How the U.S. Could Stumble into War in Ukraine

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2014/04/26/how_the_us_could_stumble_into_war_in_ukraine_110461.html

April 26, 2014
By Jean Mackenzie


The skeptics were right.

Just one week ago, as top diplomats in Geneva heralded an agreement on Ukraine that was supposed to defuse the crisis, many warned that tensions were too high to be easily resolved.

Now the situation has deteriorated even further, with clashes in eastern Ukraine that have left at least five people dead.

Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin mutter darkly, if vaguely, of "consequences" if their opponents do not back down, while Ukraine's acting prime minister warns that Europe may be on the brink of World War III.

A worldwide conflagration is still not very likely, the experts say, but as the war of words deepens there is increased danger that Washington and its allies could stumble into a situation that no one intended.

"I don't want to make too much of the centennial of World War I," said Thomas Graham, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University, and a managing director at Kissinger Associates. "But, just as in 1914, the parties could be trapped by politics and rhetoric, and by their misreading of the other side. It is not highly likely, but I don't rule it out."

Graham, who served as President George W. Bush's special assistant and National Security Council's senior director for Russia from 2004 to 2007, is concerned by what he sees as the US failure to get Russia right.

"It is our problem as a policymaking establishment that we cannot understand how the other side looks at the world," Graham said. "We think, ‘how can Russia be opposed to prosperous, democratic societies on its borders?' We do not understand why they consider such moves to be against them."

The US miscalculated the degree of extreme anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine's Maidan demonstrations, Graham says, and therefore did not understand or prepare for the Russian response. But Moscow's anger at Ukraine's rapprochement with the West was less about expansionism and more about security.

"Putin does not want responsibility for the socio-economic development [of Ukraine]," Graham said. "He just wants some assurances that it will not become part of an organization that is overtly hostile to Russia."

Guaranteeing that Ukraine will not be absorbed into NATO should be a no-brainer, according to Anatol Lieven, a war studies professor at King's College London and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation.

Obama quietly reverses Hillary’s ‘get Modi’ policy

MADHAV NALAPAT 

9th Apr 2014

Source Link

Hillary Clinton

S President Barack Obama has quietly reversed a policy initiated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to "get Narendra Modi" — ostensibly for the 2002 Gujarat riots, but in actuality "for taking stands that may be different from that favoured by the US administration" — in the words of a senior analyst in New York.

"Hillary Clinton likes to operate through NGOs, which are given funding through indirect channels, and which target individuals and countries seen as less than respectful to her views on foreign and domestic policy in the target countries," a retired US official now based in Atlanta said. He claimed that "rather than US NGOs, (the former) Secretary of State Clinton favoured operating through organisations based in the Netherlands, Denmark and the Scandinavian countries, especially Norway" as these were outside the radar of big power politics. These NGOs were active in the agitation against the Russian nuclear power plant at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, with "funding coming mainly from a religious organisation based in Europe that has close links with France".

Incidentally, French companies are in direct competition with Russian rivals in seeking to expand the market for nuclear reactors in India. The senior official, now on a visit to India, claimed that "your (i.e. the Manmohan Singh) government has full details of the religious organisation involved in funding the Kudankulam protests, but is keeping this secret as the organisation has high-level backers" in the UPA.

These present and retired officials claimed that "during the tenure in office of Secretary Clinton, several expert teams in the guise of NGOs were sent to Gujarat to try and find mass graves". The purpose was to then take the matter to the Office of the UN Commissioner of Human Rights in Geneva as an example of genocide. "In 2011, some bones were discovered in a Gujarat field by one of the search teams and there was much excitement, but these were later found to be buffalo bones", an official said. The official added that "no evidence whatsoever of mass graves was uncovered in Gujarat despite six years of clandestine searching for them" by undercover experts posing as representatives of NGOs. He added that "five politicians, three from the state and two in Delhi, assisted the search teams, but the information given by them proved unproductive".

Finally, "now that Secretary Clinton had stepped down from office, by end-2012 orders were given to stop wasting time on the search for mass graves in Gujarat, much to the dismay of those NGOs who were getting significant funding as a consequence of the search operations". Interestingly, the senior official claimed that because of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's inability to water down the Nuclear Liability Act and Defence Minister A.K. Antony's decision to prefer the French Rafale fighter to its US rival, "orders were given to activate the Khalistan file so as to create embarrassment for Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh".

Pakistan’s Water Woes and India Bashing

25-Apr-2014

Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

Source Link

A month ago, one of the water experts in Pakistan warned that the "most dreaded water scarcity ever" has at last hit the country. The warning came not too soon and the surprise if any is that the warning has come too late.

Unlike India, Pakistan is solely dependent on the Indus Water system and instead of meeting the water shortage, all that the Pakistan leaders at all scientific and political levels were doing was to do "India Bashing" as if India is responsible for the acute water shortage.

Increasing urbanisation, climate change, population exploration, indiscriminate usage of ground water particularly in Punjab and wastage of water in agricultural operations have all contributed to the shortage of water. Instead, India is being blamed day in and out for all the ills relating to water scarcity in Pakistan.

Even one simple fact that Pakistan which can store up to 40 percent of its water for leaner days has built in capacity of storing only 7 percent of water so far, that shows its lackadaisical approach towards water problems has been ignored and yet India is being described as the villain in stealing the waters of the three western rivers of the Indus under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960!

