed coming to pass? The five-year mark is a good opportunity to reconsider this seminal article about the Indian Ocean, which continues to capture the imagination of strategists who want to see how power politics will play out in this comparatively underresearched region.

Remembering Tiananmen

Published: May 31, 2014

ANANTH KRISHNAN

http://www.thehindu.com/features/magazine/remembering-tiananmen/article6069570.ece

The Hindu Photo Archives During the protest in 1989.

The HinduMemories of the 1989 protests have been forgotten as tourists throng Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

On June 4, 1989, the pro-democracy student protests at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, came to a tragic end. Twenty-five years later, the memories are fast fading in China today.

Lies written in ink cannot hide facts written in blood.

- Chinese writer Lu Xun, writing about the suppression of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1926.

A few years ago, I made the journey to the sprawling campus of Peking University, in northwestern Beijing, to dine with students of China’s most famed educational institution. Its expansive grounds boast pristine forests, pagodas and even lakes. Since its founding in 1898, the university has played a unique role in its country’s cultural evolution. In the second decade of the 20th century, its students propelled the New Culture Movement, and subsequently led the marchers to Tiananmen Square for the transformative May 4, 1919, protests that swept the country and energised nationalists, opposing the government’s acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles that ceded parts of China to Japan. China’s great writer of the 20th century, Lu Xun, who spent time at “Bei Da”, wrote famously that the university had an indomitable spirit that could never be extinguished.

Seventy years after the May 4 movement, it was Bei Da’s students who drove forward the pro-democracy protests that convulsed China exactly 25 years ago this week, in the summer of 1989. The students ignited a nation, inspiring people across social divides, as they demanded free speech and an end to the rampant corruption of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), then under Deng Xiaoping. Their protests, as the world knows, came to a tragic and brutal denouement on the night of June 3, as Deng declared martial law and sent in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to clear the square of protesters. Hundreds, if not thousands, were killed. Most deaths did not take place in the square, which had been vacated largely before the troops moved in. It was ordinary Beijingers in ordinary neighbourhoods who were shot and killed en masse as the troops fired at will and moved in to take control of the contested capital.

The Wrong Afghan Friends

Source Link

By ANAND GOPALMAY 30, 2014

In September 2012, Afghans gathered around the bodies of people reported to have been killed during clashes with an anti-Taliban militia that attacked civilians in Kunduz Province. CreditEuropean Pressphoto Agency

At a checkpoint on a dirt road in southeastern Afghanistan in 2012, Rahim Sarobi, a farmer, braked to a stop behind a knot of idling cars. Up ahead, Afghan gunmen were piled into the back of a Toyota Hilux. On the ground, tied to the rear fender by their wrists, lay two bloodied men, laboring to breathe.

Everyone was ordered out of their vehicles. The burly checkpoint commander, known simply as Azizullah, said the unfortunate pair had not slowed sufficiently at the checkpoint, and only the Taliban don’t slow down. But Mr. Sarobi and fellow motorists recognized the men as farmers from their village. They pleaded, but Azizullah would not listen. The motorists were ordered to follow the pickup as it dragged the men along six miles of rock-studded road. By the time the convoy reached Azizullah’s base, the pair were dead. Their bodies were left decomposing for days, a warning to anyone who thought of disobeying Azizullah.

Mr. Sarobi told me that story in Paktia Province last February. It echoes ominously against President Obama’s announcement on Tuesday that about 9,800 American troops will stay in Afghanistan after most have withdrawn this year. Special Operations Forces will continue training Afghans and assisting in counterterrorism. And if the current pattern holds, we can expect them, alongside the Central Intelligence Agency, to keep partnering with commanders like Azizullah to fight the Taliban.

Bear in mind that Azizullah is not a member of the Afghan army. He does not work for the Afghan National Police. He is not, in fact, under the authority of the Afghan government at all.

Instead, his militia, which has been supported by the Special Operations Forces, is part of a network of semi-independent rural paramilitary groups that owe their funding, weapons and very existence to America’s war on terror. By backing this network, the United States is fostering an environment of lawlessness and impunity, exacerbating Afghanistan’s longstanding problems, and creating fertile ground for the Taliban insurgency to survive. Using such strongmen seems to run counter to the doctrine laid out in 2006 in a much publicized Army/Marines counterinsurgency manual, which emphasized the need to convince citizens that America’s fighting forces will keep them safe.

