Everything boils down to perceptions. A recent Pew poll revealed that nearly 60% of Americans believe the U.S.-led airstrikes against the Islamic State are failing. Even more would give the operation a negative review overall. An even higher majority don’t believe we have a clearly defined goal.
The air campaign, now in its third month in the skies over Iraq and Syria,averages just seven sorties a day, but is delivering ordnance at a significant rate, estimated to cost between $200 to $300 million a month. Even with limited effectiveness, the airstrikes should be gradually degrading ISIS capability. This week’s strikes in Kobani have reportedly killed more than 600 ISIS militants, allowing Kurdish fighters to rally in defense of the city.
But in the eyes of the public, we’re losing. Why?
Because we don’t have a narrative. And it’s not that ISIS is beating us to the microphone, we’re not even trying. When we do get to the microphone, the result is often broken and unreadable. The administration that blazed a trail to the White House in 2008 with an unprecedented social media campaign now struggles to define a consistent – and convincing – narrative for what we’ve dubbed “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
The public needs to understand what we’re doing and why. They need a voice of calm reason. What we’ve offered instead is incoherent resolve.
In the past generation, we’ve made great inroads toward cementing the link between tactics and strategy. From AirLand Battle doctrine to the recent publication of the Army Operating Concept, the services have applied an incredible amount of intellectual capital toward translating “tactical victories into strategic success.” But still we flounder. Why?
“We don’t have a link between strategy and policy,” according to retired Marine Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper, speaking recently on a panel addressing war termination at the Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas. “I don’t think we’ve defined our national interests.” Where NSC-68 defined our national security objectives through several administrations, we now publish a new National Security Strategy every four years, Van Riper added. That singular lack of focus prevents us from linking strategy to policy and, in turn, from building a coherent narrative that supports our national security objectives.
Awkward.
Now, circle back on our airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Are they successful? Well, that depends on how we define success. Are they effective? Again, that depends on what “right” looks like in the aftermath of a strike. Can wedestroy ISIS? That depends on whether you can actually destroy an idea. Will we follow ISIS to the “Gates of Hell”? Yeah, that one was a rhetorical question.
Without clearly defined national security objectives, it’s impossible to build a narrative. As a result, we’re relegated to daily press briefings on the outcomes of the most recent round of sorties. There is no measurable progress, just immediate battle damage assessments (“Today we destroyed 20 Toyota trucks, flattened two neighborhoods in Kobani, and killed a donkey.”). The luster of those daily briefs dulls quickly, as we saw today and were reflected in the Pew Center study.
There was a time when we could afford to take a knee and drink water, when we had the time and space to break this down “Barney-style.” But that time has come and gone. Before we lose the already waning public support we enjoy today, we need to define “success” in Iraq and Syria, establish the national security objectives that frame success, and craft our supporting narrative. This is bigger than the Department of Defense, bigger than the State Department, and it won’t be resolved with a hashtag.
ISIS has a narrative. It’s dark, violent, and oppressive. Until we can counter that narrative, we’re pushing a rope uphill. To the public, we’re failing. We owe them better.
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