Thursday, 27 March 2014 |
The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report makes it clear that the 1962 debacle was a result of India’s military unpreparedness and also of the political leadership’s inability to recognise the danger
After the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report of the 1962 Sino-Indian war was ‘released’ by Mr Neville Maxwell, I wonder why nobody asked the Australian correspondent who wrote the famous book, India’s China War, in 1970, who gave him a copy of the top-secret report? A few decades ago, it was rumoured that a senior General or a Minister was the culprit. We will probably never know. Mr Maxwell, who had kept 126 pages of Part 1 of the report secret for the past 45 years, probably wanted to ‘clear’ his consciousness by posting it on his website.
In the meantime, the blind babus of the Ministry of Defence continued to affirm that the content of the report was of current operational value. Did they think for a second about all those who had died on the Namkha Chu or in Ladakh or about those who suffered as prisoners of war in Tibet, or even about a nation that was humiliated? No, it is not in their habit, though India is entitled to know what happened.
While reading the report, it clearly comes out that the author, Henderson Brooks, the Anglo-Indian General, was a professional, honest and courageous man. Often, he did not hesitate to point a finger at his superiors, without once directly mentioning the political leadership (it was not in the terms of reference of his work, limited to military operations).
However, the report strongly indicts others, like Lieutenant General BM Kaul, Prime Minister Nehru’s blue-eyed boy and Commander of 4 Corps. Lt Gen Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff in the Army Headquarters, before taking command of 4 Corps, is severely criticised time and again. But Nehru, who had promoted Lt Gen Kaul to positions that the general was unable to assume, was the real guilty man, though his name is never mentioned.
The report speaks, for example, of “the unbalanced posture of our forces in the Tawang sector on the eve of the Chinese offensive which “needs NO elaboration”. It adds: “[Tawang], which should have been the main centre of strength, lacked troops; the bulk having been inveigled to a flank in the Namkha Chu Valley, without adequate logistic support and in tactically unsound positions... The rout of 7 Infantry Brigade was a foregone conclusion.”
The HBR is a manual of what should not be done: “The NEFA [North-East Frontier Agency] battles were the concern of the [IV] Corps. It must, however, be made clear that this applied to only the tactical sphere. The overall defensive planning and the provision of logistic support must and always should be the concern of the Command [in Lucknow, Lieutenant General Sen] and the General Staff at Army Headquarters [in Delhi]. Unfortunately, the reverse happened. There was interference in the tactical level and the overall planning and provision of logistic support was conspicuous by its absence.”
After the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report of the 1962 Sino-Indian war was ‘released’ by Mr Neville Maxwell, I wonder why nobody asked the Australian correspondent who wrote the famous book, India’s China War, in 1970, who gave him a copy of the top-secret report? A few decades ago, it was rumoured that a senior General or a Minister was the culprit. We will probably never know. Mr Maxwell, who had kept 126 pages of Part 1 of the report secret for the past 45 years, probably wanted to ‘clear’ his consciousness by posting it on his website.
In the meantime, the blind babus of the Ministry of Defence continued to affirm that the content of the report was of current operational value. Did they think for a second about all those who had died on the Namkha Chu or in Ladakh or about those who suffered as prisoners of war in Tibet, or even about a nation that was humiliated? No, it is not in their habit, though India is entitled to know what happened.
While reading the report, it clearly comes out that the author, Henderson Brooks, the Anglo-Indian General, was a professional, honest and courageous man. Often, he did not hesitate to point a finger at his superiors, without once directly mentioning the political leadership (it was not in the terms of reference of his work, limited to military operations).
However, the report strongly indicts others, like Lieutenant General BM Kaul, Prime Minister Nehru’s blue-eyed boy and Commander of 4 Corps. Lt Gen Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff in the Army Headquarters, before taking command of 4 Corps, is severely criticised time and again. But Nehru, who had promoted Lt Gen Kaul to positions that the general was unable to assume, was the real guilty man, though his name is never mentioned.
The report speaks, for example, of “the unbalanced posture of our forces in the Tawang sector on the eve of the Chinese offensive which “needs NO elaboration”. It adds: “[Tawang], which should have been the main centre of strength, lacked troops; the bulk having been inveigled to a flank in the Namkha Chu Valley, without adequate logistic support and in tactically unsound positions... The rout of 7 Infantry Brigade was a foregone conclusion.”
The HBR is a manual of what should not be done: “The NEFA [North-East Frontier Agency] battles were the concern of the [IV] Corps. It must, however, be made clear that this applied to only the tactical sphere. The overall defensive planning and the provision of logistic support must and always should be the concern of the Command [in Lucknow, Lieutenant General Sen] and the General Staff at Army Headquarters [in Delhi]. Unfortunately, the reverse happened. There was interference in the tactical level and the overall planning and provision of logistic support was conspicuous by its absence.”