Post-Empire Nostalgia

by Stan Wiechnik

SWJ Blog Post | April 16, 2014 

In “Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia” Yegor Gaidar writes “[w]e are not the first to suffer post-empire nostalgia, which permeates the Russian consciousness today. It has occurred in history more than once. The Soviet Union was not the first empire to collapse in the twentieth century, but it was the last. … The problem for a country dealing with post-imperial syndrome is that it is easy to evoke feelings of nostalgia for the lost empire.”[i] It is easy to see the effect of the “post-imperial syndrome” in how the Russian population supports Putin’s actions in the Crimea. What may be less easy to see is how that syndrome is affecting us.

When the Soviet Union fell apart the United States was an unchallenged military leviathan; the only superpower on the planet. Our military divided the earth into sectors of military control overseen by geographical combatant commanders. We projected power across the globe, and we still do. However, since we won the Cold War the U.S. military has been involved in two less than totally successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those wars we fought an enemy who did not use the conventional tactics and systems that we had perfected over the last half of the twentieth century. As those counterinsurgency operations come to a close the military today looks to regain its past prominence as a conventional fighting force.

Russia’s land grab has offered us that opportunity. This new confrontation in Europe comes complete with convenient historical examples. Russia, with its quasi-dictatorial leadership, makes the perfect enemy. We can see the long shadow of Hitler in his actions, replaying the events of Czechoslovakia in 1938, only the first steps in his quest for German “living space”. Further, this is the Soviets, … err, … I mean, the Russians we are talking about. It was not that long ago that they were a threat to capitalist societies around the world. History dictates that we must act now. There is the added bonus of the Russians being a conventional force. We know how to fight them. Most of the equipment we now have was designed in the era where BMPs, T-90s, and Hind-Ds were the threat to defeat.

Getting India Back On Track

Ashley J. TellisOP-ED APRIL 15, 2014LIVE MINT 

SUMMARY

Progress in India requires a deep commitment to restoring the centrality of markets in economic decisionmaking.

The 2014 national elections will be a critical waypoint along the road to restoring India’s economic growth. One survey after another has suggested a deep yearning for change. The electorate—in both the cities and villages—seems seized by the need to return the country to high growth. 

Ashley J. Tellis

SENIOR ASSOCIATE

SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM

The transformations that began with the economic reforms unleashed in the 1990s have given Indians a taste of what structural change can bring to their lives. The explosion of resentment against corruption only testifies to the popular desire for better distribution of the nation’s economic gains. Such an effort will be doomed without continuing growth.

Whatever the causes of India’s economic slowdown may have been, there is a widespread conviction that the leadership failed to steer the country in a productive direction. That leads inexorably to the question of what must be done to recover momentum when the new government takes office. 

This article is the first in a 10-part series, drawn from a new book prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which tries to answer that question. Each article will examine an aspect of the Indian economy, or of the country’s social and political system, that is of central importance to the acceleration of growth, offering policy suggestions for the next government to consider for achieving change in the short term. The common themes include the importance of strengthening key state institutions, the priority of getting the details right for the success of long-term transformation, and the need for action at the state level, given the steady shift in power away from the central government. 

Above all, the series will look forward to necessary tasks that are yet to be completed. That very fact serves as a reminder of how much India’s future reforms stem from the country’s grand—but in at least one respect problematic—inheritance. This introductory essay reviews that inheritance, highlighting the entrenched challenges that the new government will face. 

*** Need for a Modern Arthashastra

By Arvind Gupta

Published: 14th April 2014 06:00 AM

In 1992, American scholar George Tanham stirred up a hornets’ nest when he charged in an essay that Indians lacked tradition of strategic thinking. Many Indian scholars countered him pointing out India had a rich tradition of strategic thinking quoted in venerated ancient texts such as the Ramayana, Mahabharata, Arthashastra, Thirukural and the Panchatantra belonging to different ages. The Cholas, Marathas, Rajputs and Mughals were adept at statecraft and warfare. They would not have been successful unless they thought strategically.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that there was hardly any systematic study of Indian ancient texts from the point of view of identifying the main ingredients of Indian strategic thought. Indian texts are still not part of global political science or international relations discourse. Few Indian or foreign universities teach these texts as part of security and strategic studies. People know Plato, Aristotle, Marx and Machiavelli but rarely Kautilya. It is a pity considering Arthashastra is a vast treatise on statecraft. A lot more systematic work needs to be done by scholars, particularly Indians, in the area. The lack of knowledge of Sanskrit and regional languages is a major hindrance. Authentic translations of these texts are not available. Archival sources have not been tapped. But more significantly, the Indian educational system has not placed emphasis on the exploration of the rich Indian traditions in strategic thinking.

The Arthashastra is one ancient such text that is a rich treasure of strategic thinking. Written in Sanskrit by Kautilya, also known as Chanakya, around 321BC in Magadha, it deals extensively with issues of state, society, economy, administration, law and justice, internal security, defence, diplomacy, foreign policy and warfare. Divided in 15 books, it has 6,000 sutras. The text lay hidden for centuries and was discovered in 1905 in Karnataka. R Shamasastry was the first person to translate the text in 1915. Today, Kangle’s English translation is considered the most authentic and widely used by scholars.

