*** Is Carnage in Syria Obama's Fault?

March 27, 2014

By Robert Kaplan


It has been alleged by some commentators that U.S. President Barack Obama -- by doing nothing to halt the carnage -- is responsible for more deaths in Syriathan President George W. Bush was in Iraq. There are, to say the least, problems with this analysis.

First of all, the number of Iraqi deaths remains inconclusive and a subject of controversy. It is possible that, say, 200,000 or more people were killed in Iraq, while 146,000 have died in Syria so far. But that is a detail. For the real problem with blaming Obama for Syria's war is the faulty assumption that America has been somehow responsible for a civil war in a complex and populous Muslim society half a world away. Such an analysis assumes Washington is in control of domestic realities around the globe when it demonstrably isn't. It assumes omnipotence on Washington's part that is self-reverential in the extreme.

The argument in favor of early intervention in Syria takes something for granted that is far from clear: that such an early intervention would have gone smoothly, or relatively smoothly. It may well not have. It is easy to design an intervention scenario on a newspaper opinion page, where none of the details have to be explained beyond the 1,000-word article limit. It is another thing to actually have to plan and carry out such an intervention, even if it does not involve the insertion of troops. Advice was legion on the op-ed pages about intervention in Libya. Libya is now a failed state. And Libya was simple compared to Syria. To say that intervention in Syria in 2011 would have been easier than in 2014 is to miss the point: Even intervention in 2011 would have been fraught with great risks.

Three years ago, there was a significant likelihood of an American-led intervention leading to a circumstance where Obama would have midwifed to power a jihadi state -- if not immediately, then eventually. For while jihadi fighters were not as numerous in Syria as they are now, the "moderate" opponents to Bashar al Assad were distinctly unimpressive in their organization, even as Sunni extremist attitudes to al Assad's Shia-trending Alawite rule had been building for decades behind the scenes.

The Israelis, who actually have to live next door to Syria, rather than merely deal with it as an issue from thousands of miles removed, have always been deeply uneasy about toppling al Assad for the very reasons I have outlined.

While it is true that interventionists were never calling for boots on the ground, it is also true that no peace in a country like Syria was ever conceivable without substantial numbers of boots on the ground. And if the United States facilitated the toppling of the al Assad regime, Washington would have come under considerable international pressure to arrange the stabilization force, if not to man it, at least in part.

Ukraine Crisis: A Lesson for Global Community and India

28/03/2014

Source Link

Narender Kumar

E-Mail- narry13@gmail.com

“We are witnessing a huge geopolitical game in which the aim is the destruction of Russia as a geopolitical opponent of the US or of the global financial oligarchy.” –

Vladimir Yakunin, former Russian senior diplomat.

Ukraine is an important bridge for Russia to reclaim the strategic space, which it conceded to the West after the demise of the Soviet Union. Crisis in Ukraine is a serious jolt to the endeavour of Russiato build greater Eurasian Union as Ukraine is a strategic pivot for Russia to control Black Sea, oil and gas supply to Europe, food grain supply to Russia andto keep NATO and US away from the Russian borders. As long as pro-Russian government was ruling Ukraine, Russian interests were safeguarded, but with the departure of Ukraine's ousted President Viktor Yanukovich, EU and US want to liberate Ukraine from Russian influence. Stakes for Russia are far higher to let go Ukraine without paying a heavy price and as a result territorial integrity of Ukraine is likely to have serious implications.

Russia has hardened its stand and is unlikely to step back.Ukraine today is polarised and stands divided in two. Western Ukraine ispro EU and is a breadbasket of Europe; Eastern Ukraine is pro-Russia and an industrial hub centre and energy corridor for Europe with Crimea a dominant ethnically Russian area. Referendum in Crimea has gone in favour of Russia but will have far reaching consequences, since Crimea is dependent on water, electricity and food from Ukraine.(Crimea was part of Russia till 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine. The Russians in Crimea have however never accepted it). The popular perception is that Ukraine is unlikely to exercise such a drastic step to cut water and electricity to Crimea because Ukraine itself is dependent on supply of subsidised Russian Gas. Prolonged turmoilin Ukraine will also impact Baltic nations which have not regained political, economic and diplomat stability. Ukraine has been trapped between the conflict of interests of West and Russia.It is also emerging slowly that Europe has realised that Russia cannot be bullied at this stage till they find an alternative to dependence on Russian gas and resolution to economic crisis of Ukraine.

Conflict over Ukraine is political, economic and strategic in nature and is morphed as West versus Russia. To some extent, this crisis has been ignited by gas export from Russia to Ukraine and rest of Europe. George Friedman has written that the EU and US have eliminated a corrupt and pro-Russian leader but have no answer to the economic crisis of Ukraine. Ukraine has a debt burden ofapproximately $145 billion, and Russia has pledged $15 billion to bail out Ukrainian economy from the present mess if Ukraine align with Russia and reject the proposal for integration with EU. To counter Russian proposal, Germany and other EU nations have proposed that IMF manage Ukrainian economic bail out, but the consequences will be serious since the economy willy-nilly will be manipulated by West and will cause major economic upheaval. Russian proposal still stands if the Ukrainian government agrees to integrate Ukrainian economy with Russia.

