What Are the Jordanian Military and Intelligence Services Doing to Counter ISIS?

Jordan responds to the Islamic State threat

IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review

October 29, 2014

US president Barack Obama, right, meets Jordanian King Abdullah II at the NATO summit at Celtic Manor in Newport, Wales, on 4 September 2014. Jordanian security forces have told IHS Jane’s they are optimistic about the future success of the multinational alliance against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Photo: PA

Key Points 

Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID), with its extensive cumulative experience, spearheads the kingdom’s security efforts against the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra threat, inside and outside the country. 

The multi-front approach being used to counter the threat comprises the promotion of moderate Islam, increased border security, and participation in the international military alliance in Iraq and Syria, in addition to GID intelligence operations. 

Arab intelligence sources interviewed by IHS Jane’s believe the jihadist threat within Jordan is minimal compared with its regional neighbours, due to Jordan’s lack of sectarianism. 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, bordering Iraq, Israel, Syria, and the West Bank, and across the narrow Gulf of Aqaba from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, has faced a dramatic increase in security threats in the past several years. “The situation is very dangerous in the Middle East, and since 2011, the Arab Spring has left a huge impact on Jordan,” said a senior Jordanian security official, who spoke to IHS Jane’s on condition of anonymity in Amman on 14 September, adding, “No stability took place, and no democracy realised, but on [the] contrary, the threats increased significantly.”

Conflict areas bordering Jordan. (IHS)

Jordanian security officials told IHS Jane’s that Islamic Salafist jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which operates in the Sinai Peninsula and claimed the improvised explosive device (IED) attack on the Egypt-Jordan gas pipeline in January 2014, form the main threats to Jordanian security. The internal stability threat of the Muslim Brotherhood within Syria and the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict form other strategic defence challenges.

Jordan’s security services and armed forces were put on the highest state of alert in September in response to the Islamic State’s growing capability and the belief that the group is a direct security threat to the country, senior Jordanian security officials told IHS Jane’s . Jordan has had a long history of being targeted by Islamist terrorists, including the ‘Millennium Plot’ allegedly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda operatives aimed at bombing and poison gassing the Radisson Hotel in Amman on 1 January 2000, according to US FBI agents. The plotters were also accused by Jordanian authorities of planning to attack two Jordan-Israel border crossings and Christian sites.

Additionally, the late Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi oversaw a number of terrorist operations in Jordan during 2001-05, including November 2005 suicide IED attacks on three hotels in Amman. Therefore, Jordan is wary of the rising threats in its neighbours Iraq and Syria, where the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra are active, as well as from Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula, and the enhanced ability of jihadist groups to cross borders ideologically through social media.

COUNTERING TERRORISM

Many security experts, including those based at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, have argued that Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the most professional and capable security service in the region. “GID has [the] highest level of professionalism in handling internal and external security crises,” a senior Palestinian Authority security officer told IHS Jane’s on 22 September. Another Arab intelligence official agreed, before adding, “But Jordan could not stand and counter the ISIS [Islamic State] threat without external support from the Gulf, the US, and EU countries. We are [in a] dangerous threat circle, and we do not know when ISIS will decide to target Jordan or Jordanian interests directly.”

With the Islamic State’s increased funds, its ability to pay salaries and recruit new fighters has also increased. As the senior security official stated, “The most dangerous threat in the Middle East is the wide spread of terrorism and extremism, and the flow of big numbers of foreign fighterian o Syria and Iraq.” Jordan’s security forces, acc rding to IHS Jane’s Jordanian security sources, make substantial efforts to protect the kingdom’s borders and prevent its use as a passage for would-be militants to join the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

The Jordanian security official told IHS Jane’s , “Al-Nusra Front [Jabhat al-Nusra] is less ferocious than ISIS, but it’s the second terrorist organisation after ISIS.” In September 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra reached as far as the northern border of Jordan, to the Deraa-Al-Ramtha post, but it has not gained traction in the Jordanian community so far, which has limited its spread in the northern part of the kingdom. However, on 6 March, Jordanian Salafist leader Mohammed Shalabi claimed that most of the approximately 1,800 Jordanian Salafists believed to be fighting in Syria had joined Jabhat al-Nusra. He subsequently told the Al Jazeera news network that Salafist supporters in Jordan were split between the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

The GID began preparing a response to the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra threat before the groups’ rapid ascendency in Iraq and Syria with its northern offensive in June, according to the senior Jordanian security official interviewed by IHS Jane’s . The GID, which is leading the Jordanian counter-terrorism efforts according to IHS Jane’s sources, with the rest of the security forces taking an executive role, has proven success in human intelligence (HUMINT), but has also recently boosted its signals intelligence (SIGINT) to match the Islamic State threat. Previously, the GID adopted a containment and rehabilitation policy with jihadist groups, but in the case of the Islamic State, it has chosen confrontation, as the GID leadership does not believe that a containment and rehabilitation policy would work with such an extremist group, senior officials told IHS Jane’s .