What the US withdrawal from Afghanistan means

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/mk-bhadrakumar-what-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-means/20140530.htm

May 30, 2014

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'Obama's decision to end the US military involvement in the Afghan civil war needs to be welcomed as a positive development for regional security and stability.'

'India, too, has a great opportunity opening up here if it plays its cards in sync with the spirit of the times rather than continuing to view the Afghan problem in zero-sum terms,' says Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar.

When it was made, finally, on Tuesday at the Rose Garden on the White House lawns in Washington DC, it couldn't have had any real surprise left in it -- President Barack Obama's announcement on how he is bringing 'America's longest war to a responsible end.'

The US-led war in Afghanistan has been grinding to a halt for quite some time already.

Yet, Obama sprang a surprise, a big surprise. He notionally gave in to the Pentagon's demand that an absolutely irreducible minimum of 10,000 US troops should remain in Afghanistan beyond this year. He chalked up a figure of 9,800.

But then he added the caveat that this number would come down by half in a year's time by end-2015 and the remaining troops shall thenceforth be confined to two locations -- Kabul and Bagram -- and, furthermore, that there shall be a complete drawdown by end-2016.

This is vintage Obama. Call it by any other name, but Obama has in reality decided to exercise the 'zero option' to be implemented through the next 30-month period.

Without even acknowledging it, he neatly de-linked it from the signing of the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (which is now a certainty as soon as the next Afghan president takes over in July.)

'The bottom line is it's time to turn the page on more than a decade in which so much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,' Obama said. He is redeeming an important election pledge that he'd bring the warriors home.

There was no triumphalism in Obama's announcement -- no victory cry, no bragging of 'Mission Accomplished', not even airy claims or his famous rhetorical flourish.

In fact, Obama was rather philosophical -- Yet, this is how wars end in the 21st century -- not through signing ceremonies...

Obama rationalised his decision primarily in terms of the US' priorities -- the war needed to be brought to an end -- having lasted 'longer than many Americans expected.' Period.

Indeed, some of the resources saved by ending the war could be redirected 'to respond nimbly to the changing threat of terrorism, while addressing a broader set of (foreign policy) priorities around the globe.'

Emerging South Asian security complex calls for expansion of regional institution

By Khurram Abbas Source:Global Times Published: 2014-5-29 

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/862957.shtml

It seems increasingly clear that security issues in South Asia cannot be solved by South Asian countries alone. 

The India-China border conflict in 1962 gave the first indication that South Asian security issues could not be fully addressed until China is involved.

In 1979, a couple of incidents occurred outside the South Asian security complex, but affected South Asia in different ways. The Afghan war and Iranian Revolution paved the way for the expansion of the South Asian security complex.

In 1985, during the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), all the above mentioned incidents could not get attention in the eyes of those who were establishing a comprehensive regional organization. Therefore, the formation process restricted the geographical boundaries and incorporated seven states into the security complex of South Asia. 

After almost 20 years, these seven states realized that without Afghanistan's inclusion into SAARC, the security complex of South Asia would remain inadequate. As a result, Afghanistan was incorporated into the organization, and was recognized as an important state for the South Asian security complex. 

Ironically, South Asian countries once again did not recognize the importance of China and Iran, both in terms of the security and economic issues linked with South Asia. 

But it is a recognized fact that if Afghanistan can become part of the South Asian security complex, then China and Iran have several reasons to become part of SAARC. 

China, which has a direct border with five out of eight SAARC countries, is actually deeply involved in South Asian affairs. This direct cooperation-competition paradox makes China eligible to be a member of SAARC and to be recognized as an important state within the South Asian security complex. 

Iran, which shares border with Pakistan, is also a key state in South Asian dynamics. Iran has key issues in SAARC, including gas pipelines, narcotics issues, as well as border issues affected by non-state actors. Iran's key role in Afghanistan due to direct border connections increases its importance in this region. 

Iran's inclusion in the South Asian security complex can provide South Asian states a better chance of cooperation and trade with energy surplus states under the banner of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement. 

Japan’s Crimea Scenario

Could China seize disputed islands the way Russia seized Crimea?

