October 7, 2014
"There are good reasons for skepticism that the United States can contain Russia as effectively today as it once did the Soviet Union."
The Ukraine crisis has ushered in a new era in U.S.-Russian relations. To be sure, relations had been deteriorating for some time—at least since fall 2011, when Putin announced his decision to return to the Kremlin. Stark differences between both countries over Syria and broader developments in the Arab world, Moscow's offer of asylum to NSA-leaker Edward Snowden, and Putin’s vehement accusations of U.S. interference in Russia's domestic affairs—thereby justifying a crackdown on internal dissent—have all stressed U.S.-Russian relations to the breaking point. The glimmer of hope offered by the agreement to work together to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons was quickly extinguished last fall by fundamental differences over the situation in the Ukraine.
But it was Moscow's reaction to the ouster of President Yanukovych in Ukraine—its annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of southeastern Ukraine, done with a combination of audacity and skill—that finally jolted the American political establishment into viewing Russia as a significant threat. That Russia was prepared to flout the rules of Europe's post–Cold War order to assert its interests was not particularly surprising. After all, it had already done that in the Georgian War in 2008. But no one had anticipated that Russia would act in Crimea with such exquisite skill and leave the United States appearing flat-footed, lacking an adequate response. That set Ukraine apart from Georgia.
Obama's reset is now dead. Previous failed resets were followed in short order by new attempts. Indeed, U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War have been marked by a recurring cycle of great expectations followed by deep disappointments. But this time is different. Today's estrangement runs deeper than it has during any time since the Gorbachev years. No influential forces in either Washington or Moscow are calling for improved relations; rather, political leaders and the media in both countries are actively vilifying the other side. Most bilateral contacts have been totally severed. Looking forward, both sides increasingly see each other as long-term adversaries. Unlike in the past, no new reset is just over the horizon simply awaiting a new American president.
In the absence of significant hope for constructive relations, the American political establishment has reached back to the recent past, to the Cold War era, for guidance. The talk is of an updated containment policy.[1] At the beginning of the crisis in early March, President Obama warned the Russians that if they did not move to deescalate the situation in Ukraine, the United States was "examining a whole series of steps—economic, diplomatic—that will isolate Russia and will have a negative impact on Russia’s economy and its status in the world."[2] As the crisis worsened, the administration began to make good on that threat by sharply reducing bilateral contacts with Russia, levying targeted sanctions against individuals and entities considered either responsible for Russia's actions in Ukraine or to be financially close to Putin, and trying to rally European allies behind its policy. At the end of May, Obama claimed success.
Our ability to shape world opinion helped isolate Russia right away. Because of American leadership, the world immediately condemned Russian actions; Europe and the G7 joined us to impose sanctions; NATO reinforced our commitment to Eastern European allies; the IMF is helping to stabilize Ukraine’s economy; OSCE monitors brought the eyes of the world to unstable parts of Ukraine.[3]
With those and similar remarks, Obama may not have explicitly adopted a policy of containment, but the logic of his administration's actions points in that direction. The administration continues to threaten Russia with further sanctions should Moscow not act to deescalate the crisis, but it provides no clear indication of what Russia must do for the sanctions to be lifted. It speaks as if it intends to treat Russia as a long-term adversary (or for at least as long as Putin remains in power), while limiting cooperation—as in the Cold War—to those areas it judges critical to American security and which necessitate working with Russia (e.g., implementation of the new START treaty and retaining access to the International Space Station). Moreover, its tendency to look at Russia and the Ukraine crisis solely through the prism of security in Europe—the Cold War's central battlefield—lends its Russia policy a Cold-War aura, even if Obama insists we are not witnessing a return to that era.[4]
There are good reasons for skepticism that the United States can contain Russia as effectively today as it once did the Soviet Union. Today's world is radically different from the Cold War's bipolar world of existential struggle between two diametrically opposed views of man, society, and the state, between two world systems with few points of contact. Now, in contrast, we live in an increasingly multipolar, globalized world in which traditional geopolitical competition is overlaid by a set of global challenges, the management of which requires collective action. Russia, among the world's largest economies, is moreover increasingly integrated into the global economy, having abandoned the Soviet quest for autarky, which is now considered unworkable. Under those circumstances, the developed world will not defer to the United States, as it generally did during the Cold War, and the major emerging powers are unlikely to give the U.S. much heed. Notwithstanding closer U.S.-European Union alignment and greater European unity after Ukraine’s rebel forces apparently accidentally shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, the travails in forging transatlantic unity on tough sanctions against Russia and the refusal of China, India, and Brazil to condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea foretell the challenges ahead. If the current cease-fire in Ukraine holds and the parties begin to seek a political settlement, these challenges will grow.