Does Nuclear Asia have its Own Dangers?

IDSA COMMENT

Rajiv Nayan

Source Link

March 28, 2014

The third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) took place on March 23-24, 2014 in The Hague with 53 countries along with the United Nations, the Interpol, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union participated. Of the 53 countries 15 were from Asia. In the run-up to the summit, a number of writings appeared. A couple of these writings tried to focus on Asian nuclear dangers.

True, the global nuclear order, at the commencement of the Cold War and the East West conflict, was predominantly centred in Europe. The 21st century is witnessing a shift. Asia is witnessing major developments relating to nuclear issues—military and civilian both. Currently, Asia has four declared nuclear weapon countries, namely China, India, Pakistan and North Korea; one acknowledged nuclear weapon country, Israel and a suspected nuclear weapon country, Iran.

China is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea was a member of the NPT, but after its withdrawal from the treaty, it has conducted three nuclear tests. The last test was on February 12, 2013. India and Pakistan never joined the NPT. Israel, too, did not join the NPT, and it is widely acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. However, it does not confirm possession of nuclear weapons. The US provides nuclear protective umbrella to Japan, South Korea and Australia in the Pacific Asia.

Whether new nuclear weapons developments will induce a nuclear chain reaction in the region and beyond has been a matter of serious debate and discussions over the years. In recent months, Iran has thrown surprises by engaging the Western world to mitigate, if not end the ongoing crisis. However, Asia still has its share of worries. There are no properly functioning Asian security institutions or regimes to regulate Asia’s nuclear politics. It has to rely on global institutions and regimes for regulation of its nuclear politics and management of nuclear order. Treaties like the NPT are struggling to provide stability in the world as in Asia.

In the last four decades, interestingly, all the new nuclear weapons countries in the world have come from Asia. China actually made the beginning of the nuclearisation of Asia. Over the years, it has become the principal source of threat and proliferation in Asia. Yet, the nuclear weapons countries outside Asia are possessing more than 90 percent of global nuclear weapons stockpile. Just focusing on Asia may not give the correct picture of the global nuclear weapons scenario.

Shifting to civil nuclear energy, two of the Asian countries—Japan and South Korea—had substantial share of nuclear energy in their national energy profiles. Japan is still struggling over its national nuclear energy policy after the Fukushima incidents. In other countries, nuclear energy has not contributed much in electricity generation. However, a number of countries in Asia have plans for the development of nuclear energy. In fact, the new phase of nuclear renaissance, to a great extent, is being fuelled by Asian nuclear energy ambition.

Afghan and Paqkistani Taliban Focusing Their Joint Military Efforts on Afghanistan, Report

March 28, 2014

Exclusive - Pakistan Taliban agrees to ceasefire to help Afghan allies

Reuters

The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have secretly agreed to focus on carrying out operations in Afghanistan, with Pakistani militants announcing a ceasefire with their government in order to preserve militant bases used to stage cross-border attacks.

The collaboration between the two Talibans, revealed to Reuters by militant chiefs and security officials in the region, increases the risk that violence will escalate further in a crucial year for Afghanistan.

The nation of 30 million people holds a presidential election on April 5, a litmus test for foreign donors hesitant about bankrolling the government after the bulk of NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan withdraw this year.

The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are closely allied and both aim to impose a strict form of Islam on their societies.

But their leadership and targets differ. The Pakistani Taliban focus their attacks in Pakistan, while the Afghan Taliban focus on Afghan and NATO security forces and anyone allied to them.

A rash of Taliban attacks this month has already raised concerns about the credibility of the poll, which should mark the first democratic transfer of power in war-ravaged Afghanistan.

Most foreign observers withdrew their monitors after a deadly attack on a hotel in the heart of the capital, increasing the risk of the widespread fraud that marred the last presidential election in 2009.

A large number of voters may also be too scared to cast their ballot.

Afghanistan’s interior minister said this week that the one-month ceasefire announced by the Pakistan Taliban on March 1 to revive peace talks with the government in Islamabad had prompted militants there to switch focus from home soil to Afghanistan.

"From the day there was a ceasefire on that side, almost every night one or other of our border posts has been attacked by people from the other side of the border," Umer Daudzai told Reuters.

CEASEFIRE STRATEGY

The ceasefire was urged on the Pakistani Taliban by the hardline Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, who are based around the mountainous border between the two countries, militant commanders and a security source said.

They feared the threat of an offensive by the Pakistani military could hamper their own push to carry out attacks in Afghanistan, including on election officials and NATO forces.

Peace talks between Islamabad and the Pakistan Taliban began in February, but broke down when the militants bombed a police bus and executed 23 paramilitary troops.

ARCHIVES: U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: NOT MUCH HAS CHANGED IN 14 YEARS

Myra MacDonald

March 28, 2014 · in W(ARCHIVES)

As the United States prepares to pull combat troops from Afghanistan by 2015, it is once again counting on a promise by Pakistan to rein in Islamist militants operating from its territory. Pakistan, so the argument goes, has recognized the folly of its past practices of arming and training jihadis to counter India after facing the blow-back from a domestic Taliban insurgency. The government says it now wants to give priority to security at home.

