The Wagah attack and the big picture

D. Suba Chandran

The Wagah post is a soft target for TTP. The attack signals far-reaching implications for the government of Pakistan. —Reuters

THE suicide attack in Wagah, a few metres across the border is a new development with far- reaching implications for Pakistan, more than Indo-Pak relations. It signifies new emerging trends across the western borders of India. It is important to analyse the big picture evolving within Pakistan. Until now, two questions have been the primary focus in the media until now – who and why Wagah? The larger question to be addressed is: What does the attack in Wagah mean, along with similar high-profile attacks recently in Karachi and Peshawar. Since the Pakistani army is engaged in operation Zarb-e-Azb, there has been militant retaliation elsewhere. Are the militants on the run? Are they re-emerging and choosing targets outside the FATA and taking the war into the mainland?

The impact of Zarb-e-Azb

First and foremost, the attack in Wagah, when seen with other high-profile attacks elsewhere in Karachi and Peshawar highlights the impact and fallout of Zarb-e-Azb. One of the primary reasons for the attack apears retaliatory. The argument that the attack was aimed at disrupting the India-Pakistan dialogue process appears unconvincing. The India-Pakbilateral relations are already troubled.

Military strikes in the FATA seem to have only disrupted and displaced the TTP framework, instead of dismantling it. A simple explanation is the military offensive in FATA is focussed primarily on North Wazirsitan, that too a few tehsils. Military operations do not cover the entire tribal regions. As a result, as the Afghan Taliban did when the US started the war on terrorism post-9/11, the Pakistani Taliban seems to have disappeared instead of fighting back. Also, the TTP today has multiple factions; the military operations in North Waziristan target primarily the Mehsud fighters of the TTP, along with few groups allied with the Al-Qaida, primarily the Uzbeks. Factions of the TTP, are emerging elsewhere and choosing their own time and target to retaliate. The high-profile attack on the airport in Karachi earlier, is a part of this retaliation. The Wagah post, for the TTP, is a soft target. Given the nature of crowd assembling every day, it would be easier for a suicide bomber to infiltrate and inflict maximum impact. And that is precisely what the TTP bomber did, exploding himself and killing more than 60 people.

This disruption and displacement of the TTP has a larger implication for Pakistan’s internal security. A section of the erstwhile sectarian militants (of multiple groups from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to Jaish-e-Mohammed) referred to as the Punjabi Taliban who were fighting along with the TTP in FATA and KP, are now returning to Punjab. The Pakistani military, as a part of its offensive could have cordoned off the FATA before starting the counter- offensive against the militants. Unfortunately for the military, precious time was wasted in the name of a political dialogue with the Taliban. Perhaps, the Zarb-e-Azb is too little, too late. It has resulted in killing of TTP fighters but the blowback elsewhere is bigger.

Punjab under the TTP shadow

Second, the attack in Wagah also signifies another important development as far as the TTP and the State is concerned. Though the attack took place in front of the Wagah post, geographically it is an extension of Lahore, the liberal bastion of Pakistan and the capital of Punjab, supposedly the most stable of all the provinces in Pakistan.

While Karachi has become a city of violence in the recent decades, the attack on Lahore is a recent phenomenon and has been constantly expanding in the last few years. Since 2008, there have been multiple bomb blasts and suicide attacks targeting State institutions, office buildings, cricket team, markets, shrines etc.

If the militants are returning to Punjab, the decision to fight them in the heartland will be a tougher choice for both the political and military establishments. If the recent attacks in Lahore are to be considered, the return of militants to Punjab is likely to take place sooner. Punjab as the battleground, instead of the FATA or KP, will transform the security situation for Pakistan into a nightmare. Why would the TTP limit its hideouts and area of operations only to the FATA and KP, if it realises Punjab would be Establishment’s achilles heel in terms of a counter-offensive? With the Punjabi militants being the bridge, it would not be difficult for the TTP to shift its base, or the Punjabi Taliban becoming the primary component of the TTP.

Will Lashkar join the party?

Third, until now, the Lashkar-e-Toiba has been on a leash; despite its huge infrastructure, ideology and number of fighters, the Lashkar has not opened a front within Pakistan. It has remained anti-Indian in its ideology and action until now. It is believed, today, the new generation cadres of the Lashkar are even more radical and expect their leader — Hafiz Saeed to be proactive vis-a-vis India. After the Mumbai attack, the Lashkar and Hafeez have been restrained by the Establishment. With so much action taking place in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, and new ideological churnings with new groups such as the Islamic State, the Lashkar cadres cannot be held back for a long time. If that happens, it will create a perfect storm for Pakistan, if the Lashkar (or even a section) decides to go against, unless they are either diverted to far flung regions such as Syria and Iraq, or into the immediate neighbourhood — either India or Afghanistan. There should be a study on the game plan of the LeT now, with so much happening s at national and international levels.

Fourth, for Pakistan today – its border on three sides with India, Afghanistan and Iran – all are on fire. The non-State actors play a destabilising role in making Pakistan’s borders really irrelevant; if they decide to breach the Wagah (and India-Pakistan border) independent of the Establishment, it would invite bigger trouble for Pakistan internationally. With the new Indian government reducing the threshold and tolerance level to any infiltration/firing from across, Pakistan will have to safeguard its borders from its erstwhile trump cards. The Durand Line has been continuously breached by the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network and the TTP. While the Quetta Shura and Haqqani network have their bases in Balochistan and FATA, respectively, they cross the Durand Line at will. Same is the case with the Pakistani Taliban. With safe havens in the eastern border provinces of Afghanistan, the TTP moves across when there is military pressure from Pakistan.

While the role of non-State actors on Pakistan’s borders with India and Afghanistan are well known, the role of sectarian militants and that of the criminal gangs operating along Pakistan-Iran border have not been given sufficient attention. Multiple attacks on the Shia pilgrims in Balochistan on their return from Iran in the recent years have become a regular exercise; added to the problem has been that of trafficking and smuggling across the Iran-Pakistan border by professional mafia. With political instability and strained civil-military relations, for both the Sharifs, there are tough times ahead.

— The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi