http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/sunday-pioneer/special/pakistans-kashmir-gambit.html
Sunday, 19 October 2014 | Col Vivek Chadha (retd) |
It is clear that India is in a position to manage status quo in J&K. It is also evident that Pakistan is in no position to alter it. Therefore, the policy of employing terrorism as state policy, firing on the borders and terrorism in the hinterland will only further weaken and isolate Pakistan, says Col Vivek Chadha (retd)
The recent firing on both the international border (IB) and line of control (LoC) sectors has been seen as an India-Pakistan standoff. This in many ways is a misrepresentation and misinterpretation of reality. The situation on the borders is a continuation of Pakistan’s attempt to change status quo, wherein it wants to seize Jammu and Kashmir, irrespective of the means employed. This is evident both from its long-term strategy and the recent incidents.
The statement of Bilawal Bhutto on September 19, however naive it may sound, is symbolic of this deep-rooted manifestation amongst the Pakistani power brokers. Even as Pakistan pursues this agenda through state-sponsored terrorism, it wants to use talks to keep up the facade of congeniality. Conversely, India’s robust response on the borders and the decision to call the bluff on the inevitability of talks, despite provocations, indicates a shift in Government policy and security strategy.
PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC CALCULUS
Pakistan’s failure to wrest J&K, despite three wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, underscored the futility of conventional conflicts as a means to gain territory. Worse, the defeat and division of Pakistan as a result of the 1971 war, left in its wake a deep sense of humiliation. The failure to occupy Siachen Glacier further aggravated the feeling of being dispossessed by India, of what was incorrectly seen as an area belonging to Pakistan. An attempt was made to snatch through proxy war what was lost as a result of popular sentiment and defeat on the battlefield. While this strategy did not achieve fruition in Punjab in the Eighties, J&K presented yet another opportunity for Pakistan. A twin objective was followed by keeping the LoC on the boil and the State unhinged through an endless series of terrorist strikes. This was accompanied by repeated calls for international intervention despite the bilateral nature of the issue in accordance with the Simla agreement of 1972 and Lahore Declaration of 1999. This strategy seemed to be succeeding until a revamp of defensive deployment limited the ability of terrorists to infiltrate through the LoC and the success of counter-terrorist operations contained terrorism within the State. And finally, the growing understanding of Pakistan’s status as the epicentre of transnational terrorism brought the international community face to face with long-neglected realities.
This frustrated the attempts of Pakistani backroom ISI agents and the army to control violence levels as was possible in the past. The only choice left for destabilising J&K and bring it back into international focus was to look for alternative areas which could be activated militarily along with simultaneous terrorist strikes. This manifested in the recent increase in ceasefire violations by Pakistan along the IB sector of J&K (called working boundary by Pakistan) and an increase in infiltration attempts by terrorists along with sensational strikes.
The attack on the army camp at Samba in September 2013 is a case in point as is the discovery of a tunnel in May 2014 in the same sector. Ceasefire violations along the IB sector in J&K also witnessed a sharp increase after the Narendra Modi Government took charge on May 26, as confirmed by the Defence Minister, as early as July 22 on the floor of Parliament, giving credence to this argument.
In order to understand the actions of the Pakistani state it is important to relate them to the status of its army and its linkage with Kashmir in particular and India in general. The raison d’être of the Pakistani army is the imagined existential threat from India and the unification of Kashmir with Pakistan. This dual bogey has ensured decades of exaggerated funding and the position and prestige that the establishment enjoys in the country.
Therefore, even if the Kashmir issue is resolved in future, the Pakistani army will ensure that India remains a credible threat in popular perception in order to retain its position of prominence. Despite an understanding of this reality amongst informed circles, the forces of democracy are not strong enough to redesignate the role and responsibility of the Pakistani army. This reinforces the inevitability of existing realities in the foreseeable future, making the expectation of rational thinking on Pakistan’s part nothing more than an illusion.
