Ashok K Mehta
26 November 2014
While Make in India is a great idea, the Armed Forces must restrain the Government from going overboard. Glitches are bound to occur, and this will result in time and cost overruns and operational impairment
The national daily, The Hindu, recently carried a revealing news item, perhaps the first ever of its kind, describing how a new Army wives’ organisation calling itself the Indian Army Wives Agitation Group, has sought the immediate replacement of unsafe military equipment. These brave wives had the courage to petition the Prime Minister to “replace outdated and unsafe military equipment that endangers the lives of military soldiers”. This issue has finally been raised not a day too soon, given that precious lives are lost flying on endless extension through jugaad and other improvisations, ageing MiG 21 fighters and sundry equipment which is flogged beyond its use by date.
In October this year, a Cheetah helicopter crashed, killing three young Army officers. The Agitation group is representing to the Supreme Court about the perennial problems of the Cheetah and the Chetak fleet, especially after Defence Minister AK Antony had said on the floor of the House in 2012 that Cheetah fleet will be replaced “soon”. Mr Antony’s stewardship of defence focussed on probity, generously blacklisting foreign defence companies endangering defence preparedness. The agitators should charge him with inflicting the highest damage on operational readiness and morale of the Armed Forces due to shelving decisions on defence acquisition.
Enter the new Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar following the welcome policy of indigenisation — Make in India, as distinct from Made by India, which is a beyond the horizon capability of the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The Modi Government wishes for the Armed Forces to catch up with a rising China, and do this mainly through making in India with FDI, which has been raised from 26 per cent to 49 per cent, with space for increased investment commensurate with scale and calibre of technology transfer. While the Army and the Air Force are hugely dependent on imported equipment, the Navy designs and manufactures its own ships. But it is still dependent on foreign hi-tech weaponry fitted on vessels.
India’s tryst with indigenisation has not been fruitful. It is still languishing at overall 70 per cent imported and 30 per cent indigenous, whereas these figures ought to have been in the reverse order 15 years ago. Not that the DRDO has not tried. LCA Tejas and MBT Arjun — the less said about them the better — are being fully operationalised after years of lost time. Both programmes were initiated in the early 1980s. The DRDO produced the semi-automatic INSAS rifle, which was far below performance of the AK 47 that the insurgents have. Ask soldiers who used it in Sri Lanka or those using it in counter-insurgency operations: Not up to scratch. The INSAS was sold to the Nepal Army and the latter complained about it bitterly during its civil war. Now, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has produced the ALH, which we have gifted to Nepal and just about managed to sell to two other countries, where one helicopter crashed. This is not a happy record of Made in India. One has to remember that the Indian Navy is the sword arm of the nation in establishing dominance over the maritime domain, especially in the Indian Ocean Area.
Yes, India was the most heavily embargoed country two decades ago, and while sanctions have been removed, it is not open seasame for high technology. It seems the Government is in great haste to indigenise with pending projects cleared rapidly, and the majority shifted to ‘Make All in India’ from ‘importing a few and making the rest’. Illustrations are numerous: six Stealth submarines Project 751, held in abeyance for a decade will now be “all produced in an Indian shipyard with foreign collaboration”. Eight mine counter-measure vessels will be built in Goa Shipyard — all eight of them — whereas earlier, two were to be imported from South Korea. This project, started in 2005, was scrapped recently due to a breach of integrity clause. It is geo-strategically imprudent to turf out a strategic partner. So, back to the drawing board even as the Indian Navy, needing 24 mine sweepers, is down to seven ageing vessels.
The real tragedy is about replacement helicopters. The original plan was to buy all 484 new LUH (Light Utility Helicopter); of these 197 LUH were to be imported, but the deal when close to fruition, was scrapped. Now all the 484 LUH will be made in India regardless of the unacceptable life-stretch of the helicopter fleet.The LUH is needed to replace the ancient Cheetah helicopters which are the lifeline for troops in Siachen. Already delayed by decade, another decade will multiply the woes of the Agitation group. Bad news also on the Bofors artillery front. With no new gun for nearly 40 years, the Dhanush-upgraded 155 mm howitzers 80 per cent indigenous gun has faced ‘barrelburst’ — pretty serious if it is a design failure.
While Make in India is a great idea, the Services must put their foot down and restrain the Government from suddenly going overboard over making in India. Glitches and teething problems are bound to occur in these programmes which will result in time and cost overruns and operational impairment. In his first full-length interview, Mr Parrikar has mentioned the word ‘priority’ and reflected on his forte: Decision-making, transparency and integrity. Defence acquisitions too have to be prioritised in relation to capacity-building and deterrence. Unfortunately, as there is no jointness in defence planning and nothing akin to Plans Programmes Budgeting System, capability accretion is largely ad hoc. That is why Minister of State for External Affairs and former Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh created an uproar in Parliament by exposing in 2011 the critical hollowness in ammunition inventories for war-fighting.
The focus, first and foremost, must be on making good, existing operational deficiencies to the satisfaction of Service chiefs. The cost of replenishing shortfalls in critical ammunition should come from Revenue head and not Capital account meant for modernisation. Mr Parrikar should review and, where necessary, reverse, some of the decisions taken by his predecessors in consultation with Service chiefs who are normally reticent to oppose any ministerial decision. He must ensure that the Make in India enterprise does not create increased and unintended voids in operational capabilities. Make in India will work when land, labour, power and expertise are cost-effectively and reliably available. That is not the case at present.
