Relentless ceasefire violations

India should be prepared for cross-border terrorism

Gen V P Malik (retd)

THE India-Pakistan ceasefire along the 1,050-km international border, Line of Control (LoC), and the Siachen Glacier area, came about on November 26, 2003. The then Pakistani Prime Minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, had announced it as a commemoration of Eid al-Fitr, marking the end of prayer and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan that year. This year's Eid al-Zuha saw its worst violation by Pakistan since 2003. During the heavy firefight, the annual tradition of exchanging sweets on Eid was done away with. And so was the practice of holding a flag meeting by the BSF and Pakistan Rangers deployed along the international border.

A historical analysis of the ceasefire violations since November 2003 shows that the escalation in the number of violations has no correlation with the new NDA government coming into power in India. The escalation picked up gradually in January 2013 and then very steeply after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assumed office in Pakistan in June 2013. According to reports, 347 violations were recorded in 2013, compared to 114 incidents in 2012. This year 334 incidents have already occurred till date. Despite much improved vigilance on the LoC, the number of cross-border infiltration attempts has also gone up in the last one year.

Many Indian journalists, who have been feted by Nawaz Sharif, believe him to be the messiah of peace. But Nawaz Sharif's rhetoric on improving relations with India fails to match up with the developments on the ground. Apart from the Kargil misadventure in 1999, his tacit approval — willingly or unwillingly — to keep the LoC alive and maintain terrorist pressure in J&K cannot be missed. He and the Pakistan army have always been together on this page.

According to intelligence reports, soon after taking over as Prime Minister in 2013, the Nawaz Sharif government cleared a new ‘Kashmir strategy’ and set up a ‘Kashmir cell’ in his office. The purpose of the cell was to keep track of developments in J&K. The other related fact in his current tenure is that as his political position weakens, he comes more and more under pressure from the Pakistan army, the ISI and the terror outfits of Punjab and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

After the Modi government came into power, the last week of August 2014 saw the first major ceasefire violation in which Pakistani troops resorted to small arms fire and 82 mm mortar shelling (such mortars have never been used on this stretch ever since the India-Pakistan war in 1971) of nearly 35 Border Security Force posts, from Samba to Akhnoor along the international border. This was responded to in the usual manner. After four days of firefight, para-military commanders of both sides met and agreed to maintain the ceasefire.

This incident was followed by the Pakistani High Commissioner meeting J&K secessionists despite being warned by the Indian government not to do so. The Indian government reacted sharply. It cancelled the Foreign Secretaries' meeting. Soon after, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif raised the J&K issue in the United Nation General Assembly on September 26, 2014. He earned a sharp rebuke from Prime Minister Modi at the same forum the next day. Modi made it clear that “Raising it at the UN won't resolve bilateral issues.”

This is where Pakistan and its army went wrong. Without taking into consideration the Indian government's revised J&K policy and resolve, it continued with its attempt to increase pressure on the new Indian regime. In a major skirmish this time, the Pakistan army and Rangers targeted the entire LoC south of the Pir Panjal Range and the civilian population and towns along the international border. This engagement of soft Indian targets after October 2, 2014, left no choice with India except to retaliate with force. The Modi government could neither afford dilution of its policy nor be seen giving in to pressure of violence. After analysing earlier incidents of ceasefire violation, it had already given greater autonomy and escalation dominance/control to local military commanders. The forceful response was evident on the ground as well as in the political rhetoric. Pakistan was shocked by the massive retaliation. It had failed to appreciate the new Indian government's strength in public and Parliament, and that of its armed forces. Even more importantly, the change in its leadership! Such failures can be a fatal flaw in any armed conflict. The important lesson from Kargil had been forgotten.

What can we foresee in the coming days?

Will the Pakistan army give up needling India on the LoC or in J & K? I do not think so. As long as it is in the driving seat without being accountable to the public and political leadership, it will continue with its anti-India programmes without pushing it to the level of a war-like situation. With further weakening of Nawaz Sharif domestically, the Pakistan army will enjoy greater autonomy. Attempts at cross-border infiltration and 'tension' on the border can be expected to go up further. The Pakistan army would also be looking to the strategic advantage when the US troops leave Afghanistan, which would enable it to use its 'strategic asset' (militant groups) in larger numbers. It would also push the Pakistan government to raise the J&K issue in all global forums.

Will the November 2003 ceasefire come to an end? Unlikely! The governments in India and Pakistan do realise that the ceasefire, which remains ‘on sometimes and off sometimes’, is better than not having one at all. There is much pressure from the civilian population on both sides. That notwithstanding, the Indian government needs to consider safer habitat for people living close to the international border and the LoC.

India will have to remain alert on the border/LoC without closing its window(s) for purposeful negotiations or allowing the dilution of its revised policy. It will have to remain prepared for increased contingencies along the LoC and cross-border terrorism. The government must ensure that the synergy among all relevant stake-holding institutions — the joint services, ministries concerned, intelligence agencies, the NSAB, the NSCS, and within the CCS — remains high.