China's Deadly Miscalculation in the Making

By Joseph Bosco

Second, our media and politicians keep telling the world that Americans are war-weary except—at least for a while and from the air against monstrous ISIL, which happens to lack nuclear-armed missiles. Would Taiwanese being slaughtered by Chinese planes and missiles arouse the same public and official revulsion as the beheading of two Americans when missiles could also be directed at “hundreds of U.S. cities” as another PLA general threatened? Beijing presently guesses not, a very risky assumption on its part.

Third, there’s something called the doctrine of strategic ambiguity by which the U.S. will not state outright that it will defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Instead, we say “it would depend on the circumstances.” Possibly we have said tougher things privately so only the Chinese can hear and can decide whether they just heard a credible red line. In diplomacy and deterrence, words matter, and words said publicly and unequivocally by an American president or secretary of state or defense would matter a lot.

Had the right words been used in December 1995 when China’s officials directly asked Assistant Secretary Joseph Nye about a possible U.S. response to an attack on Taiwan, perhaps Beijing would not have been encouraged to spend the next two decades building the capabilities Mr. Axe ably describes. That is, if they hadn’t told his interlocutors that “circumstances” (rather than strategic principle) would dictate U.S. policy, maybe the Chinese would not have set about with such determination to create the uncomfortable circumstances we now confront.

Fourth, China was an observer, and a participant, in America’s protracted limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, and learned much about the sustainability of U.S. commitment in such conflicts.

Fifth, Beijing has witnessed Washington’s handling of Russia’s Ukraine aggression and the U.S. preoccupation with “off ramps” along the escalatory ladder, even in the context of economic sanctions. In a kinetic situation over Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, or the South China Sea, China would be more than willing to offer face-saving off ramps to the U.S.

Mr. Axe aptly, but incompletely, surmises:

Beijing believes it can attack Taiwan or another neighbor while also bloodlessly deterring U.S. intervention. It would do so by deploying such overwhelmingly strong military forces—ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, jet fighters and the like—that Washington dare not get involved.

What he fails to note is that China is deploying more than capabilities. It is demonstrating that its will to take Taiwan (and other places) is stronger than America’s will to defend them. The problem is not, as the article’s title suggests, that China thinks it can defeat America in battle. It is that it believes it can defeat America without battle. 

For that reason, the expert Mr. Axe cites is wrong in saying: “We should not adopt an air-sea strike plan against the mainland, because that is a sure way to start World War IV.” That assumes China’s leaders are suicidal. They are not, and the Cold War threat of massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction proved effective in preventing not only nuclear war, but major conventional wars.

Removing ambiguity about U.S. commitment may sound provocative but would instead have a calming and cooling impact. Unclear intentions and wavering U.S. will invite Chinese adventurism.

As Henry Kissinger says of the Korean War, “We did not expect the attack; China did not expect our response.” Of such miscalculation, devastating wars are made.