Exorcise the Ghosts of 1962

ByAir Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja

14 Nov , 2014

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/exorcise-the-ghosts-of-1962/0/

To some, the India-China War, which started on October 20, 1962 with the Chinese Army walking across the contested and an undefined border, was not a war at all but an armed incursion across the mountains. Call it by any name, the event continues to rankle all and sundry in India; it should be but natural, therefore, for the leadership, military and civil, to analyse and study the happenings of that one fateful month of 1962, to prevent errors supposedly committed. But why is it that the errors, and errors had been made, are still considered as ‘perceived’ and the lessons learnt, if they have been learnt, never been placed in the public domain?

The Report, believed to be highly critical of India’s military and political leadership of the time, continues with the tag of “CLASSIFIED”…

If October 2012 was the 50th anniversary of the forgettable war, the Sino-Indian conflict, March 2014 was the centenary of the ‘birth’ of McMahon Line, which can be considered as the key attempt at defining and de-limiting the India-China border in the Eastern sector, and probably the genesis of the conflict. China’s response to the McMahon Line and its application to demarcate the India-China border has been one of outright rejection on grounds of ‘imperialist legacy’. Whether China’s stand on the issue defensible or not can be a definite subject of debate and perhaps, of mutual accommodation. China’s persistence in claiming the entire present-day Arunachal Pradesh, however, can be an indication to staking a claim for a swap in the Western Sector.

China, all along, wanted a route to Tibet through Aksai Chin and could not be bothered about facts from history. China had been active in that area for a decade prior to 1962, but in 1953, Nehru decided to redraw the boundary as per the Johnson Line of 1865, which included Aksai Chin in India; this was contrary to the British stand of 1899, which had kept it out of India. The Chinese have continuously argued that the Ladakh border has never been clearly delineated and, if at all, any border demarcation has to be as per the McCartney-MacDonald Line, which favours China.

To some, the India-China War, which started on October 20, 1962, with the Chinese Army walking across the contested and an undefined border, was not a war at all but an armed incursion across the mountains. Call it by any name, the event continues to rankle all and sundry in India; it should be but natural, therefore, for the leadership, military and civil, to analyse and study the happenings of that one fateful month of 1962, to prevent errors supposedly committed. But why is it that the errors, and errors had been made, are still considered as ‘perceived’ and the lessons learnt, if they have been learnt, never been placed in the public domain?

For India, this War continues to remain a harrowing and embarrassing experience, memories of which cannot be erased…

What happened before the Chinese walked in, and during that fateful one month of 1962, has been hidden in a classified document in the ‘impenetrable’ South Block, in what is known as the Henderson Brooks Report (co-authored by Lt. Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brig. PS Bhagat). The Report, believed to be highly critical of India’s military and political leadership of the time, continues with the tag of “CLASSIFIED” citing national security interests, as was told by the Government in Parliament in February 2008 and subsequently too. Some years ago, Neville Maxwell, now a retired journalist settled in Australia, authored the controversial “India’s China War” (Jaico 1970), while stationed in India as a foreign correspondent. It is purportedly based on a summary of what he claimed to be the Henderson Brooks Report; a claim which can be verified only if the Government decides to de-classify it. In March 2014, Maxwell has gone a step ahead and placed the ‘CLASSIFIED’ Report on his webpage. The online ‘leak’ of the Henderson Report has brought about a predictable reaction from the Indian Government; it has moved to block access to the Report in an era of Wikileaks!

For India, this War continues to remain a harrowing and embarrassing experience, memories of which cannot be erased. The new COAS, General JN Chaudhuri, appointed in December 1962 on the resignation of General PN Thapar, tasked Lt. Gen. Henderson Brooks who was then the Corps Commander in Jalandhar, Punjab, to conduct a review of the Army’s reverses. Brig. PS Bhagat (later Lt. Gen.) assisted him. Brooks submitted his report in April 1963 and it was promptly classified as “TOP SECRET”, a classification that it continues to carry.