The GID’s approach includes several new strategies, such as enhanced military forces along all borders, urban combat training for military personnel, increased intelligence-gathering operations on the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq, internal watches and intelligence-gathering on suspected Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra supporters in Jordan, and a campaign to spread ‘moderate Islam’ messages among the Jordanian population and security forces. According to the intelligence-sharing security policy of King Abdullah II, the senior security official maintained, “Our philosophy in Jordan is to share everything we have with our brothers and counterparts around the Middle East and beyond; at the end of the day, if your partners are strong, you are strong.”

Additionally, Jordan took its counter-terrorism measures beyond intelligence-gathering and beyond its borders by joining the international alliance against the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Iraq and Syria, in an implementation of a Jordanian political leadership decision that the Islamic State formed a direct threat to the kingdom’s stability. Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) sources confirmed to IHS Jane’s on 29 September that its pilots participated in alliance airstrikes that were conducted against Islamic State bases in Syria in late September. As the senior Jordanian security official reasoned, “There is no other option than to be a part of the international and regional efforts as a moderate state.” Furthermore, IHS Jane’s security sources claimed that the GID’s knowledge of the region and intelligence on where top Islamic State leaders Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, and Abu Omar al-Shishani were operating gave the country credibility among the international alliance countries.

Jordanian and US special operations forces conduct a combined demonstration with commandos from Iraq (unseen) as part of the ‘Eager Lion’ multinational military manoeuvres at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Amman, Jordan, on 20 June 2013. (PA)

However, despite Jordan’s participation in the alliance airstrikes, Mustafa Alani, a senior adviser and director of security and terrorism studies at the non-partisan think-tank Gulf Research Center in Dubai, told IHS Jane’s on 30 September that he believed Jordan’s role was still a defensive one, rather than offensive.

The senior Jordanian security official stressed that Jordan had been calling for such a united effort to fight the Islamic State threat for several years, arguing that it was in the interests of not only regional countries, but all countries to stop the threat. “There are 12,000 foreign fighters in Syria, and [he] who will not be killed [in Syria], certainly will return back to his homeland, where he will form a part of a sleeping cell, or affect his family members and friends to adopt his thoughts and ideology,” said the official.

REVENGE TARGETING

Jordanian security services believe that jihadist groups mainly target Jordan due to its close alliance with the West, and the United States in particular. “GID strength, the peace treaty with Israel, the support for the PA [Palestinian Authority], and being a close ally of the US have formed motives for the jihadist groups to [take] revenge against and target Jordan,” said the senior Jordanian security official. A further reason jihadists may want to target Jordan, according to the senior official, is its role in combating terrorist organisations outside Jordan. He said, “We have been part of the international coalition against terrorism since 11 September 2001, so we have [been] targeted by those jihadist groups.”

The King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Amman on 15 September 2014. All Jordanian security forces undergo counter-terrorism training at the centre. (Mohammed Najib)

However, Brigadier General Aref Al Zaben, CEO of the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), believes that the Islamic State threat against Jordan is less than that of other Arab countries due to the fact that Jordan has minimal sectarianism. The overwhelming majority of its population is Sunni (95%), with a Christian minority (3%), and a very small segment of Caucasians, according to the United States Department of State in 2005. Al Zaben observed that these religious groups have “lived historically together peacefully” and the Islamic State “has succeeded [in] the sectarian countries”. However, two protests in support of the extremist group held in June in Maan, attracting dozens of people, suggest the presence of a nascent pro-Islamic State movement.

Furthermore, Alani told IHS Jane’s there was “no doubt that Jordan’s engagement in airstrikes against ISIS will lead to a reaction through revenge, or warning, or public opinion revolt” against the kingdom. However, he added, “Sympathy with ISIS in Jordan is less than what people may expect in comparison to Jordanian sympathy for the Al-Nusra Front, as many Jordanians see ISIS as a criminal more than a jihadist organisation.” In this regard, the Jordanian security official sees the Islamic State as being on the back foot, asserting, “ISIS has made mistakes that we have benefited from, such as the targeting of Kurds in Erbil, and killing foreigners, which have angered the international community.”