WHY THE GAMBIT IS LIKELY TO FAIL
Pakistan has misread the evolving situation in a number of ways. First, the Pakistan-sponsored proxy war in J&K is increasingly afflicted by the law of diminishing returns. There is increasing frustration amongst the people of the State, who can perceive the futility of violence and its impact on their daily lives. This has led to local cooperation in the provision of intelligence, dramatically bringing down the average lifespan of terrorists. Second, given the residual strength of terrorists, Pakistan is not in a position to calibrate the tempo of violence any longer. This has denuded their support base even amongst radical elements, which see with growing frustration the failure of Pakistani policy. Third, the drop in infiltration figures clearly points towards the increasing challenges of crossing the LoC. Despite a clear attempt to enhance the tempo of operations, as is evident from infiltration attempts, success has eluded terrorists. Fourth, attempts to flare up the LoC have also reached a plateau, short of abrogating the ceasefire. These futile violations have failed to cause expected casualties and worse, the retaliation has been severe, delivering calibrated punishment on each occasion. The army took adequate steps in the recent past to send a message in the manner and language that is best understood by an errant and incorrigible force. Fifth, the attempt of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to internationalise the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly not only failed to gain traction, it was also brushed aside with the minimal attention and focus that it deserved.
Subsequent attempts after the recent incidents of firing to seek international intervention too have been rejected, with re-emphasis on the option of bilateral negotiations. Sixth, Pakistan’s decision to shift focus from the LoC to the IB, in a bid to regain moral ascendency, has not only been blunted but also accompanied by a clear indication of the approach to violations in future. The response has been cohesive and has simultaneously emanated from all quarters within the Government and security forces. It best reflects the sentiment of the country, which is no longer willing to sacrifice lives for what seems to be elusive peace.
MODI GOVERNMENT’S POLICY
The Modi Government has attempted to de-hyphenate a number of linkages, which were artificially created to obfuscate reality. First, there have been voices demanding that India and Pakistan work together against the scrooge of terrorism that affects both countries. This is a misconception since terrorism in Pakistan is its own creation, while India is afflicted by a proxy war from across the border. Second, the fallacy of the need for India and Pakistan to work together to bring peace on the border too has been rejected. It is Pakistan that wants to alter status quo by a combination of terrorism in India and adventurism on the borders. Therefore, the question of India reducing tension is irrelevant.
At the strategic level, the overall policy of the Government is following a dual track initiative. While on one hand, lasting and permanent peace with a united and strong Pakistan is a desirable end state; on the other is the challenge to maintain a delicate balance which ensures that the pursuit of peace will not be at the cost of sacrificing immediate national security objectives. The initiative to pursue proactive bilateralism, witnessed in the invitations to neighbouring heads of state during the Prime Minister’s swearing-in ceremony, indicates the willingness to take the first step towards lasting peace. However, there is an equally resolute policy which will not allow Pakistan and its proxies to undermine the seriousness of this initiative through repeated pin pricks aimed at testing this resolve.
This was reiterated by the Prime Minister during his UN General Assembly address, where he said that talks can only be conducted “in a peaceful atmosphere without the shadow of terrorism”. The policy of the Government has also clearly indicated that deterrence will be practised on the basis of calibrated but robust punishment. It is this policy which Defence Minister Arun Jaitley termed as making “the cost of military adventurism unaffordable”.
These objectives have translated into actions, which are unfolding in a series of tactical responses. The actions of the army on the LoC and Border Security Force (BSF) on the IB sector are indicative of these guidelines. The freedom of action witnessed, guided by reasonable escalation control measures, is already reflecting in greater unity of effort and cohesion at all levels. Over a period of time, improved responses will be accompanied by better capacities on the basis of faster induction of weapons and equipment, force multipliers and arterial networks to support mobility.
The domestic response is also likely to get international support for the fight against terrorism, of which the ongoing proxy war is an integral part. According to the joint statement during the Prime Minister’s visit to the US, for the first time both India and the US agreed to jointly fight terrorist groups like the Haqqani network, besides Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Dawood network, indicating the desire to raise the level of partnership to fight Pakistan-based and supported groups.
The present exchanges have only reinforced that Pakistan is not only the epicentre of terrorism, but also an immature nuclear armed country, which will indulge in nuclear blackmail to cover its military inadequacies. This was yet again evident from the statement of Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif on October 9.
The Government has repeatedly brought this to light during bilateral and multilateral exchanges with foreign Governments, since both threats have a transnational character. In addition, it is likely that this bluff will be called through a policy of robust response to cross-border adventurism.
Last, while India is committed to peace, this cannot be treated as a sign of weakness. There are likely to be a larger set of policy options on the table which can further explore the doctrine of deterrence by punishment unless Pakistan rejects violence and terrorism and follows the path of negotiations in the spirit of the Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration.
