One Month In, Mixed Reviews on Iraq, Syria Airstrikes
Aaron Mehta
Defense News
October 19, 2014
An F-22 Raptor taxis in the Middle East prior to strike operations in Syria on Sept. 23. Concern over possible civilian casualties has limited the airstrikes approved over Iraq and Syria. (Tech. Sgt. Russ Scalf / US Air Force)
WASHINGTON — On Sept. 23, the US began airstrikes against militants aligned with the Islamic States (IS) inside Syria, kicking off what President Barack Obama and top military leaders characterizes as a campaign that will last for some time.
But despite those pleas for patience, there is a growing wave of criticism over the US airstrike campaign, even among airpower advocates. And as IS forces continue to publicly advance on cities like Kobani, pressure is mounting for a change in tactics.
One month in, the situation in Syria and Iraq remains in flux — and the one thing everyone agrees on is that the US is locked in a complex battle for the long haul.
According to Pentagon figures, there were 294 US strikes on Iraq between Aug. 8, the start of the anti-IS mission, and Oct 15. For comparison, between Sept. 23 and Oct. 15, 229 strikes were conducted in Syria.
“As a point of comparison, in roughly the same period in Afghanistan there has been one sortie with a weapon release for every three coalition close-air support sorties flown,” a service official wrote in an email.
In total, roughly 1,300 munitions have been expended by the coalition since Aug. 8. The US and its allies are averaging around 100 sorties per day, with 25 sorties per day averaging at least one weapon release.
While that sounds impressive, airpower advocates say that’s not enough.
In an analysis titled “The Unserious Air War Against ISIS,” two senior fellows at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments compared the air campaign to a similar one against Serbian forces in 1999, which averaged 138 strikes a day — “orders of magnitude” greater than what is being done against IS.
The authors, Mark Gunzinger and John Stillion, acknowledge the complexities of the situation, but insist that more can be done from the air.
“In the end, no matter the reason, the timorous use of air power against Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria is unlikely to reduce the territory under their control,” the men wrote.
David Deptula, a retired Air Force three-star who helped lead air operations in Afghanistan in 2001, agreed, writing in an email that “the issue is not the limits of airpower, the issue is the ineffective use of airpower.”
He says airpower is being controlled at too high a command level, something he blames on military leaders he claims are trapped in the past.
“The situation in Iraq/Syria with ISIL is not the same as Afghanistan with the Taliban,” Deptula wrote. “What we are witnessing now is a symptom of fighting the last war by a command that is dominated with ground warfare officers who have little experience with applying airpower in anything other than a ‘support’ role.”
Complicating the Mix
So should the air campaign be stepped up? Opinions are mixed among analysts and observers, who pointed to several complicating factors.
The first is that operations in Syria are targeted less at causing change on the ground and more at disrupting support for IS in Iraq.
“In the short term, it’s an Iraq-first strategy,” one Pentagon official with knowledge of operations told Defense News. “We’re working to help the Iraqi force take back Iraq, defeat ISIL while we disrupt and deny ISIL of their war-making capability in Syria.”
But while Iraq may be the focus, retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, argues it may be the easier situation to deal with.
“This a very, very complex mix,” he said. “The Syrian part of this is much more challenging than the Iraq part…. the Syrian part of this will be the most intractable, long term and problematic for the US.”
Which is challenge No. 2: in Syria, the US is operating in an environment already torn by civil war, with no desire to see either of two of the most powerful factions — IS and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — gain the upper hand.
The Pentagon official acknowledged that planners are aware of Assad, but downplayed concerns he could be indirectly strengthened by the strikes.
“Many of the areas that we’re engaging have been lost to Assad’s forces long ago and he will probably never recover,” he said. “Might there be an indirect benefit to Assad in the short term? Yes. In the long term, we are building up an opposition that will not only counter ISIL, but ultimately be able to move towards confronting Assad as well.”
A third factor? The desire to avoid, at almost any cost, civilian casualties. All of of those interviewed for this report said the US is largely restricted to hunting and pecking for targets, as IS forces have mostly melted into the civilian population.
“We are taking extraordinary precautions to be able to be accurate and precise in our targeting,” the Pentagon official said. “If we do not do that, then we can lose more than we gain because the support of the population is absolutely essential.”
Barno said IS knows how to shield itself from airpower. “And we’re very constrained here because we don’t want to create civilian casualties,” he said. “That will keep this campaign from doing a lot of decisive things.”
That has provided limited targets, which in turn some have blamed on needing more ISR capabilities in the region. One senior Air Force official said that was doubtful given the number of weapons being released.
He cited one B-1 pilot who emptied his full weapons bay three times in the past two weeks after several years of not having done so in the region.
“I don’t think it’s ISR assets that are limiting the air campaign,” he said. “If that was the case you’d have people bringing back loaded planes You’d go up without a target and so you’d come home and bring your weapons back. That’s not happening.”
Deptula warned that the caution over collateral damage, while noble, may have to be loosened in order to truly be effective against IS forces.
“Rules of engagement may have to change as well, with authority to engage targets devolving to lower levels of command — even to the pilot in the cockpit,” he said. “This will increase the chances of a ‘friendly fire’ incident, or collateral damage. Enhanced effectiveness will come only with some increased acceptance of risks.
“On the other hand, a conscious and public willingness to bear those risks in the name of significantly increasing the impact of coalition operations on the fight on the ground would demonstrate a degree of commitment and resolve that might be ardently welcomed by the Kurdish and Iraqi forces who are so hard-pressed by ISIS.”
And that is the other big issue — the question of how much airstrikes can accomplish before ground forces are needed.
High-profile members of Congress such as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Rep. Buck McKeon, R-Calif, the House Armed Services Committee chairman, have been hitting the Pentagon on this issue almost from Day 1 of the campaign.
“If we don’t put boots on the ground, we can’t form the coalition, we can’t retake ground that needs to be taken and held,” McKeon said on Oct. 9.
“It will require boots on the ground, preferably not US boots, to win this thing,” Barno said, adding the last month “clearly illustrates the limitations of airpower.”
Once again, Deptula counters that the issue isn’t airpower, but how it has been used.
“Airmen have the capacity, equipment, training, tactics, and knowledge needed for this fight, but airpower needs to be applied like a thunderstorm, and so far we’ve only witnessed a drizzle,” Deptula wrote.
The Pentagon official acknowledged that ground forces would be necessary to hold territory, in both Syria and Iraq, hence the push to quickly train local forces. But he also said local populations will need to rise against the beliefs behind IS for any lasting impact.
“Airpower alone will not be sufficient. Military force alone will not be sufficient,” the official said. “It’s got to be part of the broader strategy, and ultimately if this population on the ground does not reject the ideology of ISIL, which ultimately I believe they will, then the military campaign will never be sufficient.” ?■
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