The challenges, however, are not likely to dissuade the American political establishment from considering—nor the Administration from implementing—ever-harsher measures to tame a resurgent Russia, even if actual containment is infeasible. The prevailing view is that the United States, as a matter of principle and national interest, must push back vigorously against a Russia that challenges the principles of the American-led world order and that more often than not seeks to constrain American action on a range of functional and geopolitical matters.
The world-order challenge is hardly new. Even under Yeltsin, the Kremlin never truly accepted American leadership. Initially it aspired to be an equal with the United States in managing the global agenda, however impossible an ambition that might have been given the gaping asymmetry in power and fortune between the two countries then. Later, it actively promoted a multipolar world, working with China and India, in particular, to create a counterbalance to the West. All along it vehemently opposed NATO expansion. Moreover, while it might have declared support for democratic and free-market principles, it upheld a traditional view of national sovereignty and rejected humanitarian intervention; witness the stiff opposition to NATO's military operation against Serbia for its actions in Kosovo in 1999. The United States evinced little concern, however, for Yeltsin's Russia was mired in a profound socioeconomic and political crisis and lacked the capability for effective resistance.
That changed under Putin. The remarkable and largely unanticipated recovery that took place on his watch gave Russia the resources and confidence to pursue more assertive policies against what it saw as the United States’ hegemonic designs. Throughout his first two presidential terms, Putin sought to constrain the United States in three ways: He championed the UN Security Council as the sole authority for legitimating the use of force (other than in self-defense) and sought to bring key issues to the Council, where Russia could use its veto to thwart or shape American initiatives; He built coalitions designed to limit America's room for maneuver, taking the lead in creating the BRICS in order to lessen Western domination of global economic management and joining China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to constrain the United States in Central Asia; And he sought to build a partnership with the United States based on binding agreements that would limit American options and make it more predictable in Moscow's eyes. Russia did not stray from that three-pronged approach during the Medvedev interlude, even if Medvedev himself presented a more pleasant face to Washington.
With his return to the Kremlin in May 2012, Putin took his opposition to the U.S.-led world order a step further, adding a moral dimension. He began to attack the West's growing decadence in rejecting "the Christian values that formed the foundations of Western civilization," including traditional sexual norms. While some Russian figures have advanced Eurasian values against European ones, Putin, more exactly speaking, has defended traditional European values against the West's post-modern interpretation of them, with an eye to bolstering his support among the deeply conservative Russian population, more traditional societies abroad, and even conservative segments of the West.[5]
The final, and most recent, challenge comes with Russia's seizure of Crimea, a clear violation of a fundamental principle of world order. Putin raised further alarms when he declared that Russia would "always defend the interests of [ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine] by political, diplomatic, and legal means."[6] Although he limited the scope of his remarks to Ukraine, they were understandably read by Russia's immediate neighbors, all of which have sizable populations of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, as an implicit threat. Moreover, a generalized right to defend the interests of one's ethnic and cultural community would threaten havoc in a world, including Europe, where most states are in fact multiethnic.
This broad-based challenge to the U.S.-led global order alone would have provided sufficient reason for the American political establishment to deal more severely with Russia. But the Ukraine crisis has also cast a harsher light on U.S.-Russian interaction on other functional and geopolitical issues. On none of these issues, save those concerning the former Soviet space, are American and Russian positions diametrically or irreconcilably opposed. Instead, different understandings of the nature of international problems, goals, and tactics complicate U.S.-Russian diplomacy and compel the United States to pursue less robust policies than those it would otherwise prefer.
Iran offers an apt illustration of this. For the past decade, Russia has prevented the UN Security Council from endorsing the crippling sanctions the United States has advocated, because Russia has no interest in excessively harming a country that has largely respected its interests; because it sees preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons as less of a priority than does the U.S.; and because it rejects Washington’s pursuit of regime change in Tehran. Analogous divergences in outlook and approach obtain on most of the high-profile international issues of the past ten to fifteen years, including on Syria and Iraq in the broader Middle East, and on North Korea in East Asia, as well as on non-proliferation and counterterrorism. Whatever cooperation there has been has occurred within a competitive framework.