POLICY OPTIONS
India should take forward the agenda of the Modi Government with care and caution. Every policy decision must serve as an intermediate step in the pursuit of a considered and deliberated end state. Therefore, the decision to suspend talks or a robust stand on the LoC should be accompanied by contingencies at various steps of the escalation ladder, including sensational strikes at emotive targets in the Indian hinterland by Pakistan-supported groups. Each tactical step taken by India must be a part of a larger strategic game plan. This will be strengthened by collective decision-making, including all political parties, which must resolve to put aside their differences on is-sues of national security.
Talks are a priority and a desirable option. However, these must not be conducted under any compulsions or pressure. The honourable option of strengthening pro-democracy forces in Pakistan cannot be exercised at the cost of repeatedly condoning its army’s military adventurism. An Indian proverb aptly says that for the friendship of two, the patience of one is required.
The reality of present times clearly indicates that Pakistan, given the influence of its army, is in no position to pursue long-term peace. It should be India’s strategic choice to patiently manage its security in this environment in the interim even as it focuses on strengthening its economy. In doing so, first, the Government must retain the option to diversify the sub-conventional canvas as and when the voice of reason displays its inherent limitations. This should be accompanied by a national endeavour to build capacities, hitherto fore neither contemplated nor employed. Second, India needs to spearhead a coalition of the willing amongst like-minded countries against Pakistan in order to restrain its policy of using terrorism as state policy. Third, India should cater to future triggers both on the borders and within the country along with options to act with justifiable force.
Even as India tackles Pakistan as a short-term irritant, the focus must not shift from long-term threats and objectives, which can constrain India within the South Asian context. This includes building the county’s economic strength, delivery of its benefits to a large cross-section of population and enhancing the capacity of state structures, including the armed forces.
It is abundantly clear that India is in a position to manage status quo. It is also evident that Pakistan is in no position to alter it. Therefore, the policy of employing terrorism as state policy, firing on the borders and terrorism in the hinterland will only further weaken and isolate Pakistan. Its status is likely to slip from that of an irritant to a pariah. Therefore, the ball is in Pakistan’s court, if it desires an equitable solution to existing disputes.
The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
Sunday, 19 October 2014 | Col Vivek Chadha (retd) |
It is clear that India is in a position to manage status quo in J&K. It is also evident that Pakistan is in no position to alter it. Therefore, the policy of employing terrorism as state policy, firing on the borders and terrorism in the hinterland will only further weaken and isolate Pakistan, says Col Vivek Chadha (retd)
The recent firing on both the international border (IB) and line of control (LoC) sectors has been seen as an India-Pakistan standoff. This in many ways is a misrepresentation and misinterpretation of reality. The situation on the borders is a continuation of Pakistan’s attempt to change status quo, wherein it wants to seize Jammu and Kashmir, irrespective of the means employed. This is evident both from its long-term strategy and the recent incidents.
The statement of Bilawal Bhutto on September 19, however naive it may sound, is symbolic of this deep-rooted manifestation amongst the Pakistani power brokers. Even as Pakistan pursues this agenda through state-sponsored terrorism, it wants to use talks to keep up the facade of congeniality. Conversely, India’s robust response on the borders and the decision to call the bluff on the inevitability of talks, despite provocations, indicates a shift in Government policy and security strategy.
PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC CALCULUS
Pakistan’s failure to wrest J&K, despite three wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, underscored the futility of conventional conflicts as a means to gain territory. Worse, the defeat and division of Pakistan as a result of the 1971 war, left in its wake a deep sense of humiliation. The failure to occupy Siachen Glacier further aggravated the feeling of being dispossessed by India, of what was incorrectly seen as an area belonging to Pakistan. An attempt was made to snatch through proxy war what was lost as a result of popular sentiment and defeat on the battlefield. While this strategy did not achieve fruition in Punjab in the Eighties, J&K presented yet another opportunity for Pakistan. A twin objective was followed by keeping the LoC on the boil and the State unhinged through an endless series of terrorist strikes. This was accompanied by repeated calls for international intervention despite the bilateral nature of the issue in accordance with the Simla agreement of 1972 and Lahore Declaration of 1999. This strategy seemed to be succeeding until a revamp of defensive deployment limited the ability of terrorists to infiltrate through the LoC and the success of counter-terrorist operations contained terrorism within the State. And finally, the growing understanding of Pakistan’s status as the epicentre of transnational terrorism brought the international community face to face with long-neglected realities.
