The origin of the Naxal problem is attributable to socio-political and socio-economic repression. The poor and Scheduled Castes (SC) were downtrodden by the Zamindars. Land reforms were nowhere. Forest land was shrinking. Added to that there was no development, in fact, governance was sorely lacking. At first, the states sought to control the problem through the state police forces. Most of the police were in a poor state. Numbers, infrastructure, weapons were minimal. They were swiftly rendered ineffective and the Para Military Forces (PMF) were called in. Additionally, the movement became more co-ordinated and stretched across state boundaries.
In 2009, the Naxalites were active across approximately 180 districts in ten states of India…
Chief of the Air Staff and Chairman COSC – that was me, innocent and unsuspecting, holding a press conference on Modernisation Programme of the Indian Air Force (IAF). After the subject was hashed and rehashed, all interested lobbies had finished their allotted questions, naturally the media turned to other issues which were obviously current. Naxal menace was the topic occupying the news. Asked whether I sought an incremental role for the IAF against the Naxals, I frankly replied what I had always believed in, that I was not in favour of employing the IAF against the Naxals; that we were already being used in benign roles helping the police fight Naxals and the use of air weapons in such a scenario was not advisable. Thereafter, I was quoted, misquoted and quoted out of context and generally dragged over the coals for trying to go against the Home Ministry’s desire by all forms of the media. It has been four years that I have held my peace. Since the topic is still relevant and current, I say what the hell, here goes.
Background
The background of the Naxal problem is generally well known but the origins have been dimmed by the mists of time. Let me quote an extract from Wikipedia so that we all are on the same grid. “Naxal, Naxalite and Naksalvadi are generic terms used to refer to various militant Communist groups operating in different parts of India under different organisational envelopes. In the Eastern states of the mainland India (Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Odisha), they are usually known as, or refer to themselves as Maoists while in the Southern states like Andhra Pradesh, they are known under other titles. They have been declared as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of India (1967). Leaders of the movement have been found to have hide-outs located in China.”
There is no coordinated intelligence grid and despite some efforts, no inter-state intelligence sharing…
The term ‘Naxal’ is derived from the name of the village Naxalbari in West Bengal, where the movement had its origin. The Naxals are considered far–left, radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split in 1967 of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), leading to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. In later years, it spread into less developed areas of rural Southern and Eastern India, such as Chattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups such as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). For the past ten years, it has grown mostly from displaced tribals and natives who are fighting against the exploitation by major Indian corporations and local officials whom they believe to be corrupt.
In 2006, India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) estimated that 20,000 armed cadre Naxalites were operating in addition to 50,000 regular cadres and their growing influence prompted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare them to be the most serious internal threat to India’s national security.
In February 2009, the Indian Central government announced a new nationwide initiative to be called the “Integrated Action Plan” (IAP) for broad, co-ordinated operations aimed at dealing with the Naxalite problem in all affected states namely Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Importantly, this plan included funding for grassroots economic development projects in Naxalite-affected areas, as well as increased special police funding for better containment and reduction of Naxalite influence in these areas.
In 2009, the Naxalites were active across approximately 180 districts in ten states of India. In August 2010, after the first full year of implementation of the national IAP program, Karnataka was removed from the list of Naxal affected states. In July 2011, the number of Naxal affected areas was reduced to (figure includes proposed addition of 20 districts) 83 districts across nine states. In December 2011, the national government reported that the number of Naxalite-related deaths and injuries nationwide had gone down by nearly 50 per cent from 2010 levels.
The concept of minimum force is very rarely applied whereas in a civil scenario, minimum force is paramount…
Whose Baby Is It Anyway?
The origin of the Naxal problem is attributable to socio-political and socio-economic repression. The poor and Scheduled Castes (SC) were downtrodden by the Zamindars. Land reforms were nowhere. Forest land was shrinking. Added to that there was no development, in fact, governance was sorely lacking. At first, the states sought to control the problem through the state police forces. Most of the police were in a poor state. Numbers, infrastructure, weapons were minimal. They were swiftly rendered ineffective and the Para Military Forces (PMF) were called in. Additionally, the movement became more co-ordinated and stretched across state boundaries.