This competition is most intense in the former Soviet space, which Russia sees as a zone of "privileged interest," as a critical buffer against neighboring great powers. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has created various institutions designed to maintain its influence there, beginning with the Commonwealth of Independent States. The most ambitious to date is Putin's Eurasian Union, which he hopes will eventually include all the former Soviet states with the possible exception of the Baltic States. The United States has, however, made a special point of refusing to recognize any country's claimed sphere of interest. Yet it has pursued policies in the former Soviet space aimed in practice, if not in word, at limiting the Russian presence there, which is why Washington has refused to recognize or deal with any of the regional institutions Russia has sponsored, with the exception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. That is the unspoken goal behind NATO expansion. Ukraine today is only the most visible—and dangerous—example of a more general U.S.-Russian rivalry.
It is against this comprehensive and enduring threat (in Washington’s view) that the U.S. will now elaborate a new Russia policy. The initial decisions will of course be taken against the background of the Ukraine crisis. But even if Russia works diligently for a political resolution that respects Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Washington will continue to seek ways to punish, constrain, and weaken Russia, now seen as an adversary.
Should the U.S.-Russia relationship further deteriorate, the United States will likely pursue the following goals:
• Short-term: Exacting a cost from Russia for its actions in Ukraine, deterring further aggressive Russian actions, and persuading Moscow to support a political resolution acceptable to what the United States considers to be the legitimate Ukrainian government under President Poroshenko
• Medium-term: Degrading Russian capabilities and reducing its options for expanding its sway in the former Soviet space and projecting its influence abroad, particularly into Europe
• Long-term: Exacerbating internal tensions in Russia in the hope that this will lead to the mellowing of the current regime, or its overthrow
The United States, alone and together with its various allies and partners, has already taken a number of steps in pursuit of these goals. They include imposing targeted sanctions against a limited number of Russian officials, and on other individuals and commercial entities considered financially close to Putin, as well as on a number of Russian defense firms; placing restrictions on new financing to Russia’s largest banks and energy companies; instituting stricter limits on the export of certain technologies to Russia; putting limitations on Russian access to certain U.S. facilities involved in developing cutting-edge technologies;[7] taking steps to reassure vulnerable NATO member countries of the alliance's commitment to Article 5 collective defense guarantees;[8] and exclusion of Russian from certain international organizations and mechanisms, such as the G8, now for all practical purposes the G7. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies are threatening further sanctions.
So far, these steps have not noticeably affected Russia's policy toward Ukraine, including its support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine and its integration of Crimea into the Russian political and socioeconomic system; on the contrary, Moscow has escalated its involvement in Ukraine as the United States and the EU have increased pressure on Russia. And they are unlikely to have much impact in the short run, because Moscow considers Ukraine to be a vital interest and is prepared to bear a heavy price to ensure that it does not move into the Western orbit. The more dangerous prospect for Moscow, however, is the longer-term implications for Russia's economic well-being of the American policies already in place and the still harsher steps the United States might take to harm Russia and its position in the world.
Another paper will focus on the economic steps the United States can take and on the challenges taking these steps will present to Russia. The focus here will be on security, energy, and related policy.
