Change of guard in Afghanistan

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20141009/edit.htm#5

Opportunities and concerns as Karzai relinquishes office

G Parthasarathy

Mr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (centre), who has taken over as Afghanistan's President from Mr Hamid Karzai

EVEN as Prime Minister Narendra Modi was cautioning Americans in New York against any precipitate withdrawal, Afghanistan was preparing for a momentous change in Kabul. Mr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai was taking over as Afghanistan's President from Mr. Hamid Karzai. Despite efforts to malign him personally and destabilise his government by worthy Americans like Peter Galbraith and Richard Holbrooke and a vicious propaganda barrage from Pakistan, President Karzai succeeded in establishing a measure of effective governance in Afghanistan. He skillfully brought together the country's fractious ethnic groups, to deal with challenges posed by the Pakistan-backed Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network and their Islamist allies, including Al-Qaida.

The change of guard from Mr. Karzai to Mr. Ghani was not smooth. The first round of elections in April produced no clear winner. The second round in June, which was expected to be close, produced a stunning result. Mr. Ghani secured an astonishingly large victory over his rival, Mr. Abdullah Abdullah, a former Foreign Minister. Mr. Abdullah had a substantial lead in the first round of elections, securing 46% of the vote, against 32% for Ghani. A report by the European Union declared the second round of voting as “massively rigged”. A US report held that it was mathematically impossible for Mr. Ghani to have secured the margin of victory that he did. With controversy over the electoral result spiralling out of control and assuming divisive ethnic dimensions, the Americans brokered and virtually imposed an uneasy compromise between Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah.

Mr. Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as President and Mr. Abdullah as “Chief Executive,” a post which has no constitutional sanctity. The road map for this transition includes the convening of Loya Jirga to convert the post of “Chief Executive” into that of an “Executive Prime Minister”. It remains to be seen whether the contemplated changes with two separate centres of executive authority can provide stable and effective governance in a country beset with long-standing ethnic rivalries and tensions. Within 24 hours of the assumption of power by President Ashraf Ghani and “Chief Executive” Abdullah, Afghanistan and the US inked a security agreement, which will result in the 9,800 US troops remaining in Afghanistan beyond 2014 for a training and counter insurgency role. An agreement giving immunity to foreign forces against prosecution in Afghan courts was also inked. The agreements will allow the Americans to retain air bases across Afghanistan.

Apart from formal statements by Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz and the Foreign Office welcoming the agreements, a meeting of the top brass of the Pakistan army also welcomed this development as a “good move for peace in Afghanistan”. This is an astonishing turnaround as Pakistan’s establishment has been uneasy with the American presence in Afghanistan. It comes at a time when 80,000 Pakistani troops and paramilitary, backed by air power, are pounding positions of the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan, in an operation resulting in an estimated one million tribal Pashtuns fleeing their homes. At the same time, the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban have been on the rampage this year across Afghanistan, prompting the soft-spoken President Ghani to say: “We ask the opponents of the government, especially the Taliban and Hizb e Islami, to enter political talks”.

Pakistan's massive military offensive in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan has been selectively undertaken. Long-term ISI “assets”, including the Haqqani network, the Mullah Omar-led Afghan Taliban and even the Al Zawahiri-led Al-Qaida have evidently received safe passage and been accommodated in ISI safe houses. They will be kept prepared to move into Afghanistan at a time of Pakistan’s choosing. Afghanistan is going to remain dependant on NATO for military and economic funding for the foreseeable future. NATO funding of Afghanistan’s military of $5.1 billion annually till 2017 has been agreed upon. A similar amount of external funding will be required for Afghanistan’s administrative and developmental needs.

The joint declaration issued after the Obama-Modi Summit spoke of “dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical support for terrorist and criminal networks such as Al-Qaida, Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed, D-Company and the Haqqanis”. Significantly, there is no mention in the declaration of the Mullah Omar-led Taliban, which has been primarily responsible for the killings of 2,229 American soldiers in Afghanistan, the training of terrorists for jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and for colluding with the hijackers of IC 814. It has been obvious that the Americans are keen to do a deal with the Taliban. They may piously assert that any internal reconciliation process has to be “Afghan led”. But the reality is that the Americans have sought to give the Taliban international legitimacy ever since they encouraged Qatar to host a Taliban office in Doha. While an enraged President Karzai torpedoed this American effort, President Ghani will reluctantly have to accept American moves brokered by Pakistan, to accord legitimacy and a measure of territorial control in southern Afghanistan to the Taliban.

India cannot be sanguine about these developments. A priority of the Obama Administration will be to safely take out its military equipment from Afghanistan through Pakistan. The Taliban will, therefore, be viewed more benignly than in the past. Militarily, the ISI/Taliban effort will be to seize control of large swathes of territory in southern Afghanistan, compelling a reduction of India's assistance in that part of the country. Contradictions in the priorities and compulsions of President Ghani and “Chief Executive” Abdullah in Kabul appear inevitable. Our membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will have to be utilised to fashion a more coordinated and harmonious approach with its members -- Russia, China, Iran and the Central Asian Republics. A more focused effort on developing the Port of Chah Bahar in Iran and on meeting Afghan requirements of defence equipment will be imperative. The post-9/11 “end game” for the Americans in Afghanistan is just beginning. The United States will, however, continue to significantly shape the course of developments in Afghanistan.