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/japans-crimea-scenario-652145183adb

One day in the not so distant future, the world wakes up to find that masked men, wearing military uniforms and carrying assault rifles, have suddenly appeared in a disputed territory.

The men loudly proclaim they are a of group activists, acting totally independent of any country. They stand their ground and ask for assistance from a larger, neighboring country that has made claims on the territory.

The scenario sounds familiar, but it takes place in an unlikely location—Japan. The idea that armed activists could seize Japan’s Senkaku Islands is not at all farfetched. Russia has showed the way.

Russian military and security services were undoubtedly behind the Crimean “activists” who seized key locations in southeastern Ukraine starting in late February.

The armed men claimed to be civilians. Their stated goal—splitting the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine and reintegrating it back into Russia—just so happened to coincide with Moscow’s.

Crimea goes east

Could China do something similar in the East China Sea? Deploy “activists” armed with rifles and surface-to-air missiles to one or more of the Diaoyu Islands—Senkaku Islands to Japan—declare them Chinese territory and gamble that Japan won’t fight back?

Chinese nationalist activists—real activists—have landed on the Senkakus in the past. In August 2012, activists twice occupied the islands. The vigilantes chartered fishing boats, waded ashore and planted Chinese flags. On both occasions, the Japanese coast guard rounded up the activists and sent home.

One man even tried to take a hot air balloon to the Diaoyus, but crashed into the sea and had to be rescued by the Japanese.

In the case of both landings, Beijing knew what the activists were up to but didn’t stop them. The incidents promised to further China’s cause, whipping up patriotic fervor and putting pressure on Japan—all without directly involving the Chinese government.

What if Beijing went a step further, and mounted an operation similar to Russia’s in Crimea? What if Chinese troops masquerading as “activists” sailed to the disputed islands in a fleet of fishing boats? What if they were sufficiently heavily armed to fend off any reasonable Japanese response?

Look, China loves employing non-state actors to achieve the state’s ends. Chinese security forces have quietly assisted and shaped protests outside foreign embassies and factories—even shutting down the demonstrations once Beijing’s point has been made.

Beijing has encouraged Chinese fishermen to encroach upon China’s neighbors the South China Sea. Fishing boats are the standard first wave in Beijing’s encroachment tactics. First come the boats, then the claims of Chinese territorial ownership.

Which leads to another method China uses in the South China Sea. Beijing makes some provocative move, against which there is no good counter-move. On May 9 for example, Vietnam suddenly discovered it had aChinese oil rig in its front yard.

What Keeps Asia up at Night: China's Regional Objectives

THE BUZZ

Source Link

Rod Lyon

May 30, 2014

The Asian security architecture has long been defined by two sets of arrangements: a US-centered set of alliance arrangements, and an ASEAN-centered set of institutions. The conundrum of the modern Asian security environment is that both sets of arrangements—devised during an era of relatively weak Asian powers—are struggling for leverage in an era of stronger Asian powers.

China’s rise lies at the heart of the problem. While scholars debate the extent to which Beijing even has a deliberate grand strategy, I think China currently pursues two distinct objectives. It seeks a culture of deference towards China’s interests among its neighbors, and a Great Wall at Sea to hold US naval power away from the Asian mainland. Those objectives are of course related: it’s easier for China to create a deferential regional hierarchy if a maritime buffer zone makes a US naval presence in the western Pacific less assured. The Great Wall at Sea pursues that goal of a weakened US presence in the maritime domain, and President Xi Jinping’s advocacy last week of a region free from US alliances is intended to pursue it on the land.

The problem for China, of course, and Brad Glosserman depicted it well in his recent National Interest article, is that its pursuit of those objectives has generated a new wave of anxiety along the Asian rimlands. Countries large enough to respond to the Chinese challenge—like Japan—have begun to do so. Smaller countries, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, have indulged in some balancing behavior. But Southeast Asia more generally is haunted by the concern that its classic preference in favor of rule-and-norm-generating institutions no longer seems an effective counter to growing Chinese power. For most ASEAN members, that haunted feeling hasn’t yet translated into harder-edged strategic options. Nor has it translated into greater accommodation of Beijing.

