You really want to know what makes Junior Officers decide to take their talents elsewhere? It’s the Lieutenant in the staff shop that was never allowed to lead troops in combat (for everyone’s sake), but gets promoted to Captain on the same day as the Lieutenant that successfully took Command of a Company in the middle of combat operations when the Company Commander was wounded. The Junior Officer with no leadership abilities gets promoted the same day, which is one of the reasons why the more talented of those two lieutenants is a civilian today.
Rank should have meaning. It should be earned. Even promotion from Second Lieutenant to First Lieutenant should be an indication that the wearer of the higher rank has earned the right, through competence, character and leadership abilities to be proffered the respect due that rank (and the extra pay). When I was making my way through these ranks, many of my peers earned promotion while still in initial training, prior to ever arriving at an operational unit. Others would still be wearing the lower rank, even as Platoon Leaders with combat patrols under their belt, merely as a result of the timing of their commission date and how long it took to complete training. Rank should be based on experience, and time is not the only measure of experience.
If you value talent, and you want to promote competence, character, and leadership, then prove it to Junior Officers before they decide to take their talents elsewhere. Make Officer Evaluation Reports meaningful. If an evaluation says “promote ahead of peers”, then there should be a mechanism to actually accomplish that recommendation, or it rings hollow. When Junior Officers believe that the only reason they got promoted was because they continued breathing long enough (and didn’t get caught breaking the law), then what value have we placed as an organization on that next higher rank?
Newly commissioned officers shouldn’t be able to achieve a higher rank until they have received an evaluation from a Senior Rater who recommends (at a minimum) “promote with peers”. And frankly, not every young officer needs to be promoted on that first evaluation. It should be common sense that not all leaders are commissioned with the same level of ability, so why do we expect them to promote along the same timeline? Requiring a new officer to work through an entire rating period allows an evaluation to be made of their fitness for further levels of responsibility. By holding a young officer back for further development, you may actually facilitate them competing on a more level playing field going forward.
Over the last decade of conflict, the need for Company Grade leaders forced the Army to reduce the time requirements for Captain. Over the past several years, that has been adjusted upwards to a more reasonable time requirement when one considers the year group as a whole. This adjustment missed an opportunity to shape the Junior Officer corps in a way that encourages excellence and promotes talent. When a given year group promotes approximately 90% of Lieutenants to Captain at the same time, there is no differentiation of ability or effort. Many of those promoted received multiple “Above Center of Mass” ratings and were recommended to “promote ahead of peers”. However, the 1LT that was just barely better that the bottom 10% was promoted with the same mass of his year group, just like the top performer.
Promoting the top 25% earlier than is the current standard would incentivize the most talented Junior Officers and continue to challenge them in ways that lets them know their skills are valued by the military. The “Center Mass” would promote along similar timelines as they do now, but this would require promoting fewer in this cohort. That leaves the consistently “Center Mass” and “Below Center Mass”. This group would be larger than those that currently must wait for a second look. This group would most likely have to wait an additional year for promotion. That extra time in rank should be viewed as an opportunity for development, and not be held against them moving forward. Some of these officers may learn from the additional experience and go forward to lead successful careers. Others will look for an exit door (as many already do).
These recommendations will not be popular among some Junior Officers, but that is not the intent. The purpose of early promotion of the most effective leaders, and further development of the least effective leaders, is to build a stronger officer corps over time, encourage competence and character, and retain the best leaders possible. This method is not unique; we already utilize first, second, and third looks for most other ranks. This simple proposal to adjust the timelines and requirements for promotion among Junior Officers will not solve many of the failures in our industrial-age system, but they can be implemented quickly, and relatively painlessly.
While the Army figures out how to solve more complex talent management deficiencies, this proposal would let talented Junior Officers know the institution is evolving and their future within the Army can be as successful as any opportunities they may seek elsewhere. The next challenge should be capturing unique talents that already exist within our Junior Officers and providing tailored development opportunities to maximize the talent we already possess, but consistently mismanage.
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