Afghanistan at the crossroads Pakistan's terrorist troubles grow

G Parthasarathy

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani (centre) intends to test Pakistani "sincerity". AFP 

A recent report issued by the Pentagon has, for the first time, alluded to sanctuaries in Pakistan for harbouring terrorists on its borders with both Afghanistan and India. This is not the first time that the Pentagon has indicted Pakistan for aiding terrorist violence in Afghanistan. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, stated: “The fact remains that the Quetta Shura (Taliban) and the Haqqani network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations, serving as proxies of the Government of Pakistan, are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers”. Mullen described how the Haqqani network had attacked the US Embassy in Kabul in September 2011.

Hillary Clinton has not minced words on Pakistani support for terrorism, warning that Pakistan will pay a high price for its actions. She has bitingly told Pakistan: “You cannot nurture snakes in your backyard and expect they will only bite your neighbours”. More recently, she is reported to have asked General Kayani: “How do you envisage Pakistan in 2020 — as South Korea or the Democratic Republic of Congo?” She left the smug General speechless. It is clear that the US now recognises groups like Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed and the Dawood network as inimical to its security interests. But while one can realistically expect some intelligence sharing and monitoring of funds of these outfits, India should not believe that the US will take any meaningful action to dismantle or degrade them. Action against the ISI-backed terrorist groups acting against India cannot be outsourced.

The bulk of Pakistan’s diplomatic and military attention will be focused on developments across the Durand Line for the foreseeable future. Over 80,000 Pakistani troops are now battling those of its former “assets” now affiliated with Tehriq e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With nearly a million Pashtun tribals fleeing their homes, the Pakistan military has not destroyed but dispersed internal terrorism. The attack by the TTP in Wagah was a manifestation of this development. But, given the subterranean links the ISI doubtless retains with the TTP, one should not discount the ISI using the TTP brand name to mount terrorist attacks on India. Amidst these developments, India has also to keep a close eye on what is transpiring as the new Ashraf Ghani dispensation takes charge in Afghanistan.

The most important development that India can ill afford to ignore is that the US no longer regards the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban as an Al-Qaida “asset” and is no longer prepared to designate Taliban attacks as a terrorist challenge, despite the ever-increasing Taliban attacks in Afghanistan over the past year in which American soldiers have been killed. Despite professions of reconciliation being “Afghan led”, the US appears prepared to give the ISI a major role in the entire process of Afghan “reconciliation”. Moreover, Karzai's exit has seen a paradigm shift in Afghans foreign and security policies. Learning from bitter experience, Karzai had little faith in Pakistani professions of good intentions. Ghani obviously intends to experiment with tests of Pakistani “sincerity”.

The new formula of the Ghani dispensation with more than evident American enthusiasm is to try out China to help facilitate “reconciliation” with the Taliban. Seeking to reassure the Taliban and Pakistan of Chinese intentions, the Global Times proclaimed: “China will never take on the role played by the US and NATO and act as a powerful meddler. China supports peaceful rebuilding and ethnic reconciliation in the war-torn country. There is the cost of being a major power and we need to get used to it”. While Ghani insisted on an “Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process” China has longstanding Pakistani facilitated links, overt and covert, with the Taliban and its Quetta Shura. While Afghanistan needs billions in foreign assistance every year, the Chinese offered Ghani aid amounting to merely $350 million over three years.

Pakistan’s strategy now appears apparent, with its “all-weather friend” China guiding the “reconciliation” process. The Taliban will be facilitated to take over parts of south-eastern Afghanistan and establish a de facto government there. The Afghan army lacks the firepower and airlift capabilities to retain control all across the country. With control of territory in Afghanistan the Taliban will demand “equality” in order to undermine the claims of the Ghani government as the only legitimate authority in the country. Given the ambivalence and indeed some would say duplicity involved in US links with the Taliban, commencing with the incarceration of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, it is questionable if the US would strongly object to such a Taliban strategy. While given his dependence on the US, President Ghani may well be reluctant to challenge the US, his position and standing within Afghanistan will inevitably be questioned and eroded. Nothing would suit Pakistan and the Taliban better than a political vacuum in Afghanistan. It also remains to be seen if President Ghani will adopt the same role that his predecessor did by taking note of Pakistan's vulnerabilities arising from its suppression of Pashtun tribals by its military actions in the tribal areas

All this should not deter India from going ahead with its plans to join Iran in developing the Iranian port of Chahbahar. This project strategically guarantees India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Moreover, given the ethnic and sectarian challenges that Iran faces internally and externally, New Delhi will have to closely coordinate its strategies in Afghanistan with Iran, Russia and Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours. This will no doubt figure prominently during President Putin's visit to India. It should be remembered that Taliban control of southern Afghanistan was used in the past by Pakistan to train terrorists for "Jihad" in Jammu and Kashmir. Taliban control over any part of southern Afghanistan will undermine our security. It will also strengthen the ISI belief that it pays to use terrorism as an instrument of State policy. This concern should be conveyed unambiguously to both the Obama Administration and the Republican-controlled US Congress.