Reorganising the Defence of India: The Task Ahead

BySpecial Correspondent

14 Nov , 2014

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/reorganising-the-defence-of-india-the-task-ahead-2/0/

Changes would provide a boost to defence preparedness, usher in an RMA, evolve requisite strategies and policies including for national security, response to asymmetric war, defence procurements, R&D, technology acquisition and reorganising the defence-industrial base. Development and economic progress are undoubtedly priority tasks for the new government but national defence and security issues must be given equal importance if India is to gain its rightful place in the comity of nations.

While both China and Pakistan possess advanced Sub-Conventional capability, India is lagging behind…

The security imperatives for India are multiple and dynamic with a volatile neighbourhood. The last decade has been characterised by utter neglect of the defence sector, the main features being – lack of a national security strategy and a comprehensive defence review; disjointed acquisitions in the absence of a security strategy and clear national security objectives; ignoring military modernisation, allowing the capability gap between own military and the Chinese PLA to increase exponentially; failure to establish a deterrent to proxy and asymmetric war; poor response to border violations, cross-border attacks and intrusions, showing the military and the country in poor light; inadequate border management; military-industrial complex in downward spiral with patchy windows of excellence, forcing import of over 80 per cent of defence needs; generalist bureaucrats ruling the roost in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) without accountability, one example being critical deficiencies in the Indian Navy courtesy MoD intransigence resulting in serious damage to the naval fleet with avoidable loss of lives and equipment, while the MoD failed to take any responsibility whatsoever; civil-military relations hit rock bottom with military deliberately lowered in the Warrant of Precedence; government fighting its own soldiers in Courts denying them authorised pay and allowances, even to the extent of forcing war disabled soldiers and war widows into long legal battles and paid media denigrating the military to show it in poor light.

The debate over the budget for defence and for economic growth is never-ending but recent media reports of the demand for a ten per cent increase in the defence budget just to cater for inflation (forget modernisation) indicates the grim picture. A country which is not strong militarily can hardly develop economically without a ‘safe and secure’ environment especially in a geographical and geo-political setting such as India. We also failed to grasp that conventional response and diplomacy by itself is no match to irregular threats despite having been subjected to proxy war for over two decades.

The debate over the budget for defence and for economic growth is never-ending…

Security Paradigm

Kautilya had advocated three types of war – Open, Concealed and Silent. An ‘open war’ he described as one that is fought between states; a ‘concealed war’ is one which is similar to a ‘guerilla war’ and a ‘silent war’ is one which is fought on a continued basis inside the kingdom so that the power of the King does not get diluted. India is faced with a multitude of traditional and non-traditional threats, which in today’s context are overlapping. While we continue to fight asymmetric wars, these we will continue to contend with breakout of hostilities in other segments of the conflict spectrum. That is why in the case of a China-Pakistan dual threat, a two and a half front war is talked about.

Significantly, current and future threats that India faces dictate there can be no shortcut from possessing full spectrum conflict capabilities, broad divisions of the conflict spectrum being the Nuclear, Conventional, Sub-Conventional and Cyberspace. China already has full spectrum capability. India and Pakistan are taking baby steps in cyberspace but what should be a matter of serious concern is that while both China and Pakistan possess advanced Sub-Conventional capability, India is lagging behind. This is a strategic asymmetry considering that Sub Conventional war is and will continue to be the order of the day albeit we need to also address asymmetry vis-à-vis our adversaries in other fields, particularly in the context of China.

Security Strategy and Defence Review

The MoD has defined India’s strategic interests extending from the Persian Gulf in the West to the Strait of Malacca in the East and from the Central Asian Republics in the North to the Equator in the South. Strangely, despite the large disputed borders and China illegally occupying large tracts of Indian Territory, there is no mention of China. And, given the centrality of India in South Asia and the overall asymmetry between India and its neighbours in South Asia being central to the persisting security dilemma in South Asia, China is exploiting this as well. Rectifying such aberrations apart, the government with its majority mandate provides India the opportunity to undergo the much-required strategic transformation.

Appointing a CDS should be done on priority as recommended by the Kargil Review Committee…

A priority task should be to define a National Security Strategy (NSS) followed by a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The foremost need is to enunciate the NSS to shape the environment in India’s favour. In doing so, organisations and entities such the MoD, MHA, Military, Economic Ministries, Department of S&T, DAE and ISRO need to be closely integrated. Threats and vulnerabilities need to be taken into account. While threats are mostly identifiable, vulnerabilities may not be clearly identifiable as latter are only indicators. Challenge of implementing NSS lies in preventing vulnerabilities transforming into threats using non-military elements of national power.