The Arthashastra is a practical manual of instruction for kings. The first five books deal with administration, while the next eight cover foreign affairs and defence. The last two books dwell upon miscellaneous issues.

The king is set lofty ideals—he sees his happiness in the well-being of his subjects and offers them yogakshema, i.e. security and well-being. The Arthashastra was written in times when the subcontinent was divided into a number of small and mutually hostile states. Therefore, it was necessary for a king to not only protect his state but also deal with hostile kings and expand his territory. A king could perform his functions only if he was a strong leader with a strong intellect and ever-ready to train himself in sciences.

Arming ‘After’ Aiming: Agenda for the New Government

ByBrig Amar Cheema

IssueNet Edition| Date : 15 Apr , 2014

We blaze our own tracks

“The inability to think beyond rigid assumptions and perceptions in matters strategic have often led to surprise, failure and disaster”

Mr Stephen Cohen needs to be complemented for flagging the attention of India’s leadership and her strategic community to the direction modern India needs to take towards meeting her strategic destiny. His (timely) book “Arming ‘without’ Aiming needs to be considered seriously, not merely because of the ways and means that have been recommended, but because of the urgency. Security issues and matters of strategic import can no longer be remain on the political backburner as the rapid pace at which the world is altering well-established security equations, both in the immediate region and across the globe and the role India can play in balancing relations mandate serious consideration and effort. This is an important task for the new leadership in New Delhi as they would have the opportunity and the support of the major players.

India remains a soft target because she has invariably taken a re-active approach, and the effect gets compounded since the articulation of her strategic outlook is not only defensive, but pacifist by nature.

Without delving into the merits and demerits of what Mr Cohen has prescribed for India’s security, issues that merit a re-visit are flagged for re-setting the mental mould of the new leadership as also of the well-entrenched Praetorian Guards in South Block for taking matters of security head on. In view of the major changes sweeping the globe, these have become essential for what portends to be an uncertain strategic future, a future with which the new leadership has to contend with squarely as the time for making political statements in the din and dust during electoral campaigning is now over. It also needs to be highlighted that beyond the rhetoric of ensuring the safety and security of the nation, no party attempted to make clear-cut policy statements relating to matters of security.

Modern India is restless to achieve her strategic future and for doing so, she has to arm herself, and do so with a sense of urgency. For that she not only needs to be pragmatic in her approach and ensure more than just a bang from her high end purchases and therefore need to pay heed to Mr Cohen and aim deliberately before arming.

The Issue of Defence versus Security

Defence and Security are words that are often used interchangeably, whereas, the differences between them are basic. ‘Defence’ means taking defensive action(s) against any action or actor. While, the dictionary does not amplify if the action taken is reactive or pro-active, by implication, it is merely a reaction or a counter-action. This opens up the larger point that is being made. While professing a defensive strategy makes for good diplomacy, it puts the defender on the back foot as the initiative is allowed to be with the opponent. At the same time, by professing a strategy of ‘Active Defence’ (China), ‘Offensive Defence (Pakistan) and ‘Retaining the right of Pre-emption’ (USA), nations seek to take the initiative, which as any strategist (military or otherwise) would tell is invaluable in war. India remains a soft target because she has invariably taken a re-active approach, and the effect gets compounded since the (official) articulation of her strategic outlook is not only defensive, but pacifist by nature. While many examples of this mindset can be recounted to exemplify the point, the fact that her army is disproportionately organised as Holding (now called Pivot) and Strike Forces, and the bulk of her forces remain tied down for (static) defensive tasks, instead of being organised to take the battle to the enemy is testimony of this mindset.

Getting U.S.-India Ties Back on Track

Ashley J. TellisOP-ED APRIL 15, 2014INDIA TODAY 

SUMMARY

Both India and the United States are to blame for their partnership’s slowdown, and they share the responsibility to rebuild it.

FULL TEXT

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It is now an open secret that India-U.S. relations are in trouble. In sharp contrast to the euphoria on both sides when the nuclear deal was concluded, bilateral ties between the world’s largest and oldest democracies are today brittle and frayed. Although casual observers woke up to this reality with the debacle surrounding the Indian consular official’s arrest in New York, the truth is that ties began to lose momentum long before this unfortunate incident. 

Ashley J. Tellis

SENIOR ASSOCIATE

SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM

The plateauing probably began with the nuclear liability law enacted in India early during the Manmohan Singh government’s second term. This legislation chagrined India’s international champions, especially the U.S., leaving them disappointed because of the adverse impact on all private suppliers to India’s nuclear energy program. The economic downturn in India, which had begun even earlier, only made things worse: it took the bloom off the Indian success story—a hit that was only amplified later by counterproductive policies vis-a-vis taxation of foreign companies and preferential market access. Although some of these retrograde initiatives were subsequently reversed, these corrections failed to capture the headlines the way that the damning original initiatives did. 

