Challenges in Restructuring the Combat Power of IAF

ByAir Marshal Raghu Rajan

11 Nov , 2014

The IAF’s capability covers the IOR countries on the maritime side and its principal adversaries Pakistan and China on the landward side. The government needs to finalise the contract for the 126 MMRCA at the earliest to prevent losing its combat edge in quality and numbers. A specific fighter aircraft for precision attacks in the hills should be a high priority while a scientific study to determine its utility for the IAF and the IA needs to be commenced as early as possible. An operations research study must be carried out to determine the optimum numbers of SSMs and Long Range Aircraft. A credible SSM nuclear deterrence is to be developed in relation to China.

The depletion of the IAF’s combat fleet strength has reached alarming proportions…

The general public is fascinated with the combat fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF) as fighter aircraft, which constitute the combat fleet, are associated with the glamour of fighter pilots – the air warriors of the skies. Yet people seldom realise that these fighter aircraft act in tandem with other weapon systems which form the cutting edge but are not in the public eye! These are the attack helicopters that are designed to perform aerial attack missions but do not possess cargo carrying capability, the Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs), the Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), the Air Defence Artillery (ADArty) and the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) among others. All of the above lend close-in protection to our airfields and other vital assets. These weapons systems come under the term – ‘combat power’ and would include the most important element – the men behind the machine! It needs to be understood that combat power does not operate in isolation; it needs other non-combat aspects which impact on its effectiveness.

The future will bring about the obsolescence of many weapons systems and witness changes in the relationship between India and its likely adversaries as well as the re-equipment of their armed forces, technological innovations or doctrinal changes. This will call for the Indian Armed Forces in general and the IAF in particular to address the problem of restructuring their components. The period up to 2020 will allow predictions to be more realistic. Instead of only a threat – based development, the IAF has chosen to develop its air force as a capability – based one. What, therefore, is the extent of the IAF’s responsibilities?

Areas of Responsibility

India has chosen to look after the area from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca as the region where all its trade, commerce and most importantly, its energy resources, flow into the country. This is the area which the IAF has to cover to preserve India’s interests. Interaction with Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries is essential for India to use diplomacy, trade and commerce to ensure protection of mutual interests.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

Coming to the relations with neighbors – Pakistan, China, other South Asian and South East Asian countries along with Australia form one part to the East while to the West, Saudi Arabia, Kenya and South Africa form the other part besides smaller countries along the IOR. The principal adversaries – Pakistan and China are the ones with whom India has had a difficult relationship.

Sino-Indian borders need to be kept under surveillance through satellites and unmanned platforms…

Pakistan

There is an asymmetry in the force comparison between Pakistan and India. Pakistan’s combat air power is no match for the IAF – in terms of quality and quantity at least till 2020. Pakistani intrusion into Kargil served to bring to light India’s shortcomings in providing weight to the attacks in the Himalayas. Due to India’s more powerful Air Force, Pakistan prefers to engage in indirect warfare – using terrorists and other disaffected elements to bleed India. If she felt threatened by India, she would rely on nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, to force the latter to the negotiation table. It should, however, be clear that in the future, the traditional military posture will progressively become less relevant as clandestine warfare of the future will have no clearly defined fronts. This would require doctrines and inventories to be redefined and restructured.

China

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is quantitatively superior to the IAF. The PLAAF has gone about enhancing its capability through technological improvements, induction of indigenous aircraft and weapons systems as well as introduction of capable force multipliers such as AWACS, tankers, Electronic Warfare systems. Its strategic missiles can target each and every corner of India. It has built an effective road and rail network in Tibet to enable the rapid deployment of large military forces there. India may hold the edge in a defensive battle but would need to enhance its strategic missile capability to reach a majority of targets on Chinese territory.

To overcome this asymmetry, the IAF must develop a missile-based credible nuclear deterrence to counter China’s nuclear capability. Simultaneously, the Sino-Indian borders need to be kept under surveillance through satellites and unmanned platforms. The IAF must also acquire the capability to launch a precision attack in mountainous areas from high altitude using advanced Precision Guided Munitions. In addition, it must have the capability to neutralise targets with mobile units of Surface-to-Surface Missiles with conventional warheads in coordination with target data obtained from UAVs. Which brings us to the crux of the issue – what are the issues in restructuring the combat power of the IAF?