To give some perspective to Pakistan promises, once classified cables available through the State Department’s Freedom of Information Act show similar pledges being made in 2000 – a time when the United States was increasingly worried about the threat from al Qaeda but still enjoying its last full year of peace.

In a cable summarizing a meeting with Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Maleeha Lodhi, then Undersecretary of State Tom Pickering warned Pakistan that its policies on Afghanistan and Kashmir were out of control and directly threatened U.S. national security interests. The meeting was meant to follow up on the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu to Taliban-controlled Kandahar at the end of 1999, in which India was forced to hand over three militants in Indian jails in return for the release of the passengers and crew. While Pickering said the United States did not think Pakistani authorities had planned the hijacking, it wanted action against the hijackers and freed prisoners who had escaped to Pakistan.

Ambassador Lodhi promised that Pakistan would try to detain two of the three prisoners freed and he proposed a “strategic dialogue” with the United States to discuss tensions in the relationship. Among those three freed prisoners were British-Pakistani Omar Saeed Sheikh, who lived openly in Pakistan until he was arrested and convicted for masterminding the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl in 2002. Another was Maulana Masood Azhar, who went on to found the Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group blamed for an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. As recently as January, he was allowed to address a public rally calling for a renewed jihad in Indian Kashmir.

Another declassified cable from later in 2000 shows India blaming Pakistan for the hijacking, with support from the Pakistan embassy in Nepal, and asking the United States for help in countering terrorism in the region.

Reading through those cables, it is hard to see that much has changed – Pickering repeatedly warned in 2000 that Pakistan’s own interests and those of the United States were threatened by Pakistan’s policies towards Islamist militants – just as Washington does now. Only one element has changed: in 2000 Pickering acknowledged that the Kashmir dispute was “a root cause of conflict in South Asia” and promised the United States would try to help resolve it. Such sympathy for Pakistan’s view of the Kashmir dispute dissipated years ago in the U.S.-Pakistan tensions over the Afghan war. Otherwise the United States continues to hope that Pakistan will change it approach to Islamist militants, just as it did in 2000.

Myra MacDonald is a former Reuters journalist who has worked in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. She was Chief Correspondent in France and Bureau Chief in India. After publishing Heights of Madness, a book on the Siachen war between India and Pakistan, she has focused in recent years on writing about Pakistan.

Exclusive - Pakistan Taliban agrees to ceasefire to help Afghan allies

Source Link

BY KATHARINE HOURELD

KABUL Thu Mar 27, 2014

An Afghan security personnel keeps watch near the Serena hotel, during an attack in Kabul March 20, 2014.

(Reuters) - The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have secretly agreed to focus on carrying out operations inAfghanistan, with Pakistani militants announcing a ceasefire with their government in order to preserve militant bases used to stage cross-border attacks.

The collaboration between the two Talibans, revealed to Reuters by militant chiefs and security officials in the region, increases the risk that violence will escalate further in a crucial year for Afghanistan.

The nation of 30 million people holds a presidential election on April 5, a litmus test for foreign donors hesitant about bankrolling the government after the bulk of NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan withdraw this year.

The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are closely allied and both aim to impose a strict form of Islam on their societies.

But their leadership and targets differ. The Pakistani Taliban focus their attacks in Pakistan, while the Afghan Taliban focus on Afghan and NATO security forces and anyone allied to them.

A rash of Taliban attacks this month has already raised concerns about the credibility of the poll, which should mark the first democratic transfer of power in war-ravaged Afghanistan.

Most foreign observers withdrew their monitors after a deadly attack on a hotel in the heart of the capital, increasing the risk of the widespread fraud that marred the last presidential election in 2009.

A large number of voters may also be too scared to cast their ballot.

Afghanistan's interior minister said this week that the one-month ceasefire announced by the Pakistan Taliban on March 1 to revive peace talks with the government in Islamabad had prompted militants there to switch focus from home soil to Afghanistan.

"From the day there was a ceasefire on that side, almost every night one or other of our border posts has been attacked by people from the other side of the border," Umer Daudzai told Reuters.

CEASEFIRE STRATEGY

The ceasefire was urged on the Pakistani Taliban by the hardline Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, who are based around the mountainous border between the two countries, militant commanders and a security source said.

They feared the threat of an offensive by the Pakistani military could hamper their own push to carry out attacks in Afghanistan, including on election officials and NATO forces.

Peace talks between Islamabad and the Pakistan Taliban began in February, but broke down when the militants bombed a police bus and executed 23 paramilitary troops.

The Pakistani military then launched air strikes and said it was preparing to storm militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan,a border region that is a militant stronghold. But the operation was put on hold after the Pakistan Taliban announced the truce.

Afghanistan Splits, Provoking Central Asian Cold War

Insights from the Wiki: 

Posted on March 23, 2014 

by wikistrat

Wikistrat recently concluded a two-week simulation called “Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown” in which our strategic community was asked to map out what the country will look like in 2017, three years after American and NATO forces have pulled out. One scenario suggested the country could split in two, instigating a Central Asian cold war. A summary is provided here.

Following the withdrawal of international forces, the central authority in Kabul is irreparably weakened. Local army commanders make deals with a resurgent Taliban. Regional warlords compete for territory and opium revenues. The security forces split along ethnic lines.