In both Northeast and Southeast Asia, demands for assurance from the US are climbing steeply—more steeply, indeed, than Washington could hope to satisfy. US relations with its allies and partners are starting to be dominated by two questions: how much assurance is required, and how best might it be delivered? Such questions aren’t easily answered at the best of times, since assurance is a much more difficult task than deterrence. The US alliance system seems unlikely to grow more spokes—even if the administration were to offer new alliances, the US Senate might struggle to ratify them. And not all of the answer lies within Washington’s gift. After all, exactly how close a relationship does a country like, say, Indonesia want with the US? We might well be looking at some form of more robust strategic partnership between the US and Indonesia. But how robust? How would that partnership mesh with ANZUS? Does ANZUS empower such a partnership, or distract from it?

How Chinese Think About Terrorism

A survey of Chinese attitudes in the wake of the March attack on Kunming.

By Dingding Chen and Ding Xuejie

April 19, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/how-chinese-think-about-terrorism/

On March 1, 2014, in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming, a group of eight assailants dressed in black and armed with cleavers, daggers and other knivesbrutally ended the lives of 29 civilians and maimed 143 others at the city’s railway station. Xinhua News Agency announced within hours of the incident that it was “a terrorist attack carried out by Xinjiang separatist force,” authorities and witnesses said the attackers were Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic minority Muslim group from northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Uyghurs have long resented China’s Xinjiang policies of coercion, natural resources exploitation, and marginalization of their linguistic and religious tradition. Between 1990 to 2001, Xinjiang experienced more than 200 attacks, killing more than 160 people. The most terrifying incident took place more recently, on July 5, 2009, and left 184 dead and 1,680 injured. The Kunming attack is thus expected to enflame tensions between the Han Chinese and Uyghur ethnic groups, and signals that the conflict has spread from Xinjiang to the rest of China.

After the Kunming incident, my colleague Ding Xuejie at Oxford University and I conducted a survey of Mainland China civilians, aiming at understanding opinions and attitudes towards ethnic conflicts and government policies regarding Xinjiang and its Uyghur minorities. We sent out around 2,000 questionnaires via the Internet and within one week had received 1151 responses. Our respondents were from 30 provinces across the country. Their ages ranged from 17 to 72, with an average age of 33. If the respondents, 51 percent are male, 96.3 percent are Han Chinese, and 78.5 percent have received at least a college education.

Attitudes of Chinese civilians (especially Han Chinese) toward Xinjiang Uyghur after Kunming?

Partly because of widespread media reports, 99.5 percent of respondents answered yes to the question “Are you familiar with the Kunming incident?” In answering the question “Do you think similar incidents will also occur in the city where you live?” only 34 percent of the respondents chose “unlikely” or “impossible,” while approximately 50 percent thought it was “likely” or “very likely.” This result indicates that the spread of violence from Xinjiang to other parts of China has fostered an atmosphere of insecurity among Chinese; ordinary citizens have begun to fear for their safety.

But does this sense of insecurity provoke negative intergroup attitudes, especially prejudice regarding Uyghur minorities? Our results show that Chinese people do not equate Xinjiang separatists with Xinjiang civilians, even after Kunming. Eighty-seven percent of respondents agreed with the statement “Those who support terrorism in Xinjiang are only a small minority among Xinjiang civilians.” Among people who agree with this statement, the proportion of women is significantly higher than men, and the proportion of people who had college education or above is significantly higher than people who never went to college. No significant difference was observed between ethnic groups.

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Remembering Tiananmen 

The lessons of history 

As our bureau chief leaves China, he reflects on the crushing of the protests he witnessed 25 years ago, and what has transpired since May 31st 2014 | BEIJING | From the print edition

EVEN after the Chinese army moved into Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3rd 1989, and cleared it of the detritus left by the students who had occupied it for most of the previous seven weeks, it was several days before observers were certain who was in control of China. Your correspondent, looking down Beijing’s central boulevard, Chang’an Avenue, at a maze of still-burning barricades a day after the bloody operation, was not alone in wondering whether the Communist Party could ever heal. This newspaper, with which he was not then linked, summed up a common view: “This week China looked into the abyss of coup, counter-coup and civil war”. Foreign doomsayers were proved wrong. But even after 25 years of relative stability, it is still wise to be cautious about the cohesion of Chinese politics.