The Federal Planning Development and Reforms Minister Ahsan Iqbal said on 20th March this year that Pakistan was not getting 10 million acres feet of water, its due share due to water shortage by India.

Surely the Minister must have been aware of the division of waters of the Indus River System under the Indus Water Treaty f 1960, envisages the division of the system with the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab going fully to Pakistan with the three eastern rivers- the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas going over to India for full utilization. For the western rivers India is allowed to construct run of the river projects for power generation and a limited quantity for agricultural and other purposes. No where in the Pakistan press is there any mention that India is not fully utilizing the western waters allowed to be used for agricultural purposes and used downstream by the agriculturists of Pakistan and instead there is an unanimous uproar that India is "stealing the waters."

The Indus water treaty which has withstood the tests of times, in times of war and near war never envisaged any division of scarcity or any generous "give and take" of waters at times of crisis between the two countries. It is not therefore clear how the Pakistan Minister could come to the conclusion that Pakistan is entitled to 10 million acres of water from India. It is not like the water pacts in other river systems where the waters are equitably shared between the riparian countries both during the surplus and lean seasons. The Indus water treaty is unique and given the relationship between the two countries then and even now there could have been no better division of the river waters between the two countries India and Pakistan. Hence any call to revise the treaty as is heard sometimes now would only create more complications and difficulties in managing and utilising the waters of the system between the two countries.　

Talks with the Taliban: End Game for the Military, Political Parties and the TTP in Pakistan

IPCS Special Focus

SR160-SpecialFocus-TalibanTalks.pdf

Talks with the Taliban: Endgame for the

Political Parties

Sushant Sareen

Talks with the Taliban: Endgame for the

Military

Rana Banerji

Talks with the Taliban: Endgame for the

TTP

D Suba Chandran

Pakistan and TTP: Dialogue or Military

action

Salma Malik

Talks with the Taliban: How far will the

state go?

D Suba Chandran

RELATED COMMENTARIES

TTP under Mullah Fazlullah: What next

for the Pakistani Taliban?

Consensus on talks with Taliban; Political

parties in Pakistan, however, protect

their own turf

Edited By

Ayesha Khanyari

Solution to the Pakistani terrorist quagmire

ByVijaykumar S Kasi

IssueVol 24.1Jan-Mar 2009 | Date : 26 Apr , 2014

It is difficult to comprehend why some people resort to terrorism. One of the main reasons put forward — economic failure — is no excuse to pursue the path of terror. There are many extremely poor nations and societies that struggle for a better future in a peaceful and non-violent way. For decades, a significant section of Pakistanis have chosen the wrong path.

Terrorism has become an institution in Pakistan and has widespread support. Its army and intelligence services consider it a strategic weapon.

Terrorism has become an institution in Pakistan and has widespread support. Its army and intelligence services consider it a strategic weapon. After each terrorist strike, the Pakistani government cleverly dodges international pressure by temporarily clamping down on terrorism until the focus shifts away. It never completely eliminates this menace. As a consequence, this small region has now become the most dangerous place on the planet.

Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown

Wikistrat recently concluded a two-week simulation called “Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown” in which our strategic community was asked to map out what the country will look like in 2017, three years after American and NATO forces have pulled out. One scenario challenged the conventional wisdom of Pakistan sabotaging peace efforts and suggested it could actually play a stabilizing role. A summary is provided here.

Despite leaving a residual force for training, logistics support and special operations, the drawdown in NATO military personnel in Afghanistan leaves the central government weakened. While other interested powers, like Iran and Russia, are reluctant to get involved, Pakistan steps in. It reinforces its support for the Taliban as well as the presidential faction within the government. Recognizing that they would need Pakistan’s support to overthrow the government in Kabul, many Taliban decide that they can best advanced their goals by working with the government.

Pakistan sponsors talks between the government and moderate Taliban figures to produce a coalition government. While Afghanistan’s erstwhile Western sponsors are appalled, they have no incentive to reengage, especially as the Pakistan-brokered coalition delivers peace in the previously wartorn southern provinces. Instead, they focus on lobbying Pakistan and the new Kabul government to reduce opium production and prevent a return of Al Qaeda.

China is glad to see its ally stabilizing Afghanistan and thus avoiding it offering safe haven to Uighur separatists intent on destabilizing Xinjiang. China also increasingly sees opportunities for economic investment in Afghanistan, which Pakistan’s alliance with the Kabul government can guarantee.

Saudi Arabia sees Pakistan’s actions as another welcome blow in the Middle East’s Sunni-Shia conflict. It, too, is happy to provide economic and military aid to enhance Pakistan’s meager resources. Pakistan itself gains as the stabilization of southern Afghanistan impacts positively on the other side of the border.

The presidential palace in Kabul, Afghanistan

By 2017, a coalition between Taliban and non-Taliban Pashtun governs in Kabul, in close alliance with Pakistan. Southern Pakistan is largely stable, with some more extreme Taliban groups active but lacking popular support. Tajik opposition to the majority Pashtun government remains, but it is constricted to the river valleys of the north of the country. As Afghanistan recovers economically, Pakistan is able to trade its influence with the Kabul government over drugs and terrorism suppression for respectability in the West.

The Real Winner of the Afghan War Is This Shady Military Contractor

The State Department paid out $4 billion to rebuild Afghanistan. Some $2.5 billion of that went to a single firm with a bad, bad past.