Great harm was thus done not merely to India, but also to the U.S. In Washington, dismayed policymakers watched an Indian government that had gone off the reformist rails, substituting the sensible pro-growth policies of yesteryear with new populist schemes that threatened the exchequer and unnerved the investors. Even activities that previously heralded the strength of the bilateral ties began to flag. In an ominous sign of how much Singh had lost control over his own vision, defense cooperation began to run into strong headwinds. Also, past diplomatic engagement rooted in common concerns about China began to lose steam as India seemed intent on distancing itself from Washington in an effort to chalk gains in Beijing that never came. 

Afghanistan Needs an Army Corps of Engineers

Christopher K. Tucker

April 16, 2014

Why did the United States pay to raise an Afghan National Army but fail to institute an Afghan Army Corps of Engineers? It seems that we built a capacity to fight, but did not fight to create a capacity to build. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provided the facilities and infrastructure that the Coalition needed for war, but a much-needed Afghan Army Corps of Engineers was not developed in parallel to lay the groundwork of a sustainable Afghan society. How was this basic concept overlooked? Certainly it was not for lack of engagement by the ubiquitous and well-funded USACE presence within Afghanistan.

Perhaps this oversight is the result of ignorance concerning the role that the USACE has played in America's own transformation from a frontier backwater into one of the most developed and resilient nations ever to exist on the planet Earth. Our quest to enable regional stability by building partner capacity will continue to falter until foreign-policy makers learn to embrace the critical role of engineers, and the engineering institutions that have made the United States strong.

History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The United States Military Academy at West Point was the first engineering school in the United States, founded in 1802. This institutional focus speaks as much to the long history of land armies as centers of engineering competence as it does to “nation building”—literally constructing nations—as they were winning battles and wars. In today's popular discourse, our military's role in building capacity and infrastructure both at home and abroad has suffered from a form of revisionism that has sought to lionize its war-fighting role.

Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism

Bruce Koepke

ISBN 978-91-85114-79-5 

Iran, with its breadth of experience in Afghanistan and long support for the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan, could continue to play a constructive role after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014. In this report the author details the evolution of Iran's policy of strategic pragmatism in Afghanistan. Understanding this policy could provide an opportunity for the international community to re-engage with Iran on a broad range of issues of mutual concern.

This paper is published under the Wider Central Asia Initiative, a two-year SIPRI project to promote and facilitate dialogue among the main external stakeholders in Afghanistan's future. The initiative is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Contents

1. Introduction

2. Iran's engagement in Afghanistan: from the Islamic Revolution to the fall of the Taliban, 1979-2001

3. Iran's engagement with Afghanistan: from the US-led invasion to the foreign withdrawal, 2001-14

4. Iran's post-2014 engagement in Afghanistan

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Related publications

Decoding Pakistan's 'Strategic Shift' in Afghanistan, by Moeed Yusuf (May 2013)

Europe, Afghanistan and the Transatlantic Relationship after 2014, by Erik Brattberg (May 2013)

About the author

Dr Bruce Koepke (Australia/Germany) is a Senior Researcher with SIPRI's Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme who has been working on and in Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Prior to joining SIPRI he was employed with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), initially based in northern Afghanistan and Kabul and later in Tehran, where he headed UNAMA's liaison office.

Decoding Pakistan's 'Strategic Shift' in Afghanistan

Moeed Yusuf

ISBN 978-91-85114-76-4 

When in early 2012 Pakistan touted a major shift in its Afghan policy, the move was cautiously welcomed given the influence—and spoiling power—Pakistan has displayed in Afghanistan in the past. This paper asks exactly what Pakistan's 'strategic shift' entails, what are the motives behind it, and whether it opens any new opportunities for peace in Afghanistan.

This paper is published under the Wider Central Asia Initiative, a two-year SIPRI project to promote and facilitate dialogue among the main external stakeholders in Afghanistan's future. The initiative is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Contents

1. Introduction

2. The 'strategic shift': from what, to where?

3. The logic behind Pakistan's paradoxical behaviour in the endgame

4. Approaching the ISAF withdrawal: what has Pakistan achieved?

5. Conclusions and the way forward

Related publications

Europe, Afghanistan and the Transatlantic Relationship after 2014, by Erik Brattberg (May 2013)

Iran's Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism, by Bruce Koepke (Sep. 2013)

About the author

Moeed Yusuf (Pakistan) is Senior Pakistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace and is responsible for managing the Institute's Pakistan programme. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country. He has worked extensively on issues relating to South Asian politics, Pakistan's foreign policy, the Pakistani-US relationship, nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, and human security and development in South Asia. He is the co-editor of the forthcoming volume South Asia 2060: Envisioning Regional Futures (Anthem Press, 2013). He has also edited a volume on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Asia, scheduled for publication in spring 2014. 

Development assistance in Afghanistan after 2014: from the military exit strategy to a civilian entry strategy

Jaïr van der Lijn

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2013/4 

After the departure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), delivering development assistance in Afghanistan can return to common practices and procedures used in other insecure areas such as Somalia and Sudan (and already in areas of Afghanistan). This means that the international community must develop a civilian entry strategy and communicate to the Afghan population that civilian entry, not military exit, is its strategy for the future.

