The return of the Eagle in West Asia

D. SUBA CHANDRAN

September 22, 2014

ReutersCOMPLEX: Closing down IS’s network requires significant international and regional cooperation, which poses another challenge. Picture shows a Kurdish fighter at a spot overlooking Baretle village on the edge of Mosul, and which is controlled by IS.

Bridging the trust deficit in West Asia is among the major challenges to the U.S. President’s new strategy against the Islamic State

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama outlined a new strategy to meet the challenge of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. In reality, the four-pronged approach would mean the return of the U.S. to the Middle East.

At the outset, it is a brave decision for which Mr. Obama deserves to be congratulated. Only a few weeks ago did he accept that the U.S. lacked a policy to deal with IS. Given the larger global implications and fallout of IS’ successes, it is imperative that there is coherent action taken to neutralise it. Will Mr. Obama succeed in his objective? There are at least five major challenges to the U.S. President’s new strategy.

Relying on air support

There is little doubt that this will be a long-drawn war. Though public opinion has turned around after the brutal killing of two journalists by IS, it may take yet another turn. Also, Mr. Obama, who is now being provided the necessary support of the U.S. Congress to arm the Syrian opposition to fight IS would need this to continue. But there is a larger debate taking place with the U.S. on the nature and extent of an American military presence.

There are already differences between Mr. Obama and his military on the use of ground forces in Iraq. Mr. Obama wants to rely only on “tightly controlled” air strikes whereas the military leadership would like to keep the option of engaging U.S. ground troops open. Military officials who have served under him have been quoted as saying in an Intelligence Committee of the House that “half-hearted or tentative efforts, or air strikes alone, can backfire on us and actually strengthen our foes.”

Second, Mr. Obama aims to weaken IS through “a systematic campaign of air strikes.” He has cautiously avoided deploying U.S. ground troops in Iraq, though he has also announced that American non-combat service members to “support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment” would be increased.

Given the geographic expanse, and the lack of presence of Iraqi troops, air strikes by the U.S. are crucial in fighting IS and would also disrupt supply routes from outside Iraq. But herein lies the primary challenge for Mr. Obama’s strategy of heavily relying on air support. In the Sunni dominated regions, where IS has marched on, the local population is equally apprehensive of the Iraqi Army. IS has become powerful, not primarily because of Iraq’s military weakness, but rather on account of the failure of the governance process and the lack of an inclusive government which provided the space for IS to grow stronger.

Will the air strikes alone reverse the trend? Mr. Obama has to ensure that the new Iraqi government is militarily stronger and politically inclusive. Adding more American advisers to help the Iraqi security forces alone will not change the trend. The same Iraqi forces which disintegrated during the course of this year were, in fact, trained by American advisers.

Support for the U.S.

Third, Mr. Obama is faced with the task of bringing the Middle East together. For the first time, the other states in the region which have been overtly or covertly supporting the IS are now realising what has become of it.

Saudi Arabia has already agreed to help the U.S. to train opposition forces to fight IS. However, though the regime in Saudi Arabia seems to realise the threat from IS, have its private donors who have been supporting the militants also had a change of heart?

And what about Turkey? A section within the U.S. criticises Turkey, calling it the Pakistan of the Middle East by claiming that the country says one thing but does the opposite. The inability of Turkey in not taking action against the use of routes for transfer of supplies has been a crucial factor in the growth of IS. Most of the arms and ammunition and the foreign fighters are believed to have travelled through Turkey. In the renewed fight against IS, will Turkey become a major partner, plugging the routes and sealing the borders? Also for Turkey, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a bigger problem than IS and it would be hesitant to strengthen the Kurds to fight IS. Given the regional Cold War and active interference within, Mr. Obama would find it difficult to get the region on board and on the same wavelength to fight IS.

Syria is the fourth challenge. Mr. Obama’s decision to expand the war against IS into Syria is fraught with dangers. Until recently, Mr. Obama was not keen on supporting the Free Syrian Army and other forces opposing both Mr. Assad and IS. In the three-pronged war within Syria (Mr. Assad, opposition forces and the IS), Mr. Obama, until recently, was not keen on supporting the opposition forces in Syria. Until June this year, he was convinced that the Syrian opposition is composed of doctors, pharmacists and farmers. Will Mr. Obama convert them into fighters, strong enough to fight the brutal IS?

IS has already evolved into one of the richest militant organisations in the world. According to reports, it smuggles oil for the areas it controls to provide to others through intermediaries in Syria and Turkey, and earns $2-million every day from its oil production alone. Clearly, closing down such a network means international and regional cooperation. This poses the fifth challenge.

Finally, Mr. Obama faces the challenge of bridging the trust deficit of the local population regarding the American approach. The U.S. may have succeeded in neutralising a militant group through its military might, but that does not mean the achievement of peace and stability. The general criticism the U.S. faces is that it leaves countries in tatters once the regime changes. The Iraqis and the Afghans would vouch for this fact. This would be the biggest challenge that Mr. Obama is likely to leave for the next President.

(D. Suba Chandran is director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.)