October 17, 2014
It is said that politics in the Middle-East are like the sand dunes of the vast desert that engulfs most of the region; fast moving, here today gone tomorrow. The present situation is therefore no exception. The sudden emergence of the ISIS, it’s lightening quick victories, its brutalities and its extensive use of the social media have caught the imagination of everyone.
For the western powers the crisis in West Asia assumed a perilous turn when on 19 August 2014 the ISIS placed on the social media the killings of western hostages, first the journalist James Foley, followed by Steven Sotloff and then on 13 September the British aid worker David Haines. These gruesome images decisively pushed US public opinion towards an expanded military role against the ISIS, persuading a reticent US President Obama to jettison his own previous convictions against further military involvement in West Asia. On 10 September President Obama threatened ‘to degrade and ultimately destroy’ the ISIS and urged the building of ‘a new coalition’ for decisive action against the elusive ISIS.
The US sponsored ‘coalition of the unwilling’ met in Jeddah on 11 September consisting of 6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and the US. The participants (excluding Turkey) agreed that: (a) the US would initiate air action against ISIS that might last for up to three years and (b) the GCC countries would finance the conflict and provide airbases and use of their air space. The ground fighting would be done in two parts: in Iraq, the Iraqi Army would re- armed and trained by US ‘advisers’ and would fight ISIS forces in alliance with the Kurdish peshmerga and ‘moderate’ Sunnis. In Syria, ‘moderate’ anti-Assad government elements would be trained in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Arab capitals. Turkey said it would not participate in the air operations. Turkey has reiterated two principal concerns in Syria: regime change in Damascus and curbing the influence of Syrian Kurds [the PYD and the YPG] who are affiliated with the PKK in Turkey. Both these interests are served by a strong ISIS, with whom Turkey maintains close ties and wishes to utilize it for promoting its objectives. Nonetheless, the Turkish decision to remain inactive against the ISIS may be a self- defeating combination of hubris and miscalculation. For similar reasons, the GCC Monarchies are reluctant to enter into a high profile ground combat role, for it is their belief that the ISIS creates more problems for the Shiites and does not harm their core interests.
US strategic objectives in the Middle-East have been over the years defined in National Security Directives issued by successive US Presidents. The common thought in almost all consists of the following 3 points. First is the safety and security of Israel. Second is the unimpeded free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and the third is that in order to attain its objectives the US will use force; if necessary.
Over the past millennium the area that now constitutes the state of Iraq has always attracted outside powers, first because of its fabled agricultural wealth and in more recent times because of its enormous oil reserves. Iraq was an artificial British creation, primarily to enable it to exploit its oil resources; for oil remains the engine that propels a state to great power status. Presently the oil reserves of Iraq are estimated at 145 billion barrels. But what makes it even more attractive are three facts. Firstly, Iraqi oil reserves are vast. Secondly, oil is found at depths of about 300-350ft; thus making it very easy and economical to extract and thirdly it is of very high quality; which means that it is relatively very economical to refine.
The British when they created Iraq continued the Ottoman tradition of ruling Iraq with the active assistance of the Sunni Arab elite. The Sunni domination of this area that precedes the Ottomans continued under the British and thereafter under successive Iraqi rulers including Saddam Hussein. It was this carefully crafted social balance that the US upset when under its occupation in 2003; the primacy of position both in the Administration as well as in the Armed Forces was turned over to the majority Shiite community. The Sunni backlash continues to this day and this disaffection has turned them towards the ISIS, which is seen as the ‘protector’ of the Sunnis against Shiite revanchism. The Shiite militias in Iraq make no distinction between the ISIS and moderate Sunnis when they go in for sectarian cleansing.
The Sunni-Shiite divide is almost as old as Islam itself. Iraq splits neatly into three sectarian areas; each dominated by the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds. The Shiite South is oil rich and so are the Kurdish areas. The Sunni North- East, now under the control of the ISIS, is bereft of any significant oil resources. The Kurds remain keen to split from Iraq, for that has been their consistent dream. What holds up the sub-division of Iraq into three distinct sectarian states are US geo-political compulsions and Turkish hostility to Kurdish independence? The US realizes that a Shiite led Iraqi South would be a major petro- state which inevitably would move towards an Iranian orbit and sphere of influence and that in turn would upset the Gulf Monarchies that are Sunni ruled, but contain Shiite majorities. The US, in the midst of delicate negotiations with Iran over its nuclear ambitions, does not wish to add to the strength of the Iranian state. Similarly adding to the strength of Iran would only further alarm the Saudis, the present premier Sunni [Wahhabi] state; who are long term US allies in the region.
Turning to Syria, who are the so-called ‘moderate’ Syrian elements that the GCC will be training? It cannot be the Free Syrian Army (FSA) for it has hardly any territory under its control and is known for venality and ineptitude. The US ‘strategy’ for arming the Syrian moderates is hardly realistic for there are hardly any moderates left. The ISIS is the strongest opposition group in Syria, and has systematically routed all its Sunni opponents, especially the poorly coordinated, poorly led Free Syrian Army (FSA). Why this ragtag force, which consistently failed to dislodge Bashar Assad for several years, should suddenly now be more trainable than the Iraqi Army, is a question that the administration has never addressed. Nor has it explained why, after refusing to arm the FSA earlier, it now finds the Free Syrians to be suitable inheritors of American arms.1.
With the US determined not to commit boots on the ground, the military defeat of ISIS, at present, is therefore neither feasible nor imminent. Neither the so-called retrained Iraqi Army, nor US air power against this powerful and motivated force will be sufficient. The Iraqi Army has once again been easily over-powered by elements of the ISIS and the remaining towns in Anbar Province such as Hit, Ramadi and Kubaisa have been captured by the ISIS. Today only Haditha and two bases [Al-Assad and Camp Mazrah] remain with the Iraqi government. The imminent fall of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, despite the use of US air power will be a military and political disaster. Ethnic and sectarian cleansing has become the norm both in Iraq and in Syria leading to widespread destruction and a horrendous loss of life.
But what of the future? There are strident voices emerging that demand that the West review its policy of toppling the Assad regime and instead make it a partner against ISIS. This has been firmly rejected by Saudi Arabia and as the US would perhaps not like to disturb its firm relations with the Saudis, this demand may ultimately be a non-starter.
It goes without saying that there can be no stability in West Asia without a general Saudi-Iranian understanding emerging. Iran would have to influence the Shiite led regimes in Syria and Iraq to shape more accommodative and inclusive governments, while the Saudis would have to wean ‘moderate’ Sunnis away from the ISIS coalition and encourage them to join the system. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Amir Abdollahian visited Riyadh on 25 August and did discuss the situation in Gaza, Syria and the ISIS with his counterparts2. Similarly, there are reports of discussions between the US and Iran to shape an Iranian role, with the latter said to be seeking concessions on the nuclear issue in return. A US-Iranian denouement after decades would be a positive force for stability in the region. Nevertheless these daunting challenges remain.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India
1. Talmiz Ahmed, The Hindu 26 September 2014.
2. Op cit. Talmiz Ahmed
No comments:
Post a Comment