For over a decade, the State Department gave 69% of its funding for Afghanistan to a single company—a company with a particularly checkered history. 

DynCorp, one of the largest corporations working in the government’s army of private contractors, has long been known for corruption scandals and a questionable performance record. But none of that seems to have discouraged the U.S. government from awarding the company new contracts. 

The State Department paid nearly $4 billion for projects to aid in Afghan reconstruction from 2002 to 2013. $2.5 billion of that went to DynCorp—69% of all the money awarded by the State Department over almost the entire duration of the war. 

The figures on DynCorp’s earnings come from a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR), an auditing agency created by Congress to provide oversight on government spending in Afghanistan. 

According to the SIGAR report, 89% of State Department funding, $3.5 billion, went to supporting large, so-called "rule-of-law" projects, like training and equipping the Afghan police force. And that was DynCorp’s primary focus in Afghanistan, too—although the firm also handled jobs like providing bodyguards for Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai. 

“The interior minister expressed deep concerns that lives could be in danger if news leaked that DynCorp hired ‘dancing boys’ to perform for them.” 

“Dyncorp contracts dealt principally with training and equipping the Afghan National Police and counternarcotics forces. DynCorp contracts included police trainers, construction of police infrastructure, and fielding police equipment and vehicles,” the SIGAR report states. 

The list of DynCorp’s job responsibilities, particularly in counter-narcotics and training the Afghan police force, gives a short rundown of some of the most difficult problems for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. But for all the billions the company has received to resolve these problems, there has been precious little progress. In the case of narcotics, it’s actually gotten worse in recent years, with opium production reaching record highs in 2013. 

Insights from the Wiki: Afghanistan Splits, Provoking Central Asian Cold War

Posted on March 23, 2014 by wikistrat

Wikistrat recently concluded a two-week simulation called “Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown” in which our strategic community was asked to map out what the country will look like in 2017, three years after American and NATO forces have pulled out. One scenario suggested the country could split in two, instigating a Central Asian cold war. A summary is provided here.

Following the withdrawal of international forces, the central authority in Kabul is irreparably weakened. Local army commanders make deals with a resurgent Taliban. Regional warlords compete for territory and opium revenues. The security forces split along ethnic lines.

The collapse of authority worries neighboring states. Pakistan moves first, levering its relations with the Pashtun to use the Taliban as a “stabilizing force.” China sees its investments in Afghanistan at risk and fears a destabilized country will offer safe haven to Uighur insurgents operating in Xinjiang. Initially, it moves limited forces across the border to “stabilize” the frontier, but over time sees attractions in collaborating with Pakistan to minimize its own involvement.

Iran renews its traditional links to warlords in the Herat region, exchanging weapons for influence. Its ability to offer arms is enhanced by Russia, which is cautious about overcommitting again in Afghanistan, but sees advantages in building on its alliance with Iran.

The interference by regional powers causes the tribal conflicts in Afghanistan to coalesce into two camps, one predominantly Tajik and linked to Iran and Russia and the other predominantly Pashtun and tied to China and Pakistan.

By 2017, Afghanistan has split into two semi-autonomous regions. Within each region, there is sufficient fear of the other to permit coherence. The rump national government has become irrelevant. Low-level violence between regional militias continues on a nearly daily basis, but the regional sponsors ensure that this does not get out of control.

Ethnolinguistic map of Afghanistan

Other interested powers are forced to pick sides. Most immediately, India will be tempted to associate itself with the Iranian-Russian block, seizing on the opportunity to put pressure on Pakistan and distract its attention away from Kashmir.

Afghanistan could feed into increasing Sino-Russians tensions. As Russia consolidates its support for Iran, China, marginalized in Tehran, would look to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Russia and China then in effect become sponsors of the two sides of the Saudi-Iranian, Sunni-Shia conflict for Middle East hegemony.

News World news Pakistan The Hamid Mir case: 'In Pakistan, they used to censor journalists – now they shoot us'

On Saturday in Karachi, one of Pakistan's most famous journalists survived being shot six times. Soon after, the TV news channel he works for blamed the feared Inter-Services Intelligence agency for the attack. Author Mohammed Hanif reports on a fourth estate under siege 

Mohammed Hanif

The Guardian

23 April 2014

Hamid Mir was shot on Saturday while being driven through Karachi. Photograph: T. MUGHAL/EPA

More than a hundred bouquets line the lobby of the private ward of Karachi's posh, private Aga Khan Hospital. Outside, dozens of policemen with bulletproof vests and automatic weapons look at every visitor suspiciously, officers speaking urgently into their walkie-talkies. The Karachi police force is really good at strutting about after a high-profile crime has happened. One of the largest bouquets in the lobby is from the force. "Get well Hamid Mir," it says. "We may not be able to protect you," it implies, "but we know where to order the best flowers."

Mir is upstairs recuperating. He took six bullets – in the ribs, thigh, stomach and across his hand – in an assassination attempt on Saturday as he came out of the airport to present a special broadcast on Geo,Pakistan's largest news channel. Mir had warned about a possible assassination. He had also named his would-be killers. That's what his brother claims, that's what his colleagues and managers at the channel say. Geo, just after the attack, broadcast the allegation and, in an unprecedented move, also flashed the picture of the accused: the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Zaheer ul-Islam. In that picture he comes across as a big man. We are not supposed to know much about him except the fact that he is a very professional general. According to an internet myth very popular in Pakistan, the ISI has been rated as the world's No 1 intelligence agency: Mossad is No 5 and MI6 languishes at No 9. According to television ratings, the man with three bullets still in his body is Pakistan's top-rated TV journalist and one of the most vocal critics of Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies.