In the 50 plus years that have elapsed since the submission of the Report, much of it has become public knowledge through selective leaks, even though the Report itself has not been officially placed in the public domain. Based on the fragmented information, military officers and writers have come up with their versions of India’s defeat. It is speculated that Lt. Gen. Brooks, who migrated to Australia on his retirement, had shared the Report with Maxwell and, therefore, is held guilty of betrayal by those who wish to keep his account under wraps. Why is the Henderson Brooks Report such a bogey that it has been a taboo subject in New Delhi’s corridors of power?

Declassifying the Brooks Report will allow the military and political leadership to learn from the errors of the past…

The reaction of the Government only strengthens the belief of many that the content of the Report covers not just an operational review of the Army but much more. The Terms of Reference given to Lt Gen Brooks were to inquire into what went wrong with the training, equipment, physical fitness, the system of command and control and the military leadership. It was not to comment on the failures and lapses of the political leadership yet it presumably does provide some interesting insights on the political decision-making; or else, why would the Report be kept under wraps for 51 years! Most democracies de-classify secret documents after a reasonable period, of about 25 to 30 years, has elapsed. To maintain that a 51-year old report is of operational value is an indicator of mischief and political motivation.

To answer these questions, for the Report to be kept classified for all these years, one has to understand three main issues, political, institutional and national, and the main players therein. First, and the easiest to point a finger at, is Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. Notwithstanding Nehru’s remarkable achievements, both in the pre-Independence and post-Independence periods, the China issue is considered as his most conspicuous failure. To say that he was naive, insofar as China was concerned, would be incorrect. Nehru, at various points, spoke contradictorily of China yet somewhere he missed out to grasp the instrumentality of hard power in international relations, especially where China was concerned.

The ‘Forward Policy’, as was pushed by Nehru, has been labelled as ill-conceived. What was this policy? As per the directions of the Policy, Indian forces were instructed, from November 1961 onwards, to patrol and establish posts as far forward as possible from the existing positions, in a bid to arrest the aggressive border patrolling by the Chinese Army that had commenced a month earlier. From the writings of those who claim to have had access to the Henderson Report and other documents of that period, the Forward Policy was based on a flawed premise that, “the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force, even if they were in a position to do so.” This flawed premise was driven by the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau, B N Mullick, who was close to Nehru and wielded immense power in all discussions; he is supposed to have pushed the Policy for implementation, even in the absence of military wherewithal. Apart from his failure to assess the Chinese preparations, he has also been criticised for providing incomplete and incorrect intelligence and to some extent, meddling in purely tactical matters of the Army.

The ‘Forward Policy’, as was pushed by Nehru, has been labelled as ill-conceived…

This gravely misplaced assumption was given credence by a complicit Army HQ, despite an earlier appreciation to the contrary. Nehru, too, accepted this analysis and concluded that Generals KM Cariappa and Thimayya, who had earlier advised to the contrary, were ‘colonial legacies’, influenced by Western thought processes, and thereby, were unduly unthinking when it came to an analysis of the Chinese thinking.

This leads to the second issue, that of an institutional disquiet, also revealed by the events of that period. An examination of the happenings of that time reveals a vertical divide in higher echelons of Army HQ. There were those who were always true to military traditions, followed professional thinking processes and proffered sound advice. There was also the group with political connections who spoke only what the political leadership wished to hear, even if it was against military appreciations based on sound thinking. Amongst the latter was Lt. Gen. BM Kaul, of whom it is reportedly said that he answered the question “After Nehru, who?” by pointing to himself! Lt. Gen. Kaul was the Chief of Staff at Army HQ in the months ahead of war and was later appointed as the first commander of the newly raised IV Corps at Tezpur. Distantly related to Nehru, he has been described as a good military bureaucrat but a poor battle commander but was a favourite of Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister.

