U.S. and Iraqi Governments Struggling to Undo ISIS’ Success in Co-opting or Conquering the Majority of the Sunni Tribes

Ben Hubbard

November 16, 2014

Iraq and U.S. Find Some Potential Sunni Allies Have Already Been Lost

BAGHDAD — When the militants of the Islamic State entered the Sunni Arab area of Al Alam, they gave its tribal leaders a message of reconciliation: We are here to defend you and all the Sunnis, they said, so join us.

But after a group of angry residents sneaked out one night, burned the jihadists’ black banners and raised Iraqi flags, the response was swift.

“They started blowing up the houses of tribal leaders and those who were in the security forces,” Laith al-Jubouri, a local official, said. Since then, the jihadists have demolished dozens of homes and kidnapped more than 100 residents, he said. The captives’ fates remain unknown.

In the Islamic State’s rapid consolidation of the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria, the jihadists have used a double-pronged strategy to gain the obedience of Sunni tribes. While using their abundant cash and arms to entice tribal leaders to join their self-declared caliphate, the jihadists have also eliminated potential foes, hunting down soldiers, police officers, government officials and anyone who once cooperated with the United States as it battled Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Now, as the United States and the Iraqi government urgently seek to enlist the Sunni tribes to fight the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, they are struggling to undo the militants’ success in co-opting or conquering the majority of them.

Officials admit little success in wooing new Sunni allies, beyond their fitful efforts to arm and supply the tribes who were already fighting the Islamic State — and mostly losing. So far, distrust of the Baghdad government’s intentions and its ability to protect the tribes has won out.

“There is an opportunity for the government to work with the tribes, but the facts on the ground are that ISIS has infiltrated these communities and depleted their ability to go against it,” said Ahmed Ali, an Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. “Time is not on the Iraqi government’s side.”

Much of the Islamic State’s success at holding Sunni areas comes from its deft manipulation of tribal dynamics. Portraying itself as a defender of Sunnis who for years have been abused by Iraq’s Shiite-majority government, the Islamic State has offered cash and arms to tribal leaders and fighters, often allowing them local autonomy as long as they remain loyal.

At the same time, as it has expanded into new towns, the Islamic State has immediately identified potential government supporters for death. Residents of areas overrun by the Islamic State say its fighters often carry names of soldiers and police officers. If those people have already fled, the jihadists blow up their homes to make sure they do not return. At checkpoints, its men sometimes run names through computerized databases, dragging off those who have worked for the government.

“They come in with a list of names and are more organized than state intelligence,” said Sheikh Naim al-Gaood, a leader of the Albu Nimr tribe.

The most brutal treatment is often of tribes who cooperated with the United States against Al Qaeda in Iraq in past years, mostly through the so-called Sunni Awakening movement supported by the Americans.

The Albu Nimr tribe, an important part of the Awakening effort, has been among the hardest hit. The Islamic State, since seizing the area of Hit in Anbar Province last month, has slaughtered hundreds from the tribe.

The Islamic State’s propaganda operation has emphasized those tactics, warning Sunnis that they are either with the group or against it. Its videos show fighters sharing meals with “loyal” tribal sheikhs and gunning down former soldiers.

“What did the Sunnis get from joining that army other than apostasy from God’s religion, the destruction of their homes and the cutting off of their heads?” asked Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the group’s spokesman, in a recent audio message. “Rally around the mujahedeen, O Sunnis of the Levant, and stop your sons from joining the army and the Awakening councils.”

Elements of the Awakening councils remain, and pro-government tribes are fighting alongside the army on a few fronts, though all say they lack support.

“We are the people who know the most about ISIS — who they are and where they are — so we are the only people who can fight them in Anbar,” said Sheikh Muayed al-Hamayshi, an Iraqi police commander leading tribal fighters near Ramadi.

Analysts say that the tribes that have joined the Islamic State have not done so because of its extremist ideology. For most, it has been a practical decision to ally with the authority they believe can best ensure security, and resources for their men.

So turning the tide is likely to require a steady influx of guns and money, and a track record of success. Essentially, the government must give them a better deal than they get from the Islamic State.

“There is a large number of the people from the tribes who are with ISIS; this we can’t deny,” said Wasfi al-Aasi, an Obeidi tribal sheikh who opposes the jihadists and has met with American officials. “But that does not mean that any tribe that has some members with ISIS is entirely with ISIS.”

It remains unclear how successful even a reliable long-term effort by the Iraqi government to enlist the tribal fighters can be. Though American cash and battlefield presence helped the Awakening succeed before, both are lacking this time around. American officials say the United States is encouraging the process, but that all arms and salaries must come from the Iraqi government.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi of Iraq supports arming the tribes, but many of his political allies oppose it, fearing that tribal fighters will either sell their arms to the jihadists or join them outright.

From the tribes’ side, many still distrust the government but say that the Islamic State’s violence toward Sunnis is turning people against it.

“They tell all the tribes that they are liberators who are coming to free them, but once they get in, the mask falls and you see that they are really thieves and killers,” said Mr. Jubouri, the local official from of Al Alam.

Last week, Salim al-Jubouri, the Sunni speaker of parliament, flew to Al Asad Air Base, which is surrounded by Islamic State territory in Anbar Province, to reassure pro-government tribal leaders that help was on the way.

But before leaving the base, Mr. Jubouri acknowledged the deep resistance by many in the government to arming the tribes.

“There have been doubts and a lack of confidence,” Mr. Jubouri said. “They think that someday these arms will be turned against the government.”

But a first shipment of weapons would be distributed soon, he said, and further shipments were on the way.

“A good meal has arrived and other good meals will come,” Mr. Jubouri said. “God willing.”