This frustrated the attempts of Pakistani backroom ISI agents and the army to control violence levels as was possible in the past. The only choice left for destabilising J&K and bring it back into international focus was to look for alternative areas which could be activated militarily along with simultaneous terrorist strikes. This manifested in the recent increase in ceasefire violations by Pakistan along the IB sector of J&K (called working boundary by Pakistan) and an increase in infiltration attempts by terrorists along with sensational strikes.
The attack on the army camp at Samba in September 2013 is a case in point as is the discovery of a tunnel in May 2014 in the same sector. Ceasefire violations along the IB sector in J&K also witnessed a sharp increase after the Narendra Modi Government took charge on May 26, as confirmed by the Defence Minister, as early as July 22 on the floor of Parliament, giving credence to this argument.
In order to understand the actions of the Pakistani state it is important to relate them to the status of its army and its linkage with Kashmir in particular and India in general. The raison d’être of the Pakistani army is the imagined existential threat from India and the unification of Kashmir with Pakistan. This dual bogey has ensured decades of exaggerated funding and the position and prestige that the establishment enjoys in the country.
Therefore, even if the Kashmir issue is resolved in future, the Pakistani army will ensure that India remains a credible threat in popular perception in order to retain its position of prominence. Despite an understanding of this reality amongst informed circles, the forces of democracy are not strong enough to redesignate the role and responsibility of the Pakistani army. This reinforces the inevitability of existing realities in the foreseeable future, making the expectation of rational thinking on Pakistan’s part nothing more than an illusion.
WHY THE GAMBIT IS LIKELY TO FAIL
Pakistan has misread the evolving situation in a number of ways. First, the Pakistan-sponsored proxy war in J&K is increasingly afflicted by the law of diminishing returns. There is increasing frustration amongst the people of the State, who can perceive the futility of violence and its impact on their daily lives. This has led to local cooperation in the provision of intelligence, dramatically bringing down the average lifespan of terrorists. Second, given the residual strength of terrorists, Pakistan is not in a position to calibrate the tempo of violence any longer. This has denuded their support base even amongst radical elements, which see with growing frustration the failure of Pakistani policy. Third, the drop in infiltration figures clearly points towards the increasing challenges of crossing the LoC. Despite a clear attempt to enhance the tempo of operations, as is evident from infiltration attempts, success has eluded terrorists. Fourth, attempts to flare up the LoC have also reached a plateau, short of abrogating the ceasefire. These futile violations have failed to cause expected casualties and worse, the retaliation has been severe, delivering calibrated punishment on each occasion. The army took adequate steps in the recent past to send a message in the manner and language that is best understood by an errant and incorrigible force. Fifth, the attempt of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to internationalise the Kashmir issue at the UN General Assembly not only failed to gain traction, it was also brushed aside with the minimal attention and focus that it deserved.
Subsequent attempts after the recent incidents of firing to seek international intervention too have been rejected, with re-emphasis on the option of bilateral negotiations. Sixth, Pakistan’s decision to shift focus from the LoC to the IB, in a bid to regain moral ascendency, has not only been blunted but also accompanied by a clear indication of the approach to violations in future. The response has been cohesive and has simultaneously emanated from all quarters within the Government and security forces. It best reflects the sentiment of the country, which is no longer willing to sacrifice lives for what seems to be elusive peace.
MODI GOVERNMENT’S POLICY
The Modi Government has attempted to de-hyphenate a number of linkages, which were artificially created to obfuscate reality. First, there have been voices demanding that India and Pakistan work together against the scrooge of terrorism that affects both countries. This is a misconception since terrorism in Pakistan is its own creation, while India is afflicted by a proxy war from across the border. Second, the fallacy of the need for India and Pakistan to work together to bring peace on the border too has been rejected. It is Pakistan that wants to alter status quo by a combination of terrorism in India and adventurism on the borders. Therefore, the question of India reducing tension is irrelevant.