Riad Kahwaji, the CEO of security consultancy the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), agrees with Alani. He told IHS Jane’s on 2 October, “Jordan, like all countries bordering Iraq and Syria, is subject to potential terrorist attacks by ISIS or Al-Qaeda.” However, he added, “Jordan has been part of the international war on terrorism for many years, and joining the current alliance is only a continuation of an ongoing policy.” Kahwaji also believes that it was “natural for Jordan to join the alliance because the ISIS threat is imminent and in the kingdom’s backyard, and it is best to hit the terrorists and end their threat while they are still outside the country’s borders and not wait until it is too late.”

Furthermore, with the Islamic State not concentrating on targeting governments in the region outside Iraq and Syria, Jordanian public sympathy with the organisation has decreased, contends Alani, who believes the ebb and flow of support for the Islamic State in Jordan is based on how far the kingdom will go in terms of fighting the group. He asserts, “If the Jordanian military operations continue [to] focus on ISIS… the Jordanian supporters for ISIS will be under control.”

Alani does not believe the airstrikes against the Islamic State will lead the group to seek shelter in Jordan. He said, “Jordan would not be the first option… for ISIS due to the strength of its [Jordan’s] military and security services [to] monitor any attempt by the organisation.”

Jordanian minister of foreign affairs, Nasser Judeh, centre, at the Gulf Cooperation Council and Regional Partners summit on 11 September 2014 in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. During the summit, US secretary of state John Kerry (not pictured) sought to define Middle Eastern allies’ support for combatting the Islamic State. (PA)

However, a further concern for Jordan’s security officials is that Iran’s membership in the international alliance against the Islamic State, combined with the probability of civilian Sunnis being killed in airstrikes if the Islamic State uses them as human shields or has sheltered in urban areas, will increase support for the Islamic State among the Jordanian population. The security officials worry that Iranian participation in the deaths of Sunnis could place Islamic State cadres in the perceived role of fighters in a religious war against Shia crusaders.

CONTAINING IDEOLOGY

The Islamic State expressly uses a social media campaign to promote its ideology and, potentially, recruit and garner support from an international audience. The GID division assigned to counter the terrorist intentions and the military capabilities of the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra depends primarily on intelligence-gathering as its main tool. As the senior security official maintains, the jihadist groups’ use of media technology means the GID has to be one step ahead of it on the intelligence front.

Jordanian security sources claim that there are 70 Jordanian citizens on trial at the Jordanian State Security Court for allegedly being active operatives for the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, which IHS Jane’s has been unable to verify. “Some have been misled by the extremist groups’ propaganda, and we try to rescue them from this dangerous ideology, but mainly in general we have ideas and plans to counter this extreme ideology, through security and preventive measures,” the source added.

King Abdullah II launched internal reforms in 2004 aimed at improving the confidence of Jordanians in his government and to turn them away from extremist ideologies. As the senior security official said, “We are proud that since the start of the Arab Spring… all the protest demonstrations that took place in Jordan had ‘demands’ and not reform agendas, and no single drop of blood has fallen from any demonstrator. The largest demonstration was 12,000 participants only.” Although the official is correct that most Arab Spring demonstrations in Jordan have been peaceful, on 15 July 2011 a protest of approximately 2,000 people was violently broken up by police using batons, injuring 17, and in Amman in March 2011, protesters and government supporters fought in Gamal Abdel Nasser Circle.

To minimise the spread of extremist Islamist views promoted by Salafist groups, the ‘Amman Message’ was launched by King Abdullah II on 9 November 2004. It is a training programme designed to promote moderate Islam and define violent extremist ideology and activity as ‘un-Islamic’. Within the programme, three questions were sent to 24 senior Islamic religious scholars around the world, representing all branches and schools of Islam. The questions were: ‘Who is a Muslim? Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate? Who has the right to issue fatwas (formal decrees)?’

The purpose of this exercise was to lend scholarly credence to the view that violent extremism does not fit within true Islam. Alani maintains that with the scholarly approach, “Jordan [is trying] to pass a clear message: we are not against the religious, but against the extremist who uses religion as an umbrella to justify extremist behaviours, as there is no terrorism action [that takes] place without extremism.”

Brig Gen Al Zaben, who led the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) in Afghanistan, agreed that beyond political and security leadership, the religious training programme was essential for countering terrorism within Jordan’s borders for civilians and soldiers who may be influenced by extremist doctrine. He further argued that the Amman Message also helped JAF morale, saying, “We have adopted the intellectual religious training for our fighters, because when the fighter believes in a doctrine, he will fight for [that doctrine in] the field.” Al Zaben summarised, “We are looking to fight ideology by ideology, immunise our soldiers, and [have] the intellectual security become part of the national security preventive measures.” From July to October, several Lebanese soldiers defected to join the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra, according to Lebanese officials and videos and online statements released by the men.