The Real Winner of the Afghan War Is This Shady Military Contractor

Jacob Siegel

04.24.14

Source Link

The State Department paid out $4 billion to rebuild Afghanistan. Some $2.5 billion of that went to a single firm with a bad, bad past.

For over a decade, the State Department gave 69% of its funding for Afghanistan to a single company—a company with a particularly checkered history.

DynCorp, one of the largest corporations working in the government’s army of private contractors, has long been known for corruption scandals and a questionable performance record. But none of that seems to have discouraged the U.S. government from awarding the company new contracts.

The State Department paid nearly $4 billion for projects to aid in Afghan reconstruction from 2002 to 2013. $2.5 billion of that went to DynCorp—69% of all the money awarded by the State Department over almost the entire duration of the war.

The figures on DynCorp’s earnings come from a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR), an auditing agency created by Congress to provide oversight on government spending in Afghanistan.

According to the SIGAR report, 89% of State Department funding, $3.5 billion, went to supporting large, so-called "rule-of-law" projects, like training and equipping the Afghan police force. And that was DynCorp’s primary focus in Afghanistan, too—although the firm also handled jobs like providing bodyguards for Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai.

“The interior minister expressed deep concerns that lives could be in danger if news leaked that DynCorp hired ‘dancing boys’ to perform for them.”

“Dyncorp contracts dealt principally with training and equipping the Afghan National Police and counternarcotics forces. DynCorp contracts included police trainers, construction of police infrastructure, and fielding police equipment and vehicles,” the SIGAR report states.

The list of DynCorp’s job responsibilities, particularly in counter-narcotics and training the Afghan police force, gives a short rundown of some of the most difficult problems for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. But for all the billions the company has received to resolve these problems, there has been precious little progress. In the case of narcotics, it’s actually gotten worse in recent years, with opium production reaching record highs in 2013.

Myanmar Moving Forward

Report Released

Posted on April 15, 2014 by wikistrat

Wikistrat is happy to release today the final report from its recently-concluded strategic simulation “Myanmar Moving Forward.”

Myanmar, also known as Burma, was long considered a pariah state, isolated from the rest of the world with an appalling human rights record. For 41 years, the country was ruled by a military junta that suppressed almost all dissent and wielded absolute power in the face of international condemnation and sanctions. In 2011, a nominally civilian government led by President Thein Sein was installed and a series of reforms in the months since the new government took up office has led to hopes that decades of international isolation could be coming to an end.

Late last year, Wikistrat asked its strategic community to map out Myanmar’s political risk factors and possible futures (positive, negative or mixed) for the new democracy in 2015. The simulation was designed to explore the current social, political, economic and geopolitical threats to stability — i.e. its political risk — and to determine where the country is heading in terms of its social, political, economic and geopolitical future.

The report, written by the simulation’s Lead Analyst, Dr. Maha Hosain Aziz, synthesizes the insights gathered by 65 of Wikistrat’s analysts across more than sixty scenarios.

Click here to download the PDF file of this report.

China Army Targets Students for Officers to Match Weapons

By Bloomberg News 

Apr 24, 2014 

Source Link

Members of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) rehearse before a welcoming ceremony... Read More

China’s military has used annual budget increases in excess of 10 percent to buy precision-guided weapons, fighter jets and an aircraft carrier. Now it’s seeking to upgrade its recruits to operate them.

For Wu, a 20-year-old journalism student at a university in Beijing, that means his college fees are paid and he has an extra 3,500 yuan ($561) a year to live on. Wu, who asked to be identified only by his surname because he’s forbidden from speaking publicly, takes extra lessons on war strategy alongside regular classes. He’ll join the People’s Liberation Armyas a trainee officer when he graduates in 2016.

“In the past our weapons were quite primitive so you didn’t need too much knowledge,” Wu said, sitting in a cafe on a campus in the capital. “You just used a gun and that was OK. Now there’s a need for better quality people.”

China is following the example of the U.S. Reserve Officers’ Training Corps by increasing incentives for bright minds to serve in the armed forces. President Xi Jinping, the head of the Central Military Commission, has made an army that’s better prepared for combat a priority as China becomes more assertive in regional territorial disputes. China plans to fold developers of military hardware into listed state-owned companies, people familiar with the matter said this week, giving them access to capital markets as it prioritizes high-technology defense capability.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers take part in an exercise in Heihe,... Read More

Biggest Difficulty

“Their biggest difficulty right now is recruiting and retaining technical non-commissioned officers,” said Christopher Johnson, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic & International Studies. “They’re getting all these shiny new pieces of gear and if you’re operating off a conscription system those guys are two years and out. By the time you train them up they’re already leaving.”

Wu says officers are expected to serve longer than the minimum two years required of regular recruits. Males in China are registered for military service when they reach 18 but are exempt if they are in full-time school or the only worker in their family providing means of subsistence, according to the country’s Military Service Law.

China Rises as America Weakens

 Bill Gertz

05.01.14

Source Link

We are entering an era where American dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken for granted.

—Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel

For the past five and a half years, the United States military has suffered the devastating effects of hundreds of billions of dollars in budget cuts. At the same time, China’s armed forces—both conventional and nuclear—have made dramatic gains. The People’s Liberation Army was derided a decade ago by some China-watchers as a “junkyard army” incapable of coming close to matching the military prowess of the U.S. Army. Today, the PLA boasts new strategic capabilities that validate Hagel’s words about the new era of declining American military dominance.

The new Chinese military is armed with highly sophisticated weaponry. They include cyber-warfare forces capable of crippling American electrical and financial infrastructures from computer keyboards in Shanghai as well as precision-guided anti-satellite missiles that can quickly enfeeble the U.S. military’s unparalleled ability to combine long-distance war-fighting with precision attack.

The new power balance—a weakening American military facing a rising Chinese power—has dire implications for global peace and stability. Furthermore, the sharp decline in funds for U.S. military operations and modernization, coupled with China’s rapid buildup of forces, has rendered President Obama’s premier foreign-policy initiative, to strategically shift toward the Asia Pacific and away from conflicts in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, all but impossible to achieve.

The American retreat from this plan to “pivot to Asia” became clear in several startling statements earlier this year by the senior military commander in charge of the U.S. Pacific Command. His name is Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III.

Locklear first came to national attention in 2009 because of a surprising interview with the Boston Globe, in which he said North Korea’s belligerence and China’s mounting aggression and military build-up were not his main concerns. Rather, this four-star admiral, in charge of the 300,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp personnel based in Asia and the Pacific, said the most serious security problem facing the United States was climate change. “People are surprised sometimes” by his concern, he said, even as he insisted that the global upheaval due to rising sea levels was more likely to “cripple the security environment” than anything else.

In January of this year, Locklear gave a speech about the threats and challenges in the Asia Pacific and listed them in presumed order of importance: natural disasters, transnational crime and drug trafficking, human trafficking, competition for food and water, territorial disputes, North Korea, and a rising India and—in last place—China. Note how Locklear lumped the rise of these countries, as if the world’s largest democracy poses the same challenges as the Communist dictatorship in Beijing armed with nuclear weapons.

Locklear also issued this curious comment:

So, what is changing? Our historic dominance, that most of us in this room have enjoyed, is diminishing. No question. So let me say it again. Our historic dominance that most of us in our careers have enjoyed is diminishing…[I]t’s going to be a highlight that our dominance is diminishing. But it’s something we have known was going to happen, and we have to expect to continue to happen.

In Beijing, Locklear’s declinism was the subject of intense discussion. Some commentators said it proved China would have little difficulty managing its relationship with the United States as the Western superpower diminished itself. The jingoisticGlobal Times, a publication of the Communist Party of China, said Locklear’s remarks demonstrated that America is “losing its grip on the Pacific.”

But many of Beijing’s state-controlled commentators dismissed Locklear’s words as a calculated deception designed to frighten the United States into increasing its spending on defense. They insisted that China’s military power is lagging so far behind America’s that there can be no contest.

Room for India-China Cooperation in Afghanistan?

THE PULSE

There are good strategic reasons for India and China to cooperate in Afghanistan. 

By Ankit Panda

April 15, 2014

The impending withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan presents a compelling opportunity for strategic cooperation between India and China. Although bilateral relations between the two remain troubled by territorial disputes and imbalanced trade, both countries’ interests seem to overlap in Afghanistan.

The most obvious area of concern for both India and China is the domestic security situation in Afghanistan — neither would like to see Afghanistan turn into a haven for Islamic terror groups following the U.S. withdrawal. Furthermore, should the United States and Afghanistan fail to conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement in time, India and China will be motivated even further. While China has seen opportunities for investment in Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly apparent that its foreign policy towards the country is being driven more by security concerns.

During a recent visit to the country, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the importance of domestic stability in Afghanistan for the internal stability of China’s western province on Xinjiang. For China, the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a permanent place of refuge for insurgents and terrorists that would eventually foment unrest in Xinjiang is anathema. Wang’s counterpart reassured him that Afghanistan “would never allow the ETIM [East Turkestan Islamic Movement] to take advantage of the Afghan territory to engage in activities endangering China, and will continuously deepen security cooperation with the Chinese side.”

Similar to China, the Indian government and Indian investors have shown great interest in emerging opportunities in Afghanistan in mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure development, and other sectors. Despite India’s formidable commercial interests in Afghanistan, there is also a strong strategic push to prevent the country from succumbing to domestic instability. Keeping the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan is paramount for India.