Lt. Gen. Kaul, however, was not alone; he was part of a faction in the Army who spoke to the political leadership in the language that it wanted to hear, and who conspired with the civil counterparts to marginalise the true soldiers, at times bypassing the chain of command. This group of ‘yes-men’ ignored the advice of the field commanders to restrain the Forward Policy until the troops were augmented; both Ladakh and NEFA had a minimum requirement of 12,000 troops (an additional infantry division) each, to somewhat address the imbalance with China on the borders. The figure had been arrived at during war-games conducted earlier in 1960. The Army HQ disregarded all this and pushed for the Forward Policy, with ill-equipped and short-numbered formations on the border, as against ‘defence in depth’, an earlier policy propounded in 1960-1961 by General Thimayya, prior to his retirement. The forward probes continued and as many as 60 forward posts were established in the Ladakh sector by July 1962, thus stretching the already meagre resources; some of the forward posts had just 10 soldiers each! The story in NEFA too, in the Eastern sector, was no different where forces were thinly spread in small pickets.

A name that does not feature much is that of the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon. In an interview published in the Outlook (22 October 2012), Neville Maxwell has described Krishna Menon as a very westernised Indian who did not like the military, especially the soldiers of the old guard and was inclined to be abrasive towards them at every available opportunity. Notwithstanding him being dismissive of the advice by the top brass of the Army, he was favourably inclined towards the likes of Lt. Gen. Kaul, who were emerging as the ‘good boys’. As Defence Minister, he bore the major responsibility for the military’s state of preparedness or the lack thereof, but also continuously interfered in military matters. Yet some analysts do not place the entire blame of the debacle on him.

The Report severely censures the Army leadership for its total failure of command and control…

The last issue that needs to be understood concerns the national psyche of that time and how the events and questions leading to the conflict affected the decision-making. The Sino-Indian border is actually a Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is notional and not demarcated on any map. This has led to both China and India making claims and counter-claims on Aksai-Chin, in Ladakh. In the East, China rejected the McMahon Line, a stand that it maintains until today. India claims that China has occupied about 30,000 sq km in Ladakh whereas China lays claim to the entire Arunachal Pradesh, the erstwhile NEFA (about 90,000 sq km. It, therefore, could be considered flippant to claim that the Prime Minister was forced into the Forward Policy by a clamouring media and nationalist politicians. On the other hand, does it speak well of a Prime Minister who succumbs to such pressures, and despatches his Army on an adventure without adequate preparation, both in terms of infrastructure and equipment, ignoring professional military advice?

India tried to establish good relations with China from 1950 onwards through a series of favourable actions. It advocated for its membership to the United Nations (UN), and opposed the UN resolution on the Korea War. India accepted China’s claim over Tibet and Taiwan. After the visit of the Chinese Premier, Chou en Lai, to India in 1954, the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai”, consequent to the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement, picked up and it was thought that all would be well with China on the Northern and Eastern frontiers.

Subsequent events between 1954 and 1962 moved at a rapid pace. China started showing parts of NEFA and Ladakh as its territory, ignoring India’s objections. The Dalai Lama was given political asylum in India in 1959, much to the annoyance of China. Chou en Lai officially claimed 40,000 sq. km. of Indian territory and refused to accept the McMahon Line, which it does till today. Despite talks at various levels, the tension continued to build and incursions and firing upon Indian troops increased with aggressive border patrols by both sides until Sept 1962. The rest, as they say, is history. The war continues as a prolonged embarrassment and dishonour and China remains as a constant adversary.

The glaring intelligence failures of 1962 had led to many changes in the security establishment…

The brutal truth continues to be hidden in the corridors of South Block in the two copies of the Brooks Report submitted in April 1963 and classified as “TOP SECRET”. On September 02, 1963, Y B Chavan, who took over as the Defence Minister from the disgraced Krishna Menon told the Indian Parliament that the defeat was due to poor military leadership and high-level interference in tactical operations. Other reasons listed by him were the Army’s lack of preparedness for mountain warfare and unfamiliarity with Chinese tactics, shortage of equipment during training and combat and inadequate military intelligence. It seems from the statement that Chavan’s dilemma was to defend the Government while ensuring that the morale of the Armed Forces was not further adversely affected. The Report, as per its mandate, severely censures the Army leadership for its total failure of command and control, lack of credible intelligence and deficiency in preparedness but does not mention anything about the political leadership. However, a “TOP SECRET” note written by the then COAS, General Chaudhuri, reportedly running into 40-odd pages, is severely critical of the political leadership of that time highlighting Krishna Menon’s rejection of military advice and continuous meddling in military matters.