The NSS should include the following: 

India’s political aims goals in terms of power projection, promoting security, economic, technology, environmental and bio-diversity interests. 

India’s interests in other countries and regions extending outwards from South Asia. 

Interests and relationship matrix with major powers and the United Nations. 

Threats, challenges and competitors to India’s interests in respect of above paradigms. 

Like the NSS of any country, there would also be a need to include following classified parts first, strategy to deal with competition and challenges by setting time-bound objectives in diplomatic, economic, technology, and defence and security fields vis-à-vis the competitors; second, identify economic, strategic, military and technology leverages – inter-se priorities of countries; third, lay down strategic choices for entering strategic partnership in the short, mid and long term context; fourth, review of internal dynamics of India, its linkages with trans border threats and challenges posed for the security forces including assessing degree of expected involvement of armed forces in the internal dynamics.

We cannot afford to continue with ‘generalist bureaucrats’ in the MoD with little or no knowledge of military matters…

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) must immediately follow up from the NSS though work on both can progress simultaneously. The SDR should state present military strategy as derived from NSS and project into the future. The NSS could be broadly relevant up to next 15 years and the thinking into period beyond that may be termed as vision. The SDR should comprise analysis of present military strategy and revised goals, related emerging technologies and consequent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), mesh future conflict spectrum and the battle-space milieu, compare above with roles and individual responsibilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force, leading to the development of joint force capabilities including for Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

Future military perspective (short, mid and long terms) or joint military vision and military missions so developed would lead to formulation of LTIPP based on integrated systems dynamics and force development imperatives. The undeclared portion of the SDR should include adversaries or countries that are in security competition, cooperation and friends, comparative evaluation of the nature of threats or competition, threats from competing strategic and security alliances. goals and objectives of bilateral, multi-lateral and international defence cooperation, policy on the role of armed forces in asymmetric threats and internal conflict, strategy for protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats, defence-related aspects of cyber-space, space and perception warfare, and strategy for energy, water and food security.

Axiomatically, appropriate Core Groups would need to be established working out the NSS and SDR. Simultaneous to the NSS and SDR, work should also commence to holistically review Comprehensive National Security, to include personal security, community security, food security, health security, military security, economic security, energy security, political security, and environment security. The Comprehensive National Review would also address all non-traditional threats.

Higher Defence Organisation – Responsibility for Defence of India

Many are unaware of our lopsided system where the Defence Secretary is responsible for the defence of India instead of the Defence Minister. This is because the British Colonial ‘Rules of Business’ were blindly followed wherein the British Defence Secretary was also the Defence Minister. More importantly, since the Services HQs of British India were not fully trusted, they were made “Attached Offices”. It is absolutely essential to make the Defence Minister fully responsible for Defence of the country and amend the Rules of Business of GoI to ensure that Services HQ are no more ‘attached offices’ but wholly, a part and parcel of the MoD.

We have a National Security Council that barely met under the previous government…

Reorganisation of the MoD

We cannot afford to continue with ‘generalist bureaucrats’ in the MoD with little or no knowledge of military matters. The Railways (almost as large as the Army) is managed by the Railway Board exclusively manned by Railway officials. The Foreign Secretary is an IFS Officer and not a generalist bureaucrat. So, logically, the MoD should be manned by the Military Officers (serving, on deputation or on permanent absorption) with appropriate civilian cells in Departments of Defence Production and Defence Finance. However, as a first step, it is imperative to have serving military officers appointed as Defence Secretary, Secretary – Defence Production, Secretary – Defence Procurement and Secretary – Finance (Defence). In addition, to bridge the vital void of integration, HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) should be completely merged with the MoD, as recommended by several Committees.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

Appointing a CDS should be done on priority as recommended by the Kargil Review Committee, the Group of Ministers Report and the Arun Singh Committee Report. This is vital not only for providing single point military advice to the political authority but also to bring synergy between the three Services that is completely lacking at the moment, transforming the three Services into Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capable forces. In appointing the CDS, it should also be made clear that there should be no question of MoD generalist bureaucrats carrying out arbitration over disagreement between the Services, as was cunningly inserted in the document authorising the establishment of HQ-IDS and the CDS.

National Security Commission/ Council

There has been debate in the media about the need for a National Security Commission. We have a National Security Council that barely met under the previous government while the NSAB was also working part time until recently. Whether a new National Security Commission is appointed or the existing National Security Council is reorganised (acronym for both being NSC), it has to be a dynamic organisation working on 24×7 basis. It should be headed by the Prime Minister himself as the ex officio Chairman, a Deputy Chairman on a permanent basis, the CCS and NSA as members, with full time members and staff from all the concerned fields.