Donors should ignore the current commitment to channel 50 per cent of assistance through the central government budget. Instead, in each sector (e.g. health care, education, security) an effective division of labour must be established between the central and provincial governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. Involving NGOs, the private sector and the local population in the delivery of basic services does not have to be at the expense of government control or legitimacy.

International aid donors need to pay further attention to security and rule of law. But alternatives to the current strategy, which is often perceived as being militarized and short-term, have to be found. It is often more effective to integrate these issues into broader development programmes.

The research for this paper was commissioned by Cordaid.

Yunnan: China’s Bridgehead to Southeast Asia and Beyond

The southwest province deserves to be known for more than the recent terrorist attack. 

By Gary Sigley

April 16, 2014

China’s rapid economic development and social transformation brings with it geopolitical ramifications that are features of the daily news. Yet much of the foreign media reporting on China focuses on the eastern seaboard, on the dazzling glass towers of Shanghai or the smog clouded vistas of Beijing. The western regions of China generally only attract attention when something devastating takes places, such as the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, or in reporting on ongoing ethnic tensions such as between the Han Chinese and Uyghurs in far western Xinjiang. Western understanding of China is thus often skewed. China is a geographically vast and populous multiethnic nation-state/party-state, and warrants more than a myopic focus on the Shanghais and Beijings.

On March 1, 2014, a violent attack at a busy railway station by eight knife-wielding assailants in which 33 people were killed (including four perpetrators) and dozens injured shifted the global spotlight on to China’s southwestern Yunnan Province. The Xinhua News Agency labeled the perpetrators as Uyghurs Muslim terrorists. Some commentators said this would be “China’s 911,” although Chinese authorities played down this angle in the interests, it seems, of defusing ethnic tensions. World attention, in any case, quickly dissipated as the mystery of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 unfolded.

Yunnan Province deserves more attention, and not necessarily directed at the events surrounding the brutal railway station attack. Rather it is worth looking at developments in this land “south of the clouds” (the literal meaning of “Yunnan” in Chinese), which can offer insight into trends in China beyond the eastern seaboard.

Yunnan is a mountainous landlocked province located in southwest China with an average elevation of 1,800 meters. It shares international borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, and domestic borders with Tibet, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi. With a population of 45 million, in addition to the Han Chinese that account for 67 percent, Yunnan is home to another 25 ethnic groups, making it one of the most ethnically diverse regions in China. The combination of altitude and latitude – the Tropic of Cancer cuts across the south – give Yunnan a warm and wet, and yet also extremely diverse, climate ranging from temperate rainforests to high alpine pastures. Yunnan is also, not surprisingly, one of the most biodiverse region in China and indeed in the world. The cultural and natural significance of this region is recognized with a number of UNESCO World Heritage sites.

South China Sea: Indonesia Finally Sheds Strategic Ambiguity

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1500

Paper No. 5686 Dated 16-Apr-2014

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Indonesia finally shed its strategic ambiguity in March 2014 on the China-generated South China Sea conflicts by Indonesian officials asserting that China’s Nine Dash Line is in conflict with Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty around the Natuna Inlands in response to increased Chinese military activities in the Southern Segment of the South China Sea.

This possibly portends China’s initiation of military adventurism to enforce its Nine Dash Line claim-lines.

Indonesia has all along for the past few years vainly attempted through various Track II processes to bring around China to some sort of negotiated settlement and conflict resolution of its South China Sea conflicts with its ASEAN neighbours, despite itself being an affected victim of China’s dubious Nine Dash Line claim line in the South China Sea. Indonesian efforts seem to have been stymied by an obdurate China and China thereby signalling that it has no time for any conflict resolution or conflict management processes pertaining to its South China Sea claims except on its own terms.

Indonesia’s reticence in making critical references to China’s propensity for conflict escalation in the South China Sea region was perceptionaly visible at international conferences on the South China Sea conflict attended by me. It intrigued one as to why such a reticence dominated Indonesian projections and thoughts on this vital issue affecting ASEAN security and stability especially from one of the leading and powerful nation of the region.

Presumably the above approach of Indonesia seems to have been determined by a combination of factors. The most benign attributable reason being that Indonesia genuinely believed that in terms of ASEAN stability and security, bringing about China to some sort of conflict resolution negotiations was an effort worth making. The other reason may have been to persuade China to enter into discussions to adhere to a Code of Conduct with ASEAN as a grouping since China’s conflicts on South China Sea encompasses the majority of ASEAN members and thereby the centrality of ASEAN must be maintained. The last reason can be said that Indonesia’s reticence on critical references to China on the South China Sea conflicts may have been determined significantly by the fact that up to recently China had confined its conflict escalation and aggressive brinkmanship in the Northern Segment of the South China Sea, namely with Vietnam and Philippines and refrained from casting its covetous eyes on the Southern Segment of the South China Sea and thereby not alarming Indonesia.

