No policy for northwestern front

In Kabul, Ashraf Ghani may not follow Hamid Karzai’s policy vis-a-vis India.

By: H K Dua

 November 13, 2014 

Normally, celebrations are held when foreign troops leave a native soil. No Kabuliwala has, however, brought good tidings from home after most US troops have pulled out of Afghanistan. The belief in the White House and at Capitol Hill that peace would return to Afghanistan with troops returning after the 13-year war may be misplaced. The guns will not be silenced simply because American and British soldiers have withdrawn. The Taliban have not stopped killing people. They covet power in Kabul now. And then, just across the Khyber pass there is Pakistan, waiting to acquire what its policymakers describe as “strategic depth” across the western front.

Afghanistan’s future is uncertain despite the fact that there is a democratic set-up in place in Kabul and the people, particularly women, are now feeling free. Somehow, the Americans and British believe that the Ashraf Ghani-Abdullah Abdullah dispensation brokered by US Secretary of State John Kerry will provide political stability and social peace to Afghans, among whom sharp ethnic divides are notorious. The West is also optimistic that the Afghan National Army is capable of fending off Taliban groups that might try to make a bid for power in Kabul. On both counts, the US’s optimism may prove to be self-serving, meant to rationalise the withdrawal and convey to the world that this is not another Vietnam.

There are two reasons why the US had moved into Afghanistan: one, to deal a decisive blow to international terrorism after 9/11; and two, to ensure its strategic presence in the area. Both remain unaccomplished. This is because US President Barack Obama had no stomach for

wars begun by his predecessor, George W. Bush. At the onset of his presidency, Obama had asked his policy advisors to develop an exit strategy. His administration came out with a delectable coinage: that there are “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban”.

“What are the good Taliban and what are the bad Taliban?” I asked a former US ambassador I had run into. “Good Taliban are those who accept our money, the bad Taliban are those who don’t and are hardcore fellows moved only by Islamist ideology,” he said with a chuckle.

All these years, Obama’s people have been talking to the so-called good Taliban, discussing, perhaps, not money matters, but a smooth pullout of US troops. Western policy wonks who visit Delhi these days to explain the rationale of the pullout don’t hide the battle fatigue that has set in among the US and Nato after 13 years of fighting at high cost. Most Western visitors contend that they are not abandoning Afghanistan. There will be 12,000-odd US-Nato troops, plus drones for contingencies. Also, the Afghan National Army is now equipped to handle the situation. Or so the apologists for troops withdrawals say.

Just 12,000 troops — mostly observers, advisors and their attendants — can’t do the job earlier done by 2,25,000-odd troops. Also, drones can only kill from the air; they cannot control the situation on the ground. An ill-equipped Afghan National Army, with little air support, cannot defend the government in Kabul for long. The defence and strategic treaty the US signed with Hamid Karzai before he demitted office may not be enough of a guarantee for peace.

The US might give some economic aid to Kabul, but for how long? This year’s poppy crop is going to show a massive surge, but who will this help — the Kabul government, warlords or the Taliban? There is always a link between terrorism and narcotics. The political situation in Afghanistan may not remain stable for as long as anticipated by the Obama administration. The handshake between Afghan President Ghani and CEO Abdullah doesn’t imply durable friendship or efficient teamwork.

For India, the Afghanistan situation has emerged as a major foreign policy and security challenge. India was thrown out of Afghanistan by the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Remember, an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked in 1999 and then Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh had to escort a Pakistani terrorist to the hijackers on the tarmac of the Kandahar airport to secure the release of 160-odd Indian hostages — perhaps India’s most humiliating moment after its defeat to China in 1962. After the Taliban was defeated post-9/11 by Nato and Karzai was installed as president, India again began investing in Afghanistan, politically and strategically. By now, it has also invested over $2 billion in Afghanistan’s economic and social development, for which it has earned considerable goodwill.

But Pakistan and the Taliban factions hate India’s presence in Afghanistan. The Indian embassy in Kabul and its missions in Jalalabad and Herat have been attacked by the Pakistan-backed Taliban. For India, security problems with Pakistan won’t be confined to the Wagah border or the Line of Control in J&K. In Kabul, Ghani may not follow Karzai’s policy vis-a-vis India. After taking over as president, he has approached the Chinese for help. He has reportedly contacted Pakistan believing, perhaps, that Islamabad will be able to dissuade the Taliban from destabilising the new government in Kabul. Off and on, Karzai also made similar attempts, but failed.

Stability in Afghanistan is important for its people as well as the entire region, but it does not help Pakistan, which essentially wants to instal a pliable Taliban faction in Kabul. Pakistan’s policy, a part of its overall plan to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan, can create more tension in the region. If the Indian government has a policy on dealing with the emerging situation in Afghanistan, it is not known to the country. Sooner or later, it may have to take the people into confidence about how it is going to face these challenges.

The writer, a Rajya Sabha MP, is a former editor of The Indian Express

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