In the security realm, the United States has several options. The first, and the most obvious, is further refocusing NATO on the emerging Russian threat. In a sense, the Ukraine crisis came as a god-send, with the alliance in the beginning stages of rethinking its mission as its involvement in Afghanistan draws to an end. Secretary General Rasmussen has called it a "game-changer" that compels NATO to reconsider an assumption that has guided defense planning for the past twenty years—namely, that Russia does not pose an imminent security threat.[9]
The NATO Summit in Wales illustrates how Washington will pursue this objective. With the energetic support of East European allies, the United States pressed alliance members at the summit to finally make good on their earlier commitments to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense, to build up their conventional capabilities with new and more advanced equipment, and to integrate their capabilities more thoroughly. NATO’s summit communique particularly stressed the first two points.[10]
Poland and the Baltic states at a minimum will insist on more robust contingency planning and exercises for their region, and NATO could enhance its naval presence in the Black Sea. At the extreme, the United States could decide to establish a permanent military presence in East-Central Europe on the grounds that the security environment has changed in parlous ways unforeseen in 1997, thereby effectively abrogating NATO's pledge in the NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997 to not permanently station "substantial combat forces" in that region.[11] While straining to remain within the Founding Act’s boundaries, NATO moved in this direction at the Wales Summit, when its members agreed to “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis.”[12]
Secondly, and related to first option, as many commentators are already urging, the United States could reconsider it plans for missile defense in Europe. In 2009, the Obama administration abandoned its predecessor's plans to build missile defense sites in the Poland and the Czech Republic in favor of a different architecture, termed the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Although the administration argued then that it made the change based on a reassessment of the Iranian threat, the initial response from Moscow was positive. (Moscow's position turned negative after it analyzed more fully the capabilities of the new system.) The administration could now decide to build a more robust and capable system in Europe. And it could do that even if the ongoing P5+1 negotiation with Iran lead to a deal on its nuclear program; conceptually, missile defense was intended to defend against a broader range of threats than those from Iran and North Korea, the countries of immediate concern.[13] As part of that effort, the United States could locate more facilities in East-Central European states, including, at the extreme and most provocative, in the Ukraine. Along with the facilities would come at least a small permanent contingent of American military personnel, which would reassure the host governments of the United States' commitment to their defense.
Thirdly, the United States could further bolster its bilateral defense cooperation with former Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. There will be some pressure for the administration to press for NATO membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia, although that remains a non-starter, given German attitudes, in particular, and given the situations on the ground in both countries. Nevertheless, the United States, alone or in cooperation with some allies, could help enhance the capabilities of these and other former Soviet states though programs similar to the train and equip program the Bush administration conducted with Georgia. Closer intelligence cooperation—especially on the Russian threat—could also be part of the package. After the NATO Summit, the White House issued a fact sheet describing some steps in this direction. Two military exercises involving Ukraine—one on Ukrainian territory—are planned for September.[14]
And should the cease-fire break down and Russia go so far as to invade Ukraine to defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, as Putin has threatened and more nationalist elements of the Russian elite desire, the United States—along with its allies—would almost certainly encourage Ukraine to resist. They would also begin to provide the equipment—non-lethal and lethal—and intelligence support with which to do so, with the goal of raising the prospects of a repeat of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
Finally, the United States could impose ever-stricter controls on technology exports to Russia and press its allies to do the same in order to retard the modernization of Russia's defense sector, which continues to face formidable problems and obstacles to growth. Its domestic machine-tool industry can no longer produce modern, advanced tools and is compelled to rely on foreign sources, while the military has turned to imports—such as Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the French Mistral amphibious assault vessel—for items which it cannot obtain domestically.[15] France’s recent decision to withhold delivery of the first Mistral—the Vladivostok—reflects strong U.S. and NATO pressure to limit arms sales to Russia that could grow in the future.
The United States will portray all of these steps as defensive, intended to reassure allies and to deter Russian aggression. Moscow, however, will see them as elements of a burgeoning strategic threat. European security, which for the past generation has been a more or less cooperative endeavor in dealing with challenges that emanate largely from outside Europe (WMD proliferation and international terrorism, for example) and pursuing arms control and other confidence-building measures to ease tensions, will once again become a competition in maintaining an appropriate military balance between Europe and Russia in and around Europe. The danger for Russia is that it will believe it is in an arms race, in which it starts at a significant disadvantage: Its military is no match for NATO, whose members spend over ten-times more than does Russia on defense and possess superior technical capabilities,[16] and who maintain that superiority while spending less on defense as a share of GDP than does Russia. It is a race that Russia will be no better placed to win than was the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In the field of energy, the United States also has at least three major options for pursuing two goals: diminishing Russian leverage in European markets (Russia supplies 45 and 33 percent of the EU's gas and oil imports, respectively, and about one-quarter of its gas resources overall[17]), and undermining Russia's federal budget (oil and gas account for over half of revenues, with oil contributing 7-8 times more than does gas[18]).
Firstly, as many commentators have already suggested, the United States could take advantage of the accelerating production of shale gas and tight oil to export significant volumes into global markets. That in itself would put downward pressure on prices to Russia's disadvantage. The implications for European markets are less straightforward. The overwhelming share of LNG now goes to Asian markets, where prices are higher and the infrastructure is better developed.[19] As a result, the United States—and the EU—would have to put in place significant incentives to persuade private companies to export to Europe.