China’s Urbanization Plan—Sustainable Development?

Pacific Money

The government plans to increase the rate of urbanization. Will it be sustainable?

By Sara Hsu

April 16, 2014

China is planning to increase its rate of urbanization, but will this process, which is expected to increase the economic status of millions of individuals and the state itself, be sustainable? In other words, will the process encourage environmentally sound practices and enhance well-being?

China has committed to urbanizing a large part of its population through the Twelfth Five Year Plan and this has been elaborated on in the National Plan on New Urbanization. The plan aims to allow 100 million rural migrants to urban areas to obtain urban hukou, or household registration permits. In addition, more than 90 million rural residents are expected to be moved to urban areas in the next seven years. Many (but not all) rural migrants to cities will be able to access public services, including education and social security. New city clusters will be developed from existing small towns and cities, with an emphasis on concurrent industrialization and technological improvements.

The plan proposes to address ecological conservation, endeavoring to bring about environmentally sustainable development. Yet, given China’s track record in this area, analysts are rightly concerned that urbanization will lead to destruction of the environment. While China is attempting to restrict growth of megacities—a positive move in terms of containing the negative impacts of urban sprawl—intense environmental pressure will be placed on the regional city clusters that are to be developed. Rapid urbanization in recent years has, after all, resulted in an increase in consumption of fossil fuels, soil pollution, water pollution, and creation of waste. The type of development that has occurred has been far from environmentally sustainable; air in some cities is outside pollution limits set by the World Health Organization, and most of the country’s rivers are contaminated with pollutants.

Yunnan: China’s Bridgehead to Southeast Asia and Beyond

The southwest province deserves to be known for more than the recent terrorist attack.

By Gary Sigley

April 16, 2014

China’s rapid economic development and social transformation brings with it geopolitical ramifications that are features of the daily news. Yet much of the foreign media reporting on China focuses on the eastern seaboard, on the dazzling glass towers of Shanghai or the smog clouded vistas of Beijing. The western regions of China generally only attract attention when something devastating takes places, such as the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, or in reporting on ongoing ethnic tensions such as between the Han Chinese and Uyghurs in far western Xinjiang. Western understanding of China is thus often skewed. China is a geographically vast and populous multiethnic nation-state/party-state, and warrants more than a myopic focus on the Shanghais and Beijings.

On March 1, 2014, a violent attack at a busy railway station by eight knife-wielding assailants in which 33 people were killed (including four perpetrators) and dozens injured shifted the global spotlight on to China’s southwestern Yunnan Province. The Xinhua News Agency labeled the perpetrators as Uyghurs Muslim terrorists. Some commentators said this would be “China’s 911,” although Chinese authorities played down this angle in the interests, it seems, of defusing ethnic tensions. World attention, in any case, quickly dissipated as the mystery of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 unfolded.

Yunnan Province deserves more attention, and not necessarily directed at the events surrounding the brutal railway station attack. Rather it is worth looking at developments in this land “south of the clouds” (the literal meaning of “Yunnan” in Chinese), which can offer insight into trends in China beyond the eastern seaboard.

Yunnan is a mountainous landlocked province located in southwest China with an average elevation of 1,800 meters. It shares international borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, and domestic borders with Tibet, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi. With a population of 45 million, in addition to the Han Chinese that account for 67 percent, Yunnan is home to another 25 ethnic groups, making it one of the most ethnically diverse regions in China. The combination of altitude and latitude – the Tropic of Cancer cuts across the south – give Yunnan a warm and wet, and yet also extremely diverse, climate ranging from temperate rainforests to high alpine pastures. Yunnan is also, not surprisingly, one of the most biodiverse region in China and indeed in the world. The cultural and natural significance of this region is recognized with a number of UNESCO World Heritage sites.

Deciphering China’s latest defence budget figures

Mar2014: 

On 4 March the Chinese Government presented its 2014 budget to the National People’s Congress (NPC). The budget does not accurately represent the total amount spent by China on its military but its inclusion of an increased amount for defence echoes similar increases in recent years. Both the increase and the related modernization of China’s military capabilities reflect a complex series of external and internal factors.

The 2014 budget presented to the NPC totalled 15.3 trillion yuan ($2.5 trillion), including 808 billion yuan ($132 billion) for defence—an increase of 12.2 per cent on the 720 billion yuan spent on defence in 2013. The figure for the defence budget appears to refer only to expenditure by the central government, although there is also a small amount of spending (about 21 billion yuan) by local government.

The SIPRI estimate

The official government defence budget covers only a proportion of China’s total military spending. There is little transparency in the budget, which is disaggregated into just three major categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment, usually in roughly equal proportions.

To give a more accurate representation of China’s spending, SIPRI’s estimate—which is based on open sources including the China Government Finance Yearbook—includes official figures or estimates for a number of other items in addition to the central and local defence budgets and the official budget of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

These other items include estimated additional research and development (R&D) spending; spending on the paramilitary People’s Armed Police; estimated additional military construction; spending on pensions and demobilization payments to soldiers by the Ministry of Civil Affairs; and estimated spending on arms exports.