At the strategic level, the overall policy of the Government is following a dual track initiative. While on one hand, lasting and permanent peace with a united and strong Pakistan is a desirable end state; on the other is the challenge to maintain a delicate balance which ensures that the pursuit of peace will not be at the cost of sacrificing immediate national security objectives. The initiative to pursue proactive bilateralism, witnessed in the invitations to neighbouring heads of state during the Prime Minister’s swearing-in ceremony, indicates the willingness to take the first step towards lasting peace. However, there is an equally resolute policy which will not allow Pakistan and its proxies to undermine the seriousness of this initiative through repeated pin pricks aimed at testing this resolve.
This was reiterated by the Prime Minister during his UN General Assembly address, where he said that talks can only be conducted “in a peaceful atmosphere without the shadow of terrorism”. The policy of the Government has also clearly indicated that deterrence will be practised on the basis of calibrated but robust punishment. It is this policy which Defence Minister Arun Jaitley termed as making “the cost of military adventurism unaffordable”.
These objectives have translated into actions, which are unfolding in a series of tactical responses. The actions of the army on the LoC and Border Security Force (BSF) on the IB sector are indicative of these guidelines. The freedom of action witnessed, guided by reasonable escalation control measures, is already reflecting in greater unity of effort and cohesion at all levels. Over a period of time, improved responses will be accompanied by better capacities on the basis of faster induction of weapons and equipment, force multipliers and arterial networks to support mobility.
The domestic response is also likely to get international support for the fight against terrorism, of which the ongoing proxy war is an integral part. According to the joint statement during the Prime Minister’s visit to the US, for the first time both India and the US agreed to jointly fight terrorist groups like the Haqqani network, besides Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Dawood network, indicating the desire to raise the level of partnership to fight Pakistan-based and supported groups.
The present exchanges have only reinforced that Pakistan is not only the epicentre of terrorism, but also an immature nuclear armed country, which will indulge in nuclear blackmail to cover its military inadequacies. This was yet again evident from the statement of Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif on October 9.
The Government has repeatedly brought this to light during bilateral and multilateral exchanges with foreign Governments, since both threats have a transnational character. In addition, it is likely that this bluff will be called through a policy of robust response to cross-border adventurism.
Last, while India is committed to peace, this cannot be treated as a sign of weakness. There are likely to be a larger set of policy options on the table which can further explore the doctrine of deterrence by punishment unless Pakistan rejects violence and terrorism and follows the path of negotiations in the spirit of the Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration.
POLICY OPTIONS
India should take forward the agenda of the Modi Government with care and caution. Every policy decision must serve as an intermediate step in the pursuit of a considered and deliberated end state. Therefore, the decision to suspend talks or a robust stand on the LoC should be accompanied by contingencies at various steps of the escalation ladder, including sensational strikes at emotive targets in the Indian hinterland by Pakistan-supported groups. Each tactical step taken by India must be a part of a larger strategic game plan. This will be strengthened by collective decision-making, including all political parties, which must resolve to put aside their differences on is-sues of national security.
Talks are a priority and a desirable option. However, these must not be conducted under any compulsions or pressure. The honourable option of strengthening pro-democracy forces in Pakistan cannot be exercised at the cost of repeatedly condoning its army’s military adventurism. An Indian proverb aptly says that for the friendship of two, the patience of one is required.
The reality of present times clearly indicates that Pakistan, given the influence of its army, is in no position to pursue long-term peace. It should be India’s strategic choice to patiently manage its security in this environment in the interim even as it focuses on strengthening its economy. In doing so, first, the Government must retain the option to diversify the sub-conventional canvas as and when the voice of reason displays its inherent limitations. This should be accompanied by a national endeavour to build capacities, hitherto fore neither contemplated nor employed. Second, India needs to spearhead a coalition of the willing amongst like-minded countries against Pakistan in order to restrain its policy of using terrorism as state policy. Third, India should cater to future triggers both on the borders and within the country along with options to act with justifiable force.
Even as India tackles Pakistan as a short-term irritant, the focus must not shift from long-term threats and objectives, which can constrain India within the South Asian context. This includes building the county’s economic strength, delivery of its benefits to a large cross-section of population and enhancing the capacity of state structures, including the armed forces.
It is abundantly clear that India is in a position to manage status quo. It is also evident that Pakistan is in no position to alter it. Therefore, the policy of employing terrorism as state policy, firing on the borders and terrorism in the hinterland will only further weaken and isolate Pakistan. Its status is likely to slip from that of an irritant to a pariah. Therefore, the ball is in Pakistan’s court, if it desires an equitable solution to existing disputes.
The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
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