Ukraine Is Running Out of Time

PUTIN’S IRREDENTIST PROJECT

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/09/12/ukraine-is-running-out-of-time/

ANDREW A. MICHTA

Putin’s goal is clear: to dismember Ukraine in whole or in part as a means of restoring Russia to great power status. The West has few opportunities left to prevent Moscow from achieving its end game.

Published on September 12, 2014

Ukraine has reached an inflection point in its war with Russia to preserve its territorial integrity. There are signs that an outright partition may not be far off. Whether it holds or not, the ceasefire with the “rebels” in eastern Ukraine, announced by President Petro Poroshenko on the margins of the NATO summit in Wales, has begun the process of Russia’s carving out yet another chunk of Ukrainian territory. With the military balance now shifted decisively in favor of Russia, Putin’s long-term objectives are firmly in view.

The ceasefire, brokered by Germany with support from other allies, has in effect allowed Russia to entangle the West in its goal of bringing about the abridgement of Ukraine’s sovereignty over its eastern provinces, implicitly underwriting Russia’s claim that Ukraine is fast shifting into its sphere of influence and control. The West has continued to deny Ukraine the military assistance it needs, and economic aid remains insufficient; whether consciously or unwittingly, it has become a co-participant in Putin’s game. By not branding Russia’s direct entry into Ukraine as an act of state-on-state aggression, choosing instead to frame the narrative as an “intrusion,” NATO seems to have implicitly acceded to that which it refuses to name. At the same time Ukraine’s President has been pushed to negotiate a deal with Vladimir Putin and sign an agreement with the very rebels who only a few weeks back were branded as terrorists. The ceasefire has put front and center the proposition that, as far as the largest European powers are concerned, the fate of Ukraine rests in Russia’s hands.

The West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has consistently lagged behind the pace of events. This lag has become the dominant narrative of the crisis; if it doesn’t change, and if there is no unequivocal assistance for Ukraine in coming weeks, the country’s army will not survive a protracted winter campaign in the east. The Obama administration promised a modest $70 million in mainly non-lethal aid to include radios, rations, concertina wire, first aid kids, and limited supplies of body armor but no arms. Much of the assistance, including urgently needed night-vision goggles has yet to be delivered. The U.S. program to train 700 Ukrainian national guardsmen will not start until 2015. Europeans are divided on military aid to Ukraine, a few in support but others determined to oppose it all out. NATO’s stated position is that it will not supply weapons to Ukraine as a non-ally, even though individual states may choose to do so. In short, without military assistance Ukraine may not be able to hold on to its present borders much longer; ultimately it may also be unable to preserve its independence.

There is no question that not all of the blame for Ukraine’s current predicament can be laid at the West’s doorsteps. Riven by corruption and in deepening economic decline after two decades of mostly wasted opportunities, Ukraine has earned a large share of the blame for the approaching destruction of its sovereignty. Still, the greed and sloth of the Ukrainian political class haven’t had nearly as great an impact as Russia’s years-long efforts to undercut the government in Kiev. Russian strategy prior to the war focused on making inroads into Ukraine’s defense infrastructure—for instance, the 2010 deal with Ukraine that extended Russia’s lease for the Sevastopol naval base through 2042 and expanded Russia’s influence on Ukraine’s defense industry. The strategy also leveraged Moscow’s energy weapon and Ukraine’s deteriorating financial picture to bring it into an even closer orbit. When the Maidan uprising nullified that approach, Russia shifted to new pressure points: ethnic minority communities, an undeclared “hybrid” war, and now a direct invasion of Ukraine by Russian regulars. Territorial gains served as the yardstick of Russia’s progress: Crimea, then Donetsk and Luhansk, and now a new southern area around Novoazovsk and Mariupol, with Odessa likely to be the next goal.

The current phase of Putin’s irredentist project in Eastern Europe will be built on the completion of a southern corridor linking Russia with the Crimean Peninsula, with the ultimate goal of occupying and incorporating Eastern Ukraine. The pattern is likely to be the same as in Crimea: promoting ethnic conflict and destabilization, followed by military intervention to sever the province and attach it to Russia. It is now a matter of weeks before a new state entity, another “Novorossiya” of some kind, will begin to emerge and claim control over the eastern parts of Ukraine. This will leave central Ukraine exposed to a further expansion of Russian influence. It will also generate a backlash against Poroshenko from Ukraine’s pro-Western population, which is dead set against any deal with Moscow, thereby further destabilizing the Kiev government. The Kremlin’s end game is either making Poroshenko accept vassal status or replacing him with a new pro-Russian leader. The sum of all these changes impacting eastern and central Ukraine will be a de facto partition of the country that will realign the country’s politics. Once it happens, the remaining rump Ukraine, though vociferously opposed to Russia, will be in no position to offer meaningful resistance to Moscow’s pressure and will become either a ward of the West or a “black hole” in Eastern Europe, in both security and economic terms.

Time is running out for Ukraine. Lest we forget, the country is trying to reform its government, elect a new parliament, stabilize the economy, and defend its territory all at the same time. The country’s biggest weakness today is that, notwithstanding its EU association agreement and frequent statements by Western politicians condemning Russian aggression, Ukraine is in this conflict alone; thus far none of its allies have been willing to take risks in its defense. Its military forces lack both the equipment and training necessary to resist much longer. Ukraine urgently needs the West to provide military aid, including anti-tank and anti-air weapons, night vision equipment, and intelligence support.

Across the board, the West’s responses so far have reflected a conviction that a military option cannot be exercised. Sanctions, efforts to promote dialogue, and public and private signals that the West stands ready to facilitate an exit compromise for Russia have thus far been the gist of the policy. In contrast, Russia is determined to achieve its goals through military means. The West has made it clear that it seeks to avoid confrontation with Russia at all costs; this has been underscored by our denial of meaningful military aid to Ukraine and only partial acquiescence to the requests by Poland and the Baltic states for permanent NATO installations on their territories. If current trends continue, by winter we will have reached a point of no return. Unless in short order it receives military equipment and training from the West, Ukraine will have all but lost the war on the ground. Although now some units are pulling back, Russian forces still have the initiative, which they can use at will to accelerate cleanup operations in the East and move on to the next strategic targets deeper in Ukraine, at a time and in a form of Vladimir Putin’s choosing.

The ending of Ukraine’s two-decade run as the largest sovereign state in Eastern Europe has implications for European and Transatlantic security that few have been willing to articulate.

At the end of the day, the geostrategic results for Europe will not be so different than they were after 1921, when the Soviet Union defeated and then absorbed the nascent Ukrainian state. A Ukraine that is dismembered and partially or wholly incorporated into the Russian Federation will set the stage for Russia’s reemergence as a threat to Europe of a degree unknown since the end of the Cold War.

When the history of this conflict is written, one lesson will be clear: Russia was determined from the beginning to subjugate Ukraine as a pathway to the restoration of its great power position, and the West simply lacked the interest, understanding, or commitment to block Putin’s irredentist project.

Andrew A. Michta is the M. W. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).