6/3/2014
The warfighters of the electronic warfare layout of the IDF C4I Corps operate alongside the combat elements at the front line and are responsible for the warfare effort against the enemy
According to the IDF doctrine, the EW (Electronic Warfare) elements are a part of the fire delivery plan, and the elements of this layout operate close to the combat units," explains Col. Avi, head of the EW layout administration who also serves as the IDF EW officer attached to the General Staff during wartime. Unlike kinetic weapon systems, EW attacks are carried out in the electromagnetic spectrum and their objective is to disrupt/jam the communication and data networks of the enemy during combat operations.
The EW unit was established in 1964, under a cloak of secrecy and was regarded as a special unit. Only after the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, when the IDF supreme command realized that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces also possess EW capabilities, the unit evolved into a layout with a structured administration in the IDF C4I Division, and an OrBat that includes an EW officer, with suitable equipment, attached to every IDF division.
According to Col. Avi, EW operations are complex deception and subterfuge activities that require a high degree of creativity and severely undermine the other side's ability to operate. One Example of EW attacks is neutralizing the communication network of a hostile infantry battalion.
Unlike the western doctrine, as used by the IDF, Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria rely on Russian equipment and on the Russian doctrine. "While we differentiate between EW and SIGINT, according to the Russian doctrine, these disciplines are combined. It is because their SIGINT and EW capabilities are intended for offensive purposes. In Israel, the SIGINT world is not used solely for offensive wartime purposes, and our monitoring units are a national asset that serve more than just the IDF. This is the reason for the differentiation."
It is important to note that the EW layout of the IDF C4I Division is not responsible for the EW suits of such IDF weapon systems/platforms as aircraft or naval vessels. The manufacturers (either local or foreign industries) providing the weapon systems to the IDF are responsible for these suits.
Unlike other western armed forces, the IDF have a unique operating concept for the EW layout, with the activity divided into three primary axes: attack, defense and electromagnetic compatibility management. In other armed forces, each one of these axes is the responsibility of a separate arm. In the IDF, the entire activity is carried out by the Lotem unit of the C4I Division.
"Regarding the attack axis, I do not care what the IDF have, but rather what the enemy has. We have communications officers who know how the enemy implements and uses his communication networks and that makes the attack more effective. This applies primarily to offensive electronic warfare against enemy ground forces," says Col. Avi.
"The second axis of our activity is what we call 'counter-EW'. It is our responsibility to ensure that the IDF develop effective solutions for the enemy's EW attacks. These solutions provide protection for the communication networks of the IDF. In this case, too, owing to the familiarity of our communications officers with the enemy's systems as well as with the systems of the IDF, we know how to provide the manufacturer with a reference threat.
"The third axis involves the management of the electromagnetic spectrum on the battlefield. In the context of this activity, we are responsible for the electromagnetic compatibility between the various weapon systems in a given area cell. It is a new activity we embarked on about a year ago, pursuant to a joint decision by the IDF Chief of Staff and the Head of the IDF C4I Division. This will be one of the most critical aspects of the next war, as today every weapon system is an emitter, be it an aircraft, a missile, a tank or a naval vessel.
"Until about a decade ago, the division between combat realms was sea, land and air, with the electromagnetic medium of each realm managed independently. Nowadays, there are no longer any boundaries between those realms. The aircraft can interfere with the tank and the naval vessel can interfere with the aircraft. This has led to a situation where the management of the electromagnetic spectrum should take place at the General Staff level."
The solution found by the IDF is to manage the spectrum of the battlefield according to scenarios rather than by frequencies. In other words, the function of the EW officer assigned to the General Staff is to determine the significance of each combat activity and how it will affect other systems – both military and civilian – operating in the same area cell.
It All Depends on Timing
"The Yom-Kippur War was a turning point in the way the IDF perceives Electronic Warfare. Until that war, EW had been used against strategic targets, mainly to disrupt coordination efforts between enemy countries," explains Col. (res.) Yariv, a veteran officer of the unit who still serves as Col. Avi's right-hand. "The results of that war showed that there is serious potential for employment (of EW) at the tactical echelon as well, which had not been effectively utilized during the fighting. Today, every IDF division has an EW officer. During the Yom-Kippur War it was strictly a General Staff capability."