While the Army HQ does not want its humiliation to be revealed, the political leadership also wants to keep its inadequacies from being known to all and sundry. It is no small wonder then that the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report continues to be classified.

What Next?

Former Defence Minister AK Antony, answering a question on the Henderson Report in Parliament in 2010, said that it could not be made public as an internal study by the Army had established that the contents of the Report, “are not only extremely sensitive, but are of current operational value”. Several army Chiefs, however, have contradicted this. To claim that the contents of a 51-year old report are of operational value defies common sense!

Lack of coordination between intelligence and security agencies, credibility of resources, inconsistency are among the key issues…

Selective leaks of the Report over the years raise some serious questions about the conduct of the political and military leadership, some of which continue to be of relevance even today. Three exceptionally disquieting trends demand a national debate to prevent a recurrence of 1962. The issues relate to the continuing civil-military disconnect, serious gaps in training and provisioning of equipment, and inadequate or faulty intelligence, leading to curious decisions.

The glaring intelligence failures of 1962 had led to many changes in the security establishment including the creation of an exclusive agency to gather foreign intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The deficiencies highlighted by Brooks in his report, however, bear striking similarity to the challenges being faced by the security establishment even today. Lack of coordination between intelligence and security agencies, credibility of resources, inconsistency are among the key issues and the story is not very different even today, as can be seen from the 1999 Kargil conflict, or the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai.

Declassifying the Brooks Report will allow the military and political leadership to learn from the errors of the past and correct deficiencies that keep being exposed at regular intervals on the Chinese flank. The Government gets hyperactive with every instance of an incursion, a visa-issue or any other such happenings, but remains in a passive mode otherwise. Making public the Report will present an opportunity to the Government to revisit its China policy, shedding rigidity of the past and following a more flexible and pragmatic approach. Through political consensus, and not parochial ‘one-up-man-ship’, India needs to shed its unbending stand on the border delineation on the maps and settle the dispute once and forever by going in for an exchange of territory, as China has been offering all along.

It is time to move ahead rather than continue to be haunted by the ghosts of 1962…

The ever-widening chasm of mistrust between the military and political leadership, as highlighted by Henderson Brooks in his report, later in the K Subrahmaniam Report after the Kargil conflict, and then in the Naresh Chandra Report in 2012, needs to be bridged urgently. The culture of suspicion in civil-military relations has to be banished through proper integration of the military and civil bureaucracy in the security decision-making process.

China realises that the India of today is not the India of 1962. In a ‘glocal’ world, as compared to global, trade between the two nations is touching $100 billion. Due to fast changing scenarios in the world and the continuously evolving regional geo-political situation, India and China cooperate with each other in many forums. Both nations stand to gain from cooperation rather than confrontation.

While India should not ever lower its guard, it is time to move ahead rather than continue to be haunted by the ghosts of 1962. It is time to exorcise the ghosts.

References 

Outlook, The Weekly Newsmagazine, 22 October 2012. 

“India and China- Unsettled for a Long Time Yet”, The Economist, 20 October 2012. 

Brahma Chellaney, “How Beijing Fights”, Newsweek, 05 November 2012. 

Dhiraj Kukreja, “India-China War: Lessons to Learn”, Defence Watch, December 2012. 

Shishir Gupta, “50 Years of India China War”, Sunday Hindustan Times, 07 October 2012. 

“Brooks No Secrecy”, Editorial, The Times of India, 19 March 2014. 

Rajat Pandit, “When Nehru Stepped on the Dragon’s Tail”, The Times of India, 19 March 2014. 

Ashok Malik, “Phantoms of the Mind”, The Times of India, 20 March 2014. 

“We Have Learnt No Lessons From 1962”, Times News Network, www.timesofindia.com, accessed on 20 March 2014. 

Hardeep S Puri, “So That 1962 is History”, The New Indian Express, 21 March 2014. 

Notes taken by the author during a Seminar, “China’s India War 1962: A Looking Back to see the Future”, conducted by Centre for Air Power Studies, 28-29 December 2012. 

The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.