September 30, 2014
Enough with “Boots on the Ground:” What Will the U.S. Advisory Mission in Iraq Look Like?
A U.S. and Iraqi soldier take part in a shooting exercise at an Iraqi military base south of Baghdad August 30, 2010. (Saad Shalash/Courtesy Reuters)
A U.S. and Iraqi soldier take part in a shooting exercise at an Iraqi military base south of Baghdad August 30, 2010. (Saad Shalash/Courtesy Reuters)
This commentary comes courtesy of Captain Robert A. Newson, CFR’s U.S. Navy fellow and a SEAL officer. CAPT Newson recently served Special Operations Command (Forward) Commander in Yemen 2010-2012, where he helped coordinate military advising efforts in the region. He argues that the reintroduction of U.S. advisory personnel to Iraq does not automatically set the military on a “slippery slope” to full-scale intervention. Rather, the chance of escalation will be determined by three factors: the total required forces, the concept of operations, and any applicable mission restraints. This question will become only more important with late-breaking news of anti-ISIS air strikes’ expansion into Syria.
While some commentators have been quick to warn Americans that the reintroduction of U.S. personnel in Iraq is putting us on a “slippery slope” towards a full-scale intervention, the history of military advisory efforts shows that the Pentagon has frequently employed limited troops with success throughout the last few decades-and without a follow-on invasion. Past operations in El Salvador and Colombia and current efforts in the Philippines, Yemen, and across Africa highlight the utility of consistent, long-term, small force constructs.
The large-scale invasions of Afghanistan (100,000 personnel) and Iraq (165,000 personnel), combined with the length of these interventions, have rightfully made Americans cautious about the use of ground troops. In addition, Vietnam still looms large in our collective memory. A mission that began with dozens of Special Forces advising in Vietnam reached a high water mark of 525,000 deployed troops and ended in ignominy and tragedy. However, the eventual open-ended commitment of U.S. resources is not the only, or even the primary, path the United States has taken to conclude advisory operations.
The U.S advisory efforts in El Salvador and Colombia are often cited as exemplar successes of these types of missions. In El Salvador (1979-1992), Congress limited the total number of long-term advisors in the country to 55. Over more than a decade of advisory assistance in El Salvador, the maximum number of troops was around 150; the additional personnel were units on shorter-term deployments. In Colombia, since 2005 U.S. military forces have been capped at 800, although they have never actually reached that number.
More recent advisory missions since 9/11 further underscore the positive impacts small numbers of troops can foster. In the Philippines, the number of deployed forces remained consistently between 500 and 600 personnel over twelve years of advisory work. In Yemen and across Africa, the numbers dedicated to long-term advisory missions are much smaller. In most of these cases, our partners are engaged in active fighting against our shared enemies. U.S. forces are not involved in combat but still face the risk of enemy attack. As committed partners, the U.S. provides assistance while acknowledging that this is host nation’s country and their fight.
The use of ill-defined terms such as “boots on the ground” or “combat troops” highlights the need for clarity and distracts from the real issues which include: the total of forces required to accomplish the task, the concept of operations for the overall mission plan, and restraints on the activities of the troops involved. There are a range of options and pros and cons to each. In all of the Pentagon’s recent advisory efforts, the U.S. military has operated across the spectrum of each of these issues and found a way to make progress.
Required Forces. We will soon have roughly 1,600 military personnel deployed to Iraq. Depending on the tasking of these forces, this could be the largest commitment of troops in the history of U.S. advisory efforts since 1960 in Vietnam. It won’t be clear if this number is sufficient for the task until they begin their work in earnest, but much will depend on what they are directed and allowed to do and where. It is important to remember-and it seems many have forgotten-that in Afghanistan, just 100 Green Berets initially partnered with the Northern Alliance and U.S. air power in late 2001 to astonishing effect. Small numbers of SOF advisors, uncontested air power, and super-enabled partner forces are ideally suited for this fight.
However, there are issues beyond the number of forces. Much more depends on our partner’s will, commitment, and focus than on our ability to enable them. We should be ready to walk away from bad partners and find better ones. Additionally, in this complex mix of stakeholders, early success can be derailed by spoilers such as Iran and their Shiite militia surrogates or infighting among the partner forces. Expecting and addressing inevitable spoilers should be part of the game plan.
Concept of Operations. The Green Berets advising the Northern Alliance were engaged in direct combat in small numbers, directing U.S. strikes, assisting with operational planning, strengthening the will of our partners, and continually assessing the motivations and capabilities of partner leaders and forces. This does not appear to be the concept that is being contemplated for ISIS. Combat advising, similar to our early experience in Afghanistan, provides the greatest opportunity for military success against ISIS and will produce greater insight into the situation on the ground, will minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, and increase our ability to avoid manipulation by competing factions on the ground. However, it also increases the risk to U.S. forces and can divert responsibility away from the Iraqis and regional partners where it rightly belongs.
Restraints. In military operations, restraints are common and might include restricted fire areas, prohibitions on collateral damage, restricted areas of travel or operations, or other limiting rules of engagement. Restraints can be appropriate and necessary, and have proven useful in past advising efforts such as in El Salvador. While force caps and other limitations can negatively impact the mission, these restraints also can positively contribute to political and informational objectives. For instance force caps can mitigate local anti-American sentiment, keep the onus on the host nation government to take responsibility for action, and might limit the enemy narrative concerning occupation.
Additionally, these restraints may assist in maintaining U.S. congressional or popular support. These may be as or more important as military objectives. If there are restraints on U.S. combat advisors-as there are in the Philippines, Yemen, and other locations-U.S. advisors need to be as close to the front lines as possible. This proximity will allow them to fly tactical UAS reconnaissance missions, support tactical planning, and develop insights and alternative sources of intelligence to reduce our dependence on information filtered by our partners.
Finally, advising should not be limited to one type of unit. In Yemen, our efforts were hampered by an over-reliance on partnering with Yemeni counterterrorist forces and insufficient engagement with the conventional forces that did the majority of the fighting. In the end, restraints may be appropriate and useful. However, they will not completely remove the risk of death and injury to U.S. troops. In the Philippines, since 2002, two U.S. service members have been killed by IEDs, ten died in a helicopter crash, and more died in non-operational accidents. These are dangerous missions and the enemy will attack U.S. forces regardless of whether the U.S. troops are considered combat troops, advisors, or trainers.
Despite widespread perceptions and ill-defined terms of reference, we should not forget that the United States has successfully conducted small force, long-term advise and assist campaigns that never evolved into large-scale operations. The slope is not always slippery.
Captain Robert A. Newson is a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer who recently led strategy and concept development for the Naval Special Warfare Command. Previously, he commanded Special Operations Command (Forward) in Yemen and NSW Support Activity, a cross-functional intelligence operations command, and served as director of the Joint Interagency Task Force – Counter Terrorism. Newson is a graduate of the University of Kansas and the Naval Postgraduate School (with distinction. He is a PhD candidate at the University of San Diego. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government.
Posted in Guest Post, Military History, Military Operations
No comments:
Post a Comment