The collapse of authority worries neighboring states. Pakistan moves first, levering its relations with the Pashtun to use the Taliban as a “stabilizing force.” China sees its investments in Afghanistan at risk and fears a destabilized country will offer safe haven to Uighur insurgents operating in Xinjiang. Initially, it moves limited forces across the border to “stabilize” the frontier, but over time sees attractions in collaborating with Pakistan to minimize its own involvement.

Iran renews its traditional links to warlords in the Herat region, exchanging weapons for influence. Its ability to offer arms is enhanced by Russia, which is cautious about overcommitting again in Afghanistan, but sees advantages in building on its alliance with Iran.

The interference by regional powers causes the tribal conflicts in Afghanistan to coalesce into two camps, one predominantly Tajik and linked to Iran and Russia and the other predominantly Pashtun and tied to China and Pakistan.

By 2017, Afghanistan has split into two semi-autonomous regions. Within each region, there is sufficient fear of the other to permit coherence. The rump national government has become irrelevant. Low-level violence between regional militias continues on a nearly daily basis, but the regional sponsors ensure that this does not get out of control.

Ethnolinguistic map of Afghanistan

Other interested powers are forced to pick sides. Most immediately, India will be tempted to associate itself with the Iranian-Russian block, seizing on the opportunity to put pressure on Pakistan and distract its attention away from Kashmir.

Afghanistan could feed into increasing Sino-Russians tensions. As Russia consolidates its support for Iran, China, marginalized in Tehran, would look to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Russia and China then in effect become sponsors of the two sides of the Saudi-Iranian, Sunni-Shia conflict for Middle East hegemony.

Pakistan Stabilizes Afghanistan

Insights from the Wiki: 

Posted on March 15, 2014 

by wikistrat

Wikistrat recently concluded a two-week simulation called “Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown” in which our strategic community was asked to map out what the country will look like in 2017, three years after American and NATO forces have pulled out. One scenario challenged the conventional wisdom of Pakistan sabotaging peace efforts and suggested it could actually play a stabilizing role. A summary is provided here.

Despite leaving a residual force for training, logistics support and special operations, the drawdown in NATO military personnel in Afghanistan leaves the central government weakened. While other interested powers, like Iran and Russia, are reluctant to get involved, Pakistan steps in. It reinforces its support for the Taliban as well as the presidential faction within the government. Recognizing that they would need Pakistan’s support to overthrow the government in Kabul, many Taliban decide that they can best advanced their goals by working with the government.

Pakistan sponsors talks between the government and moderate Taliban figures to produce a coalition government. While Afghanistan’s erstwhile Western sponsors are appalled, they have no incentive to reengage, especially as the Pakistan-brokered coalition delivers peace in the previously wartorn southern provinces. Instead, they focus on lobbying Pakistan and the new Kabul government to reduce opium production and prevent a return of Al Qaeda.

China is glad to see its ally stabilizing Afghanistan and thus avoiding it offering safe haven to Uighur separatists intent on destabilizing Xinjiang. China also increasingly sees opportunities for economic investment in Afghanistan, which Pakistan’s alliance with the Kabul government can guarantee.

Saudi Arabia sees Pakistan’s actions as another welcome blow in the Middle East’s Sunni-Shia conflict. It, too, is happy to provide economic and military aid to enhance Pakistan’s meager resources. Pakistan itself gains as the stabilization of southern Afghanistan impacts positively on the other side of the border.

The presidential palace in Kabul, Afghanistan

By 2017, a coalition between Taliban and non-Taliban Pashtun governs in Kabul, in close alliance with Pakistan. Southern Pakistan is largely stable, with some more extreme Taliban groups active but lacking popular support. Tajik opposition to the majority Pashtun government remains, but it is constricted to the river valleys of the north of the country. As Afghanistan recovers economically, Pakistan is able to trade its influence with the Kabul government over drugs and terrorism suppression for respectability in the West.

Is Russia Preparing for a Spring Invasion of the Ukraine? A Military Analysis

March 28, 2014

State Of War

Christopher J. Miller and Mark Rachkevych

Kyiv Post

Russia is mobilizing for war and may be poised for a springtime invasion of Ukraine’s mainland, after stealing Crimea in less than three weeks.

Tens of thousands of Russian troops and military hardware, including artillery, tanks, warplanes and helicopters are amassing and carrying out war games on all sides of Ukraine.

High concentrations have been spotted in Russia’s Klimovo in the north and Russia’s Belgorod in the northeast, in Russian-annexed Crimea in the south and in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region in the southwest, as well as sizable groups carrying out military exercises in Belarus in the north.

As a spring invasion of mainland Ukraine looms large, Yevhen Marchuk, a retired Ukrainian general and former defense minister, warned on March 27 that the crisis is intensifying, saying that Russia has now moved to the “second phase” of its plan “to eliminate” Ukraine as a nation.

“There are many signs of an imminent attack,” he told journalists at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center. “Now it is in fact war time.”

Estimates of Russian troops on war footing vary, from the West’s estimates of more than 30,000 to the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council’s calculations of 100,000 soldiers ready to strike.