While Make in India is a great idea, the Armed Forces must restrain the Government from going overboard. Glitches are bound to occur, and this will result in time and cost overruns and operational impairment
The national daily, The Hindu, recently carried a revealing news item, perhaps the first ever of its kind, describing how a new Army wives’ organisation calling itself the Indian Army Wives Agitation Group, has sought the immediate replacement of unsafe military equipment. These brave wives had the courage to petition the Prime Minister to “replace outdated and unsafe military equipment that endangers the lives of military soldiers”. This issue has finally been raised not a day too soon, given that precious lives are lost flying on endless extension through jugaad and other improvisations, ageing MiG 21 fighters and sundry equipment which is flogged beyond its use by date.
In October this year, a Cheetah helicopter crashed, killing three young Army officers. The Agitation group is representing to the Supreme Court about the perennial problems of the Cheetah and the Chetak fleet, especially after Defence Minister AK Antony had said on the floor of the House in 2012 that Cheetah fleet will be replaced “soon”. Mr Antony’s stewardship of defence focussed on probity, generously blacklisting foreign defence companies endangering defence preparedness. The agitators should charge him with inflicting the highest damage on operational readiness and morale of the Armed Forces due to shelving decisions on defence acquisition.
Enter the new Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar following the welcome policy of indigenisation — Make in India, as distinct from Made by India, which is a beyond the horizon capability of the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The Modi Government wishes for the Armed Forces to catch up with a rising China, and do this mainly through making in India with FDI, which has been raised from 26 per cent to 49 per cent, with space for increased investment commensurate with scale and calibre of technology transfer. While the Army and the Air Force are hugely dependent on imported equipment, the Navy designs and manufactures its own ships. But it is still dependent on foreign hi-tech weaponry fitted on vessels.
India’s tryst with indigenisation has not been fruitful. It is still languishing at overall 70 per cent imported and 30 per cent indigenous, whereas these figures ought to have been in the reverse order 15 years ago. Not that the DRDO has not tried. LCA Tejas and MBT Arjun — the less said about them the better — are being fully operationalised after years of lost time. Both programmes were initiated in the early 1980s. The DRDO produced the semi-automatic INSAS rifle, which was far below performance of the AK 47 that the insurgents have. Ask soldiers who used it in Sri Lanka or those using it in counter-insurgency operations: Not up to scratch. The INSAS was sold to the Nepal Army and the latter complained about it bitterly during its civil war. Now, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has produced the ALH, which we have gifted to Nepal and just about managed to sell to two other countries, where one helicopter crashed. This is not a happy record of Made in India. One has to remember that the Indian Navy is the sword arm of the nation in establishing dominance over the maritime domain, especially in the Indian Ocean Area.
Yes, India was the most heavily embargoed country two decades ago, and while sanctions have been removed, it is not open seasame for high technology. It seems the Government is in great haste to indigenise with pending projects cleared rapidly, and the majority shifted to ‘Make All in India’ from ‘importing a few and making the rest’. Illustrations are numerous: six Stealth submarines Project 751, held in abeyance for a decade will now be “all produced in an Indian shipyard with foreign collaboration”. Eight mine counter-measure vessels will be built in Goa Shipyard — all eight of them — whereas earlier, two were to be imported from South Korea. This project, started in 2005, was scrapped recently due to a breach of integrity clause. It is geo-strategically imprudent to turf out a strategic partner. So, back to the drawing board even as the Indian Navy, needing 24 mine sweepers, is down to seven ageing vessels.
The real tragedy is about replacement helicopters. The original plan was to buy all 484 new LUH (Light Utility Helicopter); of these 197 LUH were to be imported, but the deal when close to fruition, was scrapped. Now all the 484 LUH will be made in India regardless of the unacceptable life-stretch of the helicopter fleet.The LUH is needed to replace the ancient Cheetah helicopters which are the lifeline for troops in Siachen. Already delayed by decade, another decade will multiply the woes of the Agitation group. Bad news also on the Bofors artillery front. With no new gun for nearly 40 years, the Dhanush-upgraded 155 mm howitzers 80 per cent indigenous gun has faced ‘barrelburst’ — pretty serious if it is a design failure.
While Make in India is a great idea, the Services must put their foot down and restrain the Government from suddenly going overboard over making in India. Glitches and teething problems are bound to occur in these programmes which will result in time and cost overruns and operational impairment. In his first full-length interview, Mr Parrikar has mentioned the word ‘priority’ and reflected on his forte: Decision-making, transparency and integrity. Defence acquisitions too have to be prioritised in relation to capacity-building and deterrence. Unfortunately, as there is no jointness in defence planning and nothing akin to Plans Programmes Budgeting System, capability accretion is largely ad hoc. That is why Minister of State for External Affairs and former Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh created an uproar in Parliament by exposing in 2011 the critical hollowness in ammunition inventories for war-fighting.
The focus, first and foremost, must be on making good, existing operational deficiencies to the satisfaction of Service chiefs. The cost of replenishing shortfalls in critical ammunition should come from Revenue head and not Capital account meant for modernisation. Mr Parrikar should review and, where necessary, reverse, some of the decisions taken by his predecessors in consultation with Service chiefs who are normally reticent to oppose any ministerial decision. He must ensure that the Make in India enterprise does not create increased and unintended voids in operational capabilities. Make in India will work when land, labour, power and expertise are cost-effectively and reliably available. That is not the case at present.
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