Shifting sands and shifty friends

Chirosree Basu

The former president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, with the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, November 20, 2014 

When the purpose of the book is to make India conscious of the fact that "the evolving realities in Afghanistan present India with a historic chance", and that it will lose credibility with not only the United States of America but also with ordinary Afghans if India fails to seize it, one wonders why the book should have "a lost opportunity" as part of its title. In fact, it is not clear which lost opportunity Pant is talking about.

There is one which is obvious. From 2001 to around 2009, India was at the pinnacle of the success brought by its exercise of soft power in Afghanistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan was ubiquitous - in the construction of the critical Zaranj-Delaram road in Nimruz province, in its cooperation with Afghanistan in civil aviation, media and information, rural development, education, commerce and banking, waste and water management, training of defence and civil administration professionals, the enhancement of Afghanistan's food security through wheat aid, the rehabilitation and medical treatment of children, electoral management and standardization of State services and so on. That unnerved Pakistan, which hit back by orchestrating attacks on Indian establishments in Afghanistan through its proxy warriors.

The heightened militant activity in Afghanistan led to a troop surge by the Barack Obama administration in 2009. The exit plan was announced at the same time and that changed the entire complexion of the game. India was expressly told to tone down its presence in Afghanistan that was making Pakistan act wayward and thereby difficult for the West to handle it. India may not have followed instructions to the T but its steadfast principle of not bringing in boots to preserve the investments it had made, and thereby secure its own interests, went against it. As Pant puts it, "if India was unwilling to stand up for its own interests, few saw the benefit of aligning with India."

Pant also acknowledges that Indian presence in Afghanistan got weaker with the Obama administration's deepening of its security dependence on Pakistan in the hope of achieving a semblance of success in Afghanistan. By 2010, the US had been sold the idea that a reconciliation was possible with the Taliban and by 2011, Pakistan had established itself in the role of the indispensable mediator in such reconciliation drives, much to the indignation of Afghanistan's then president, Hamid Karzai, who was trying to proceed independently on the same lines.

India's marginalization in Afghanistan was thus not merely a function of its failure to meld soft power with hard power, but also the change in the West's prerogatives. Pant sees this as the result of the inherent weakness of India's policy in Afghanistan that has been too dependent on the action of others, particularly that of Pakistan and the US. As a rising power, Pant argues, India should have the confidence to go it alone and weigh its choices independently.

Fair enough. But if Pant is so adamant that India should not be influenced by the choices and designs of other powers in the region, why does he hold it against India for failing to understand the subtle shift of the US policy towards it? Pant traces this "convergence" of US interests with India's to sometime in 2012, when the Americans started to speak up against Pakistan's duplicity. By 2013, the US and Pakistan were clearly at loggerheads. In fact, since the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 in Abbottabad and the accidental massacre of Pakistani troops by US forces on the border the same year, US-Pakistan relations had steadily gone downhill, no matter how many billions of dollars were ch-annelled into Pakistan to help it combat Taliban 'insurgency' within its borders.

Pant believes that there has been a genuine shift in US policy, which is no longer averse to India showing a more pro-active role in Afghanistan. The US, he argues, has grown more tolerant towards India's dalliances with Iran as a result. Afghan leaders themselves are keen on seeing India pick up the cudgels on behalf of the Afghan people. On repeated visits to India, Karzai and his ministers have requested India to train its defence personnel and supply the country the arms that it so desperately needs. The new government of Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai has also done so, although more discreetly. And yet, an exasperated Pant says, India dithers.

Throughout the book, however, Pant himself leaves copious hints about how India's Afghanistan engagement could complicate the scenario. These come through most persuasively in the chapter, "Regional realities: as complicated as ever". Since the complexities are so grave, Pant believes that a regional approach cannot work. But how could India ever go into Afghanistan without involving other countries in the region? For example, with Pakistan blocking off transit routes, could India have shipped supplies to Afghanistan without the use of Iran's Chabahar port?

Pant himself acknowledges that India's moving closer to the US would automatically set off alarm bells in Russia and China. That is precisely what has happened. Having lifted its embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan last year, Russia has now signed a defence pact with Pakistan. India's larger footprint in Afghanistan again would strengthen the bonhomie between China and its all-weather friend, Pakistan.

There is no doubt that India's Afghanistan policy is in a muddle and that it has lost not one but several opportunities to reap the benefits of the enormous investment, in monetary aid and manpower, that it has made in Afghanistan. India remains muddled because there is no simple way out of the Afghan conundrum. The muddled US policy has to take a substantial blame for this. Its constant shifts are doing nobody any good. From fighting for democracy to fighting to dismantle al Qaida to fighting to preserve the life and limb of its remnant troops, the US has constantly shifted its goal posts in Afghanistan. Pant is right when he says that India should not depend on the US to define its Afghan policy. Unfortunately, he also advises India not to let the US down by spurning its hand of friendship this time.