Terrorism and domestic politics

G Parthasarathy

Dec 18 2014

Pakistani politicians too fan terrorist violence in India

In our public discourse on terrorism from territory under Pakistan's control, there has been a tendency to hold the military establishment as being solely responsible for the rise of terrorist outfits in Pakistan, as though the country's political parties are devoid of any responsibility for the burgeoning of radical Islamic groups in the country. The Deobandi-oriented Jamiat Ulema e Islam (JUI) headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman has backed the Taliban in Afghanistan, Harkat ul Mujahideen in J&K and Jaish e Mohammed, responsible for the hijacking of IC 814 and the December 2001 attack on our Parliament. Pakistan Government assistance to the Taliban was organised by Benazir Bhutto's Interior Minister, Gen Nasrullah Babbar, when Maulana Fazlur Rahman was her political ally. Jamat e Islami, a perennial ISI favourite since the days of General Zia, backs Hizbul Mujahideen in Jammu and Kashmir.

It is in this context that the role of Nawaz Sharif in the promotion of terrorism across Pakistan's borders with India and Afghanistan has to be analysed. While the Sharif family may have lived in Punjab (initially in Amritsar and thereafter in Lahore and Raiwind), their roots are really in Kashmir. Mian Mohammed Sharif (Nawaz's father) hailed from Anantnag and his mother from Pulwama. Sharif has a far more hardline position on J&K than many other politicians. Despite the obvious futility of seeking international mediation and a UN role in Jammu and Kashmir, Sharif is obsessed with creating conditions to keep international attention focused on Jammu and Kashmir, even if this involves promoting terrorist violence across India.

Sharif started his political career in the 1980s with patronage from the Islamist-oriented President Zia ul Haq. He was elected for his first term as Prime Minster, heading a group of Islamic parties, stitched together by then Army Chief, Gen Aslam Beg. His Islamist inclinations towards Afghanistan became evident when, in 1992, he became the only foreign Head of Government to visit Afghanistan, then ruled by a motley group of radical "mujahideen," put together by the ISI. More importantly, Sharif appointed a bearded fundamentalist, Lt. Gen Javed Nasir, who was a member of Tablighi Jamat, then backed by Mian Mohammed Sharif, as head of the ISI. There is substantial evidence that it was General Nasir, backed by Sharif, using the services of Dawood Ibrahim, who masterminded the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts in which 250 Indians perished,

Equally ominous are the links of the Sharif family with an obscurantist “Ahle Hadees” fundamentalist, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, who was an asset for the ISI during its Afghan jihad in the 1980s. When Sharif returned to power in 1997, he accorded formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban led by Mullah Omar. He ordered Governor of Punjab Shahid Hamid and his Information Minister Mushahid Hussain to call on Hafiz Saeed. Lashkar e Taiba thereafter replaced Harkat ul Mujahideen, backed by Benazir, as the primary instrument of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in J&K and elsewhere in India. Sharif also moved to strengthen residual ties with “Khalistanis” worldwide with the appointment of Gen Javed Nasir as the head of a so-called “Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee”. Barely hours after the conclusion of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore, “Khalistan” banners and slogans came up in gurudwaras across Pakistan to incite Sikh pilgrims, then on pilgrimage. An Indian diplomat witnessing this was beaten up.

There has been no change in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's approach on all these issues even in his third term. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed continues to receive patronage with funds from the Punjab Provincial Government, headed by the Prime Minister's brother, Shahbaz Sharif. His co-conspirators in the 26/11 terrorist attack, led by Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, live in comfort, ostensibly under detention, in Adiala jail. It is no coincidence that Hafeez Saeed's recent Lahore jamboree coincided with the terrorist attack in Uri, which was quite evidently designed to disrupt public participation in the last three rounds of polling for the State Assembly in Jammu and Kashmir. India has, therefore, to respond to Pakistani provocations organised by the military, but backed by the political establishment in a measured and effective manner politically, diplomatically and militarily, whenever intrusions, backed by covering fire across the LoC and the international border are attempted.

Major interlocutors like the US, the EU, Russia and China have to be candidly told that we will not countenance continuing terrorism and will respond as we have done in the recent past. One can sense some shifts in the US and EU positions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. After some initial prevarication on the December 5 Uri terrorist attack, a senior State Department official stated: "The United States remains firmly committed to working in close partnership with India to defeat terrorism in all its forms. Our hearts go out to those affected by this deplorable attack". India should seek a clarification from President Obama about American efforts to promote "reconciliation" with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistani commentators are envisaging a virtual handover of several districts in Afghanistan to Taliban control. This will have serious implications for India's security. 

As Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure was approaching an ignominious end on July 4 1999, Mr. Sharif rushed to the White House to bail him out. President Clinton asked Sharif to first restore “the sanctity of the Line of Control.” Mr Sharif agreed to take steps for the “restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement”. General Musharraf thereafter agreed in January 2004 that “territory under Pakistan's control” would not be used for terrorism against India. There should be no problem in normalising relations with Pakistan once Mr. Sharif ensures these promises, made by the two architects of the Kargil conflict, are observed in letter and spirit. It remains to be seen if the tragic events in Peshawar will lead to any rethinking about the dangers posed by nurturing terrorist outfits like the Taliban and Lashkar e Taiba.