Harsh V. Pant
Ashraf Ghani
With the swearing in of Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank economist, Afghanistan now has a president who has promised reform, development and an end to poverty and corruption. In September, after months of tortuous negotiations, the Afghan presidential candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ghani, finalized and signed a power-sharing pact brokered by the United States of America. The last disagreement was based on how to announce the results of the June 14 run-off election vote audit. Abdullah, who was widely assumed to be trailing Ghani, had insisted that the official percentages either not be made public at all or be altered to give him more votes. The election authorities ultimately decided not to reveal the vote tallies, but declared Ghani the president-elect just hours after the agreement was signed. Abdullah has taken on the newly created position of chief executive officer — similar in power to a prime minister — with a promise to “work together for a better future with trust and honesty.”
The international community, not surprisingly, has welcomed recent developments. The Barack Obama-led administration heaved a sigh of relief with this pact and hailed it as an “important opportunity” for unity and increased stability. Washington also congratulated Abdullah and Ghani for ending Afghanistan’s political crisis and confirmed that the United States “stands ready to work with the new administration to ensure its success.” A day after Ghani’s taking over, the Bilateral Security Agreement allowing for 9,800 US soldiers to stay in Afghanistan past 2014 to help train, equip and advise Afghan military and police forces was signed. A separate, status of forces agreement has also been signed, which permits a small Nato force to remain in Afghanistan after December 2014.
The Taliban, not surprisingly, have assailed the pact terming it a “sham” orchestrated by the US. In a statement, its spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said: “Installing Ashraf Ghani and forming a bogus administration will never be acceptable to the Afghans,” adding that: “We reject this American process and vow to continue our jihad until we free our nation from occupation and until we pave the way for a pure Islamic government.”
Defying odds, Afghanistan has now taken a major step towards its post-2014 political future. Much will now depend on how this first democratic transfer of power in the country unfolds. India will now have to articulate its own policy response. So far, the Narendra Modi-led government has been reluctant to spell out the terms of its engagement with Kabul as the political realities in Afghanistan have been in flux. Though the external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, had visited Afghanistan in September, it was largely a symbolic exercise. Swaraj underscored India’s commitment to continue extending all possible help to Afghanistan to meet various challenges, and conveyed that it will remain engaged in the country’s reconstruction activities in a significant way. Describing India as Afghanistan’s first strategic partner, Swaraj suggested that New Delhi would always share the Afghan people’s vision of a “strong” and “prosperous” Afghanistan. And she thanked the people of Afghanistan for their constant appreciation of India’s partnership with the country. For this, she received fulsome praise from her political opponents. Shashi Tharoor lauded Swaraj for underlining “India's priority by meeting up top leaders in Afghanistan” and showing that “India is not going to give up.”
Of all of India’s south Asian neighbours, the Modi government’s outreach to Kabul has been the most lackadaisical. Perhaps the reason is obvious: the political uncertainty so far in Afghanistan would have made any outreach to Kabul devoid of any real meaning. But when asked whether the new Indian government would review its policy towards Afghanistan, Swaraj had suggested that there was no question of any change in it and asserted that India would continue to help the country in its reconstruction. As Afghanistan turns a new leaf in its political destiny, the usual approach from New Delhi will not do. The argument that India will merely focus on reconstruction and developmental issues without bothering about the security implications of the rapidly changing ground realities in Afghanistan is unlikely to get India any traction. India will have to think more creatively than it has done for the past decade.
During the prime minister’s visit to the US, Afghanistan was one of the main items for discussion on the agenda. It is on the subject of Afghanistan that the US-India divergences have been getting more striking by the day. Forced by India, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, had underlined that “any political settlement must result in the Taliban breaking ties with al Qaida, renouncing violence, and accepting the Afghan constitution, including its protection for all Afghans, women and men.” The reality, however, is that the peace process is a sham and merely to get the Taliban on board, Washington agreed to let Mullah Omar come to the negotiating table without acceding to any of the “red lines.” There has been no acceptance of the Afghan constitution as was reflected in the title of the office that the Taliban opened in Doha — the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban have refused to recognize the Afghan government. There has been no cease-fire on the ground or even an attempt to delink Afghanistan from global terrorism. Moreover, even the Haqqani network has been given a seat at the table at the Pakistani army’s behest.
The Taliban are well aware of how eager Washington and London are to end the war in Afghanistan at any cost, and they are willing to play to their weakness. A myth is being sold in Washington and London as high strategy that the Taliban are interested in sharing power. There is no empirical or historical basis to support this claim. Yet it is being made repeatedly and is now almost conventional wisdom in Washington and London’s power circle. There is going to be no reconciliation out of this peace process, only a face saving interregnum for a smooth disengagement of the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan.
During his visit, Modi tried to get an assurance from Washington that Indian interests will not be compromised when it comes to American demands that the Taliban break its ties to international terrorist networks and participate in a normal political process. But it is important for New Delhi not to rely primarily on America to pull its chestnuts out of the fire in Afghanistan. New Delhi has made itself marginal in Afghanistan and it has no one but itself to blame. It should be willing to fight its own battles. The time has come for the Modi government to assert itself, as much to Washington as to its allies and adversaries in Kabul.
The author is Professor of International Relations, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College, London
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