Secondly, the United States could work toward the normalization of relations with Iran—a development that becomes more practicable as a deal on Iran's nuclear program approaches and both countries face the threat of the growing power of the militant Islamic State terrorists in Iraq. Normalization would open up the possibility of exports of Iranian gas into European markets. That would pose much more of a threat to Russia's market position. Not only does Iran hold the world's second-largest reserves of natural gas, but its gas would be exported by pipelines into the very markets that Russia now dominates in East-Central Europe. As part of this effort, the United States and the EU would need to work together to expand plans for the Southern Corridor, now being built primarily to compete with Russia's South Stream project.
Thirdly, as with the defense sector, the United States could also put in place further sanctions and restrictions on technology exports that would retard the development of Russia's energy sector, expanding those imposed so far. As the old fields that were first developed during the Soviet period are depleted, Russia will have to move into geologically and climatically more challenging regions—offshore in the Arctic and onshore in East Siberia and in the Far East—to maintain adequate production levels. It does not, however, possess the technology or managerial skill to develop those resources on its own, and the only place it can get them is in the West. That is the primary reason why Russia's energy giants, Rosneft and Gazprom, have partnered with Western majors, such as ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total, on projects in Russia.
To be sure, none of those three measures would have a significant and immediate impact on Russia's energy position. It would, for example, take a few years and billions of dollars in investment to build the infrastructure for the export of liquefied natural gas from the United States. But over the medium to long term, those steps would have the desired effect of squeezing Russia on both the demand and supply side, reducing Russia's presence in European markets, and putting pressure on its budget revenues.
Russia will be challenged to formulate an effective response. Aware of the vulnerabilities, Putin has for some time promoted the diversification of Russia's energy export markets, with special emphasis upon China. Indeed, as the Ukraine crisis intensified in May, he traveled to China as if to demonstrate that Russia had alternatives. There he made a special point of heralding progress toward the formation of a "Sino-Russian energy alliance," which he said would be a critical element of energy security throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The showpiece of the alliance is the 30-year, $400-billion gas contract signed by Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation. Under its terms, Gazprom will, beginning in 2018, gradually build up to annually exporting 38 billion cubic meters of gas (roughly one-quarter of the amount it now sends to Europe[20]). The project will entail building a tremendous amount of infrastructure, creating, as Putin put it, "the biggest construction project in the world, without any exaggeration."[21]
A decision by the United States to move vigorously against Russia's energy sector entails serious risks. With reduced possibilities in Europe, less upside for domestic production, and the absence of the West as operator or investor in regions of prospective growth, Russia would find itself in a much weaker bargaining positions vis-à-vis China. The Chinese have a well-earned reputation for being tough negotiators, and they are not about to make concessions simply to curry Russia's favor. (There is already considerable speculation that, to close the gas deal, Russia made concessions on the issue—price—that had been holding talks up for a decade, which Gazprom said was a "commercial secret,"[22] presumably to conceal the scale of its concessions.) Russia will likely find itself at a great disadvantage not only in energy negotiations, but also across the board. The long-term danger is that Russia, or at least its East Siberian and Far Eastern provinces, will become a raw materials appendage of China.
Measures taken in the security and energy realms threaten to have the most devastating impact on Russia in the medium to long term. Additionally, there are less dramatic steps the United States could take to erode Russian power and influence. Frustrated by Russian obstructionism, it could, for instance, actively seek, along with its European allies, ways to circumvent the UN Security Council in ways that reflect little regard for Russia's interests, especially in regions where it enjoys a preponderance of force, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s. Similarly, it could work to limit Russian influence in other international and regional organizations, from the OSCE to the IMF and the WTO. And it could erode Russia's development prospects by encouraging greater brain drain by adopting more welcoming visa and immigration regulations. Creative minds will imagine further measures the U.S. could take in this area.