The raison d’etre of the PMF is to tackle such contingencies. Except in one or two cases, as the Naxal movement snowballed, the PMF were stymied. Some of the reasons could be attributed to:
Jurisdiction
The states jealously guard their jurisdiction and frown upon any infringement by sister states. Since the problem stretched across state boundaries, continuity was a problem. The situation is like a balloon. If you applied pressure one side, the other side would swell and the Naxals would migrate to other states. There was no coordinated plan to counter the menace.
The Army and the IAF are meant to annihilate the enemy; the enemy is very clear and unambiguous…
Command Failure
Different forces with similar weapons and manpower tend to operate differently in anti-terrorist/insurgency situations. The difference comes in because of the leadership, command and control, ethos of the organisation and operational awareness. Presently, the CRPF is employed in company or platoon strength, often attached to local police with no specified area of operations. Inspectors are often in their fifties with insufficient knowledge of terrain or local conditions. Stamina and motivation are often not as high as one would find in a younger, professional leadership cadre.
Intelligence
Local police are used for intelligence. There is no coordinated intelligence grid and despite some efforts, no inter-state intelligence sharing. Even when invaluable intelligence is obtained, the reaction is slow due to a convoluted command chain.
Infrastructure and Training
A lot of money has been spent on acquiring new weapons and equipment. Training has not been commensurate. I remember when Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) of the IAF were deployed over Dantewada, we had accurate and timely IMINT on a large gathering of Naxals. We had even trained CRPF in slithering from choppers since the roads were likely to be mined. Our choppers were ready but the troops took a long time to assemble. Such fleeting targets do not remain for a long time and the operation was a failure. The security of camps needs beefing up; training standards raised, new weapons and equipment practised with. A communication grid needs to be established and soldiers trained in its use. So the proverbial ‘baby’ gets thrown out with the bath water. With the inevitable aftermath of massacres like Chintalnar, media hysteria takes centre stage and there is public outrage. The political leadership trying to minimise political damage comes out with all kinds of pacific statements. Then some wise guy says, get the Armed Forces inducted. Kill them, wipe them out. Some Chief makes his dissent public and all hell breaks loose.
Why Not the Armed Forces?
I wish to make a few things clear at the outset. The Armed Forces are India’s Armed Forces. They are the peoples’ forces and are ever prepared to make the supreme sacrifice to protect the people and the country from external and internal threats. The Armed Forces are also aware of the need for civilian control over the military. If they are called to step in to restore order due to bad governance, then they are equal stakeholders in good governance as also equal partners in the well being and development of the country. They must make their views known to the people. Of course, the ethos of the Armed Forces is that after all is said and done, once the government passes an order, it is their bounden duty to execute that order with all commitment at their disposal.
It seems almost inevitable that in the not too distant a future, the role of the Armed Forces in such insurgencies will increase…
A solution to the Naxal problem needs to include socio-political and developmental aspects also and a pure military intervention will not be sufficient. It is going to take a long time to come to grips with this issue and, in my opinion, a short term, quick fix solution, however attractive, must not be resorted to. Presently, the Armed Forces participation is restricted to the Army and the IAF. Let us have a look at some of the problems involved.
Role, Tasks and Training
The Army and the IAF are meant to annihilate the enemy; the enemy is very clear and unambiguous. They operate on the principle of maximum force in minimum time. The concept of minimum force is very rarely applied whereas in a civil scenario, minimum force is paramount. The Army has been operating in Jammu and Kashmir for decades and has brought the terrorists under good control. But at what cost? Their conventional training has suffered. Their peace to field ratio has suffered, raising morale issues. Their weapons are for war, ill-suited against terrorists. The moment they come in contact with local constabulary, their character rubs off on the soldiers and may cause disciplinary issues.
Intelligence, Air Weapons and Collateral Damage
Insurgents are fleeting targets. Especially in the Naxal context, there is common ethnicity. Air weapons are fired from large ranges which preclude identification of minute targets. Therefore, 120 per cent surety of target intelligence is mandatory to prevent fratricide. We do not yet possess this technology. Our intelligence has never achieved such accuracy. Uninformed people talk of dropping weapons through a window. Of course, the IAF has the capability to fire a weapon through a window 2”x2”. But the load is, let us say 200 kg. When it explodes, it has a lethal 100-metre radius. So whither collateral damage? We do not have low charge or low lethal weapons as yet for air to surface firing. However, such weapons are now emerging on the world stage.