Overall, SIPRI estimates that total Chinese military spending is about 55 per cent higher than the total central and local defence budget. For example, SIPRI’s estimate for China’s military spending in 2012 was 1049 billion yuan ($166 billion), compared to the official defence budget of 669 billion yuan. This estimate carries a considerable margin of error, especially in relation to the additional military R&D spending.

Shanghai 1937 Is China’s Forgotten Stalingrad Remember this epic urban battle between China and Japan

Japanese marines at the Battle of Shanghai in 1937. 

Shanghai 1937 Is China’s Forgotten Stalingrad 

Remember this epic urban battle between China and Japan 

Michael Peck in War is Boring

In the summer of 1937, the “Pearl of the Orient” became a slaughterhouse. A million Chinese and Japanese soldiers engaged in savage urban combat in China’s coastal city of Shanghai.

Before the battle, Shanghai had been a thriving metropolis bustling with Western traders and missionaries, Chinese gangsters, workers and peasants and Japanese soldiers and businessmen.

As many as 300,000 people died in the epic three-month struggle that pitted China’s best divisions against Japanese marines, tank, naval gunfire and aircraft.

Yet even in China, few people remember the Battle of Shanghai, says Peter Harmsen, author of Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze. The clash receded beneath another horrific memory: the Rape of Nanking.

Shanghai “was one of 22 major battles of the Sino-Japanese War that are listed in official Chinese historiography,” Harmsen told War is Boring in an email. “Many Chinese have heard about the individual battles, but it’s mainly just specialists and military history buffs who actually remember when exactly they took place—and how and why.”

It was an unfortunate confluence of forces that brought war to Shanghai in August 1937. China and Japan had been in limited conflict since 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria in search of empire and raw materials. In 1937, Japan seized Beijing after the Marco Polo Bridge incident.

Enough was enough. Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek had spent the 1930s trying to destroy the Communists. Now was the time to stand up to Japan.

Just why he chose Shanghai is unclear, Harmsen explained. “For example, it has been argued that Chiang wanted to demonstrate China’s willingness to resist Japanese aggression in front of a big international audience and therefore picked Shanghai because of its large expat population.”

“Others have pointed out that the river-rich countryside in the Shanghai area offered fewer tactical advantages to Japanese tanks than the flat north Chinese plains,” Harmsen added.

Ironically, it was bellicose Japan that wasn’t looking for a fight in Shanghai. The Japanese army was focused on securing north China, where it could grab territory and resources as well as keep an eye on its arch-rival the Soviet Union.

It was the Japanese navy, often perceived as being a little less militaristic than the army, that was determined to hold Shanghai.

As often happens with wars, it was a tiny spark that detonated the powder keg. The mysterious murder of a Japanese officer on August 9, 1937—an event that might have been a police matter in more peaceful times—escalated into open warfare.

Deploying his German-trained divisions—the pride of the Nationalist Chinese army—Chiang tried to push the small Japanese garrison into the Huangpu River.

Watch Out, Ukraine, America is Giving You Counterinsurgency Advice

Why should Kiev listen to a country that lost three wars? 

Michael Peck in War is Boring

Walk away, Ukraine. No, run away. One U.S. expert is advising you to use counterinsurgency tactics to put down pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine.

This advice comes from the nation that got beat by insurgents in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Retired U.S. Navy admiral James Stavridis, former commander of U.S. European and Southern Commands, penned a piece for Foreign Policyarguing that the “United States and its NATO allies should lean in to help the Kiev regime prepare to conduct counterinsurgency operations, given what appears to be obvious Russian support to violent separatists.”

Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, offers seven tips on how the Ukrainian government should wage a counterinsurgency campaign in eastern Ukraine, where armed separatists have declared a “People’s Republic of Donetsk” and seized government buildings.

Ukraine has sent in troops in what Kiev calls an “anti-terrorist operation.”

Stavridis calls his advice “counterinsurgency 101,” and sure enough, it’s fairly basic stuff that would not have been unfamiliar to French commanders fighting Algerian rebels back in the 1950s.

Better employ public relations to convince eastern Ukraine’s pro-Russian population that they are part of a unified Ukraine, Stavridis advises. Improve the region’s economy. Control the borders with Russia and deploy military and police forces to protect the population from insurgents.

Stavridis also suggests the West should provide counterinsurgency expertise and equipment, including “intelligence, information, advice and mentorship, defensive weapons systems, tactical signals intelligence capability, small arms, light sensors, canine assistance and other classic counterinsurgency tools for the Ukrainian military.” 

On the surface, it’s hard to argue with these ideas. Improving the local economy and improving public relations are no-brainers. Controlling borders and being able to put down rebellion is what separates a successful state from a failed one.

But solving eastern Ukraine’s crisis through counterinsurgency? Not likely.

As the Americans discovered in Vietnam—and the Russians in Chechnya—counterinsurgency is a long-term process. It’s hard enough for major powers to wage COIN for years. What about a smaller nation like Ukraine, beset by political and economic instability?