SSMs beyond the Tactical Battle Area will form the other component of combat power…

IAF’s Combat Power – Present Day

Fighter Aircraft

The depletion of the IAF’s combat fleet strength has reached alarming proportions. As reported in an interview with the previous CAS, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, the IAF has the approval to build up to 42 squadrons by 2027; the present strength is 34 squadrons. The Su-30s of the IAF along with the AWACs, Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft and tanker aircraft can cover the countries in the IOR as well as the land borders. The numbers of these force multipliers, however, need to be enhanced to cover the land as well as the maritime responsibilities. The IAF has consciously preferred to have all fighter aircraft including the LCA with air-to-air refueling capability.

While the upgradation of the Mirage-2000, the MiG-29, the MiG-27 and the Jaguar fleet will allow some room for manoeuver, the induction of the 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) will serve to tilt the balance in IAF’s favor. The delay in finalisation of the MMRCA contract with Dassault of France will only escalate the price that India will have to pay for its acquisition in the future. Accountability for the delay and the resulting escalation in costs adversely affecting the IAF’s combat capability, is the major issue.

Another important but long standing aspect is the continued and prompt availability of spares and maintenance support for all weapons systems in the IAF’s inventory. Here too, it is the intransigence of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence (Finance), who have not been accountable for delays affecting the combat potential of the IAF, and the inability of the IAF top brass to take this matter up to the highest level to ensure prompt redressal of the IAF’s needs

Mirage-2000

The next is the progress of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project that started in 1983 but the aircraft is yet to reach full operational capability status. Being the main operator, the IAF should be the program managers and determine the cost benefits of this programme. Cost and time overruns must be mutually agreed upon and the program dumped if these are not met. The IAF must have an Aviation Design Directorate at Air HQ which will be the main agency involved in future acquisitions with IAF program managers managing each and every program. This is being practiced by the Indian Navy and should, therefore, be acceptable to the government.

The IAF needs to review its ability to carry out precision attacks in the Himalayas. A transonic fighter with adequate payload and endurance such as the A-10 Thunderbolt needs to be acquired so that this gap in the IAF’s capability is met with.

Boeing AH-64D Apache

Attack Helicopters

The government has accepted that the anti-armour attack helicopters will function under the Indian Army. As in the Gulf War, when the Apaches destroyed Iraqi Air Defence radars to create a gap and enable safe passage to other fighter aircraft to attack Iraqi targets, attack helicopters have other uses for the IAF. War is a continually changing phenomenon and the utility of attack helicopters for an emergent need should be left to the Air Component Commander under the Joint Forces Commander! The numbers of these airborne platforms for both the IAF and the IA should be arrived at after a cost benefit study.

The current state of SAMs in the IAF is reported to be far below the optimum level…

Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs)

SSMs beyond the Tactical Battle Area will form the other component of combat power. An operational research study needs to be conducted to determine a target to weapon system matching between long range fighter aircraft such as the Su-30s and SSMs such as the AGNI -inputting their accuracies, their vulnerabilities, the mobile and static targets that each weapons system can tackle and arrive at the optimum numbers. In the fast moving tactical battle space, in spite of tactical SSMs and Artillery, the need may arise for additional firepower from fighter aircraft to add to the weight of attack. Since future operations will be jointly carried out, this may require a few changes by the IAF and the IA. This joint requirement could arise even in a maritime setting, when land and carrier based fighter aircraft could act in tandem with SSMs to tackle a naval adversary. To counter the asymmetry in relation to the PLAAF, the IAF must therefore develop a missile-based credible nuclear deterrence.

Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs)

The current state of SAMs in the IAF is reported to be far below the optimum level, for both the medium and short range variety. The Pechora Medium Range SAM, the OSA Short Range and the IGLA shoulder-launched point defence SAM – all need upgradation or replacement. The Army’s and the Navy’s SAM requirements need to be dovetailed with the IAF’s and at least two vendors ought to be identified to meet the overall needs of the defence forces and prevent modernisation by a single vendor.

The indigenous Medium Range SAM AKAASH holds much promise and must be supported by all three services. An example of a unified approach to the purchase of SAMs is that of the BARAK Israeli SAM. If the Navy and the IAF had gone for the naval and land-based BARAK, there would have been cost savings in placing large orders as well as capability build up for both the services in a short span of time. It is understood that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with Israeli guidance is developing a Medium Range SAM with a range of 70 km and a Long Range SAM for 100 km in the future. These can be taken into consideration.