Development and socio-political balm must be applied synchronous with military operations…
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs)
RPAs or drones, at first glance, seem to provide the answer. They have a lot of limitations. Firstly, they need to be parked carefully, protected from weather and strong winds. In flight, weather and clouding are major hazards. They are ineffective in jungle terrain except with certain payloads. They can detect and track but cannot attack unless they are the UCAV variety. Transit speeds are about 100 to 150 kmph and they are noisy. Modern RPAs with V/STOL capabilities are in the offing and they would better deal with such operations.
Helicopters
Helicopters are a potent force in anti-Naxal/anti-terrorist operations. They can be and are even now being used in a variety of vital roles. Some tasks are recce, surveillance, logistics, insertion and extraction of troops, Casevac, and air drop and re-supply. Choppers are most vulnerable during the take-off and landing phases. In spite of armour, the IAF has lost a gunner to Naxal ground fire because the helipad zone was not properly sanitised. The IAF choppers are in short supply. They provide logistics support to the Army all the year round. Any pull out is likely to increase the load on the others. So is the case with the number of crew.
The Way Ahead
The future does not seem rosy. Governance has been a key issue for the whole country and extra governance to affected areas seems a remote possibility. Political will seems remarkably absent. My only fear is that the leadership might choose a short term, quick-fix solution for puny political gains and complicate the issue further.
It seems almost inevitable that in the not too distant a future, the role of the Armed Forces in such insurgencies will increase. The first to be affected, covertly or overtly, will be the Army.
We need to understand the primary difference between Naxals and Jihadis.
However, all is not lost. This, too, can be managed. It will involve operations under a central planning agency involving all stakeholders. The chain of command must be clear. Development and socio-political balm must be applied synchronous with military operations. Synergy is the order of the day. Leadership, training, infrastructure and equipment are prerequisites to such endeavours. Some organisations may need restructuring and rejuvenating. In my opinion, it is likely to be an ‘out’ to ‘in’ approach with forces operating out of a few well-protected bases, conducting operations and returning to a safe home. The first priority should be to stabilise easier areas, secure them and then act on the more difficult areas.
Central areas of the country may prove difficult to cordon off. In border areas like Jammu and Kashmir there is scope for a more offensive use of air power. RPAs in conjunction with special mission aircraft such as the C-130J and helicopters with NVDs give excellent results if the target area is well-defined. In Jammu and Kashmir, Red Zones can be implemented on the ground and used to stymie intrusions. Technology will need to be harnessed, especially in communications and imagery to deliver the best results.
Clear lines of communication and logistics will be necessary along with security infrastructure.
Conclusion
We need to understand the primary difference between Naxals and Jihadis. Naxals are basically rural and indigenous. Their ire is against indigenous ill treatment, torture, neglect and mal-governance. The Jihadi, on the other hand, projects the agenda of external powers, with separatism from the Union as the prime objective. Therefore, while one needs to be addressed mainly by winning the hearts and minds, the other needs ruthless execution. God help me and I hope I am wrong. But sometimes in the past I have had a feeling we may be doing it the other way round.
It is primarily in the realm of policing that the Naxal problem falls and is to be dealt with by the police and the PMF who are established for this purpose, leaving the Armed Forces to fight external threats. For the last so many decades, the Armed Forces have been carrying out the additional task in Jammu and Kashmir and to great effect. But they have had to pay a price. Obviously, therefore, they should not be involved further in internal policing. However, we do not live in an idealistic world, hence my fear that our involvement may increase in the future, starting with the Army. Firstly this needs to be resisted strongly. Failing which, we must participate on our terms. Difficult but that is the way the cookie seems to be crumbling.
The solution to the Naxal problem lies in a multi-pronged approach with governance and development taking centre stage. Brute force is definitely not the answer. However, the quality of force applied has to improve. This will entail rigorous training in the strategic as well as the tactical field. Clear lines of command, younger, more motivated commanders, going right up the chain. This will involve knowing the importance of development and the principle of minimum force. This will involve a basic change in ethos. Clear lines of communication and logistics will be necessary along with security infrastructure. The PMFs will have to maintain close liaison with both the Army and the IAF.
There is nothing new in what I have said. There are exemplary police and PMF officers I have known. Then why have these things not happened all these years? Well it has not happened because their political masters are reluctant to make the police independent. Therefore, a last statement: “Once and only once there is strong political will and good governance, will we find the Naxal problem unraveling itself much more easily.”
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