Kanwal Sibal
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1141128/jsp/opinion/story_1850.jsp#.VHfmpzGUfb4
With a tougher leader and a stronger government in Delhi, it would have been normal for our neighbours to examine whether they needed to review their India-related policies. In a positive scenario for us, we could have expected them to seek a better understanding with us, work to build greater trust, show more receptivity for our sensitivities, take greater cognizance of our security interests and avoid provocations that could invite a more robust response from a more self-confident government.
One could have also thought that, with the increased international attention that the Narendra Modi government was getting, the rising interest in the Indian market because of the prime minister's business-friendly credentials and the likelihood of the reforms process gaining momentum under his leadership, they would think of promoting greater economic links with India.
They might have concluded, too, that the Indian prime minister is very pragmatic in his thinking, that he wants good relations with all major countries irrespective of outstanding problems, including with China, and that this all-round bridge-building might require them to reassess whether they had the same external cards to play against India as in the past.
In actual fact, early signs are that in spite of the Modi government's emphasis on good-neighbourly ties and gestures in reaching out to our neighbours, not all of them are redefining their approach towards India. Pakistan, of course, stands out as a prime example of this and signals from Sri Lanka are not comforting.
Pakistan is a unique case. Unless it ceases to think that its national mission is to counter India with all means, including terrorism, our differences will defy reasonable solutions. Even now there is no sign that Pakistan has changed its basic thinking towards India. It continues to harp on Kashmir, feeling no need to rethink its sterile position even after 67 years. It is undeterred by the loss of Western support on the issue. The end of the Cold War changed the contours of international relations, but not those of India-Pakistan relations.
It is unclear what Pakistan wants in Kashmir realistically, as it possesses two-fifths of it already, which has given it a common border with China and denied us one with Afghanistan. It can neither seize Kashmir by force, nor win it through negotiations. It can, at best, support the separatists there and abet periodic violence.
Some in India blame the government for rebuffing Nawaz Sharif's desire to improve ties with India, recalling that, during the last elections in Pakistan, the manifestos of mainstream parties advocated good relations with us, indicating changed sentiments towards India. This, they argue, merits continued effort by India to engage Pakistan, especially the India-friendly civil society there. They rue that India, now insisting that Pakistan end terrorism for a dialogue to continue, is emulating Pakistan that had long made peace with India contingent on a resolution of the Kashmir issue.
These arguments are questionable. If the public in Pakistan is now electorally disinterested in the Kashmir issue and Nawaz Sharif wants better ties with India, then why is he aggressively posturing on Kashmir, seeking Western intervention and demanding self-determination under United Nations resolutions, and why has even Bilawal Bhutto begun ranting about Kashmir? If Pakistan's civil society can show little tangible achievement all these years to settle any of our differences, why do we cling to hopes that it can do so in the future with our support? Our previous government had formally de-linked terrorism and dialogue, without Pakistan willing even to place curbs on Hafiz Saeed, much less eradicate the India-directed jihadi infrastructure in the country. Our legitimate insistence that Pakistan must abjure terrorism cannot be equated with Pakistan's illegitimate position that we make territorial concessions to it in Kashmir as otherwise Pakistan's "diplomatic and moral support to freedom fighters in Kashmir" will continue.
The argument - that infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-abetted terrorist incidents having declined, the case for engaging Nawaz Sharif becomes stronger - is flawed. Since these downward trends began before his election, should the credit go to the civilians that want better relations with India or the armed forces that actually control Pakistan's India-related policies and impede good relations with us? How to explain this contradiction except to conclude that, at the end of the day, there is consensus in Pakistan that, for the reward of peace, India must pay the price of making concessions of the kind that Pakistan's armed forces want. Even that may not provide the final answer to India-Pakistan differences because of Pakistan's increasing Islamization.
Globalization has knit countries together in several ways, especially economic, but without bringing India and Pakistan closer. Pakistan is unable to extend even the most- favoured-nation treatment to India because of domestic, economic and religious lobbies. Even calling it "non-discriminatory market access" does not permit Nawaz Sharif to end this absurdity for fear of "public opinion", which, at the same time, is supposed to have become more India-friendly. When the rest of the world is signing free trade agreements and forging trans-continental economic partnerships, Pakistan refuses to even normalize trade relations with India, much less agree on investments and services.
In Asia in particular, connectivity is the buzzword. China is focusing on creating connectivities to expand its commercial influence in Asia as a whole, with links extended to Europe, but Pakistan will not allow transit rights to India through its territory to Afghanistan and reap the revenues, apart from preventing the contribution this step will make to improved economic conditions in Afghanistan. It is, of course, willing to promote connectivities that bolster China's geo-political ambitions in the region.
Terrorism has become a global phenomenon. If many believe that this menace has spread because of the manner in which the West has dealt with the Arab world, controlling their ruling classes and resources, bringing about regime changes there, not to mention supporting Israel at the cost of Palestinian rights, Pakistan's involvement with terrorism has no such 'justification'. Pakistan voluntarily became the instrument of the United States of America to counter the former Soviet Union in order to boost its capacity to confront India. It nurtured jihadi groups within the country for carrying out asymmetric warfare against India, and spawned the Taliban with 'strategic depth' with India in mind. Now Pakistan is paying internally the costs of its pernicious policies. Pakistan is a unique case of a country resorting to terrorism to back its territorial claims on another.
China's spectacular rise, the enormous financial resources it commands, its search for more markets for its huge export capacities in certain sectors, especially infrastructural, the land and sea connectivities it is building to expand its commercial presence - with greater political influence to follow inexorably - are being increasingly felt in our neighbourhood, presenting new challenges to us for maintaining control over our neighbourhood in a way that our fundamental security interests are not threatened. Pakistan apart, we have to contend with mounting pressures on our vital interests in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh and even Bhutan with which we have an excellent understanding. The challenge building up in the Indian Ocean with Sri Lanka's accord is particularly problematic.
The author is former foreign secretary of India. sibalkanwal@gmail.co
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