By The Editors,
Oct. 8, 2014
An Iraqi Air Force Cessna 208 flies over Iraq on a training sortie, Nov. 9, 2008 (U.S. Air Force photo).
Earlier today, fighters from the so-called Islamic State (IS) shot down an Iraqi military helicopter. In an email interview, Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and former senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq from 2006-2011 who led a RAND study entitled “Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver and Disestablishment of United Sates Forces —Iraq,” discussed the current air capabilities of the Iraqi military and its significance for both internal security and external defense.
WPR: What air assets does the Iraqi army currently have, and what purchases—on order and planned—are expected to expand its air capabilities in the near term?
Rick Brennan: The preponderance of the Iraqi military’s air capability resides in the helicopter fleet controlled by the Iraqi Army Air Corps. The current fleet consists of three (of six planned) Mi-35M Hind and three (of 30 planned) Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters purchased from Russia. While Iraq planned to purchase 24 AH-64 Apache helicopters from the United States, Congress delayed the purchase because of fears they would be used to target civilians. The Army Air Corps’ operational fleet also includes: 30 Bell-417 armed scout helicopters, 10 Bell-206 light reconnaissance helicopters, 60 Mi-17 Hip medium utility helicopters and 15 UH-1 Iroquois helicopters configured for medevac missions.
The biggest shortfall in Iraqi air capabilities is its fixed-wing fleet. In 2011, Iraq ordered 36 F-16s from the United States, but none have been delivered. As a result of the current threat from IS, Iraq recently procured 12 used Su-25 air-to-ground attack fighters from Russia and Iran. The Iraqi air force also has 15 medium transport aircraft which includes 9 C-130 Hercules aircraft. Finally, the Iraqi air force has 37 airframes dedicated for ground reconnaissance, to include three Cessna-208 Caravans that have been modified to carry Hellfire missiles.
WPR: How well-trained are Iraqi pilots, and how capable are ground and air forces of engaging in joint operations?
Brennan: The capability of Iraqi helicopter pilots is considered good for the region; however, their ability to conduct night operations is extremely limited. As discussed in the 2013 RAND study, “Ending the U.S. War in Iraq,” the Army Air Corps has demonstrated an ability to conduct air movement of ground forces and casualty evacuation, but has very limited capability to provide air-to-ground attack aviation support. As for the air force, it has the capability to conduct troop movements and provide limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). As of August 2014, only two of the 18 Iraqi pilots that are being trained at a U.S. Air Force base near Tucson, Arizona, had progressed far enough to be certified as a lead pilot. It is most likely that the Su-25s recently provided to the Iraqi air force by Russia and Iran are being piloted by Iranians. Because of limited training, the Iraqi air force has virtually no capability to provide air-to-ground tactical support of troops in contact.
WPR: How long before the Iraqi air force is able to effectively control its airspace, and what implications does that have in the meantime?
Brennan: In order to control its airspace a country needs an ability to “watch, warn and respond.” This requires a nation-wide RADAR and ISR system, a networked communication system and an integrated air-defense system that includes ground-based air-defense weapons and fighter aircraft able to intercept. Given the current and projected capabilities of the Iraqi air force, Iraq probably will not be able to control its own airspace until 2020. Iraq currently has the ability to watch its airspace, but limited ability to warn of incursions and no ability to respond. Until it has the full range of capabilities, Iraq will not be able to prevent other nations from unlawfully transiting its airspace—as Iran has been doing in support of the Assad regime in Syria since 2012.
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