Getting the EW elements closer to the combat forces has narrowed the knowledge gap between the General Staff and the field, and enables employment with proper timing and in an accurate manner. "If you want to attack an enemy brigade, and you do not jam their communication during combat, the EW factor will be irrelevant. How would it help the combat elements if we arrived on the scene two hours too late?" explains Col. Avi.
"The same logic applies to the jamming of an explosive charge setup. You want the EW element to help you at the moment you pass through that setup and not later. Accuracy has become critical, vis-à-vis the force on the ground as well as opposite the intelligence elements, lest we disturb their collection efforts. This is the reason why every IDF division has this triangle made up of the combat element, the intelligence element and the EW element. Another important point is maintaining one's sector boundaries, so that the divisions would not interfere with one another. This is why the EW element only receives resources that are relevant to the sector assigned to it".
The Second Lebanon War represents another notable milestone in the history of EW in the IDF. During the early days of the past decade, the prevailing sentiment among the IDF supreme command was that the military is ready to cope with the electromagnetic spectrum using its regular forces. EW resources were dispersed among divisions, reservists were trained for wartime operations and the need to cut the budgets overrode the operational consideration, which resulted in the closure of the IDF C4I Division's EW administration. The situation remained unchanged until July 2006, when the IDF went to war against Hezbollah.
"The IDF thought it would have to fight regular armed forces and for that task we had prepared. In the years 1999-2000, it was said that the EW HQs were no longer necessary. In 2006, while we were fighting Hezbollah, we realized that the enemy was different. Cellular telephones, amateur radio equipment and highly diversified commercial communication equipment were employed. This was all new to us, something we had not encountered previously," says Col. (Res.) Yariv, who served as the EW officer of the IDF Northern Command during the Second Lebanon War.
"I reported for duty and there was a reservist HQ. At the same time, an IDF operation (Operation Summer Rains) was underway in Gaza. We had an argument with the commander of a regular battalion over specialized measures employed in Gaza and in Lebanon, and there was no mechanism that would regulate the capabilities between the two theaters. Some of the conclusions drawn from the Second Lebanon War called for the EW administration to be reestablished."
These organizations can change their communication system every day, adds Col. Avi, explaining that they normally seek the solution that is the most effective and cheapest for them, as they do not possess the resources of a regular military. As far as the IDF is concerned, this is a dynamic reality that necessitates a constant quest for new solutions.
Global Industry
The intensive preoccupation with Electronic Warfare over the years and Israel's desire to gain independence in this field has led to the emergence of a substantial number of defense industries that develop EW systems regarded as the state-of-the-art on a global scale. "Many of the employees of the industry grew up here, in our unit. It is a very small clique. One should bear in mind that there are not too many RF specialists and proven experience produces excellent products," says Col. Avi.
"We present our needs to the industry and determine the operating concept for the system. Without the context of the operating concept, no one in the world would buy the products. Additionally, the Israeli military is a user of these products and provides the industry with a local pedigree that promotes exports.
"At the same time, when dealing with an operational EW system, you regard its 'brains' as if it were a code. You do not share it with anyone, and the development is done right here at the Lotem unit. The parts of the system can be purchased from the industries, but the 'wisdom' of the system will be developed in the IDF."
Beyond the technological capabilities, the people of the IDF's EW layout are proud of the abilities of their human capital and of the number of female fighters. "About 15% of our manpower are female fighters, who complete a full combat service term of three years", says Col. Avi. "It is a unit whose manpower consists almost entirely of volunteers. We currently compete for the best female warfighters in the military against Magav (Police Border Guard) and Caracal (the reconnaissance unit of IDF Southern Command)."
Along with the gender equality aspect, the unit boasts one of the highest percentages of officer candidates in the IDF. Of each draft, between 30% and 40% of the troopers leave the unit to attend the IDF Officer Training School, and all of them qualify as battalion communication officers. They go through a complementary training course for officers provided by the C4I Corps, and only a few of them return to the unit and take a complementary course for EW officers. Additionally, the unit offers an EW conversion course for reserve officers.
"The quality of the people makes all the difference in many cases. Admittedly, we use automatic techniques that do not require an operator's intervention, but the added value of the man in the loop is reflected when we employ flexible systems," explains Col. Avi. "The operator is on the ground, monitoring the enemy's networks (the training course includes linguistic studies) and watching the battlefield – and operates accordingly. Our warfighters are not trained in the operation of one particular system. All of them are qualified to operate EW systems in the air, at sea and on land. They learn how to operate any platform that may be required." ž
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