The Geopolitics of the Black Sea

America has the Caribbean, China has the South China Sea, and Russia has the Black Sea.

By James R. Holmes

April 16, 2014

Still think an incidents-at-sea (INCSEA) agreement between China and the United States is some sort of cure-all for high-seas disputes between the two seafaring states? At most it would be a palliative. Heck, after the news out of the Black Sea this week, I’d settle for an INCSEA agreement between the United States and Russia. Here’s some proposed language:

Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

Whoops. My bust. That’s the text of Article IV of the INCSEA accord concluded by Washington and Moscow … 42 years ago. The accord remains in force to this day despite the fall of the Soviet Union.

Yet words on parchment did little to stop a Russian Su-24 Fencer attack plane from making repeated passes near the destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea last Saturday. The encounter spanned 90 minutes, meaning this was no fighter jock out hotdogging. This was a deliberate provocation. INCSEA agreements are fine for averting escalation during genuine misunderstandings. Warlike acts are another matter entirely.

But why such conduct now? It appears something about enclosed and semi-enclosed seas encourages the local great power, or powers, to think about them in proprietary terms. Ringed by strong sea powers, the Mediterranean Sea was an arena of nautical strife from classical antiquity until well into living memory. The United States had the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. China has the South China Sea and East China Sea. And Russia, it seems, has the Black Sea (and covets primacy in an ice-free Arctic Ocean — but that’s a story for another day).

Japan: The “Return to Militarism” Argument

Could Japan see a return to militarism as some have claimed? Several factors make that highly unlikely. 

By Jeffrey Ordaniel

April 16, 2014

Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power for the second time in December of 2012, there has been growing concern that his defense policies and nationalist ideologies are driving Japan in the wrong direction. Notably, two of Japan’s neighbors, China and South Korea, have complained that Abe’s actions, including his recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, are the prelude to a “return to militarism.” This concern warrants very important questions. What does “return to militarism” mean? Can Japan realistically return to its militarist past? And finally, are the concerns of Beijing and Seoul regarding Tokyo’s current behaviors valid?

In answering those questions, it is important to analyze the dynamics of civil-military relations in contemporary Japan, relate them with those of the past, and draw sound conclusions on what they imply moving forward.

Japan today has very strong and functioning institutions of democracy that clearly govern civil-military relations. The two institutions of democracy in Japan, namely its legislature, the Diet, and its Constitution, are strong enough to withstand any attempt by anyone to be “militarist.”

The Japanese Ministry of Defense’s White Paper released in 2013, under the premiership of Abe, clearly underscores the importance of civilian control over the military. It recognizes that “the Diet, representing the Japanese people, decides laws and budget including the allotted number of uniformed Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel and principal institutions of the Ministry of Defense/SDF. It also approves the issuance of Defense Operation Orders.” The hold of the Japanese Diet on the nation’s military affairs is strong, and this is significant given that Diet members are civilians, and are democratically elected officials subject to the will of their constituents. Moreover, the Japanese Constitution is very explicit in requiring that the positions of prime minister and other ministers of State in the Cabinet be held exclusively by civilians. It must be noted that the prime minister is designated as the commander-in-chief of the SDF, effectively subordinating Japan’s de facto military under a democratically elected government. Given these very strong institutions of democracy, Japan cannot realistically return to its militarist past. 

Evolving Threats and Strategic Partnerships in the Gulf

By Anthony H. Cordesman

APR 15, 2014 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, THE AFGHAN PROJECT, THE AFGHAN WAR IN 2013

Topics

DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY STRATEGY

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A Thirty Years' War in the Middle East

Greg R. Lawson

April 16, 2014

History teaches through the use of analogies. Inexact though these analogies may be, they represent one of the best ways to draw upon the past to inform, though certainly not dictate, the future.

In the wake of the end of the Iraq War and the vagaries of the Arab Spring-cum-Winter, the Middle East is ripe for an analogy to describe its present turmoil. One could do far worse than the hellish Thirty Years’ War that convulsed Europe between 1618 and 1648 and ended by bequeathing to the world the modern state system. Whether the present bloodletting in Syria, the ongoing geopolitical contest of wills between Sunni and Shia Muslim powers, and renewed Great Power rivalry yields anything approximating such a dramatic and long-standing order is questionable in the extreme. Yet it would benefit analysts to consider the similarities between that previous epoch shaping event and today’s ongoing drama.

The Thirty Years’ War was a massive and complex conflict that began with the notorious “Defenestration of Prague” on May 23, 1618. It was a multi-faceted affair that requires multiple lenses to look through in order to begin to understand it. It began as a religious conflict between Protestant princes in Germany fighting to preserve their autonomy and their faith against the Catholic Habsburg Empire to their south. Yet it would metastasize into a great-power conflict among several Catholic dynasties—the French, guided by the famed practitioner of realpolitik, Cardinal Richelieu, and the Habsburgs of both Austria and Spain. Richelieu, in a typically calculating move, allied with Protestant Sweden against France’s Habsburg coreligionists. Meanwhile, Spain, and its own Machiavellian political operative, the Duke of Olivares, worked to recapture rebellious Holland. Against this backdrop of sectarian and geopolitical conflict, individual personalities and power seekers (like the ambitious, if tragic, Albrecht von Wallenstein) came to the fore, along with a steady stream of petty German princes seeking to secure independence and new territory for their own dynasties.