The point is that the United States has a broad range of options to counter what it sees as a resurgent Russian threat. None of the options is cost-free, and the administration will not decide on any of them lightly, given the public mood against an activist U.S. foreign policy and America’s other priorities, including the Obama administration’s expanding military action against the Islamic State. And there are downsides that few of the most ardent proponents of containment have considered, including, ironically, the weakening of Russia to such an extent that it could no longer govern its own territory effectively or serve as an effective element in creating a global equilibrium.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake for Moscow to discount the possibility of a more concerted and assertive anti-Russian American policy. In the past few months, the mood in the United States has turned on Russia. That turn came not as a consequence of a single act or a specific crisis, but rather as the result of a long period of frustration in dealing with Russia and of skepticism that it approached relations in good faith—much the way the Russian mood about the United States has turned over the past decade. Meanwhile, the situation in Ukraine and elsewhere along the Russia periphery remains unsettled. There are ample opportunities for unanticipated events that could cause all sides to overreact. Moscow might believe the United States is mired in disarray and self-doubt, but it should remember that the American political establishment, despite Russia's recent assertive policy, continues to consider Russia to be in decline with a one-dimensional—and vulnerable—economy based principally on oil and gas. Rightly or wrongly, the Washington foreign policy establishment believes Russia will eventually succumb to American pressure.
In such circumstances, as it develops its own policy, Moscow should never forget that the United States still retains considerable potential to do harm to Russia. That does not mean Washington is seeking confrontation. It is not, especially given the other challenges it is facing around the globe. Thus, even if tension will likely remain high for some time whatever the outcome in Ukraine, Russia still has an opportunity to avoid a determined U.S. effort at containment.
Thomas E. Graham is a managing director at Kissinger Associates, Inc., where he focuses on Russian and Eurasian affairs. He was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007 and Director for Russian Affairs on that staff from 2002 to 2004. From 2001 to 2002, he served as the Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. From 1998 to 2001, Mr. Graham was a senior associate in the Russia/Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1984 to 1998, he was a Foreign Service Officer and served twice in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
[1] See "Summary of North American Chapter" in Paula Dobriansky, Andrzej Olechowski, Yukio Satoh, and Igor Yurgens, Engaging Russia: A Return to Containment?, The Trilateral Commission 2013/2014 Task Force Report, May 15, 2014, pp. 12-20, which leans heavily towards containment as the appropriate U.S. Russia policy.
[2] See "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu before Bilateral Meeting," March 3, 2014, available at http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201....
[3] See Remarks of President Barack Obama, Graduation Ceremony, West Point, New York, May 28, 2014, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2....
[4] Ibid.
[5] See Putin's remarks at the Valdai International Discussion Club, September 19, 2013, from which the quoted material is drawn, available athttp://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19243.
[6] See "Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii," March 18, 2014, available at http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603.
[7] See United States Department of State, "Ukraine and Russia Sanctions,” athttp://m.state.gov/mc62304.htm.
[8] See “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia,” September 3, 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia.
[9] See NATO Secretary General Rasmussen's monthly press conference, May 19, 2014, available athttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_109980.htm.
[11] The text of the Act is available athttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm.
[12] See the Wales Summit Declaration.
[13] See the Missile Defense Agency's discussion of the threat, athttp://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html.
[14] “FACT SHEET: NATO and U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Partners, Including Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia,” www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/fact-sheet-nato-and-us-efforts-support-nato-partners-including-ukraine-m.
[15] See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013 (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 207-8.
[16] See Slobodan Lekic, "Despite Cuts, NATO Still Accounts for Most of the World's Military Spending," Stars and Stripes, February 25, 2014. European NATO members spend more than three times more than Russia does.
[17] See the European Commission on EU-Russia energy relations athttp://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/russia/russia_en.htm. Dependence varies greatly by country. The most vulnerable are the Baltic states, which rely entirely on Russia for their gas. Germany gets over 35 percent of its gas from Russia. See "Conscious Uncoupling," The Economist, April 5, 2014, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/russia/russia_en.htm.
[18] Putin said earlier this year that oil accounts for $191-194 billion in revenue, and that gas constitutes $28 billion. See PBK, April 17, 2014, available at http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140417140241.shtml.
[19] See "Conscious Uncoupling."
[20] See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Weekly (for the week ending May 28, 2014), May 29, 2014.
[21] See Putin's remarks at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, May 23, 2014. See also Alexei Anishchuk, "As Putin Looks East, China and Russia Sign $400-billion Gas Deal," Reuters, May 21, 2014.
[22] See, for example, "The Politics Behind Russia-China's Gas Deal,” Channel NewsAsia, June 1, 2014, available athttp://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/the-politics-behind/1131860.html.
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