"Operation Protective Edge brought the Future into the Present Reality"

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

16/11/2014

Colonel A., who commanded the IDF electronic warfare center during the Operation Protective Edge, in a rare interview about the center's activity and the implementation of "Network IDF"

The Second Lebanon War was a constitutive event for the IDF C4I Directorate. As far as the technology aspect was concerned, IDF authorities had realized that they must be able to share visual and aural information in real time, all the way down to the tactical echelon. Eight years later, that insight was implemented in the context of Operation Protective Edge – which has also evolved into a constitutive event. This time, the IDF realized that it was necessary to provide the command echelons with a decision support system that would enable flesh-and-blood officers to cope with the flood of information coming in from the field. The fragrance of a technological revolution is evident in the corridors of the IDF C4I Directorate. The name of this revolution is "Network IDF". 

"You cannot look at Operation Protective Edge without referring to Operation Pillar of Defense," says Colonel A., who commanded the IDF electronic warfare center during Operation Protective Edge and today commands the C3 center of IDF Central Command. "Looking through a more farsighted prism, you can say that between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead we had closed the gaps in the field of EW and recovered. 

"As far as we were concerned, Operation Pillar of Defense was a model (practice run) and Operation Protective Edge was the actual operation. A technological organization that has the opportunity of running a 'wet' model before actually entering the combat zone enjoys a definitive advantage. During Operation Pillar of Defense, that model was not executed. Eighteen months later, during Operation Protective Edge, it was executed, and we entered it better trained and prepared. As a fire element, you can say that during Operation Protective Edge the Network IDF concept was implemented, and we saw it in the fire employment process. It was the largest network-centric operation we have staged to this day. It brought the future into the present reality." 

Asymmetrical Warfare 

For the EW elements of the IDF, the era of asymmetrical warfare presents challenges that stem from the characteristics of the equipment acquired by the terrorist organizations. This is not the case of a regular military organization that develops its communication systems in-house, but rather of organizations that mostly acquire civilian equipment. Consequently, the pace at which technology changes is faster, and the equipment to be attacked is more diverse. This compels the EW systems to be more readily available and highly flexible ("flexivailable"), faster. 

"If Hezbollah feels like buying ten sets of a certain type on E-bay, it will buy them and give them to its people," explains Colonel A. "This compels us to understand what the organization has (in use) all the time. Today, it is a world of multiple systems. This compels us, as attackers, to revise our operational concept and capabilities." 

In addition to using the Internet for procurement purposes, the terrorist organizations also use the web in order to collect information on the EW capabilities of the IDF. "The other side is aware of our capabilities, at least of some of them," says Colonel A. "The EW world is fairly open. There is no one on the battlefield who has not heard about it. A lot of overt information is available on the Internet. I am confident that the enemy is aware of us, including the enemy in Gaza. This is the reason why we keep the exposure of our capabilities on the media to a minimum." 

Another aspect of the EW activity during Operation Protective Edge involves the management of the actual employment of EW measures. "The whole world was watching what we were doing in the Gaza Strip," explains Colonel A. "Consequently, we did not employ the full spectrum of our capabilities, so as not to expose our entire arsenal. The implementation of tactical connectivity in the context of the operation enabled us to conduct the offensive process in a more intelligent manner. Eventually, connectivity enables situational awareness and efficient inter-organizational cooperation. These are the advantages of network-concentric warfare and during Operation Protective Edge they were implemented exceptionally well." 

Tactical Connectivity 

The EW center is not the only element of the IDF C4I Directorate that has changed for the better in the context of Operation Protective Edge. Tactical connectivity has also undergone a revolution, or – more correctly – a rebirth. In the past, IDF arms exchanged information by word of mouth, over radio communication or in face-to-face meetings. Today, information (including voice and video) is exchanged through a network. "This capability has been implemented to its fullest extent in combat operations for the first time," explains Colonel N., Head of the IDF C4I Directorate's Planning Division, who experienced Operation Protective Edge firsthand. 

During Operation Protective Edge, the combat operations were based primarily on C3 systems, and the information was delivered all the way down to the forward command post level, and in some cases even to the individual armored vehicle level. This was the first confrontation of the IDF where a brigade commander could change a mission using his C3 systems. 

"A classic incident that illustrates this was the attack from the sea on the shore of Zikim, staged by the Hamas naval commando unit," says Colonel N. "The surveillance operator had the ability to share visual and voice information with all of the forces deployed in that sector, and she could employ all of the forces, in all of the arenas. Another added value was reflected by the small number of 'friendly fire' incidents. Relative to the complexity of the activity in Operation Protective Edge, there were very few 'friendly fire' incidents, owing to tactical connectivity. Tactical connectivity also facilitates IBW – Intelligence Based Warfare. This is an infrastructure that makes intelligence accessible to the tactical echelon, to the forward command posts. It changes the battlefield." 

Tactical connectivity also leads to efficiency improvements regarding the aspects of manpower field deployment. In the past, hundreds of people were required in order to erect a forward command post. Today, a single trailer of the TZAYAD system contains 23 chairs – there is no room for any more. This should be multiplied by 2 or 3 in order to establish a forward command post that can operate 24/7. "This changes the campaign command culture and the entire concept regarding the establishment of command posts," says Colonel N. 

"One of the challenges we face is creating an infrastructure solution that would enable a higher target throughput while the life cycle of each target is shorter. For this purpose, we demand that each arm should comply with technological standards that would enable tactical interoperability. All of the services available to the system of a certain arm should be made available to all of the arms. The idea is for the information to flow among all of the arms/services of the IDF. 

"In the field of communication, we developed in the wrong direction. Each arm had developed its own physical infrastructure. Network IDF is a plan that should resolve this issue. We have reached a good position by this time – Operation Protective Edge – and the challenge is to evolve with the operational needs. 

"One of the directions involves Decision Support Systems (DSS). MATZPEN, our software unit, is already there. The IDF is not yet there. These systems are similar to such products as Get Taxi, Waze or Siri – products capable of producing value from information in real time. This comes under the classification of big data and data fusion. In order to accomplish it, we get the MATZPEN unit closer to the combat echelon. The objective is to encourage brainstorming during the development stage. "The first step is to build at MATZPEN a 'thought room' where the programmers will meet with the warfighters once a week and jointly develop the DSS systems IDF require. Some initial steps have already been made in that direction, but we are not yet there. 

"We need to prepare for an extensive range of threats. A confrontation opposite a single organization, multiple organizations, a state or several states. The military develops itself for the most extreme situations and we want to see how the new technology works in the context of a more intensive campaign and more extensive scenarios." 

Major I., the C4I officer of the IDF 188th Armored Brigade that operated in the context of Operation Protective Edge, reports that the systems demonstrated a very high level of reliability during the days of the fighting. "Until the operation, we had practiced a week and a half of continuous system operation. The operation proved that the systems work well over longer periods as well," he says. "During the training of tank commanders and higher echelons, the warfighter receive instruction on the systems. Once the technology is up and running, it is up to the commander to assume responsibility and use it. 

"We received positive feedback from the people on the ground, including battalion commanders and company commanders. It is clear to them that the systems work well. When you look back at the decision making at all of the various levels, you cannot ignore the technology that makes the process possible and shapes it. People understand that."