V. R. Raghavan
Title: IRSA Asymmetrical threat Perceptions in India-China Relations. Author: Tien-sze Fang.
A fascinating analysis of the mutual threat perceptions of the two countries
Perceptions and misperceptions of threat become a variable in the strategic policies of states. International relations theorists have long analysed threat perceptions as the estimated intent and capabilities of the adversary state. Based on such analysis, not always wise or right, states adopt countermeasures to cope with the perceived threat. These have often taken the form of balancing, through internal strength, either military or economic or both, or external partnerships with allies. Some other states try ‘band wagoning’ by joining another power while some others seek a constructive engagement through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to reduce the threat. The book puts out the view, not surprisingly, that the weaker of the two will attempt to reduce the asymmetry by improving its capabilities. This is what in fact India is doing militarily albeit slowly and by building a network of cooperative relationship with other states extending from the Asia Pacific to Indian Ocean. As the author argues, this in itself can be a trigger for perceptional misunderstanding.
India’s nuclear weapons capability, is quite clearly not driven by the nuclear powers in the UN Security Council other than China. Pakistan’s nuclear capability, supported and sustained by China, added to New Delhi’s perceptions of asymmetry. India was willing to pay the price of economic and other sanctions in order to become a nuclear weapons state. It was a major measure to change the asymmetry, which allowed New Delhi to approach its bilateral problems with China in a more confident manner. China does not see India as a serious nuclear threat, but the resulting change in India’s stature as a rising power and the resultant improved ties with the US is a new variable in China’s calculus of asymmetry.
Tibet has been a source of continuing friction between China and India. China has not been able to satisfy either the Tibetan population or the global opinion on its intentions in Tibet. It opposes the discourse on autonomy, and has hugely changed the military infrastructure in Tibet. It has little leverage over the role of the Dalai Lama and over international media on its reporting on Tibet. Beijing’s sense of inadequacy clearly creates a perception of threat in China’s party and military leadership. While India is not the cause of this, and has unambiguously stated its position on Tibet being a part of China, the Tibetan question will continue to remain part of China’s sense of asymmetric threat to its national identity. Indian analysts are not unjustified in arguing that the slow pace of boundary negotiations and a continuing series of irritants on the disputed borders have a connection with Beijing’s Tibet conundrum.