Centre on Asia and Globalisation Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Guest Column The China discourse in India By Shai Venkatraman and Dev Lewis For the last six decades, India has viewed China with suspicion and through the prism of a war. Two chronological points highlight this – 1959, when China annexed Tibet and India offered shelter to the Dalai Lama, and 1962, when India lost a short war with China over a disputed northern border, and China aligned with Pakistan, India’s principal security threat. Over the past decade, both countries have chosen to separate the issues of contention from areas of cooperation. Today China is India’s largest trading partner, with over $65 billion in trade in 2013, up from $2 billion in 2000. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made India his first overseas visit in March 2013, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing in October that year, and signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. The year 2014 is jointly observed as the “Year of Friendly Exchanges.” Few of these positive overtures are reflected in the mainstream media in India or China. According to Simon Shen, who wrote a paper on the online Chinese perception of India in September 2011, the unfriendly bilateral images in the popular media could have far-reaching implications for future China-India relations. There has been no similar study on the portrayal of China in the Indian media. Gateway House, Mumbai, has made the first such examination of the Indian media’s role in shaping Indian perceptions of China. We selected a recent time-frame – 1 January 2012 to 1 January 2014 – and identified particular aspects of the India-China bilateral relationship as our focus. We selected a sample of reports on China from the mainstream Indian newspapers and TV channels both Hindi and English, business and non-business, wire agencies and online chat forums. Our sample included conventional English news sources like the Times of India, The Hindu, the Hindustan Times, Livemint, Economic Times, Hindu Businessline, Firstpost and Rediff. From Hindi newspapers we chose Dainik Jagran and Navbharat Times; and from the wire agency Press Trust of India. TV channels included Times Now, NDTV, CNN-IBN, Aaj Tak, ABPTV, and Rajya Sabha TV which is part of the national broadcaster Doordarshan. We analysed reports relating to specific incidents and events during this period, like the arrest of Indian traders in Yiwu in China, the Depsang and Chumar border incidents and the annual India-China Strategic Economic Dialogues which have given a fillip to the relationship after Chinese President Xi Jinpeng took charge in 2013. The reports were divided into three categories – positive, negative and neutral. Positive reports showed China in a positive light, through its achievements, or if it acted in a manner friendly to India. Negative reports mention China acting as an aggressor towards India or against Indian interests. Neutral reports stated facts or reported an event. Of the 148 newspaper reports studied, there were two negative reports for every positive one, with 39% of the articles focusing on border or security issues. A full 45% of the reports were negative, 31% were neutral and 24% were positive. There was scant mention of the significant gains made during the annual India-China Strategic Economic Dialogues or India and China’s growing cooperation on issues like climate change, trade and the oil industry in South Sudan. While all major print publications covered Li Keqiang’s visit, the coverage itself was limited, without analysis of the economic benefits from the eight agreements signed across industries. Opinion pieces were highly critical of the visit, focusing only on the border issue. Similarly China’s offer to invest $300 billion in India’s infrastructure over the next five years was barely covered by the mainstream media, though the business papers did publish details of the working groups set up to address the growing trade deficit between the two countries. In contrast, the response on the online discussion forums was largely positive with many acknowledging the economic benefits. A minority expressed mistrust, citing Chinese spying, and the poor quality of Chinese technology. It is the business papers in India which seem to have made a much fairer case for China. There is an understanding of the commercial advantages of dealing with China despite the strategic differences, and mostly positive reportage on the Chinese offer to fund infrastructure development in India, as well as the willingness on the part of Chinese telecom firms to comply with security checks for foreign spyware – unlike the European telecom firms like Blackberry which declined to do so. The economic aspects of the bilateral relationship find little reflection in TV channels. The tone across all channels was strident and reached fever pitch when it came to Depsang and Chumar even though both governments issued statements downplaying the incidents. Primetime shows with provocative titles like Should India trust China and Will India react to China’s defiance highlighted the historical ‘betrayal.’ There was no nuance visible nor any attempt to reflect the differing perceptions over the borders. India’s strategic advantage in Chumar, subsequently brought out in a Gateway House security briefing, found no mention. Part of this one-dimensional coverage is due to limited access: just four Indian media houses – three newspapers and a wire agency – have reporters based in Beijing. The rest rely on international wire agencies – and their residual biases – while Indian TV has no presence at all in China. Barring The Hindu reporter, the others rarely travel out of Beijing, as travel and accommodation costs are not reimbursed to correspondents. Just how damaging the impact of such slanted coverage can be became evident when a diplomatic crisis erupted following the arrest of the Indian traders in Yiwu in early 2012. The Indian media claimed the traders were humiliated and jailed and an Indian diplomat attacked by local traders. The escalating tensions led to both India and China issuing travel advisories to their citizens. The discussion on online forums turned especially ugly and abusive. It later emerged that though the traders were jailed, neither they nor the diplomat were mistreated. To a substantial extent, the misrepresentation can be attributed to an information vacuum as very little information is shared by the government. So the media has at the most joint statements, communiqués or official briefings to work from. The two governments are working hard to contain the bias through their foreign ministries, youth and sports departments and commercial envoys. Regular youth exchanges have begun, as have joint production of films, Mandarin language classes in Indian government schools and the organisation of business forums where think tanks and policy groups from both countries can regularly interact. Perhaps by 2015, bilateral perceptions will be more in line with bilateral realities. Shai Venkatraman and Dev Lewis are Authors at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Centre on Asia and Globalisation

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Guest Column

The China discourse in India

By Shai Venkatraman and Dev Lewis

For the last six decades, India has viewed China with suspicion and through the prism of a war. Two chronological points highlight this – 1959, when China annexed Tibet and India offered shelter to the Dalai Lama, and 1962, when India lost a short war with China over a disputed northern border, and China aligned with Pakistan, India’s principal security threat.

Over the past decade, both countries have chosen to separate the issues of contention from areas of cooperation. Today China is India’s largest trading partner, with over $65 billion in trade in 2013, up from $2 billion in 2000. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made India his first overseas visit in March 2013, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing in October that year, and signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. The year 2014 is jointly observed as the “Year of Friendly Exchanges.”