It was not just foreign observers who were given to apocalyptic musings at the time. “If the rebels had had their way, there would have been a civil war,” Deng Xiaoping told a visiting Chinese-American physicist, Tsung-Dao Lee, three months after the army crackdown that left hundreds, if not thousands, dead. Thanks to strenuous efforts by the Communist Party to erase memories of what happened (see article), many in China now have only a dim understanding of the history of the protests in Tiananmen Square and the nationwide unrest they triggered. But Deng’s analysis is remarkably close to the mainstream among the generation of young urban residents who have grown up since: if they have heard of the 1989 protests, many feel that, though the killings may have been bad, the army’s resolute action helped to create the stability that allowed China’s economy to grow from one that was then smaller than Britain’s into the world’s second-largest.

This argument, however, glosses over the factional infighting within the party that paralysed decision-making and allowed the protests to grow to the scale they did. Even after Tiananmen, Deng appeared to recognise that political stability was by no means assured. By 1992, then retired, he had concluded that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies was mainly attributable to their failure to make citizens richer. To avoid a similar fate for China, he went on his famous “southern tour” to drum up support for a fresh round of economic reform. It was this bold move, in the face of stiff conservative resistance, rather than the crushing of largely peaceful dissent, that laid the groundwork for China’s prosperity today. As he tottered round southern China, berating conservatives and calling for the liberation of China’s economy from ideological shackles, he remarked: “If any problem occurs in China, it will arise from within the party.” His words remain apt.

IRAN AND CHINA MOVING TOWARD EXPANDED COOPERATION? – ANALYSIS

MAY 30, 2014 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/30052014-iran-china-moving-toward-expanded-cooperation-analysis/ 

By Iran Review

By Mohsen Shariatinia

Relations between Iran and China are as old as history. The two countries, as cradles of the world’s most ancient human civilizations, have been interacting in various fields for thousands of years. During this long period of time, cooperation has been the dominant model governing the relations between Iran and China. The Silk Road stands as the symbol of cooperation and interaction between the two countries during past centuries. Under present circumstances and in continuation of the aforesaid historical model, relations between the two countries are based on cooperation in various political, security, economic and cultural fields.

The logic that rules political, security and defense cooperation between Iran and China has its roots in common interests as well as foreign policy goals pursued by the two countries. On the other hand, as two developing countries with complementary economies, Iran and China are able to address various needs of each other and this situation has further expanded the area of common interests that can cement relations between the two countries. In addition, Iran and China enjoy a great number of commonalities in terms of values and norms that are acceptable in their societies. The existence of such commonalities has provided many potential grounds for cooperation between the Islamic Republic and China in political, security and economic fields.

In international political sphere, Iran and China both reject the existing unipolar world order, which is currently governing international relations because both countries consider it unjust and against their national interests. Of course, the method used by each country to oppose this order is different. Therefore, existence of a certain degree of overlap between the two countries’ large-scale viewpoints about international relations can be considered as the most important aspect of their relations, which can create new capacities for further promotion of political collaboration between Tehran and Beijing.

Another factor, which can serve to create political capacities in the two countries’ relations, is related to both countries’ effort to protect their national sovereignty against a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty as they both are opposed to foreign interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Iran and China hold common views in opposing the West’s intervention in other countries’ internal affairs, violation of other countries’ sovereignty by the West, forceful regime change in various countries and the Western states’ effort to introduce new international procedures in a bid to further limit sovereign rights of other countries. This situation has also provided a fertile ground for political cooperation and consultations between the Islamic Republic and China.

As for security matters, it should be noted that under the present conditions, there are important common elements in the security environment of both countries and this issue can provide good potential for further collaboration between Tehran and Beijing in this regard. Persian Gulf region is the most important spheres of Iran’s security environment. On the other hand, since China has been increasing its energy imports from this region, Persian Gulf has turned into a major component of China’s security environment as well. Therefore, stability and security of this region is of high importance to both countries.