Well-trained, motivated and properly led manpower can lead a side to victory…

Close in Weapon System (CIWS)

This is synonymous for the gun or short range missile protection to land-based targets of the Army and the IAF. All airfields, strategic targets, as well as Army formations are provided point defence by elements of the AD Arty. It is suggested that the IAF take over the responsibility of airfield and strategic target protection from the Army allowing them to look after the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) only. When approved, the IAF needs to create an additional cadre for the CIWSs with additional training and accommodation facilities for this important weapons system. The next step is to arrive at a common CIWS for all three services without compromising their individual requirements.

UAVs

All three services use UAVs, and these Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) weapon systems have proved their worth as effective aerial delivery platforms too. When the task is dangerous, dirty and dumb, UAVs are the preferred modes of ISR and weapon delivery. There is no loss to aircrew and they can remain on station for hours on end by day and night. Although their cost is much less when compared to manned fighter aircraft they do have shortcomings. As of now, they only carry Air-to-Ground Missiles of limited range and weight and with low sub sonic speed, they can only operate in a benign air defence environment. They have yet to develop their capability as fully operational UCAVs to compete with manned fighter platforms.

There is a need to develop UCAVs for the IAF either indigenously or through direct purchase. The proliferation of UCAVs and armed UAVs of the three services will need a holistic approach towards command and control of these vital assets. During operations, the chances of interference between the UAVs of the three services need to be addressed so that tasks are speedily accomplished.

Heron UAV

As UAVs and UCAVs are inducted into the IAF, not only should the country prevent the proliferation of these capable weapons systems in the three services to reduce duplication but the IAF will itself need to take a hard look at the ratio of fighter aircraft vis-à-vis the UCAVs in order to ensure the optimum mix to serve the IAF’s needs!

The Human Element

Well-trained, motivated and properly led manpower can, even with inferior combat power, lead a side to victory. The important considerations are to make all the elements of combat power function in a cohesive manner. This will be possible when the induction of fighter/attack helicopter/SSMs/SAMs/UAVs is done into each element keeping in mind their future employability, their career progression so that each officer can at least aspire to a three-star rank and their training is geared to keep them fighting fit.

UCAVs need to be developed through the indigenous route or direct purchase…

Presently, the IAF has only the pilots aspiring to a three-star rank. As more and more UAVs, UCAVs, SAMs and SSMs are inducted, the need to have a specialist cadre of these non-flying and operationally relevant officers and men will force the IAF to broaden the scope for these officers to rise to higher two and three-star rank operational appointments in the service. Not to forget that as the entry requirements for airmen move higher to graduate level, they too must be given the opportunity to rise to the rank of an officer. While this opportunity is present in the IAF, the future will see more and more operational duties being performed by airmen. Hence their training itself must be tailored to enable them to become officers as a natural progression of their capability! These measures will ensure that the restructured IAF will become a more inclusive service!

Non-Combat and Vital Issues

Combat power needs the inputs from Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance platforms, an effective Command, Control and Communication System for effective guidance and feedback, Force Multipliers to extend its reach and punch and finally, Electronic Warfare platforms to provide protection against enemy electronic emissions. Combat Power is most effective when all these elements function in a cohesive manner.

Conclusion

The IAF’s capability covers the IOR countries on the maritime side, and its principal adversaries Pakistan and China on the landward side. The government needs to finalise the contract for the 126 MMRCA at the earliest to prevent losing its combat edge in quality and numbers. A specific fighter aircraft for precision attacks in the hills should be a high priority while a scientific study to determine its utility for the IAF and the IA needs to be commenced as early as possible. An operations research study must be carried out to determine the optimum numbers of SSMs and Long Range Aircraft. A credible SSM nuclear deterrence is to be developed in relation to China.

The pace of SAM development by the DRDO with Israeli assistance should be quickened. UCAVs need to be developed through the indigenous route or direct purchase. Integration and coordination between multi-agency UAVs should be carried out to allow freedom of operation between each user. Depending on the external security situation, a study may be carried to determine the numbers of fighter aircraft and UCAVs that the IAF needs. Finally, the human element requires career progression for all officers of the combat power stream so that they can aspire to rise to higher ranks. Airmen in the combat power stream also need to be allowed to aspire to officer rank. These measures will facilitate the restructuring of the IAF’s combat power to be more inclusive and effective.