There are, in addition, 700 tanks and armed personnel carriers staging near the eastern border, according to Dmitry Tymchuk, head of the Center for Military and Political Research in Kyiv. He added there are 240 warplanes and helicopters, 150 artillery systems of various calibers, and 100 units of multiple rocket launcher systems.

In Transnistria, Tymchuk noted, there are 2,000 Russian boots on the ground, of whom 800 are commandoes.

But presidential chief of staff Serhiy Pashynsky said at a briefing that “no activity of Russian troop mobilization” has been spotted near Ukraine’s borders for two days now.

Still, experts noted that the battle-ready force is capable of cutting Ukraine off from the sea with a westward thrust, chopping perhaps a quarter of Ukraine’s territory into Moldova.

Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted at a plan to do this in his March 18 speech at the Kremlin, during which he spoke of righting historical wrongs, specifically calling out the loss of those regions of Ukraine.

Lessons Learned About the Russian Military After the Fall of the Crimea

March 28, 2014

Analysis: Crimea intervention - The increasing sophistication of Russia’s military resurgence

Tim Ripley

IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly

Late on 25 March, the last Ukrainian warship blockaded in its port on Crimea’s west coast surrendered to Russian forces, completing just over three weeks of operations to wrest the strategic peninsula from Kiev’s control.

This whirlwind campaign seems to herald a new sophistication in how Russian commanders conduct military operations. The most distinctive feature of the Russian operation was its emphasis on economy of effort. Unlike previous interventions in Afghanistan in the Soviet era, or Chechnya and Georgia more recently, where Russian commanders relied on mass employment of tanks and artillery, the Crimea intervention featured fewer than 10,000 assault troops lined up against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. The heaviest fighting vehicle employed by the Russians against the Ukrainians was the wheeled BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier (APC).

Once Russian troops had moved to blockade Ukrainian military personnel in their bases, psychological warfare, internet/media propaganda, intimidation, and bribery were their main weapons to undermine their opponents’ will to resist, rather than overwhelming firepower. Russian troops also displayed considerably discipline and patience during this phase. In addition, they appeared well equipped, boasting new personnel equipment, body armour, and light wheeled armoured vehicles.

This novel approach was necessitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s need for the operation to be launched within a tight timeframe after the fall of the pro-Moscow regime in Kiev on 27 February.

Although the operation may have been planned for many months, there was insufficient time to mobilise a larger force. Russian commanders had to make do with naval infantry from the Black Sea Fleet already based in Crimea, backed up by a couple of battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos flown onto the peninsula. Economy of force also fitted the campaign’s political narrative: that this was a mission to protect Crimea’s Russian-speaking population rather than an invasion.

In just over three weeks, the will of the Ukrainian forces in Crimea was broken and all 190 of their bases had surrendered with barely a shot being fired by their defenders. However, even if some Ukrainian heavy armour was present in Crimea, many of the Ukrainian forces were naval and administrative personnel rather than combat troops. Organised military resistance was never a serious prospect. Instead of achieving a simple military triumph on the battlefield, the Russian armed forces facilitated a political and psychological victory.

WHAT NOW?

In the wake of his success, there has been intense speculation about President Putin’s future intentions. In his 18 March victory speech after the fall of Crimea, he laid out his underlying worldview. Russia’s loss of power and status at the end of the Cold War in 1989 was a deliberate, generational humiliation at the hands of the West - and a reason for hatred and apprehension.

Can Asia prevent its own Crimea?

http://csis.org/publication/can-asia-prevent-its-own-crimea-1

By Bonnie S. Glaser, Ely Ratner 

MAR 26, 2014 

With the world watching Ukraine with wary eyes, the U.S. Navy’s lead admiral in the Pacific suggested Asia could face a similar crisis if the continent’s other major power continues on its current path.

Since 2009, China has stepped up what Philippine officials have called a “creeping invasion” in the South China Sea. Although less dramatic than Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Beijing has been bullying its neighbors to assert and advance an expansive set of territorial and maritime claims encompassed by its “nine-dash line,” which skirts the coastlines of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines and gobbles up islands, rocks and resources in the process.

Seeking to make new facts on the ground (or, more literally, on the water), Beijing has permitted and encouraged its paramilitary law enforcement ships and navy to engage in persistent harassment and intimidation of non-Chinese fisherman, military vessels and energy companies seeking to go about their business in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Chinese coast guard vessels reportedly interfered with the delivery of supplies to Filipino marines stationed on Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef near Reed Bank that is believed to be rich in oil and gas. If such incidents are allowed to continue, armed conflict could be around the corner.

But what distinguishes the contest over sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific from events unfolding more than 5,000 miles away in Eastern Europe is that hope remains for a peaceful solution that eschews coercion and force in exchange for international law and diplomacy.

Outmatched by China’s rapidly growing military, and dispirited by 17 years of failed bilateral diplomacy to settle its disputes with Beijing, the Philippines decided in January 2013 that its only recourse was to submit its claims to compulsory arbitration under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs international rules and rights on the world’s seas. This came on the heels of China’s illegal seizure and occupation (continued to this day) of the contested Scarborough Shoal off of the Philippines’ west coast.