IRAN AND CHINA MOVING TOWARD EXPANDED COOPERATION? – ANALYSIS

http://www.eurasiareview.com/30052014-iran-china-moving-toward-expanded-cooperation-analysis/ 

MAY 30, 2014 

By Iran Review

By Mohsen Shariatinia

Relations between Iran and China are as old as history. The two countries, as cradles of the world’s most ancient human civilizations, have been interacting in various fields for thousands of years. During this long period of time, cooperation has been the dominant model governing the relations between Iran and China. The Silk Road stands as the symbol of cooperation and interaction between the two countries during past centuries. Under present circumstances and in continuation of the aforesaid historical model, relations between the two countries are based on cooperation in various political, security, economic and cultural fields.

The logic that rules political, security and defense cooperation between Iran and China has its roots in common interests as well as foreign policy goals pursued by the two countries. On the other hand, as two developing countries with complementary economies, Iran and China are able to address various needs of each other and this situation has further expanded the area of common interests that can cement relations between the two countries. In addition, Iran and China enjoy a great number of commonalities in terms of values and norms that are acceptable in their societies. The existence of such commonalities has provided many potential grounds for cooperation between the Islamic Republic and China in political, security and economic fields.

In international political sphere, Iran and China both reject the existing unipolar world order, which is currently governing international relations because both countries consider it unjust and against their national interests. Of course, the method used by each country to oppose this order is different. Therefore, existence of a certain degree of overlap between the two countries’ large-scale viewpoints about international relations can be considered as the most important aspect of their relations, which can create new capacities for further promotion of political collaboration between Tehran and Beijing.

Another factor, which can serve to create political capacities in the two countries’ relations, is related to both countries’ effort to protect their national sovereignty against a Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty as they both are opposed to foreign interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Iran and China hold common views in opposing the West’s intervention in other countries’ internal affairs, violation of other countries’ sovereignty by the West, forceful regime change in various countries and the Western states’ effort to introduce new international procedures in a bid to further limit sovereign rights of other countries. This situation has also provided a fertile ground for political cooperation and consultations between the Islamic Republic and China.

China’s cyber-generals are reinventing the art of war

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/05/30/chinas-cyber-generals-are-reinventing-the-art-of-war/

BY DOMINIC BASULTO

May 30

Five Chinese military officials are redefining how we think about cyberwar. (Charles Dharapak/AP)

The conventional wisdom is that the future of war will involve private robot armies, predator drones carrying out precision strikes, and maybe even the militarization of space. All of this assumes, however, that the fundamental nature of war does not change, only the technological sophistication with which we wage this war. And, contrary to just about any military text dating back to the era of Sun Tzu, it also assumes that we always know who our enemies are.

That’s why the current high-profile tussle over Chinese cyberattacks is so fascinating. The White House’s recent condemnation of Chinese cyberspying is just the clearest signal to date that we have entered a new era of warfare. Instead of tallying costs in terms of dead and wounded, we now measure them in purely economic terms. Instead of a known enemy, we now have a shadowy assailant who, on the surface, is still our friend. For every claim by the United States that the Chinese have gone beyond mere spying for national security to include ruthless appropriation of commercial secrets, there is a counterclaim by China that the United States has been using the NSA as its own kind of global surveillance state.

Yes, nations still fight wars, but it’s in a totally new and different way.

When the new paradigm for the world is economic power rather than military power, it means that we will find ways to fight without destroying our economic relationships. Traditional warfare is very expensive, requiring massive buildups and drains on the state treasury for military campaigns in far-flung locales. The new warfare will be cheap, low-intensity and most likely, waged primarily in cyberspace. Attacks will occur against economic targets rather than military targets. Taking down a stock market or a currency has greater tactical value than taking out a hardened military target.

You can blame many factors for this. The relentless pace of globalization has created interconnections between all economies of the world and blurred the line between “national” and “multinational” companies. The reach of the global Internet means that digital targets (say, a nation’s grid) are now just as important as physical targets. And, in an increasingly multi-polar world, there are no longer two clear sides, good vs. evil. It’s a global free-for-all. It’s not so much ideology that matters as the ability to reassure investors about the viability of your financial markets.

N. Korea Won’t Cause a Nuclear Domino in Asia (But China Might)

http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/n-korea-wont-cause-a-nuclear-domino-in-asia-but-china-might/

If there is a nuclear arms race in Asia, China’s conventional military power will be to blame.

By Zachary Keck

May 31, 2014

On Thursday the Wall Street Journal published excerpts from an interview it conducted with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.