The Thirty Years’ War was a particularly brutal conflict that was the world war of its century. Amazingly, given the disasters to follow in the twentieth century, a larger share of the pre-Reich German population died. Some estimate that as much as 40 percent of the German population died as a result of battle, deprivation, disease and famine. Of course, as alluded to above, the violence also led to a series of agreements that became part of the larger Peace of Westphalia and the formation of what is now known as the “Westphalian” state system. Today, international relations scholars take this system largely for granted.

The analogy is relevant today because it helps to illustrate, no doubt inexactly, the manner in which current Middle East is enmeshed in its own complex web of conflicts that are geopolitical as well as sectarian. Today the roles played by France and Sweden are played by the United States and Russia, along with an assortment of European states.

Information Warfare: Hezbollah And The Three Front War

April 16, 2014

The war in Syria is spreading to Lebanon and this is a major problem for Hezbollah, the armed militia that has become the dominant political and military power in Lebanon since the 1980s. The problem here is that most Lebanese, including lots of Hezbollah supporters, are hostile towards Syria. That is because most Syrians consider Lebanon part of historic “Greater Syria” and want to incorporate Lebanon back into Syria. Hezbollah has played down this angle for three decades by depicting itself as the defender of Lebanese independence against Israel. But Israel has no historic, or current, claims on Lebanon while Syria does and more Lebanese are realizing that these days. Worse yet, the well-publicized activities of Hezbollah gunmen in Syria are making these Syrian claims more visible in Lebanese politics. Despite orders from their leaders to stay out of the media Hezbollah fighters in Syria are sending back cell phone photos and videos that end up on the Internet for all Lebanese to see. Threats to seize cell phones from Hezbollah gunmen sent to Syria is not a good option because it is so unpopular with the young men doing the fighting. 

The Hezbollah gunmen are fighting in support of the Assad government, which has long interfered in Lebanese affairs and is a known supporter of Greater Syria. Many of the Syrian rebels are more interested in merging Syria with Iraq under the control of a religious dictatorship. Then again, many of the Syrian rebels also support Greater Syria, especially since that unification would make it easier to punish those damn Lebanese Shia for supporting the Assads. 

This situation got worse over the last year as Sunni Lebanese joined the fight via local militias in Lebanon or by joining anti-Assad Islamic terrorist groups in Syria. In Lebanon the fight is often between Sunnis and Shia. This is further complicated by the Iranian connection. Hezbollah is a Shia militia financed and organized by Iran in the 1980s to protect Shia interests in Lebanon (where Shia are the largest minority in a nation of religious minorities). The biggest loser in Lebanon was the Sunni minority, who had long dominated the less educated and affluent Shia. By embracing Islamic radicalism (especially al Qaeda), the Lebanese Sunni found themselves with a suitable weapon to use against the better organized and more numerous Hezbollah gunmen. The Sunni terrorist attacks occur all over the country now, wherever there are Hezbollah facilities or Shia populations (mostly in the south). In the northern city of Tripoli, with its many Shia and Sunni neighborhoods right next to each other, local militias have been battling each other for years now. So far in 2014 there have been hundreds of casualties even though the army and police struggle to maintain the peace. 

*** Surprise Attack on Iran: Can Israel Do It?

Thomas Saether

April 16, 2014

According to a report in March by the Israeli daily Haaretz, Israel continues to prepare for a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Quoting anonymous members of the Knesset who were present during hearings on the military budget, officials in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) have allegedly received instructions to continue preparing for a strike and a special budget has been allocating for that purpose. However, conducting a military operation against Iran’s key nuclear facilities would be a challenging task for the Israeli military. The distance from Israel to the Iranian nuclear sites is such that any strike using the air force would be challenging on its fuel capacity. Allocating tanker planes to the mission could alleviate part of this concern. Nonetheless, Israeli jets can't spend too much time in Iranian airspace before the mission itself is in jeopardy. Engaging Iran's air force in dogfights must be avoided. Therefore, surprise will be a necessary element in a successful Israeli mission.

A successful surprise attack is not easy to achieve. It rests on the ability to deceive the adversary. In general, a deception strategy might involve several elements, related to the timing of the operation, the military platforms involved, the targets, the routes chosen to the targets, the munitions used, and so on. There are several potential obstacles. First, preparations for conducting a military operation must be made without revealing the main elements of the surprise. Second, the political decision must be made covertly, that is, without revealing the timing of the operation. Could Israel pull it off?

Israel's History of Surprise

Israel has in the past utilized both of these elements in order to succeed with conducting military operations. Both the Entebbe operation in 1976 and the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 came as complete surprises to the targets due to their lack of knowledge about Israel's military capabilities and understanding of its decision-making process and willingness to accept risk.