Despite Beijing’s unrelenting efforts to pressure Manila to drop the case, the Philippines plans to file its final “memorial” at the end of March, which will detail its case that many of China’s claims, including the notorious “nine-dash line,” have no standing in international or customary law. Legal experts predict a ruling could come down as early as mid- or late 2015.

In the meantime, countries in the Asia-Pacific – and the international community – have an opportunity to decide what kind of world they want to live in: one governed by rules and institutions; the other by brute force.

Robert Kaplan: The center of military power in the world is moving to Asia

Global Viewpoint

In an interview, Robert Kaplan says: 'The United States can preserve the peace [in the Asia Pacific] by seeking not domination, but a favorable balance of power with China. It must at some level allow China its rightful place in the Western Pacific.'

By Nathan Gardels, Commentary contributor, Robert Kaplan, Commentary contributor / March 27, 2014

Chinese President Xi Jinping, waves to reporters as he leaves a meeting with France's Prime Minister Jean Marc Ayrault in Paris, March 27.

Robert Kaplan is the author of “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific.” He spoke with WorldPost and Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels on March 25.

NATHAN GARDELS: “China’s efforts to enhance its influence as a rising power in an assertive way will backfire and result in an unintended encirclement of China by her neighbors. The irony is that this ‘security dilemma’ was exactly what happened in Europe when Kaiser Wilhelm II, confident of rising power of Germany, began to practice a muscular diplomacy in 1890.”

This is a quote from former South Korean foreign minister Yoon Young-kwan in a recent WorldPost article. Like many others, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he suggests that the situation inEast Asia in 2014 is analagous to 1914 in Europe.

Do you see it that way? In what ways yes, in what ways no?

ROBERT KAPLAN: The better comparison is not with the Kaiser’s Germany or World War I, but with American policy in the 19th and early 20th century for the Greater Caribbean.

China sees the South China and East China seas as blue water extensions of its continental land mass, just as a younger America saw the Greater Caribbean that way. Domination of the Greater Caribbean gave the United States strategic control of the Western Hemisphere, allowing it to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere throughout the 20th century.

China believes it is its right to be the preponderant power in its adjacent seas, thus unlocking the door to the wider Pacific and Indian Ocean for the Chinese navy.

World War I was a history- and culture-transforming event because of its interminable length and massive body count. Asia by contrast is a maritime sphere that could have short intense wars over blue sea with no civilian casualties.

GARDELS: What are the dimensions of the arms race in East Asia? What is its fundamental motivation?

KAPLAN: China is on its way to having one of history’s great navies. The other states are responding in kind. These are not 20th century land armies that are being built, but postmodern navies, air forces, missile systems, and cyber-warfare capacities.

The center of military power in the world is moving to Asia. The reason: Sustained capitalist expansion leads to military acquisitions. As states consolidate their institutions at home and do more trade and business abroad, they seek militaries in order to defend their new interests. Asian states like China, Japan, and Vietnam are no longer internally focused, but projecting power out – and thus their territorial claims clash and overlap. So we have a great military build-up.

GARDELS: What can be done to prevent East Asia from going the way of Europe in the 20th century where rival nationalisms led to war? Can China and the US share power to stabilize the Pacific?

KAPLAN: The United States must not let China Finlandize its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific. But neither can the United States allow Japanese, Filipino, or Vietnamese nationalism to force the United States into a military conflict with China. The United States can preserve the peace by seeking not domination, but a favorable balance of power with China. It must at some level allow China its rightful place in the Western Pacific. 

© 2014 The WorldPost/Global Viewpoint Network, distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC. Hosted online by The Christian Science Monitor.

The Next Round in Gaza

Read full report (pdf)

Middle East Report N°14925 Mar 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ceasefire between Israel and Gaza has eroded during the past several months and recently threatened to come to an abrupt end. The day after three members of Islamic Jihad were killed by Israel in a border clash on 11 March 2014, the group, apparently in coordination with Hamas, launched the largest salvo of rockets toward Israel since the last major escalation (known in Israel as Operation Pillar of Defence), in November 2012. In a little over a day’s mediation, Egypt restored quiet. But with Hamas’s fortunes declining and Gaza suffering its worst isolation and economic constriction in years, it is likely a matter of time until a flare-up escalates to major conflagration – unless the sides reach an understanding to extend a fragile quiet. Given Hamas’s isolation and worsening relations with Cairo, it is hard to imagine full implementation of the ceasefire Egypt brokered to end the 2012 fighting. But a rump deal, comprised of that ceasefire’s core elements, still could lessen the chance that Hamas and Israel will be dragged into a conflict neither currently desires, while helping both to secure advantages beyond the Gaza-Israel theatre.

Periodic escalations between Israel and Gaza militants are the rule, not the exception. Their shared border has witnessed regular, low-scale violence punctuated by short, intense escalations, typically when one or both sides feel the implicit rules of engagement have been undercut. Hamas and Israel have been headed toward such a clash since 3 July 2013, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was deposed, and Cairo, as part of its campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadis in Sinai, initiated a push to further isolate Gaza by closing the tunnels under its border with Egypt. Among Hamas’s limited tools for dealing with its downward spiral is directly participating in a military escalation in the hope that a new crisis would bring about at least temporary alleviation of the closure; call the world’s attention to the resultant economic distress; increase sympathy for the territory in Egypt and elsewhere; and embarrass Egypt’s leaders about their role in immiserating Gaza.