One article from the interview discusses the dire consequences President Park foresees if North Korea goes through with a fourth nuclear weapons test.

“North Korea would effectively be crossing the Rubicon if they were to conduct another nuclear test,” WSJ quotes Park as saying. President Park has also suggested that the six-party talks over North Korea’s nuclear program could end for good if Pyongyang goes through with its threat to conduct a new kind of nuclear test.

The article goes on to say that President Park also claimed that a fourth nuclear test by North Korea could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, where non-nuclear weapon states decide to acquire a nuclear deterrent in response to Pyongyang’s growing atomic capabilities.

“It would be difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area,” were North Korea to conduct another test, Park is quoted as saying.

Park is hardly the first to worry that a new state acquiring a nuclear weapon will have a nuclear domino effect among its neighbors. Indeed, this has been a constant concern in the United States since the dawn of the nuclear era. This concern continues today with many in Washington claiming that Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal would spark a nuclear arms race in the already volatile Middle East.

Nor is Park wrong to emphasize that North Korea conducting another test could be especially problematic for its neighbors. While many attribute North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests entirely to domestic politics, Pyongyang’s interest in continuing with tests is almost certainly due to its desire acquire a nuclear deterrent. The only way to be certain that a state has achieved this status is by conducting actual tests, which is why every nuclear state (very possibly including Israel) has carried out tests.

The next few North Korean nuclear tests will be particularly important because many believe that it is on the verge of being able to build a nuclear warhead small enough to be placed on top of a missile. This will give it the operational nuclear deterrent that it has heretofore lacked. While North Korea will initially still lack the capability to reach the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), it will only be a matter of time before it can achieve this too. As we saw in the Cold War when the Soviet Union acquired the capability to reach the continental United States with nuclear missiles, North Korea’s ability to target the U.S. homeland will complicate extended deterrence.

Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-south-china-sea-spark-war-10572?page=show

And by the way...Washington could get dragged in. 

Abraham M. Denmark

May 31, 2014 

In the South China Sea, China’s ambitious “nine-dash line” claim of sovereignty has been disputed by several other claimants, relations have in recent weeks turned remarkably chillier. Vietnam and the Philippines are facing the brunt of Beijing’s ire, and the potential for crisis and conflict is significant. Positions are hardening, willingness to compromise is low, and the fact that the Philippines is an ally of the United States raises the potential for a disastrous crisis and potential conflict between the U.S. and China.

The clash between China and Vietnam has attracted more attention in recent days. Just a few days after President Obama’s visit to the region, a Chinese mobile oil rig took position in a carefully selected site that, while closer to the Vietnam mainland than China’s Hainan Island, is just fourteen nautical miles from Chinese-occupied island, a part of the Paracel Island group that is claimed by both China and Vietnam. China sent a large flotilla of ships to escort the derrick; a group that included several armed Naval vessels. After Hanoi expressed outrage at this action and violence against Chinese nationals across Vietnam, Beijing expanded the escort flotilla to over 100 ships. Most recently, Chinese ships interdicted, rammed, and sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel that was challenging the derrick. Vietnam claims that four ships were attacked in all, and now there are reportedly 113 ships standing off against sixty Vietnamese vessels.

Similar incidents have played out in recent months between China and the Philippines. After China took effective control over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, Beijing seemed to set its sights on the Second Thomas Shoal—a small land formation about 105 nautical miles from the Philippines but is claimed by both countries. To buttress its claim, the Philippines in 1999 intentionally beached the hospital ship Sierra Madre on the reef and has maintained a small crew on the beached craft ever since (see an exceptional piece about the sailors on the ship and the broader dispute by theNew York Times here). Most recently, the Philippines arrested a group of Chinese fishermen found 70 miles from the Philippines near Half Moon Shoal with a ship filled with endangered (and valuable) turtles.

To an outsider, all this hyperbole and saber rattling about small rocks, oil derricks, fishermen, and turtles must seem like much ado about nothing. Yet it is deadly serious—these seemingly trivial issues are used as avatars for deadly serious questions about history, power, ambition, and national sovereignty. An examination of how countries see these issues and how they have behaved in the past provides a window for how they are likely to act in the future. It’s not a comforting thought.