By BREE FENG
NOVEMBER 10, 2014
The United Arab Emirates 1st Aerobatic team performed in their BM-339A jets during a test flight on Monday ahead of Airshow China 2014 in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province.Credit Johannes Eisele/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Every two years since 1996, the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, the largest air show in China, has been held in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, attracting thousands of commercial traders and military enthusiasts. This year its opening was set for Tuesday, the 65th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, or Plaaf, adding to the buzz around the six-day event. For those in commercial aviation, it is an opportunity to show off their wares to a fast-growing aviation market, including an increased appetite for private jets. Nearly 150 military and trade delegations attended the previous exhibition in 2012, which saw $11.8 billion in sales, according to the organizers.
But the exhibition, also known as Airshow China or Zhuhai Airshow, also grants the military enthusiast a closer look at some of the equipment being developed by the Chinese military. China announced a 12.2 percent increase in its 2014 defense budget this year, reporting a total budget of nearly $132 billion. This increased investment comes as China is striking a more assertive stance on the world stage, led by President Xi Jinping, who has moved quickly to establish China as a regional leader since consolidating power last year.
Dennis M. Gormley, a senior lecturer in military affairs at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, is the author, with Andrew S. Erickson and Jingdong Yuan, of “A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions,” published in April by the National Defense University Press. In an interview, he discussed highlights of the air show and China’s military development:
Q. What is the purpose of an event like Airshow China?
A. Air shows primarily promote military commerce. In China’s case, these biennial events offer it an opportunity to suggest that it is catching up to the United States. Of course, air shows do not divulge the true capabilities of what is seen on the ground and in the air. That would require substantially greater access to the items on display.
Q. Photos and video footage of China’s J-31 stealth fighter jet have been garnering a lot of attention among Chinese military enthusiasts and the media. What is the significance of this plane in terms of China’s military development and the regional military balance?
A. Let’s keep in mind that we know very little about the J-31, other than like many other recent Chinese aircraft, it appears externally to be a copycat of U.S. aircraft, in this case, the F-35. Press reports suggest that China intends to offer the J-31 for sale in the Asia-Pacific region, but other than Pakistan I’m not sure there’s much of a market. China is still struggling to achieve improvements in turbofan engine technology. For example, advanced U.S. military aircraft like the F-16 undergo engine overhauls roughly every 1,300 hours. China’s do so every 300 to 350 hours. In my view the Plaaf is still inferior to both the U.S. Air Force and Taiwan’s air force. What worries me more is China’s still growing inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, which together with even an inferior air force, will present stiff challenges for the United States and Taiwan were a war to occur.
Q. A Plaaf spokesman announced last week that the air force will highlight the Y-20 heavy-lift transport aircraft, the KJ-2000 airborne early warning and control system and J-10 fighter aircraft this week at the air show, as well as a selection of aviation equipment in active service including the JH-7A fighter jet, H-6M bomber, Y-9 transport plane and Z-8KA heavy-lift helicopter. What will be the most interesting aircraft to watch at the air show?
A. Frankly, the list is not terribly impressive in terms of truly advanced technology systems. For example, the KJ-2000 is China’s airborne warning and control aircraft, but it possesses a Soviet-era Illyushin IL-76 airframe, although the electronics and radars are of Chinese origin. I’m sure the Z-8KA heavy-lift helicopter will draw a lot of photographic attention.
Since I pay particular attention to China’s growing interest in land-attack cruise missiles, the H-6M is of most interest to me. That said, there’s a much more important point to make. Many analysts tend to focus on this new weapon system or that one rather than assessing China’s capacity to execute combined arms warfare. This is particularly important for a country like China that hasn’t fought a war in nearly 35 years. Wars are not won by means of any single weapon system. Rather, it is the capacity to integrate many systems together to maximize their effectiveness.
Let me illustrate. China’s aircraft are certainly inferior to U.S. aircraft, and Taiwan’s as well. However, China is compensating by procuring scores of conventionally armed ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles. These missiles would be expected to destroy enemy aircraft before they take off from airfields or pin them down in hardened bunkers before takeoff. If some managed to take off, then intensive missile attacks on airfield runways would keep them from returning to their support bases.
That sounds easy, but in fact it’s quite demanding to execute because it depends on the acquisition of all the relevant enabling technologies and systems that would spell success. Currently, China has shortcomings in intelligence support, command and control, platform stealth, survivability and post-attack damage assessment — each of which is essential to achieving the desired attack effects.
How do military organizations achieve such success? Learning by doing, as realistically as possible. In the U.S. case, for each weapon system used in combat, detailed performance data are collected on the true effectiveness of each weapon in a combined arms context. The same holds true during the peacetime testing of weapons. There is over 40 years of what I call forensic engineering data that’s been collected on the Tomahawk cruise missile, as just one example, which is then shared with system engineers, who strive then to improve the Tomahawk’s future performance.
Q. When the Y-20 transport plane conducted its maiden flight last January it suggested that China would be the fourth country in the world, after the United States, Russia and Ukraine, to have its own heavy military transport aircraft. How will the successful incorporation of the Y-20 aircraft affect China’s ability to project aerial power? For example, over disputed islands in the South China Sea?
A. The advent of the Y-20 is indeed a sign of Chinese ambitions to project influence and power within its own sphere of influence. However, it has a long way to go to truly project and sustain such force, particularly if it faces opposed forces. Airlift is only one of three complementary capabilities needed for sustained force projection. Also required are airborne and naval capabilities. Take the Y-20 as a sign of China’s long-term interest in force projection.
Q. China’s drone program is reported to be making rapid advances and Chinese arms makers including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China and Norinco will exhibit drones at the air show. How would you appraise China’s progress in manufacturing drones for military use and what is worth watching for at the show?
A. China is still considerably behind U.S. advances in the use of drones, armed or unarmed. This is primarily due to the experience the United States has gained from over a decade’s experience in real-world drone use. Moreover, China must develop a sophisticated drone infrastructure to accompany drone aircraft manufacturing —for example, remote pilot training, satellite data links, imagery exploitation, etc. I would pay most attention to large drones at Zhuhai, as China has stated that it wishes to take advantage of U.S. export control restrictions on large drone sales, particularly armed systems. As one Chinese aerospace official observed in 2011, they wish “to take advantage of that hole in the market.”
Q. South Korea scrapped plans to send its aerobatics team to Zhuhai, reportedly in deference to U.S. security concerns regarding the aircraft involved, which were jointly developed by Lockheed Martin and Korea Aerospace Industries. Overreaction or not?
A. The aircraft involved depended in part on U.S. technology. Flying the aircraft at Zhuhai doesn’t involve exporting it to China, but I’m not an export control lawyer. It sounds more more like a political decision.
Q The Chinese military has been transforming itself from a primarily land-based force to one with increased naval and aerial power. Yet it’s frequently accused of copycatting, industrial espionage, and relies on foreign technology, including jet engines. What are the Chinese military’s biggest weaknesses and greatest strengths?
A. All the accusations are legitimate. But Chinese production of U.S. look-alike systems does not alone produce true military effectiveness. War is a combination of human and technical factors, including extremely well-trained military personnel who have practiced routines in diverse ways over many years, together with a command and control architecture needed to deal with orchestrating complex combined arms warfare. Sadly, at the loss of too many lives, the U.S. military has benefited from over a decade of real-world experience. By contrast, China’s large-scale command and control exercises more often are for show than for honing combined arms skills. That said, perhaps China’s greatest strength is a combination of confining its war-fighting capabilities close to home and its willingness to take the long view.
No comments:
Post a Comment