September 8, 2014
"Neither Israel nor Hamas have gained anything significant from the violence."
On August 26, after more than fifty days of fighting, the latest phase of the Israel-Hamas War ended with an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire. It will be months, if not years, before the ramifications of the 2014 war will become clear and fully apparent. At this early point, just over a week after the ceasefire was announced, any assessment of the violence must be considered tentative at best. The following are a number of early reflections on this recent explosion of Palestinian-Israeli violence:
First, as reflected in the ceasefire agreement, neither Israel, nor Hamas has gained anything significant from the violence. Hamas may have gained a modest expansion of fishing rights for Gazans and may gain some improvement in the ease of movement and access of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. Israel may eventually gain some tightening of the constraints on the smuggling of weapons and ammunition into the Strip. None of these constitute strategic gains.
Hamas did not gain any significant change in Gaza’s isolation—neither its demands for building a seaport, nor for the rebuilding of the airport were accepted. Similarly, there is little hope that Israel’s wish to see the Gaza Strip demilitarized will ever materialize. Talk of a grand bargain in the framework of which Hamas will agree to disarm in exchange for massive reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will most likely remain just that—talk.
A second prism leading to the conclusion that neither side has gained anything significant in the war is that the fighting ended not because one or both sides had achieved their objectives, but rather because at some point, Israeli and Hamas leaders concluded that there was no point to the war’s continuation. Namely, that more fighting with its associated costs were not likely to yield a different result. Given its limited resources and unlimited aims, Hamas could not coerce Israel into making significant concessions merely by increasing Israel’s pain and suffering incrementally through the further use of rocket fire. Its attempts to increase Israeli costs dramatically through a “game changer”—the imaginative use of “attack tunnels”—was defeated by a combination of Israeli technology and the agility of the IDF’s response teams.
Similarly, Israel was unlikely to coerce Hamas into submission by conquering additional neighborhoods in the outskirts of Gaza City. Yet it was reluctant to attempt to do this through a “game changer” of its own: a deep penetration of the heart of Gaza by ground forces in an attempt to destroy the command and control structure of Hamas’ military arm. This reluctance was fueled by four concerns: First, the expectation that such a strike would be associated with very high casualties on both sides; Second, unwillingness for Israel to find itself once again holding a population of 1.6 million Gaza Palestinians against its will; Third, huge uncertainty about an “exit strategy”—what would allow Israel to end its reoccupation and leave? And finally (and perhaps most importantly), fear that with Hamas destroyed, the IDF’s eventual withdrawal would leave Gaza completely chaotic and Jihadi groups far worse than Hamas would enjoy an ideal breeding ground.
The third insight is that no factor seems to have played a greater role in determining the parameters of the war than the dramatic changes witnessed in the broader Middle East in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. Most importantly, Hamas found itself completely alone in the fight. No Arab or non-Arab state and no significant nonstate actor came to its assistance and no significant expressions of mass sympathy with Hamas could be observed. Indeed, it is remarkable that the few pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe during the war were far larger than anything seen in the Middle East during the fighting.
Hamas’ isolation resulted from three factors: First, its decision in late 2011 to side with the rebels in Syria and to relocate its headquarters away from Damascus. At the very least, the decision alienated Syria’s Assad regime, Iran and Hezbollah who saw Hamas’ behavior as nothing short of betrayal. Second, the July 2013 counter-revolution in Egypt resulted in a new regime which regards the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat. As Cairo’s new leaders view Hamas as an arm of the Brotherhood, by implication it has also come to be regarded as a threat to Egypt’s national security. Third, the disintegration of some Arab states—notably Syria, Iraq and Libya—and the inward focus of all other Arab states produced an environment in which the fate of Hamas was not a priority for any important player in the Middle East.
Another important determinant of the war’s course and consequences was the dysfunctional domestic politics of both Hamas and Israel. In Hamas’ case, the geographic split between the leadership in Gaza and Khaled Mashaal’s residence in Qatar proved a serious obstacle to ceasing the fire. Backed by Qatari money, Mashaal took a hard line in the talks to end the fighting, in the hope of extracting what Israel would never yield. In the end, the decision to accept a ceasefire was taken by Hamas’ Gaza leadership, sidelining, if not altogether ignoring, the objections that Mashaal raised.