For the time being, Hamas has rejected this option, as it cannot afford a new round of hostilities. It is politically isolated and in severe economic distress. It can neither count on Egypt’s sympathies nor easily rearm during or after a future crisis. Hamas is hamstrung by the burdens of governance and by the fact that it would bear the brunt of any Israeli offensive. As a result, it chose a softer and less risky alternative this month: giving greater leeway to other factions that wish to attack Israel.

Islamic Jihad, with its massive retaliation for the killing of its militants, saw an opportunity to push to the forefront of the national struggle. In contrast with Hamas, it demonstrated continuing fidelity to the principle of resistance, and, by negotiating a ceasefire directly with Egypt, emerged from Hamas’s shadow, positioning itself as a regional player. Hamas too saw an advantage in the escalation: sending a message that Gaza would not remain passive in the face of isolation and misery.

The Turkey–Iran–Saudi Arabia Co-Evolution

In the recent strategic simulation The Turkey–Iran–Saudi Arabia Co-Evolution — in which Wikistrat’s analysts explored competing pathways for Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis each other — Senior Analyst R. Jordan Prescott suggested that Israel and Saudi Arabia might sign a non-aggression pact to balance against their common enemy, Iran. He expands on that proposal here.

State Department Photo

In October, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stunned international observers by turning down the opportunity to sit on the United Nations Security Council. According to the Saudi Foreign Ministry, the rejection reflected frustration with the United Nations’ ineffectiveness in “preserving world peace”. Diplomats speculated that the move actually reflected Saudi frustration with the West, especially the United States, regarding its policies toward Egypt and Syria. Now, in the wake of the recently concluded nuclear agreement with Iran, Saudi Arabia is reportedly exploring alternatives to its alliance with the United States. While experts acknowledge Saudi frustration is genuine, they assert the kingdom has few viable options. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia could contravene all geopolitical calculations if it is prepared to engage a nemesis that also happens to be the region’s sole credible counterweight to Iran.

Mounting Unease

The alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia dates back to 1944 and has weathered many crises, from the 1973 OPEC oil embargo to the participation of nineteen Saudi nationals in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, in the aftermath of American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as foreign policy decisions over the past twenty-four months, the Saudi leadership has become very apprehensive as to the alliance’s durability.

CONTAINING RUSSIA AND RESTORING AMERICAN POWER

Robert Killebrew

March 27, 2014 

Source Link

Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine are ringing alarm bells in Europe and United States. For the first time since World War II, European national boundaries are being changed by force, and, in an eerie echo of 1938, by an authoritarian leader who claims the right of intervention on behalf of ethnic kin in other countries.

Is this a temporary setback in relations that can be smoothed over by diplomacy? Or is this the beginning of Cold War II, a reprise of the old days that will be with us as long as Russia continues its bellicosity?

While the returns are still coming in, it’s increasingly clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to set Russia on a long-term course to restore Russian greatness and its influence over the states that used to fall within the Soviet empire. His speech of March 19 deserves careful reading. Although the former Soviet Union based its legitimacy and its right to empire on an ideology, Putin’s new Russia is based on his view of former Soviet glory, strident Russian nationalism and opposition to the West. Whether that view will survive him – whether there will be a similarly motivated line of succession as there was from Stalin to Malenkov to Khrushchev and so forth – is unknown. But Putin is a serious man, and his intentions should be taken seriously.

By now it should be clear that the “American moment” at the end of the Cold War – or, more precisely, of Cold War I – is over, and our security policies must be realigned. During the decade that coincided with the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton and the incompetent incumbency of Boris Yeltsin, the post-Cold War era appeared to be the age of democracy, led by a prosperous and militarily untouchable United States. Those days are long gone. From an explosion of post-Cold War optimism, the number of democratic states in the world is declining from its high water mark in the 1990s, and authoritarianism of the “one man, one vote, one time” type is spreading.

The Certainty of Donald Rumsfeld (Part 3)

By ERROL MORRIS

MARCH 27, 2014

This is the third installment of a four-part series.

3. A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION

Wikipedia

Rumsfeld’s life is bookended by two major historical events, two surprise attacks — the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 when he was 9 years old and 60 years later, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Rumsfeld wrote in Known and Unknown:

I had dictated a note to myself [July 23, 2001] that I intended to offer when I was next testifying before Congress. “I do not want to be sitting before this panel in a modern day version of a Pearl Harbor post-mortem as to who didn’t do what, when, where and why,” I wrote. “None of us would want to have to be back here going through that agony.”[1]

But he was back testifying before Congress several months after that memo was written — not for a post-mortem assessment of what had happened, but to plead for more money from Congress following the 9/11 attacks.