Few of these positive overtures are reflected in the mainstream media in India or China. According to Simon Shen, who wrote apaper on the online Chinese perception of India in September 2011, the unfriendly bilateral images in the popular media could have far-reaching implications for future China-India relations. There has been no similar study on the portrayal of China in the Indian media. Gateway House, Mumbai, has made the first such examination of the Indian media’s role in shaping Indian perceptions of China. We selected a recent time-frame – 1 January 2012 to 1 January 2014 – and identified particular aspects of the India-China bilateral relationship as our focus.

We selected a sample of reports on China from the mainstream Indian newspapers and TV channels both Hindi and English, business and non-business, wire agencies and online chat forums. Our sample included conventional English news sources like the Times of India, The Hindu, the Hindustan Times, Livemint, Economic Times, Hindu Businessline, Firstpost and Rediff.From Hindi newspapers we chose Dainik Jagran and Navbharat Times; and from the wire agency Press Trust of India. TV channels included Times Now, NDTV, CNN-IBN, Aaj Tak, ABPTV, and Rajya Sabha TV which is part of the national broadcaster Doordarshan.

We analysed reports relating to specific incidents and events during this period, like the arrest of Indian traders in Yiwu in China, the Depsang and Chumar border incidents and the annual India-China Strategic Economic Dialogues which have given a fillip to the relationship after Chinese President Xi Jinpeng took charge in 2013. The reports were divided into three categories – positive, negative and neutral. Positive reports showed China in a positive light, through its achievements, or if it acted in a manner friendly to India. Negative reports mention China acting as an aggressor towards India or against Indian interests. Neutral reports stated facts or reported an event.

Is Communist China Christianity’s Future?

ASIA LIFE

New estimates predict China will soon be home to the world’s largest Christian community. 

By Zachary Keck

April 26, 2014

China will soon be home to the largest Christian population of any country on earth, according to a leading expert on religion in China.

The London Telegraph reports that Fenggang Yang, a professor of sociology at Purdue University and expert on religion in China, predicts that China’s Christian population will become the largest of any country by 2030.

Already, China is home to some 58 million Protestants — more than leading Protestant nations like Brazil and South Africa — and 67 million total Christians, according to Pew Research. To put this in perspective, in 1949 China’s Protestants numbered just 1 million persons and its entire Christian community was believed to be about 3 million strong.

Yang, however, believes that China’s Protestant population will swell over the next 11 years to reach 160 million in 2025. Furthermore, Yang forecasts that China’s overall Christian population could reach 247 million people by 2030.

If these forecasts are correct, this would almost certainly put China above the United States in terms of the size of their respective Christian communities. In 2010, the U.S. boasted roughly 159 million Protestants and just under 247 million Christians overall, making it home to the largest Christian population in the world. However, religion has been on a gradual but consistent long-term decline in the United States and thus by 2030 America is likely to have a smaller Christian community than it did in 2010.

United States President Visits Asia Pacific April 2014: Challenges

25-Apr-2014

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Source Link

United States President Obama commenced his four-nation visit to the Asia Pacific region by his first State Visit to Japan which commenced on April 23 2014 and will be followed by visits to South Korea, Philippines and Malaysia and these visits becoming strategically significant in that contextually it is taking place against rising tensions generated by China in East Asia more pointedly.

The US President’s visit is strategically significant in that Japan, South Korea and Philippines enjoy bilateral security alliance relationships and Japan and the Philippines lately have been the victims of adversarial military actions by China endangering regional security and stability. South Korea though not locked in any territorial conflicts with China, however, has major security concerns posed to its security by the nuclear-armed Chinese proxy, namely North Korea.

Malaysia is eagerly looking forward to President Obama’s visit as it was cancelled at short notice last autumn when President Obama was faced with a shut-down of the US Government by Congressional cuts and therefore had to be present in Washington. Malaysia is perceived by the United States as a moderate democratic Islamic country and well worth the US diplomatic effort.

US President’s seven day swing through Asia Pacific can be overall expected to focus on two major thrusts, the first being strategic and the second, economic. Strategically the US President would seek to impress on his hosts that the United States is serious about reinforcing the US Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific despite any budgetary cuts and some Middle East distractions. The Asia Pacific nations hosting the US President’s visit would necessarily like to be reassured by the US President that the United States has firm intentions to stay embedded in East Asia and Asia Pacific and would be looking forward to obtain some strong and meaningful guarantees from the United States.

Economically, it is the United States that would be seeking to motivate his host countries to actively join the US-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which is being viewed as an economic grouping to forestall China’s unchallenged economic supremacy in the region. In a certain sense it could also be termed as aimed at economic containment of China.

Japan logically was the first stop of President Obama as a major nation of not only East Asia but also of Asia Pacific. In fact along with India it is a contending power with China. Unlike China it is a benign Asian power and a responsible stakeholder in Asian security and stability. Japan has been a longstanding and reliable military ally of the United States.

Japan today under the dynamic and assertive leadership of Prime Minister Abe is intent on striking a self-reliant defence posture and possibly also likely to amend the war-renouncing Peace Constitution imposed by the United States in 1951. Japan has held its own in the face of Chinese provocations and military brinkmanship over the East China Sea Senkaku Islands held by Japan. The United States is worried that in the climate of military brinkmanship resorted to by Chia against Japan even a small incident could ignite armed hostilities.

Commercial Implications of Climate Change:

Wikistrat Report

Posted on April 13, 2014 by wikistrat

Wikistrat is happy to release today the report from a recent brainstorming session called “The Coming Storm: Commercial Implications of Climate Change.”

Download PDF

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change established by the United Nations, each of the last three decades has been successively warmer than any other on record. Climate change models predict increased warming will have the direct effect of rising sea levels and an increase in the frequency and strength of extreme weather events. Climate change threatens societies’ access to clean air, safe drinking water, sufficient food supply and secure shelter. These factors, in turn, result in indirect challenges to existing consumption patterns and public policies.

In a world where goods and capital markets are highly integrated, firms depend on international markets to buy their inputs, sell their outputs and raise investment. In this interconnected world, climate change will be an increasingly important factor.

In February 2014, Wikistrat ran a two-week brainstorming drill exploring the commercial implications of climate change. More than fifty analysts collaboratively explored which industries are most vulnerable to climate change — and which industries stand to gain from it.

In this report, Wikistrat Senior Analyst Dr. Amanda Jakobsson highlights a selection of the insights from this exercise.

Click here or on the thumbnail to download the PDF report.

Russia’s Greatest Challenge for the Next Decade:

Wikistrat Report

Posted on April 7, 2014 by wikistrat

Wikistrat is happy to release today the report from its recent brainstorming exercise “Russia’s Greatest Challenge for the Next Decade”.

Download PDF

In February, both the Sochi Olympics and the unfolding events in Ukraine drew international focus to Russia.

Both events demonstrated President Vladimir Putin’s eagerness to promote and restore the perception of Russia as a global power. In 2013, he seemed to be on a roll after sidelining the domestic opposition and successfully tightening his grip on the Russian political and business elite. Most importantly, he seemed be restoring Russia’s clout as a geopolitical power by capitalizing on the foreign policy mishaps and weaknesses of its rivals.

Since then, the challenges that Russia and its leaders will face in the next decade have become increasingly visible. Wikistrat’s analysts have identified many of these challenges and threats, including: 

• Risks associated with Russian power projection abroad; 
• Systemic problems in the Russian economy; 
• Transfer of power after Vladimir Putin’s term ends; 
• Russia’s pressing demographic problems; and 
• Dual trends of both increasing nationalism and persistent separatism. 

During the month of February, Wikistrat held a collaborative brainstorming exercise to predict the greatest challenges Russia faces over the next ten years. More than forty analysts from Wikistrat’s global community of experts participated in the exercise; this report, authored by Wikistrat Contributing Analyst András Tóth-Czifra, is a summary of the brainstorming drill and the crowdsourced analysis produced therein.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Four Potential Roadblocks

24 April 2014

Ruhee Neog

Senior Research Officer, NSP, IPCS 

The Joint Statement released by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif after the latest round of nuclear talks towards a possible comprehensive agreement states that “A lot of intensive work will be required to overcome the differences which naturally still exist at this stage in the process.” This suggests that not much headway has been made in terms of compromises, especially keeping in mind that the six-month interim nuclear deal has a self-imposed deadline of 20 July for the lifting of sanctions and implementation of a comprehensive agreement. 

What are some of the issues that are likely to pose a problem in the run-up to a comprehensive agreement?

First, the remarkable pace at which the negotiations have taken place since November 2013, owing to changed circumstances, is praiseworthy. Both sides have also maintained that they would not let non-nuclear tensions between Iran and the West disrupt the process. However, US’ very clear opposition to Iran’s chosen envoy to the UN, Hamid Aboutalebi, who was allegedly involved in the 1979 hostage crisis, has led to many ruffled feathers. The US has refused to grant Aboutalebi a visa, and Iran understandably is refusing to pick a replacement and has instead stated that it will seek legal recourse through the UN. This leads to two questions: how will Rouhani’s government seek to placate domestic audiences, given that the US stand has elicited strong anti-US sentiment within the country? Complicating this scenario is the presence of differing views on Iranian engagement with the West by Iranian opinion-makers, and the US refusal to grant entry to Aboutalebi will only embolden the hard-liner stand. To what extent will both the P5+1 and Iran be able to keep the negotiations on a separate track that is immune to disruptions from the outside?

Second, the next meeting is slated for 13 May and this is when the drafting of the agreement is expected to begin. Given the importance of the text of a legal document, this tricky process may be even harder to negotiate than the preliminary talks.

Third, nuclear negotiations with Iran have thus far taken place on two different tracks. One of these was with the P5+1 that resulted in the six-month Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that concludes on 20 July - this is essentially a political agreement. The Framework Agreement struck between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) looks to the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. In this regard, there has been some debate about a possible conflict of interest between the two tracks. In 2011, IAEA Director General Yukiyo Amano submitted an exhaustive report to the Board of Governors on Iran’s ‘possible military dimensions’ (PMD). The report was apparently based on numerous reliable sources as well as IAEA’s own independent investigation, and it claimed that Iran had in the past pursued activities related to the development of a nuclear weapon. The IAEA would therefore naturally seek answers to these allegations from Iran. However, it has been alleged that in the enthusiasm for a comprehensive agreement, the P5+1 could ignore the PMD aspect if all other conditions are met. It could stand to reason that if Iran’s break-out capability is indefinitely delayed and the technology available to it is severely limited, in addition to greater transparency and IAEA access to its facilities, the PMD question may not have to be directly dealt with at all. In addition, even if the P5+1 agree to discuss theissue, Iran is unlikely to admit to any such activity in the fear of a backlash, and due to its fatwa against nuclear weapons.