President Obama’s recent press conference sparked a firestorm of concern over the state of his strategy for dealing with ISIS. But ISIS isn’t the only Middle East challenge deserving some well-thought-out “strategery.” The administration also needs to craft a solid, sustainable plan for supporting the people of Jordan.
On the surface, the fate of Jordan may not appear to be of vital interest to the United States. But American strategists would be unwise to be indifferent to the country’s fate. Jordan is a “keystone.” It sits between nations whose futures are vitally important to protecting U.S. interests in the region.
Yes, the United States must deal effectively with today’s crises in the Middle East: the warfare and terrorism, the humanitarian challenges, the political instability and sectarian conflict. But the key to bringing long-term peace and prosperity to the region is to advance economic freedom in the region within the context of a constructive civil society.
Jordan has long struggled to be a regional leader in the march to sustainable development. It is in the U.S. interest to help the people of Jordan succeed and become a catalyst for progress in the region.
Long before the Syrian Civil War or ISIS became trending topics on Twitter, a 2008 study from the U.S. Army War College rightly pegged the role Jordan plays in regional geopolitics and its outsized importance for a small country of limited means.
To the administration’s credit, since the start of the Syrian Civil War, the United States has amped up engagement with Amman. Last year, Defense Secretary Hagel traveled to Jordan to visit two of its most influential military leaders: Lieutenant General Prince Faisal bin Al Hussein and General Mashal al-Zaben. The personal outreach was a smart move. So too was the secretary’s public statement, in which he reaffirmed the importance of the strategic relationship. Hagel also announced he was extending the U.S. military deployment to Jordan that was engaged in joint contingency planning.
Later that year, the administration announced the addition of almost $400 million in humanitarian assistance to an existing five-year aid program. On top of military and economic aid, the U.S. government has supported broader economic development and capacity building in areas likes managing public finance and facilitating trade. The United States has also signed sovereign loan guarantee agreements designed to support Jordan’s ongoing economic reforms. Further, the Obama administration is drafting a new five-year aid program to begin next year.
All this attention is well warranted. Even before the ISIS invasion of Iraq, the Syrian Civil War was laying a tremendous burden on Jordan. The country’s population has swollen to about 6.5 million, but only half of them are citizens. The other half are refugees. Most are Palestinian, but more than 600,000 refugees are Syrian. These individuals entered primarily via Jordan’s northernmost border, but have now dispersed to other parts of the country.
Not all of the stress comes from the north. Jordanians have close ties with the Palestinian people. The conflict in Gaza adds another wild card to volatile domestic attitudes towards events in the region.
Further, Jordan has an established wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the government allows to engage in some political activity. In August, the Brotherhood staged a massive rally in support of Hamas. Yet, while not repressing the group, the government seeks to keep it on a “short leash,” seeing the organization as a destabilizing factor if allowed to act unrestrained.
There is also no question that Jordan is well within the ISIS area of interest. The ultra-orthodox Salafists, an important faction of Jordanian Islamists, have openly debated whether it is appropriate to declare support for ISIS. Hundreds of Jordanian “foreign fighters” joined the ranks of extremist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. Wikistrat, an online consultancy that employs a crowd-sourced planning methodology, has outlined four credible scenarios that ISIS could use to threaten Jordan.
For months now, the Jordanian government has been signaling its concern over a direct threat from ISIS. In June, the government dispatched additional troops to the border on reports that rebels had seized Iraqi facilities at the crossing point of Treibel. In August, Jordanian security forces killed two extremists and captured five others attempting to infiltrate across the border, the latest of several incidents that have occurred in recent months. Amid these mounting security concerns, Jordan is struggling with its political- and economic-reform agenda. King Abdullah II is consolidating power. Several new amendments have been floated that, if adopted, would reverse the power-reducing measures implemented after the Arab Spring. The political-reform train appears to have stopped.
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