BORDER CONTROLS

The weakness of the Iraqi and Syrian security services greatly increases the infiltration threat from the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra along the shared border with Jordan. On 22 June, the Islamic State seized the Turaibil border crossing post in Iraq, just across from Karameh in Jordan. Internal Jordanian security sources told IHS Jane’s that in light of the weakness of the Iraqi and Syrian security forces, the responsibility of border protection had become the full responsibility of the JAF.

Jordan has enhanced its border control and reinforced its military and security presence alongside its northern borders with Iraq (approximately 190 km) and Syria (approximately 375 km), with the aim of preventing any infiltration by Islamic State fighters or those sympathisers wishing to pass through the kingdom in an attempt to access Syria or Iraq.

Syrian refugees at the Zaatari camp, near Mafraq, Jordan, on 26 July 2013. Jordanian security forces had been engaged in tackling the threat of Islamist extremism in the region for some years before the Syrian civil war and emergence of the Islamic State. (PA)

Security officials interviewed by IHS Jane’s expressed an unsubstantiated fear that some Arab countries, as well as some from outside the region, facilitate the travel of unwanted domestic jihadists to Iraq and Syria, hoping they will be killed there. However, they warned that if the jihadists survive and return home, they will form a direct threat to the security of those countries. Nevertheless, Jordanian security officials told IHS Jane’s that they still believed the country’s borders “are the most controlled borders in the Middle East”.

JAF border guards and Jordanian law enforcement forces are now required to receive one to two months of intensive training courses at KASOTC, Al Zaben toldIHS Jane’s . The training includes the use of night-vision technology, enhanced sniper techniques (using mobile and static observation towers), and co-ordination drills between the Jordanian operative security forces to prepare for “handling an infiltration incident”. Al Zaben also told IHS Jane’s that the JAF and Jordanian law enforcement forces have already participated in international peacekeeping missions, such as in Angola in 1989 and in the former Yugoslavia during 1993-96, which have enhanced their capabilities against external threats and co-ordination against internal threats. Furthermore, Al Zaben said that the JAF is considering transforming some infantry battalions into special operation forces, intended to be more capable of handling the new type of security threat.

As IHS Jane’s spoke to Al Zaben at his office at KASOTC on 15 September, JAF ground forces training was in progress, with Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters, most likely of the UH-60-L variant, flying at low levels, practicing drops. The Islamic State is fighting in urban areas, stressed Al Zaben, making it necessary for the JAF and other personnel to practise fighting in these conditions. The JAF sources would not reveal the total number of its deployed forces on the borders, nor its armaments. However, an eyewitness located between Al-Ramtha and Deraa, on the Jordan-Syria border, told IHS Jane’s that hundreds of JAF personnel and armoured vehicles have deployed recently on the borders, with units on patrol to prevent civilians crossing.

CONCLUSION

Jordanian security sources told IHS Jane’s that the kingdom predicted the Syrian civil conflict, and consequent instability, would last for several more years, maintaining the security threat against Jordan. Jordanian security officials toldIHS Jane’s that they believed the Islamic State threat was more dangerous than Al-Qaeda, and would last as long due to the Islamic State’s capabilities and funding. Yet the multi-nation alliance against the Islamic State is not stable, making the likely future and effectiveness of the effort unclear. The accidental killing of a civilian Sunni, perhaps amid attempts to counter the Islamic State in urban areas, could be enough to rally Sunni anger against JAF and anti-Islamic State alliance activities in Syria and Iraq, or at home.

Meanwhile, Jordan is depending on arguably the most professional and capable intelligence service in the region - the GID. The service has a long cumulative experience of fighting Islamic jihadist groups dating back to the 1970s, and has gained cross-regional and international experience during the last 70 years, since the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom in 1948. In contrast, many national security services in the region have not fared well, starting anew following the Arab Spring.

Jordan’s growing economic challenges, including an unemployment rate of 12%, an energy crisis, and a major drop in oil trade with Iraq, also put pressure on its defence budget, which Jordanian security officials said had been doubled to enable the kingdom to operate its anti-Islamic State campaign. “Jordan’s engagement in [a] comprehensive military and security confrontation with ISIS will lead to huge pressure on its military and security budget,” said Alani, who asserted that in order for Jordan to carry out a prolonged counter-terrorism campaign, it would need generous support from regional allies - mainly from the Gulf countries - and global powers. He said, “The alliance countries have to provide Jordan with financial assistance for its effective contribution and participation in fighting ISIS. Right now we conduct these security efforts depending on our own local financial capabilities, but as the process will last for [a] long time, then we need [major] international community support.”