India has Special Forces quantitatively on par with the USA but not one-tenth their capability…

Advisory Groups/Cells

The Prime Minister needs a Strategic Core Group (SCG) because defence and security issues have been neglected too long and the level of our defence preparedness has gone down. A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is vital with a Prime Minister at its helm. Threats that India faces require a synergised response at the national level, requiring continuous monitoring and dynamic simultaneous actions to prevent being a reactive nation. Aims of the SCG would be: one, to keep the PM briefed and updated on all matters pertaining to national defence and security; two, to assess short, medium and long-term threats and suggest courses of action; three, to recommend a roadmap for RMA and monitor its execution once approved by the PM; four, to make recommendations related to defence procurements, R&D, technology acquisition and reorganising the defence-industrial base; five, to recommend a policy response against asymmetric war and employment of Special Forces for politico-military missions at strategic level; and six, to recommend a roadmap for perception management including optimising Think Tanks in India and abroad. In addition, it would be advisable to have appropriate military advisory cells with the External Affairs Minister and Home Minister as well.

Response to Proxy Wars

Despite having been subjected to cross-border terrorism for over two decades, we have not been able to establish a credible deterrence against irregular warfare. India has Special Forces quantitatively on par with the USA but not one-tenth their capability. We have total voids in terms of strategic intelligence despite this being the main task of Special Forces of modern armies today. While Special Forces are required to be central to asymmetric response, their employment would be totally covert, giving nil or deniable signatures. Optimising the Special Forces effort and their employment at strategic level on politico-military missions can best be worked out by the SCG of the PM, assisted by the CCS and NSA as required. In addition, countering state-sponsored terror requires inter-ministerial and multi-agency response coordinated by an apex body.

Indigenisation must be given a boost with a dynamic roadmap for Research & Development…

Revolution in Military Affairs

India desperately needs an Act of Parliament like the Goldwater-Nichols Act of the US or the Berlin Decree of Germany plus political direction at the highest level as done by Deng Xiaoping and Ziang Zemin in China, to transform the Indian Military into a fourth generation network-centric warfare capable force by inducting platforms, integrating reconnaissance, surveillance, information and command and control assets and through doctrinal and functional jointness. Apex level direction and monitoring is all the more vital because of limited fiscal resources.

Military Diplomacy

Military diplomacy implies using resources of armed forces to promote national security interests, peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence to achieve positive outcomes in developing the country’s bilateral and multi-lateral relationships. It is distinct from coercive diplomacy and is being used extensively by foreign countries including the US, China and Pakistan. While application of national power should be through the domains of diplomacy, information operations, military and economic, military diplomacy can contribute in all the four. India must make military diplomacy part of its foreign policy and create capacities, structures and processes necessary to put it into action.

Defence Industrial Complex

A complete review of DRDO, OFB and DPSUs including their achievements and failures in different technical fields must be carried out to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses, where the flab is and how to integrate the private industry. This is to have a realistic idea of those sectors where indigenous technology can be exploited in the short term and where to resort to joint ventures and import. Manning of command and control appointments in Defence PSUs, OFB and Ordnance Factories by military veterans should be considered.

A realistic assessment of the state of readiness of our border infrastructure must be made…

Indigenisation must be given a boost with a dynamic roadmap for R&D, producing state-of-the-art arms, equipment and technologies to be developed according to laid-down timelines. The news about FDI in defence being raised from the current lowly 26 per cent to 100 per cent is heartening. This will encourage genuine Public-Private Partnership in India. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) should be energised and a time-bound review of the Defence Procurement Manual should be affected to identify redundant procedures, reduce duplication and limit the number of agencies involved.

Border Management

A realistic assessment of the state of readiness of our border infrastructure must be made and timelines drawn to fast track development incorporating private players for road infrastructure, boosting capabilities of the Border Roads Organisation. Sensitive areas along the LAC should not be manned by Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) like the ITBP under MHA. The task of defending the LAC must be under the MoD. It should be left to the Army to decide what troops to deploy and they should be given additional CAPF, as demanded by them and as found feasible. Considering the illegal immigration, smuggling of arms, narcotics, placing the CAPF deployed along the Bangladesh and Myanmar borders under the command of the nearest Area or Sub Area HQ could be examined.

Conclusion

Changes as above would provide a boost to defence preparedness, usher in an RMA, evolve requisite strategies and policies including for national security, response to asymmetric war, defence procurements, R&D, technology acquisition and reorganising the defence-industrial base. Development and economic progress are undoubtedly priority tasks for the new government but national defence and security issues must be given equal importance if India is to gain its rightful place in the comity of nations.

The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.