I sometimes remarked that the only thing surprising is that we continue to be surprised when a surprise occurs. In 1962, Harvard economist Thomas Schelling wrote a foreword to a book on Pearl Harbor that captured this idea perfectly. “We were so busy thinking through some ‘obvious’ Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made,” [Schelling] wrote. “There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.” I was so taken with his piece that I sent a copy to President Bush during our first month in office as well as to many members of Congress.[2]

HASC CHAIR MCKEON: U.S. CAN’T PROJECT POWER WITH DIPLOMACY ALONE

March 25, 2014 

by Fortuna's Corner

For Immediate Release: March 25, 2014 Contact: HASC Communications (202)-225-2539

Chairman McKeon Op-Ed: U.S. can’t project power with diplomacy alone

“America is losing the very strength that keeps the peace and reassures its allies when they stand up to bullies”.

U.S. Can’t Project Power with Diplomacy Alone

By Chairman Buck McKeon

March 21, 2014

The Washington Examiner

A certain worldview in the White House overlooks reality: The nation doesn’t need a strong military because there are no significant threats to it, and the president can handle any crisis through diplomacy.

How has that been working? The president resets the United States’ relationship with Russia, and Vladimir Putin invades Ukraine. White House proposals to resolve the crisis have been flatly rejected by Moscow. Instead, Moscow is amassing troops on the border of eastern Ukraine. The president scraps U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic and cuts U.S nuclear forces, while Moscow proceeds to violate a nuclear arms treaty.

America’s European allies are worried, and its Asian allies are nervous. China recently declared an air defense zone over Japanese territory and may very well seek to expand its claims to other maritime territory. It harasses U.S. allies in the Philippines, Vietnam and others in the South China Sea. North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons and deploy long-range missiles, including a new ICBM aimed at American cities.

The president strikes a deal with Iran that doesn’t require it to stop enriching uranium. This neither cuts Iran’s ballistic missiles nor curbs its supply of arms to terrorists. Meanwhile, three years after the president’s cut-and-run from Iraq, al Qaeda has retaken Fallujah and Ramadi and has spread to new corners of the globe — no less determined to kill Americans.

While the president’s diplomatic strategy and rosy threat picture haven’t panned out, his drastic cuts to the military have. Since President Obama took office, more than $1 trillion has been cut from defense. Defense is not a priority in this White House.

The president’s budget cuts the U.S. Army to pre-World War II levels. The Marines are cut so low that it has to throw its entire force “all in” for one conflict, leaving other parts of the world vulnerable. The president’s budget also cuts force structure. It cuts an aircraft carrier. It sends hundreds of perfectly good aircraft to the boneyard in Arizona. It cuts U.S. missile defense, submarine forces, amphibs, cruisers and ground combat vehicles.

Nuclear loopholes pose worrying dilemma

Global Times | 2014-3-24

By Xie Chao 

World leaders are gathering in The Hague to address nuclear security issues. China has been playing an active role in nuclear dialogue and cooperation. But there is an absence of effective Sino-India nuclear dialogue. India has never figured in China's threat assessment in any serious fashion.

Sino-Indian strategic stability is sustained by two cornerstones, China's possession of a more advanced nuclear arsenal, and the adoption of a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine by both countries. But if we look deeper into this, these foundations seem less staple.

As a declaratory policy, the credibility of NFU commitment is a two-way process, dependent on both how a country makes the statement and how others interpret it.

China was the first to propose and pledge an NFU policy and has consistently held a position which states that "China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones."

However, India's ambiguous nuclear status complicates this issue. India's self-exile from the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime makes it, technically, not a nuclear weapon state and its de facto possession of nuclear weapons makes it not a non-nuclear weapon state either. Hence, India falls in a technical loophole in the context of China's full NFU commitment.

India's NFU policy is under constant debate and interpretation. India first announced its NFU policy after its nuclear tests in 1998, designed to alleviate international pressure after the blast, but no specific content was added.

Its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 stated that "India will not resort to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers." This stirred up great controversy and failed to get final approval by the government.

In 2003, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine was released, stating an NFU posture but added that "in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons." This indicates that India would retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

On October 21, 2010, India's National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states," and despite the speculation it generated, the Indian government chose not to walk back this comment. In April 2013, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that Pakistani development of tactical battlefield nuclear weapon would nullify Indian NFU doctrine. Hence, the efficacy of India's NFU commitment has been significantly downgraded.

As for the other cornerstone of China's nuclear superiority, India's recent progress has significantly narrowed any gap.

India is now the fourth country in the world to have a workable nuclear triad. In September 2013, India tested its inter-continental ballistic missile the Agni-5, with a range of 5,000 kilometers covering the whole of China and reaching Europe and it further claims to possess the capability of producing a weapon system with a range of 10,000 kilometers in 2015.

According to the 2012 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian nuclear arsenal comprises 80 to 100 warheads and it keeps expanding its storage of weapon-grade plutonium.

So if China was enjoying and still enjoys a certain nuclear superiority over India, this relative gap is definitely being narrowed.

Enhanced strategic stability needs more than an NFU and shrinking nuclear gap. Both countries are aiming at a greater role in global politics, and neither can afford a strong but hostile nuclear neighbor.

Confidence-building measures can be strengthened, and more effective dialogue mechanisms are required to address nuclear accidents and strategic misperceptions between the two countries. Increasing efforts on bilateral nuclear dialogue and cooperation will thus lead to sustained strategic stability.

The author is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, and currently visiting at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn